by Dr. Tsilla Hershco
The French leadership has failed to cope with the uncontrolled Islamist 
radicalization as it is not politically correct to intervene in religious 
matters. 
 Montage of Islamist attacks in Paris in 2015, via Wikipedia
Montage of Islamist attacks in Paris in 2015, via Wikipedia
BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 967, October 5, 2018
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: The lack of integration
 into France of many Muslims over a long period, combined with severe 
socioeconomic problems, has produced bitterness, alienation, and fertile
 ground for radical imams who use the French separation between state 
and religion (Laïcité) to promote uncontrolled Islamist 
radicalization. The French leadership has failed to cope with these 
problems as it is not politically correct to intervene in religious 
matters. The ISIS terrorist attacks, perpetrated by radicalized French 
Muslims, brought the issues to the center of the public discourse. 
President Macron embraced many of his predecessor’s counterterrorism 
measures and moved further with ambitious de-radicalization plans 
designed to address the core problems, including mounting suburban 
crime. However, increasing Muslim radicalization, as well as a growing 
left-right polarization regarding the ways to tackle the problem, still 
present serious challenges to the French republican order. 
French president Emmanuel Macron, in a major 
policy address at the August annual French ambassadors’ conference, 
reiterated that the fight against Islamist terrorism is his top priority
 goal. During his presidential campaign and soon after his election, 
Macron underlined that his main objectives – alongside his social and 
economic platform – were to ensure security within France and to fight 
Islamist terrorism as a central pillar of his foreign policy.
Macron inherited the complicated problem of Muslim
 radicalization, which for years had been either swept entirely under 
the carpet or inefficiently dealt with. Initially, the problem relates 
to the lack of integration into the French society and economy of 
numerous second- and third-generation French Muslims of North African 
descent who live mainly in the suburbs around Paris and other cities in 
France (they are estimated to number between six and eight million). 
Many years of unsolved socioeconomic problems such as high unemployment 
(especially among young people), poverty, poor housing, and low-level 
schools produced a vicious circle of high crime rates, resentment, and 
alienation on the one hand and growing discrimination towards Muslims in
 French society on the other.
Additionally, radical imams from abroad who 
provide religious services in France have taken advantage of the French 
law of separation between state and religion (Laïcité) to 
promote uncontrolled radical Islam. Radical imams have also provided 
religious services to Muslim prisoners, leading to their radicalization.
 Indeed, many perpetrators of terrorist acts, such as those of Toulouse 
in 2012, Paris in 2015, Nice in 2016, and Trebes in 2018, were criminals
 who had undergone radicalization in French prisons.
From time to time, this complicated problem has 
exploded in mass riots, accompanied by violent confrontations with 
police and the burning of public and private property. The most 
challenging riots (in October 2005) lasted about three weeks and were 
followed by President Chirac’s declaration of a state of emergency.
Geostrategic factors – particularly the so-called 
“Arab spring,” the Syrian civil war, and the strengthening of ISIS – 
also contributed to the radicalization process. Radical Islamist 
internet messages encouraged young Muslims and non-Muslims to join the 
ranks of ISIS, or detailed how to carry out terrorist attacks. Hundreds 
of French Muslims joined ISIS and became security threats upon their 
return to France.
Growing Muslim radicalization has also been 
reflected in the increasing number of incidents of violent anti-Semitism
 in France. The French authorities and media preferred, at first, to 
view the crimes as stemming from socioeconomic factors rather than from 
Islamic radicalization. They occasionally presented or even justified 
the increase in anti-Semitic violence as a product of the Muslims’ 
identification with the Palestinians. It seems that the Laïcité
 principle created a barrier that prevented an examination into the 
intensification of anti-Semitic violence as a result of radicalization 
and religious incitement.
Even when the French political leadership became 
aware of the problem of radicalization, it did not sufficiently 
internalize the threat. France passed laws banning the carrying of 
religious symbols by Christians, Jews, and Muslims in French schools 
(2004) and prohibiting women from hiding their faces behind the Muslim 
burqa while in the public sphere (2011). These laws sparked debates in 
France about their legality and effectiveness while also stoking 
bitterness among Muslims.
The appalling ISIS terrorist attacks of 2015-17 
caused deep shock due to their frequency, their scope in terms of 
casualties, and their disruption of citizens’ sense of security. The 
shock was particularly severe as the perpetrators were French citizens 
who had undergone a process of radicalization and carried out acts of 
terror by joining ISIS or identifying with it. The terrorist attacks 
opened a Pandora’s Box and brought the problem to the epicenter of 
French public discourse.
