Thursday, January 7, 2010

Back to the Future.

 

by Noah Pollak

A year into the Obama administration, a pattern has been established for public diplomacy with Israel versus the Palestinians. For Israel, the administration airs an ongoing series of petty complaints, most of which relate to housing construction in Obama-disapproved neighborhoods of Jerusalem. Such construction is hurting the peace process, intones Robert Gibbs; it prevents the recommencement of negotiations and is inconsistent with the Road Map, he laments.

Even defensive IDF operations, such as the one last week that eliminated three Fatah murderers, are now reason for public finger-wagging from the administration and requests for "clarification." This was done on behalf of the Palestinian Authority. There indeed should have been a request for clarification, but it should have been directed at the PA, given the fact that the terrorists in question were on the payroll of the Palestinian Authority's ruling party, Fatah.

By contrast, the administration has been indifferent to Palestinian terrorism and its official celebration by the PA. I can't recall a single instance in which the president or a prominent member of his administration criticized the Palestinians for anything. Maybe it's because the PA has been doing such a commendable job when it comes to incitement and terrorism? Not quite.

In just the past week, official PA television has hailed the first female Palestinian suicide bomber; PA president Mahmoud Abbas personally honored Dalal Mughrabi, a legend of Palestinian terrorism who participated in the coastal-road massacre, the deadliest act of terrorism in Israel's history (37 innocents were murdered); and both Abbas and the supposedly moderate PA Prime Minister, Salaam Fayyad, celebrated the killers of Rabbi Meir Avshalom Hai, who was gunned down by members of Fatah while driving last week.

Meanwhile, Politico reported that a federal judge "complained that the Obama administration was 'particularly unhelpful' and the State Department 'mealy-mouthed' in refusing to provide official guidance" on a lawsuit that implicates the Palestinian Authority in the terror murder of an American citizen.

President Obama is repeating one of the worst mistakes of the Oslo period, when the official promotion of terrorism by the Palestinian Authority was studiously ignored on behalf of the larger "peace" mission. We know how successful that strategy was.

 

Noah Pollak

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

First, Do No Harm.

 

by Evelyn Gordon

After Israeli media reported yesterday that White House chief of staff Rahm Emanuel had threatened to curtail U.S. involvement in Israeli-Palestinian talks, the White House rushed to deny it. That’s a pity — because curtailing U.S. involvement would be far more helpful than what special envoy George Mitchell is actually doing.

Interviewed by PBS yesterday, Mitchell (as Jennifer noted) declared: “We think that the negotiation should last no more than two years … Personally I think it can be done in a shorter period of time.”

That, frankly, is ridiculous. In 16 years of talks, the parties have yet to resolve a single final-status issue. Just 15 months ago, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas rejected an Israeli offer of 94 percent of the West Bank, territorial exchanges for the remainder, and international Muslim control over the Temple Mount. Current Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will certainly offer no more, and probably not as much. So what does Mitchell think will happen in the next two years to suddenly make Abbas abandon positions he has stuck to for the last 16 — or else make Israel agree to suicide by, for instance, accepting Abbas’ demand that it absorb 4.7 million Palestinian “refugees”?

Nor need one be “anti-peace” to recognize this. Here’s the first sentence of a column published in the left-wing Israeli paper Haaretz yesterday by its leftist, pro-peace diplomatic correspondent, Aluf Benn: “Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman is right: During the next two years Israel will not reach a permanent status agreement with the Palestinians.”

While arguing that Israel must make concessions anyway to placate world opinion, Benn articulates an important truth: “The establishment of new states arouses multigenerational conflicts” that rarely end quickly. The India-Pakistan and Cyprus conflicts, which also date back to the British Empire’s mid-20th century breakup, are still unresolved, he notes, and the Israeli-Arab conflict is no less intractable.

But were Mitchell just spouting nonsense, nobody would care. The problem is that such nonsense does active harm by raising expectations that cannot be met — then provoking a backlash of disappointment.

First, Palestinians and other Arabs routinely interpret such statements by U.S. officials as pledges to make Israel kowtow to Palestinian demands. When that doesn’t happen, it increases anti-American sentiment, entrenches disbelief in the possibility of peace (thus strengthening extremists like Hamas), and can even spark renewed anti-Israel terror, as the Camp David summit in 2000 showed.

Second, it further entrenches Israeli skepticism about peace.

Third, it will almost certainly increase anti-Israel hysteria in Europe. Unlike Israelis and Palestinians, Europeans largely share Mitchell’s conviction that peace is imminently achievable. Hence every time it fails to materialize, they seek a scapegoat. And so far, that scapegoat has always been Israel: while demanding ever more Israeli concessions, the EU has yet to publicly demand any Palestinian concessions.

There are things America could do to further peace — like finally telling the Palestinians that they, too, must compromise. But doing nothing would be better than doing active harm. And that’s what Washington is doing now.

 

Evelyn Gordon

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

Wednesday, January 6, 2010

Is the US Constitution Worth Dying For?

 

by  Emmanuel Navon

 

A few weeks ago, a reader posted the following comment on my blog: "I perceive that young liberal U.S. Jews (i.e., the vast majority) are uncomfortable with the idea of a Jewish "nation" - just as they challenge the ethnic identification of nations generally. This is only natural for an American whose allegiance is to a legal document (the Constitution) and a flag, not a people. How do you make the argument to young Jews who are two generations removed from violent anti-Semitism, attracted to the "tikkun olam" worldview, and skeptical of nationalism generally, that Jews need a separate nation of their own that is worth killing and dying for? I think this is a serious issue that is already manifesting itself in the ever weakening support of Israel among under 40, non-orthodox U.S. Jews."

 

Most nations today define themselves ethnically. This is true of the Japanese, of the Germans, of the Russians, or of the Swedes. Indeed, it is because of ethnic differences that a civil war broke out in Yugoslavia in the late 1980s and that Czechoslovakia broke apart twenty years ago. And it is because of ethnic differences that the Québécois keep trying to break apart from Canada. Nationalism and national identity are a fact a life, whether you like it or not. Many academics have tried to de-construct and to de-legitimize nationalism and national identity, but it is a fact that most people identify with a nation, and that most nations define themselves ethnically.

 

I can understand that some people feel uncomfortable with the fact that many nations, indeed most nations, define themselves ethnically. But nations are entitled to define themselves however they want. And it is illiberal to be judgmental on how they define themselves. So people cannot on the one hand call themselves "liberal" and on the other hand denigrate the way other people wish to define their identity. Why is there such tolerance for gender and ethnic differences within American society, but at the same time such intolerance for ethnic differences within the international community?

 

It is true that American national identity is not ethnic. But the fact that Americans do not define themselves ethnically does not mean that other nations are not entitled to do so. The way America defines its national identity is the exception rather than the rule. And Israel happens to be part of that exception.

 

Israel, as a nation, does not define itself ethnically. Being Jewish does not mean being part of an ethnic group. Walk on the street in Israel, and you'll see for yourselves that there are Jews of all types of ethnic backgrounds: Black Jews from Ethiopia, fair-skinned Jews from Eastern Europe, dark-skinned Jews from Yemen, and red-head Jews.

 

Until the nineteenth century, with the emancipation of Jews in Europe and the emergence of modern nationalism, most if not all Jews defined themselves religiously. Being part of the Jewish nation and of the Jewish religion was the same thing. It meant being the descendants and inheritors of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, and of the children of Israel who left Egypt, received the Torah at Mount Sinai, built the Kingdom of Israel, and were dispersed by the Babylonians and by the Romans. In exile, being Jewish meant living according to the Torah and its commandments and always aspiring to return to the land of Israel.

 

Secular Zionism tried to redefine Jewish identity in purely ethnic terms by downplaying if not removing the religious content of Jewishness. But you can't write off three thousand years of Jewish history. I know this is going to shock you, but the opening sentence of Israel's Declaration of Independence fails the test of evidence and scrutiny. It says that "The Jewish people was born in the land of Israel." Really? That's certainly not the way the Bible records the birth of the Jewish people.

 

According to the Bible, the Jews became a people the moment they received the God-given constitution called the Ten-Commandments. The Bible does not describe the land of Israel as the source of Jewish identity, but as a means to build a society according to the principles of the Torah. Ethnic national movements see their land as the origin of their identities. The ancient Greeks regarded themselves as the original occupants of their land. The French talk about mère patrie (motherland) and the Germans about Vaterland (fatherland). But in the Bible, the land in neither mother or father. It is God-given and the Jews deserve it only if they honor their contract with God by keeping His commandments.

 

Ben-Gurion tried to depart from the traditional Jewish narrative by adopting an ethnic definition of Jewish identity. But this simply doesn't hold water, because the Jews do not constitute an ethnic group. Indeed, Israel's citizenship law contradicts Ben-Gurion's definition of national identity. If all you need to become Jewish and to enjoy the right of automatically becoming an Israeli citizen is to convert to Judaism, how exactly is Jewish nationality divorced from Judaism?

 

The fact that most Jews and most Israelis are not strictly observant doesn't mean that their identity is not, ultimately, rooted in the Bible. According to a recent survey, 98% of Israelis have a mezuzah on their front door; 85% participate in a Passover seder every year; and 71% always light Hanukkah candles.

 

In recent years, many Israelis, who received a strictly secular education, have been exploring their Jewish roots. Very often, they travel to the Far East after their military service and then realize that you don't have to fly to India to find spirituality. You can just take a bus to Jerusalem. I recently read the story of an Israeli student who had just returned from a trip with her school to America. When she was asked about her trip, she said she was angry at her parents and at her teachers. When asked why, she replied: "Because as a Jew who grew up in Israel, I shouldn't have to go to America to see havdalah for the first time in my life."

 

We are the People of the Book. The Nazis killed six million Jews not because of the color of our skin or because of some common genes. They killed us because of the ideas and ideals we stand for. They burned our books because they knew that our identity and purpose as a people are rooted in a book. And they didn't send Jews to gas chambers according to their level of religious observance. Our enemies realized what many Jews seem to forget: That whether or not we are observant, whether or not we are religious, our national DNA is the Book of Books.

 

This Book of Books is the bedrock of Western Civilization. It gave birth to three monotheistic religions and inspired the US Constitution. So if young American Jews can relate to the fact that the source of American nationality is a 200 year old Constitution, surely they can relate to the fact that the source of Jewish nationality is a 3,000 year old Constitution. Not only is our Constitution older; it is the original. America's is the copy. Young American Jews who feel that national allegiance can only be to a document are the ones who have to explain why it's OK when this allegiance is to the copy, but not when it's to the original.

 

 

Emmanuel Navon

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

The Suicidal Rules of Arab Political Debate: How Relatively Moderate Regimes are Robbed of Self-Defense.

 

by Barry Rubin

It’s always interesting to analyze those little stories that show so clearly the rules of Arab politics and debate, themes which never quite find their way into the Western media, which only see these issues in a Western political and intellectual framework. Yet if you want to understand Middle East politics it is imperative to comprehend such realities.

The example here is a statement by Egyptian Minister of Legal Affairs Mofid Shehab attacking al-Jazira television for, in his words, “instigating civil war” in Egypt. Al-Jazira has been complaining that Egypt is building a steel barrier along its border with the Gaza Strip to block Hamas from smuggling in weapons and other things.

Shehab complains:.

"A number of Arab satellite stations, and [al-Jazira] especially, have placed themselves as responsible for the sovereignty of our country, and as usual have poisoned the public against the state."

Here are some of the rules. The more militant a group is in fighting Israel or the West, the better. All Arab regimes are supposed to help these groups without reservation, even if it damages their infrastructure and drags it into an unwanted war (Lebanon in 2006; Jordan in the 1960s).

Egypt is building the barrier because it views Hamas as an enemy of the Egyptian regime and national interest in two respects. First, Cairo sees Hamas as an instrument of Iran and its bloc, a grab for regional power of Persian, Shias, and Islamists to the determinant of Arabs, Sunnis, and Arab nationalists.

Second, because Hamas is aligned with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood which wants to overthrow the regime. If Hamas succeeds in entrenching itself in the Gaza Strip, that will be an inspiration to the regime’s enemies at home, while the arms’ smuggling will also eventually provide more guns for terrorists within Egypt.

Consequently, the Egyptian government would like to see Hamas fall from power in the Gaza Strip and be replaced by a Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority regime. But given the constraints of Arab politics, it will not do too much to bring about that outcome. Similarly, the Egyptian government would be happy in theory if the Palestinians made peace with Israel, ended the conflict, and obtained a state. Again, though it won't do much toward that goal other than insisting the United States has to make it happen.