However, even after the terrible attacks of 
January and November 2015, President Hollande’s messages to the nation 
continued to reflect a politically correct attitude. In accordance with 
the Laïcité principle and in order to prevent the 
stigmatization of the Muslim community, he refrained from explicitly 
naming Islamists as the perpetrators of the terrorist attacks as well as
 of the increasing anti-Semitic violence.
Hollande’s politically correct messages were at a 
dissonance with the reality in which Muslims, particularly young ones, 
defiantly expressed their religious identity as standing above their 
allegiance to the French republic and its values. For instance, Muslim 
pupils in French public schools refused to respect a nationwide moment 
of silence in memory of the victims of the “Charlie Hebdo” terror attack
 in January 2015. They reportedly said the terrorist act constituted 
justifiable vengeance, as the satirical magazine had published 
caricatures of the prophet Muhammad. This shocked the French public, 
which viewed the attack on the Charlie Hebdo office as an attack on 
freedom of speech – one of France’s central republican values.
Prime Minister Manuel Valls deviated, to some 
extent, from Hollande’s politically correct discourse. He spoke of a new
 type of anti-Semitism in France, created in the suburbs and driven by 
hatred of Israel. Moreover, he stressed critically that people refrained
 from overtly condemning radical Muslims for fear of being charged with 
racism and “Islamophobia,” and that fear prevented an open public 
debate.
Concurrently with Holland’s politically correct 
discourse, he approved several counterterrorism measures, such as 
allocating budgets for increasing the number of counterterrorism agents 
as well as boosting intelligence gathering units designated to monitor 
and curb jihadists. In addition, he announced the formation of a 
military force of 10,000 soldiers and 4,500 policemen and gendarmes 
(Operation Sentinelle) to protect “sensitive” points in France from 
terror attacks.
Following the “Black Friday” Islamist assaults in 
November 2015, Hollande decreed a state of emergency, which allowed the 
French security powers to (inter alia) carry out preventive 
arrests of suspects, conduct massive raids without a judge’s warrant, 
ban demonstrations, and close websites considered to pose a danger to 
public order. Hollande also proposed tougher measures such as expelling 
foreigners viewed as security threats, rescinding French nationality 
from dual nationals implicated in terror activities, introducing greater
 state involvement in the training and appointment of imams, and making 
emergency laws part of the constitution. However, Hollande withdrew from
 most of these tougher proposals because of protests by civil rights 
supporters.
Hollande later unveiled an extensive plan to fight
 delinquency and radicalization in order to strengthen the republic’s 
values among pupils in the suburbs. In May 2016, the government created 
an inter-ministerial committee for the prevention of delinquency and 
radicalization (CIPDR). At the end of September 2016, an experimental 
center was set up in Pontourni, in central France, aimed at the 
de-radicalization of young Muslims who had expressed a desire to join 
ISIS. The center, which was supposed to serve as a model for additional 
centers, was closed several months later, due in part to the small 
number of participants and in part to the opposition of local residents.
It should be noted that the security services and 
general intelligence services have increased their alertness with regard
 to outward signs of radicalization. For instance, they wrote a report 
in 2015 stating that fitness clubs are a magnet for radicalized Muslims 
as part of their training for terrorist acts. However, it was not until 
2017 that they organized sessions for educators and social workers to 
teach them to recognize signs of radicalization such as beard-growing or
 changes of lifestyle.
The terrorist attacks, combined with the 
deteriorating economic situation involving high unemployment and a large
 public deficit, led to a massive drop in Hollande’s public support. 
Conversely, the attacks increased support for the far right in France. 
Marine Le Pen, the leader of the National Front party (FN), demanded 
that the authorities clearly pronounce the connection between Islamists 
and terrorist acts, that all religious activities be banned from the 
public sphere, that radical imams be expelled, and that Muslim 
immigration to France be stopped. Le Pen also demanded that the Schengen
 agreements be annulled, arguing that a closure of the borders would 
prevent illegal immigration to France. Le Pen’s views on Islamic 
radicalism and immigration increased her popularity, and for the first 
time, the FN representative reached the final stage of the presidential 
elections.
In May 2017, Emanuel Macron was elected president.
 He managed this by winning the support of a large proportion of the 
public that did not necessarily support him but wished to prevent Le 
Pen’s election. At his inauguration, Macron used symbolic gestures to 
manifest the importance he attached to the fight against terrorism. For 
instance, on his way from the Elysees Palace to the traditional ceremony
 at the Arc de Triomphe, he stopped to pay tribute to the memory of the 
policeman shot dead by French Islamists in April 2017. In addition, one 
of his first trips outside France as president was a visit to French 
troops stationed in Mali to fight terrorism.