The above is basic and normal national interests’ stuff. Yet not one word of this—or at least very little--can be expressed by Egypt. After all, Hamas is fighting Israel and Western influence, so that has to be good. It is “Islamist,” piously Muslim, so that has to be good, too. Iran and Syria can speak and act freely; Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan cannot.

Shehab expresses his views in an interview with al-Ahram, a regime-controlled newspaper. Clearly, Hamas’s use of statist repression isn’t something repugnant in principle to the Egyptian government. And so Shehab switches the target from Hamas itself to foreign news media which is assumed to be the instrument of another state rather than merely reporting facts.

The goal of these television networks, explains Shehab, is, “To engender a civil war and inflame the Egyptian and Arab streets, and cause a clash of official authorities."

That is, calling attention to the wall is intended to stir up Egyptians against their own government. How come they’re restricting rather than helping Hamas in its battles? Since Shehab’s government cannot answer that question within the bounds of permitted discourse, it has to focus on the mere raising of the issue as the problem.

Shehab then raises another issue in his arsenal: al-Jazira and other Arab media attacked Israel during the Cast Lead operation in the Gaza Strip in early 2009. They now criticize Egypt. Therefore, according to this logic, they are comparing Egypt to Israel, which is unacceptable: "They have launched a war against the Egyptians just as they did during the barbaric attack on Gaza a year ago."

The mythology must be maintained that all Arabs are always on the same side and that all Muslims are always on the same side. The good guys are good guys who cannot be criticized; the bad guys are always bad guys who must always be criticized. Indeed, Shehab then turns to the ultimate weapon, the atomic bomb of propaganda: attacking Israel and America:

"Why didn't Al-Jazeera have a single word of condemnation to say about the weapons, missiles, and smart bombs that were sent from Al Udeid Base [in Qatar]to Israel in order to bomb the residents of Gaza?"

This is quite a startling lie for a cabinet minister of a “moderate” government “aligned” with the United States and receiving massive amounts of American aid. Shehab, obviously with permission from the highest levels of the Egyptian government is trying to “inflame the Egyptian and Arab streets, and cause a clash" of the Arab masses with the United States.

And of course it is untrue, a lie that could lead to terrorist murders of Americans. There was no U.S. equipment shipped to Israel especially in order to be dropped on the Gaza Strip, especially not from Qatar (which is singled out here because it is the master of al-Jazira). In other words, the proper response for any criticism by Arabs or Muslims is: Oh yeah! Well, you’re a murdering Zionist agent and a lackey of American imperialism!

This is, one must remind oneself, the end of the twenty-first century’s first decade while in the Middle East it is just like being in the 1960s. And the early 1960s at that.

Indeed, Shehab continues, this specific report is a Zionist operation to discredit Egypt:

"This civil war network is first and foremost an Israeli tool. It transferred reports on the Egyptian construction on the border from the news agencies in Israel and has begun to weave its usual plot."

Of course, Israel is happy that Egypt is building this wall. Precisely at the moment when Egyptian and Israeli interests align, the Egyptian government has to step up its verbal attacks on Israel.

The minister does note indirectly that the barrier is being built to avoid a repeat of the time in January 2008 when many Gazans broke through the border defenses as Hamas gunmen shot at Egyptian soldiers. "I ask all Egyptians, and all those who support their homeland, are you willing to accept the violation of your country's sovereignty?"

Shehab thus indulges in a bit of Egyptian patriotism, which is permissible though usually only as a secondary factor which doesn’t enjoy the same level of legitimacy of the other arguments. In short, a more moderate state, at least, is not quite able to pursue its own interests.

They can go against the current when necessary but always at a cost. Egypt made peace with Israel, for example, but faced years of boycott, President Anwar al-Sadat was assassinated, and the peace cannot be a warm one. Saudi Arabia can seek Western help in the fact of Iraq’s seizure of Kuwait but the cost is the rise of Usama bin Ladin and years of terrorism.

Already criticisms and demonstrations are starting against the Egyptian wall in various countries. The claim is that the structure is unacceptable because it “helps” Israel. The fact that it also helps Egypt as much or more is not considered to be relevant.

Thus, one sees in this little item, as in hundreds more, how crippled the Arabic-speaking world is by its own form of Political Correctness. Such a doctrine is incompatible with democracy at home, full peace with Israel or a real alliance with the West. The question for the future is whether it is compatible with the survival of the Arab regimes themselves in the face of a challenge from Iran and revolutionary Islamists.

 

 

Barry Rubin
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

How Taqiyya Alters Islam's Rules of War. Part I

 

by Raymond Ibrahim

1st part of 2

Islam must seem a paradoxical religion to non-Muslims. On the one hand, it is constantly being portrayed as the religion of peace; on the other, its adherents are responsible for the majority of terror attacks around the world. Apologists for Islam emphasize that it is a faith built upon high ethical standards; others stress that it is a religion of the law. Islam's dual notions of truth and falsehood further reveal its paradoxical nature: While the Qur'an is against believers deceiving other believers—for "surely God guides not him who is prodigal and a liar"[1]—deception directed at non-Muslims, generally known in Arabic as taqiyya, also has Qur'anic support and falls within the legal category of things that are permissible for Muslims.

Taqiyya offers two basic uses. The better known revolves around dissembling over one's religious identity when in fear of persecution. Such has been the historical usage of taqiyya among Shi'i communities whenever and wherever their Sunni rivals have outnumbered and thus threatened them. Conversely, Sunni Muslims, far from suffering persecution have, whenever capability allowed, waged jihad against the realm of unbelief; and it is here that they have deployed taqiyya—not as dissimulation but as active deceit. In fact, deceit, which is doctrinally grounded in Islam, is often depicted as being equal—sometimes superior—to other universal military virtues, such as courage, fortitude, or self-sacrifice.

Yet if Muslims are exhorted to be truthful, how can deceit not only be prevalent but have divine sanction? What exactly is taqiyya? How is it justified by scholars and those who make use of it? How does it fit into a broader conception of Islam's code of ethics, especially in relation to the non-Muslim? More to the point, what ramifications does the doctrine of taqiyya have for all interaction between Muslims and non-Muslims?

 

The Doctrine of Taqiyya

According to Shari'a—the body of legal rulings that defines how a Muslim should behave in all circumstances—deception is not only permitted in certain situations but may be deemed obligatory in others. Contrary to early Christian tradition, for instance, Muslims who were forced to choose between recanting Islam or suffering persecution were permitted to lie and feign apostasy. Other jurists have decreed that Muslims are obligated to lie in order to preserve themselves,[2] based on Qur'anic verses forbidding Muslims from being instrumental in their own deaths.[3]

This is the classic definition of the doctrine of taqiyya. Based on an Arabic word denoting fear, taqiyya has long been understood, especially by Western academics, as something to resort to in times of religious persecution and, for the most part, used in this sense by minority Shi'i groups living among hostile Sunni majorities.[4] Taqiyya allowed the Shi'a to dissemble their religious affiliation in front of the Sunnis on a regular basis, not merely by keeping clandestine about their own beliefs but by actively praying and behaving as if they were Sunnis.

However, one of the few books devoted to the subject, At-Taqiyya fi'l-Islam (Dissimulation in Islam) makes it clear that taqiyya is not limited to Shi'a dissimulating in fear of persecution. Written by Sami Mukaram, a former Islamic studies professor at the American University of Beirut and author of some twenty-five books on Islam, the book clearly demonstrates the ubiquity and broad applicability of taqiyya:

Taqiyya is of fundamental importance in Islam. Practically every Islamic sect agrees to it and practices it … We can go so far as to say that the practice of taqiyya is mainstream in Islam, and that those few sects not practicing it diverge from the mainstream … Taqiyya is very prevalent in Islamic politics, especially in the modern era.[5]

Taqiyya is, therefore, not, as is often supposed, an exclusively Shi'i phenomenon. Of course, as a minority group interspersed among their Sunni enemies, the Shi'a have historically had more reason to dissemble. Conversely, Sunni Islam rapidly dominated vast empires from Spain to China. As a result, its followers were beholden to no one, had nothing to apologize for, and had no need to hide from the infidel nonbeliever (rare exceptions include Spain and Portugal during the Reconquista when Sunnis did dissimulate over their religious identity[6]). Ironically, however, Sunnis living in the West today find themselves in the place of the Shi'a: Now they are the minority surrounded by their traditional enemies—Christian infidels—even if the latter, as opposed to their Reconquista predecessors, rarely act on, let alone acknowledge, this historic enmity. In short, Sunnis are currently experiencing the general circumstances that made taqiyya integral to Shi'ism although without the physical threat that had so necessitated it.

 

The Articulation of Taqiyya

Qur'anic verse 3:28 is often seen as the primary verse that sanctions deception towards non-Muslims: "Let believers [Muslims] not take infidels [non-Muslims] for friends and allies instead of believers. Whoever does this shall have no relationship left with God—unless you but guard yourselves against them, taking precautions."[7]

Muhammad ibn Jarir at-Tabari (d. 923), author of a standard and authoritative Qur'an commentary, explains verse 3:28 as follows:

If you [Muslims] are under their [non-Muslims'] authority, fearing for yourselves, behave loyally to them with your tongue while harboring inner animosity for them … [know that] God has forbidden believers from being friendly or on intimate terms with the infidels rather than other believers—except when infidels are above them [in authority]. Should that be the case, let them act friendly towards them while preserving their religion.[8]

Regarding Qur'an 3:28, Ibn Kathir (d. 1373), another prime authority on the Qur'an, writes, "Whoever at any time or place fears … evil [from non-Muslims] may protect himself through outward show." As proof of this, he quotes Muhammad's close companion Abu Darda, who said, "Let us grin in the face of some people while our hearts curse them." Another companion, simply known as Al-Hasan, said, "Doing taqiyya is acceptable till the Day of Judgment [i.e., in perpetuity]."[9]

Other prominent scholars, such as Abu 'Abdullah al-Qurtubi (1214-73) and Muhyi 'd-Din ibn al-Arabi (1165-1240), have extended taqiyya to cover deeds. In other words, Muslims can behave like infidels and worse—for example, by bowing down and worshiping idols and crosses, offering false testimony, and even exposing the weaknesses of their fellow Muslims to the infidel enemy—anything short of actually killing a Muslim: "Taqiyya, even if committed without duress, does not lead to a state of infidelity—even if it leads to sin deserving of hellfire."[10]

 

Deceit in Muhammad's Military Exploits

Muhammad—whose example as the "most perfect human" is to be followed in every detail—took an expedient view on lying. It is well known, for instance, that he permitted lying in three situations: to reconcile two or more quarreling parties, to placate one's wife, and in war.[11] According to one Arabic legal manual devoted to jihad as defined by the four schools of law, "The ulema agree that deception during warfare is legitimate … deception is a form of art in war."[12] Moreover, according to Mukaram, this deception is classified as taqiyya: "Taqiyya in order to dupe the enemy is permissible."[13]

Several ulema believe deceit is integral to the waging of war: Ibn al-'Arabi declares that "in the Hadith [sayings and actions of Muhammad], practicing deceit in war is well demonstrated. Indeed, its need is more stressed than the need for courage." Ibn al-Munir (d. 1333) writes, "War is deceit, i.e., the most complete and perfect war waged by a holy warrior is a war of deception, not confrontation, due to the latter's inherent danger, and the fact that one can attain victory through treachery without harm [to oneself]." And Ibn Hajar (d. 1448) counsels Muslims "to take great caution in war, while [publicly] lamenting and mourning in order to dupe the infidels."[14]

This Muslim notion that war is deceit goes back to the Battle of the Trench (627), which pitted Muhammad and his followers against several non-Muslim tribes known as Al-Ahzab. One of the Ahzab, Na'im ibn Mas'ud, went to the Muslim camp and converted to Islam. When Muhammad discovered that the Ahzab were unaware of their co-tribalist's conversion, he counseled Mas'ud to return and try to get the pagan forces to abandon the siege. It was then that Muhammad memorably declared, "For war is deceit." Mas'ud returned to the Ahzab without their knowing that he had switched sides and intentionally began to give his former kin and allies bad advice. He also went to great lengths to instigate quarrels between the various tribes until, thoroughly distrusting each other, they disbanded, lifted the siege from the Muslims, and saved Islam from destruction in an embryonic period.[15] Most recently, 9/11 accomplices, such as Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, rationalized their conspiratorial role in their defendant response by evoking their prophet's assertion that "war is deceit."