Macron also unveiled plans for numerous 
counterterrorism policy measures, such as increasing the security 
forces, enforcing the expulsion of migrant workers, initiating 
educational programs for de-radicalization, and allocating budgets for 
the suburbs. Additionally, he announced the creation of a national 
center for counterterrorism, located at the Elysees Palace and operating
 under his command. The center, which operates 24 hours a day, unites 
internal and external intelligence services and monitors and coordinates
 all activities in the war on terror. Macron proposed a return to 
community policing in order to improve relations between the police and 
young people of the suburbs. Concurrently, he revived legislation that 
enshrines counterterrorism laws in the constitution. The French 
parliament voted with a significant majority in support of the law, 
which replaces the state of emergency.
Parliament members introduced amendments to the 
initial bill, according to which all the new measures will expire at the
 end of 2020. Civil rights groups criticized the law anyway, claiming 
that it will be used mainly against Muslims.
In February 2018, Prime Minister Edward Phillip 
unveiled a comprehensive plan to fight Islamist radicalism. It includes 
several key components, such as detection and prevention of 
radicalization in the education system and in prisons, interdisciplinary
 and inter-ministerial cooperation, professional specialization in the 
subject of radicalization, increases in financial and personnel 
resources, and collaboration and exchange of information among security 
authorities in the various French regions.
Macron also proposed replacing the traditional 
model “Muslims in France,” which implies non-governmental involvement, 
with the model “Islam of France,” which implies the shaping of a 
moderate Islam that adapts itself to French republican values and 
rejects the Islamist radical version of Islam. In this context, France 
has already promoted a university program for French imams that trains 
them, among other things, in French law. The program has not fulfilled 
its goal in terms of the number of participants. Many imams still 
receive their training and accreditation in Arab countries.
Liberal circles sharply criticized Macron’s plans,
 arguing that they do not conform to French liberal values, that they 
violate French republican laws of non-interference in religious affairs,
 that they contradict citizens’ freedom of religion, and that the French
 authorities use terrorist attacks to promote a nationalist agenda. 
Conversely, far-right circles persist in their arguments that Muslims in
 France present an inherent danger to the French republic as they do not
 wish to integrate but to impose sharia law over French secular law, as 
their values and way of life contradict the values of the republic. They
 also criticize French authorities for their weakness in confronting 
these threats.
Another criticism has surfaced regarding Macron’s 
policy towards illegal immigrants in France. Macron emphasized that 
uncontrolled illegal immigration is a security problem as well as a 
burden on the budget of the French Republic. The interior minister 
Gérard Collomb accordingly ordered that immigrants in 
public shelters be registered and checked whether they are asylum 
seekers or migrant workers, who are liable to be expelled. However, 
intellectuals, opposition journalists, and social associations appealed 
to the Council of State (Conseil d’Etat), which advises the 
government on legal and administrative matters, to cancel the order on 
the grounds that it is inhumane and illegal. In January 2018, the news 
weekly Nouvel Observateur published a provocative photo of 
Macron covered with barbed wire to illustrate its criticism of what it 
considers to be his inhumane attitude towards immigrants. Macron 
responded with a sharp message, stressing the need to be humane as well 
as effective and to be careful with “false good sentiments.” He also 
noted that France had given entry permits to 100,000 refugees, 
maintaining international humanitarian law. Far-right circles and 
particularly Le Pen continue to loudly oppose any additional Muslim 
immigration to France.
The growing right-left polarization regarding the 
ways to tackle these complicated problems increases the difficulties of 
the French authorities in shaping and promoting effective 
counterterrorist and de-radicalization policy. The numerous 
counterterrorism and de-radicalization measures embraced by President 
Macron and by his predecessor through trial and error have not yet 
effectively addressed the root problems that have bred Islamist 
radicalization and increasing anti-Semitic violence. Furthermore, 
surveys indicate an increase in the process of radicalization of Muslims
 in France and its expansion in French republican schools, including 
among teachers. Patrick Calvar, head of the Internal Security Agency 
(DGSI, or General Directorate for Internal Security) reportedly warned 
in June 2016 that additional terror attacks might ignite revenge attacks
 by right-wing circles against Muslims and lead to confrontation with 
Muslims. Calvar’s warning took on a more ominous significance when in 
June 2018 the French police arrested a radical right-wing group that 
planned to attack radical imams, radicalized ex-prisoners, and veiled 
Muslim women.
France has come a long way in its fight against 
Islamist terrorism. However, the unsolved core issues of increasing 
Muslim radicalization and the deteriorating socio-economic conditions in
 the “no-go” suburbs, combined with the growing left-right polarization 
regarding how to tackle the problem, still present serious challenges to
 the French republican order.
BESA Center Perspectives Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family
Dr. Tsilla Hershco, a senior research 
associate at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, specializes 
in Franco-Israeli and EU-Israeli relations.
Source:  https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/frances-fight-against-islamic-radicalization-the-writing-is-still-on-the-wall/  
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