A more compelling expression of the legitimacy of deceiving infidels is the following anecdote. A poet, Ka'b ibn Ashraf, offended Muhammad, prompting the latter to exclaim, "Who will kill this man who has hurt God and his prophet?" A young Muslim named Muhammad ibn Maslama volunteered on condition that in order to get close enough to Ka'b to assassinate him, he be allowed to lie to the poet. Muhammad agreed. Ibn Maslama traveled to Ka'b and began to denigrate Islam and Muhammad. He carried on in this way till his disaffection became so convincing that Ka'b took him into his confidence. Soon thereafter, Ibn Maslama appeared with another Muslim and, while Ka'b's guard was down, killed him.[16]

Muhammad said other things that cast deception in a positive light, such as "God has commanded me to equivocate among the people just as he has commanded me to establish [religious] obligations"; and "I have been sent with obfuscation"; and "whoever lives his life in dissimulation dies a martyr."[17]

In short, the earliest historical records of Islam clearly attest to the prevalence of taqiyya as a form of Islamic warfare. Furthermore, early Muslims are often depicted as lying their way out of binds—usually by denying or insulting Islam or Muhammad—often to the approval of the latter, his only criterion being that their intentions (niya) be pure.[18] During wars with Christians, whenever the latter were in authority, the practice of taqiyya became even more integral. Mukaram states, "Taqiyya was used as a way to fend off danger from the Muslims, especially in critical times and when their borders were exposed to wars with the Byzantines and, afterwards, to the raids [crusades] of the Franks and others."[19]

 

Taqiyya in Qur'anic Revelation

The Qur'an itself is further testimony to taqiyya. Since God is believed to be the revealer of these verses, he is by default seen as the ultimate perpetrator of deceit—which is not surprising since he is described in the Qur'an as the best makar, that is, the best deceiver or schemer (e.g., 3:54, 8:30, 10:21).

While other scriptures contain contradictions, the Qur'an is the only holy book whose commentators have evolved a doctrine to account for the very visible shifts which occur from one injunction to another. No careful reader will remain unaware of the many contradictory verses in the Qur'an, most specifically the way in which peaceful and tolerant verses lie almost side by side with violent and intolerant ones. The ulema were initially baffled as to which verses to codify into the Shari'a worldview—the one that states there is no coercion in religion (2:256), or the ones that command believers to fight all non-Muslims till they either convert, or at least submit, to Islam (8:39, 9:5, 9:29). To get out of this quandary, the commentators developed the doctrine of abrogation, which essentially maintains that verses revealed later in Muhammad's career take precedence over earlier ones whenever there is a discrepancy. In order to document which verses abrogated which, a religious science devoted to the chronology of the Qur'an's verses evolved (known as an-Nasikh wa'l Mansukh, the abrogater and the abrogated).

But why the contradiction in the first place? The standard view is that in the early years of Islam, since Muhammad and his community were far outnumbered by their infidel competitors while living next to them in Mecca, a message of peace and coexistence was in order. However, after the Muslims migrated to Medina in 622 and grew in military strength, verses inciting them to go on the offensive were slowly "revealed"—in principle, sent down from God—always commensurate with Islam's growing capabilities. In juridical texts, these are categorized in stages: passivity vis-á-vis aggression; permission to fight back against aggressors; commands to fight aggressors; commands to fight all non-Muslims, whether the latter begin aggressions or not.[20] Growing Muslim might is the only variable that explains this progressive change in policy.

Other scholars put a gloss on this by arguing that over a twenty-two year period, the Qur'an was revealed piecemeal, from passive and spiritual verses to legal prescriptions and injunctions to spread the faith through jihad and conquest, simply to acclimate early Muslim converts to the duties of Islam, lest they be discouraged at the outset by the dramatic obligations that would appear in later verses.[21] Verses revealed towards the end of Muhammad's career—such as, "Warfare is prescribed for you though you hate it"[22]—would have been out of place when warfare was actually out of the question.

However interpreted, the standard view on Qur'anic abrogation concerning war and peace verses is that when Muslims are weak and in a minority position, they should preach and behave according to the ethos of the Meccan verses (peace and tolerance); when strong, however, they should go on the offensive on the basis of what is commanded in the Medinan verses (war and conquest). The vicissitudes of Islamic history are a testimony to this dichotomy, best captured by the popular Muslim notion, based on a hadith, that, if possible, jihad should be performed by the hand (force), if not, then by the tongue (through preaching); and, if that is not possible, then with the heart or one's intentions.[23]

 

War Is Eternal

That Islam legitimizes deceit during war is, of course, not all that astonishing; after all, as the Elizabethan writer John Lyly put it, "All's fair in love and war."[24] Other non-Muslim philosophers and strategists—such as Sun Tzu, Machiavelli, and Thomas Hobbes—justified deceit in warfare. Deception of the enemy during war is only common sense. The crucial difference in Islam, however, is that war against the infidel is a perpetual affair—until, in the words of the Qur'an, "all chaos ceases, and all religion belongs to God."[25] In his entry on jihad from the Encyclopaedia of Islam, Emile Tyan states: "The duty of the jihad exists as long as the universal domination of Islam has not been attained. Peace with non-Muslim nations is, therefore, a provisional state of affairs only; the chance of circumstances alone can justify it temporarily."[26]

Moreover, going back to the doctrine of abrogation, Muslim scholars such as Ibn Salama (d. 1020) agree that Qur'an 9:5, known as ayat as-sayf or the sword verse, has abrogated some 124 of the more peaceful Meccan verses, including "every other verse in the Qur'an, which commands or implies anything less than a total offensive against the nonbelievers."[27] In fact, all four schools of Sunni jurisprudence agree that "jihad is when Muslims wage war on infidels, after having called on them to embrace Islam or at least pay tribute [jizya] and live in submission, and the infidels refuse."[28]

Obligatory jihad is best expressed by Islam's dichotomized worldview that pits the realm of Islam against the realm of war. The first, dar al-Islam, is the "realm of submission," the world where Shari'a governs; the second, dar al-Harb (the realm of war), is the non-Islamic world. A struggle continues until the realm of Islam subsumes the non-Islamic world—a perpetual affair that continues to the present day. The renowned Muslim historian and philosopher Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406) clearly articulates this division:

In the Muslim community, jihad is a religious duty because of the universalism of the Muslim mission and the obligation to convert everybody to Islam either by persuasion or by force. The other religious groups did not have a universal mission, and the jihad was not a religious duty for them, save only for purposes of defense. But Islam is under obligation to gain power over other nations.[29]

Finally and all evidence aside, lest it still appear unreasonable for a faith with over one billion adherents to obligate unprovoked warfare in its name, it is worth noting that the expansionist jihad is seen as an altruistic endeavor, not unlike the nineteenth century ideology of "the white man's burden." The logic is that the world, whether under democracy, socialism, communism, or any other system of governance, is inevitably living in bondage—a great sin, since the good of all humanity is found in living in accordance to God's law. In this context, Muslim deception can be viewed as a slightly less than noble means to a glorious end—Islamic hegemony under Shari'a rule, which is seen as good for both Muslims and non-Muslims.

This view has an ancient pedigree: Soon after the death of Muhammad (634), as the jihad fighters burst out of the Arabian peninsula, a soon-to-be conquered Persian commander asked the invading Muslims what they wanted. They memorably replied as follows:

God has sent us and brought us here so that we may free those who desire from servitude to earthly rulers and make them servants of God, that we may change their poverty into wealth and free them from the tyranny and chaos of [false] religions and bring them to the justice of Islam. He has sent us to bring his religion to all his creatures and call them to Islam. Whoever accepts it from us will be safe, and we shall leave him alone; but whoever refuses, we shall fight until we fulfill the promise of God.[30]

Fourteen hundred years later— in March 2009—Saudi legal expert Basem Alem publicly echoed this view:

As a member of the true religion, I have a greater right to invade [others] in order to impose a certain way of life [according to Shari'a], which history has proven to be the best and most just of all civilizations. This is the true meaning of offensive jihad. When we wage jihad, it is not in order to convert people to Islam, but in order to liberate them from the dark slavery in which they live.[31]

And it should go without saying that taqiyya in the service of altruism is permissible. For example, only recently, after publicly recounting a story where a Muslim tricked a Jew into converting to Islam—warning him that if he tried to abandon Islam, Muslims would kill him as an apostate—Muslim cleric Mahmoud al-Masri called it a "beautiful trick."[32] After all, from an Islamic point of view, it was the Jew who, in the end, benefitted from the deception, which brought him to Islam.

 

Raymond Ibrahim
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

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How Taqiyya Alters Islam's Rules of War. Part II

 

by Raymond Ibrahim

2nd part of 2

Treaties and Truces

The perpetual nature of jihad is highlighted by the fact that, based on the 10-year treaty of Hudaybiya (628), ratified between Muhammad and his Quraysh opponents in Mecca, most jurists are agreed that ten years is the maximum amount of time Muslims can be at peace with infidels; once the treaty has expired, the situation needs to be reappraised. Based on Muhammad's example of breaking the treaty after two years (by claiming a Quraysh infraction), the sole function of the truce is to buy weakened Muslims time to regroup before renewing the offensive:[33] "By their very nature, treaties must be of temporary duration, for in Muslim legal theory, the normal relations between Muslim and non-Muslim territories are not peaceful, but warlike."[34] Hence "the fuqaha [jurists] are agreed that open-ended truces are illegitimate if Muslims have the strength to renew the war against them [non-Muslims]."[35]

Even though Shari'a mandates Muslims to abide by treaties, they have a way out, one open to abuse: If Muslims believe—even without solid evidence—that their opponents are about to break the treaty, they can preempt by breaking it first. Moreover, some Islamic schools of law, such as the Hanafi, assert that Muslim leaders may abrogate treaties merely if it seems advantageous for Islam.[36] This is reminiscent of the following canonical hadith: "If you ever take an oath to do something and later on you find that something else is better, then you should expiate your oath and do what is better."[37] And what is better, what is more altruistic, than to make God's word supreme by launching the jihad anew whenever possible? Traditionally, Muslim rulers held to a commitment to launch a jihad at least once every year. This ritual is most noted with the Ottoman sultans, who spent half their lives in the field.[38] So important was the duty of jihad that the sultans were not permitted to perform the pilgrimage to Mecca, an individual duty for each Muslim. Their leadership of the jihad allowed this communal duty to continue; without them, it would have fallen into desuetude.[39]

In short, the prerequisite for peace or reconciliation is Muslim advantage. This is made clear in an authoritative Sunni legal text, Umdat as-Salik, written by a fourteenth-century Egyptian scholar, Ahmad Ibn Naqib al-Misri: "There must be some benefit [maslaha] served in making a truce other than the status quo: 'So do not be fainthearted and call for peace when it is you who are uppermost [Qur'an 47:35].'"[40]

More recently, and of great significance for Western leaders advocating cooperation with Islamists, Yasser Arafat, soon after negotiating a peace treaty criticized as conceding too much to Israel, addressed an assembly of Muslims in a mosque in Johannesburg where he justified his actions: "I see this agreement as being no more than the agreement signed between our Prophet Muhammad and the Quraysh in Mecca."[41] In other words, like Muhammad, Arafat gave his word only to annul it once "something better" came along—that is, once the Palestinians became strong enough to renew the offensive and continue on the road to Jerusalem. Elsewhere, Hudaybiya has appeared as a keyword for radical Islamists. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front had three training camps within the Camp Abu Bakar complex in the Philippines, one of which was named Camp Hudaybiya.[42]

 

Hostility Disguised As Grievance

In their statements directed at European or American audiences, Islamists maintain that the terrorism they direct against the West is merely reciprocal treatment for decades of Western and Israeli oppression. Yet in writings directed to their fellow Muslims, this animus is presented, not as a reaction to military or political provocation but as a product of religious obligation.

For instance, when addressing Western audiences, Osama bin Laden lists any number of grievances as motivating his war on the West—from the oppression of the Palestinians to the Western exploitation of women, and even U.S. failure to sign the environmental Kyoto protocol—all things intelligible from a Western perspective. Never once, however, does he justify Al-Qaeda's attacks on Western targets simply because non-Muslim countries are infidel entities that must be subjugated. Indeed, he often initiates his messages to the West by saying, "Reciprocal treatment is part of justice" or "Peace to whoever follows guidance"[43]—though he means something entirely different than what his Western listeners understand by words such as "peace," "justice," or "guidance."

It is when bin Laden speaks to fellow Muslims that the truth comes out. When a group of prominent Muslims wrote an open letter to the American people soon after the strikes of 9/11, saying that Islam seeks to peacefully coexist,[44] bin Laden wrote to castigate them:

As to the relationship between Muslims and infidels, this is summarized by the Most High's Word: "We [Muslims] renounce you [non-Muslims]. Enmity and hate shall forever reign between us—till you believe in God alone" [Qur'an 60:4]. So there is an enmity, evidenced by fierce hostility from the heart. And this fierce hostility—that is, battle—ceases only if the infidel submits to the authority of Islam, or if his blood is forbidden from being shed [i.e., a dhimmi, or protected minority], or if Muslims are at that point in time weak and incapable. But if the hate at any time extinguishes from the heart, this is great apostasy! ... Such then is the basis and foundation of the relationship between the infidel and the Muslim. Battle, animosity, and hatred—directed from the Muslim to the infidel—is the foundation of our religion. And we consider this a justice and kindness to them.[45]

Mainstream Islam's four schools of jurisprudence lend their support to this hostile Weltanschauung by speaking of the infidel in similar terms. Bin Laden's addresses to the West with his talk of justice and peace are clear instances of taqiyya. He is not only waging a physical jihad but a propaganda war, that is, a war of deceit. If he can convince the West that the current conflict is entirely its fault, he garners greater sympathy for his cause. At the same time, he knows that if Americans were to realize that nothing short of their submission can ever bring peace, his propaganda campaign would be quickly compromised. Hence the constant need to dissemble and to cite grievances, for, as bin Laden's prophet asserted, "War is deceit."

 

Implications

Taqiyya presents a range of ethical dilemmas. Anyone who truly believes that God justifies and, through his prophet's example, even encourages deception will not experience any ethical qualms over lying. Consider the case of 'Ali Mohammad, bin Laden's first "trainer" and long-time Al-Qaeda operative. An Egyptian, he was initially a member of Islamic Jihad and had served in the Egyptian army's military intelligence unit. After 1984, he worked for a time with the CIA in Germany. Though considered untrustworthy, he managed to get to California where he enlisted in the U.S. Army. It seems likely that he continued to work in some capacity for the CIA. He later trained jihadists in the United States and Afghanistan and was behind several terror attacks in Africa. People who knew him regarded him with "fear and awe for his incredible self-confidence, his inability to be intimidated, absolute ruthless determination to destroy the enemies of Islam, and his zealous belief in the tenets of militant Islamic fundamentalism."[46] Indeed, this sentence sums it all up: For a zealous belief in Islam's tenets, which legitimize deception in order to make God's word supreme, will certainly go a long way in creating "incredible self-confidence" when lying.[47]

Yet most Westerners continue to think that Muslim mores, laws, and ethical constraints are near identical to those of the Judeo-Christian tradition. Naively or arrogantly, today's multiculturalist leaders project their own worldview onto Islamists, thinking a handshake and smiles across a cup of coffee, as well as numerous concessions, are enough to dismantle the power of God's word and centuries of unchanging tradition. The fact remains: Right and wrong in Islam have little to do with universal standards but only with what Islam itself teaches—much of which is antithetical to Western norms.

It must, therefore, be accepted that, contrary to long-held academic assumptions, the doctrine of taqiyya goes far beyond Muslims engaging in religious dissimulation in the interest of self-preservation and encompasses deception of the infidel enemy in general. This phenomenon should provide a context for Shi'i Iran's zeal—taqiyya being especially second nature to Shi'ism—to acquire nuclear power while insisting that its motives are entirely peaceful.

Nor is taqiyya confined to overseas affairs. Walid Phares of the National Defense University has lamented that homegrown Islamists are operating unfettered on American soil due to their use of taqiyya: "Does our government know what this doctrine is all about and, more importantly, are authorities educating the body of our defense apparatus regarding this stealthy threat dormant among us?"[48] After the Fort Hood massacre, when Nidal Malik Hasan, an American-Muslim who exhibited numerous Islamist signs which were ignored, killed thirteen fellow servicemen and women, one is compelled to respond in the negative.

This, then, is the dilemma: Islamic law unambiguously splits the world into two perpetually warring halves—the Islamic world versus the non-Islamic—and holds it to be God's will for the former to subsume the latter. Yet if war with the infidel is a perpetual affair, if war is deceit, and if deeds are justified by intentions—any number of Muslims will naturally conclude that they have a divinely sanctioned right to deceive, so long as they believe their deception serves to aid Islam "until all chaos ceases, and all religion belongs to God."[49] Such deception will further be seen as a means to an altruistic end. Muslim overtures for peace, dialogue, or even temporary truces must be seen in this light, evoking the practical observations of philosopher James Lorimer, uttered over a century ago: "So long as Islam endures, the reconciliation of its adherents, even with Jews and Christians, and still more with the rest of mankind, must continue to be an insoluble problem."[50]

In closing, whereas it may be more appropriate to talk of "war and peace" as natural corollaries in a Western context, when discussing Islam, it is more accurate to talk of "war and deceit." For, from an Islamic point of view, times of peace—that is, whenever Islam is significantly weaker than its infidel rivals—are times of feigned peace and pretense, in a word, taqiyya.

 

Raymond Ibrahim is associate director of the Middle East Forum.

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

[1] Qur'an 40:28.
[2] Fakhr ad-Din ar-Razi, At-Tafsir al-Kabir (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiya, 2000), vol. 10, p. 98.
[3] Qur'an 2:195, 4:29.
[4] Paul E. Walker, The Oxford Encyclopedia of Islam in the Modern World, John Esposito, ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), vol. 4, s.v. "Taqiyah," pp. 186-7; Ibn Babuyah, A Shi'ite Creed, A. A. A. Fyzee, trans. (London: n.p., 1942), pp. 110-2; Etan Kohlberg, "Some Imami-Shi'i Views on Taqiyya," Journal of the American Oriental Society, 95 (1975): 395-402.
[5] Sami Mukaram, At-Taqiyya fi 'l-Islam (London: Mu'assisat at-Turath ad-Druzi, 2004), p. 7, author's translation.
[6] Devin Stewart, "Islam in Spain after the Reconquista," Emory University, p. 2, accessed Nov. 27, 2009.
[7] See also Quran 2:173, 2:185, 4:29, 16:106, 22:78, 40:28, verses cited by Muslim jurisprudents as legitimating taqiyya.
[8] Abu Ja'far Muhammad at-Tabari, Jami' al-Bayan 'an ta'wil ayi'l-Qur'an al-Ma'ruf: Tafsir at-Tabari (Beirut: Dar Ihya' at-Turath al-'Arabi, 2001), vol. 3, p. 267, author's translation.
[9] 'Imad ad-Din Isma'il Ibn Kathir, Tafsir al-Qur'an al-Karim (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiya, 2001), vol. 1, p. 350, author's translation.
[10] Mukaram, At-Taqiyya fi 'l-Islam, pp. 30-7.
[11] Imam Muslim, "Kitab al-Birr wa's-Salat, Bab Tahrim al-Kidhb wa Bayan al-Mubih Minhu," Sahih Muslim, rev. ed., Abdul Hamid Siddiqi, trans. (New Delhi: Kitab Bhavan, 2000).
[12] Ahmad Mahmud Karima, Al-Jihad fi'l Islam: Dirasa Fiqhiya Muqarina (Cairo: Al-Azhar, 2003), p. 304, author's translation.
[13] Mukaram, At-Taqiyya fi 'l-Islam, p. 32.
[14] Raymond Ibrahim, The Al Qaeda Reader (New York: Doubleday, 2007), pp. 142-3.
[15] Mukaram, At-Taqiyya fi 'l-Islam, pp. 32-3.
[16] Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 367-8.
[17] Shihab ad-Din Muhammad al-Alusi al-Baghdadi, Ruh al-Ma'ani fi Tafsir al-Qur'an al-'Azim wa' l-Saba' al-Mithani (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiya, 2001), vol. 2, p. 118, author's translation.
[18] Mukaram, At-Taqiyya fi 'l-Islam, pp. 11-2.
[19] Ibid., pp. 41-2.
[20] Ibn Qayyim, Tafsir, in Abd al-'Aziz bin Nasir al-Jalil, At-Tarbiya al-Jihadiya fi Daw' al-Kitab wa 's-Sunna (Riyahd: n.p., 2003), pp. 36-43.
[21] Mukaram, At-Taqiyya fi 'l-Islam, p. 20.
[22] Qur'an 2: 216.
[23] Yahya bin Sharaf ad-Din an-Nawawi, An-Nawawi's Forty Hadiths, p. 16, accessed Aug. 1, 2009.
[24] John Lyly, Euphues: The Anatomy of Wit (London, 1578), p. 236.
[25] Qur'an 8:39.
[26] Emile Tyan, The Encyclopedia of Islam (Leiden: Brill, 1960), vol. 2, s.v. "Djihad," pp. 538-40.
[27] David Bukay, "Peace or Jihad? Abrogation in Islam

," Middle East Quarterly, Fall 2007, pp. 3-11, f.n. 58; David S. Powers, "The Exegetical Genre nasikh al-Qur'an wa-mansukhuhu," in Approaches to the History of the Interpretation of the Qur'an, Andrew Rippin, ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), pp. 130-1.
[28] Jalil, At-Tarbiya al-Jihadiya fi Daw' al-Kitab wa ' s-Sunna, p. 7.
[29] Ibn Khaldun, The Muqadimmah. An Introduction to History, Franz Rosenthal, trans. (New York: Pantheon, 1958), vol. 1, p. 473.
[30] Hugh Kennedy, The Great Arab Conquests (Philadelphia: Da Capo, 2007), p. 112.
[31] "Saudi Legal Expert Basem Alem: We Have the Right to Wage Offensive Jihad to Impose Our Way of Life," TV Monitor, clip 2108, Middle East Media Research Institute, trans., Mar. 26, 2009.
[32] "Egyptian Cleric Mahmoud Al-Masri Recommends Tricking Jews into Becoming Muslims," TV Monitor, clip 2268, Middle East Media Research Institute, trans., Aug. 10, 2009.
[33] Denis MacEoin, "Tactical Hudna and Islamist Intolerance," Middle East Quarterly, Summer 2008, pp. 39-48.
[34] Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1955), p. 220.
[35] Ahmad Mahmud Karima, Al-Jihad fi'l Islam: Dirasa Fiqhiya Muqarina, p. 461, author's translation.
[36] Ibid., p. 469.
[37] Muhammad al-Bukhari, "Judgements (Ahkaam)," Sahih al-Bukhari, book 89, M. Muhsin Khan, trans., accessed July 22, 2009.
[38] Michael Bonner, Jihad in Islamic History: Doctrines and Practice (Princeton: Woodstock Publishers, 2006), p. 148.
[39] Ahmed Akgündüz, "Why Did the Ottoman Sultans Not Make Hajj (Pilgrimage)?" accessed Nov. 9, 2009.
[40] Ahmad Ibn Naqib al-Misri, Reliance of the Traveller: A Classic Manual of Islamic Sacred Law (Beltsville: Amana Publications, 1994), p. 605.
[41] Daniel Pipes, "Lessons from the Prophet Muhammad's Diplomacy," Middle East Quarterly, Sept. 1999, pp. 65-72.
[42] Arabinda Acharya, "Training in Terror," IDSS Commentaries, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, May 2, 2003.
[43] "Does hypocrite have a past tense?" for clip of Osama bin Laden, accessed Aug. 1, 2009.
[44] Ibrahim b. Muhammad al-Shahwan, et al, "Correspondence with Saudis: How We Can Coexist," AmericanValues.org, accessed July 28, 2009.
[45] Ibrahim, The Al Qaeda Reader, p. 43.
[46] Steven Emerson, "Osama bin Laden's Special Operations Man," Journal of Counterterrorism and Security International, Sept. 1, 1998.
[47] For lists of other infiltrators of U. S. organizations, see Daniel Pipes, "Islamists Penetrate Western Security," Mar. 9, 2008.
[48] Walid Phares, "North Carolina: Meet Taqiyya Jihad," International Analyst Network, July 30, 2009.
[49] Qur'an 8:39.
[50] James Lorimer, The Institutes of the Law of Nations: A Treatise of the Jural Relations of Separate Political Communities (Clark, N.J.: The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd., 2005), p. 124.

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