by Atai Shelah
One of the primary characteristics of this new type of confrontation is that the terrorist organizations do not have clearly-defined borders to defend. What they do have is scattered assets and focal points. Moreover, those organizations are always inferior to the states attacking them, so in order to gain a relative advantage and compensate for their inferiority opposite the superior capabilities of the state, they enter the built-up area and avoid, to the maximum extent possible, combat encounters in open terrain, where the state opponent is not hindered by the problem of collateral damage
Obstacles were present on the battlefield since the first
human conflict and the first war to these days. Obstacles are intended
to disrupt the ground moves of the opponent and deny him his objective
of capturing and dominating the defender's territory. I will not wear
out the reader with elaborate descriptions of the various types of
obstacles and their functions. I will only state, generally, that all
obstacles are generally classified into natural obstacles (utilization
of natural features) and man-made obstacles. The latter classification
includes the significant, primary category of explosive obstacles
(explosive charges, mines, booby-traps, explosive pits, et al.), which
is a highly significant element in combination with the former obstacle
categories.
One example of an interesting combination of natural
elements with man-made and explosive elements is the case of the "nature
reserves", where localities are excavated in a natural area, fortified
strongholds are erected and additionally, in accordance with a
structured operational concept, explosive charges and mines are laid and
integrated. The "nature reserves", just like the rural and urban areas,
are characteristics that reflect the transition from linear obstacle
systems to obstacle focal points that defend specific assets and areas.
In the not-too-distant past, most obstacles were built to
defend the national borders of states, when those states were concerned
about the possible invasion by the military forces of other states. The
nature and characteristics of the obstacle systems were, therefore,
determined by the need to defend states against other states. In line
with this principle, obstacle systems were built in Europe before,
during and after the First World War and the Second World War, and
complete obstacle systems were erected in the subsequent decades.
Similarly, the State of Israel erected its obstacle systems
along the borders surrounding it in accordance with the opponents it
faced and the threat of invasion by Arab countries into its territory.
It was evident, through the years, that Israel's borders were fortified
and protected by obstacle systems of varying intensity and depth,
according to different priorities. These obstacle systems were arranged
in structured lines facing the border, while the areas behind the
obstacle systems, into the depth of the national territory, remained
almost totally free of any obstacles.
The old, linear obstacle systems were made up of lines of
minefields (containing a combination of anti-personnel and antitank
mines), antitank ditches, fence systems of various types and other
obstacles, intended to channel the opponent into points and bottlenecks
dominated by observation and fire. These obstacle systems were built
with the direction from which the opponent will arrive anticipated and
the opponent's routes of advance well known.
In the last few decades, and most intensively over the last
two decades, confrontations between states have disappeared completely,
and the confrontations that do take place involve states on one side
and non-state organizations on the other side: Hezbollah inside the
State of Lebanon, Taliban inside the State of Afghanistan or, naturally,
Hamas inside the Palestinian territory of the Gaza Strip. Terrorist
organizations have recently sprouted inside non-governed areas along the
western border of Syria (the north-eastern border of the State of
Israel), in the Sinai Peninsula and in many other areas around the
world.
One of the primary characteristics of this new type of
confrontation is that the terrorist organizations do not have
clearly-defined borders to defend. What they do have is scattered assets
and focal points. Moreover, those organizations are always inferior to
the states attacking them, so in order to gain a relative advantage and
compensate for their inferiority opposite the superior capabilities of
the state, they enter the built-up area and avoid, to the maximum extent
possible, combat encounters in open terrain, where the state opponent
is not hindered by the problem of collateral damage (casualties and
property damage inflicted on uninvolved parties).
One of the most significant phenomena that evolved in the
last few decades, which many refer to as asymmetrical warfare, is also
reflected in the context of the various ground obstacles and their
characteristics.
So what happened to the obstacles? What are the actual
implications? Where did the changes occur and where are the primary
challenges?
Well, the primary change is the fact that there are no
longer structured, "classic" obstacle systems, which means that there
are no longer any "school solutions", as many of us have been taught in
the context of the "breakthrough and obstacle breaching battle". This
means that we must improvise, as the opponent draws us in that
direction. This also means that the "toolbox" we "assembled" in the past
in accordance with certain standards, is no longer relevant in its
present format. For example, the IDF and Israeli defense establishment
have endeavored, for many years, to find solutions for breaching
obstacle systems made up of linear minefields whose specifications and
boundaries were more or less known in advance. Today, these solutions
are no longer relevant as there are no linear obstacle systems – only
scattered focal points, heavily fortified localities and decentralized
areas that should be approached from different directions, with the
obstacle systems surrounding them often resembling a "sphere" – a
360-degree, all-around defensive system that includes obstacles above
and below the objective.
An interesting paradox is at work here, which calls for
some fresh thinking. On the one hand, technologically, military
organizations (including IDF) have developed impressively in the last
few decades, and a major share of their investment in technology was
devoted to the task of overcoming obstacles in the context of the ground
maneuver. Now, when there are hardly any linear obstacle systems any
more, the opponent improvises and comes up with obstacle solutions of
different types, thereby rendering the "cutting edge of military
technology" useless. On the one hand you will find technological
masterpieces, and on the other hand, in many cases, you will encounter
primitive but highly effective obstacles. The mixed urban arena,
including the rural areas and the areas in between, has produced a
different "playground" or obstacle ground that is often amorphous, which
compels us to switch to s different thought pattern. This new thought
pattern should be reflected in two primary elements: a suitable combat
doctrine and suitable weapon systems.
Concept-wise, the supreme command is the need to cope with a
mobile, decentralized, constantly-changing obstacle system that is not
always frontal and where the structures of two different localities are
never identical. For example, as far as the force build-up aspects are
concerned, there is no point investing in training activities of
breaching through frontal obstacle systems, as was the case until
recently. The reason may be found in actual examples all around us: the
disintegration of Syria ("the collapse of the last frontal obstacle
system"), and on the other hand, in a significant number of
confrontations/operations conducted between 2006 and today, in which the
IDF had to cope, in Lebanon and in the Gaza Strip, with scattered
obstacle systems possessing different characteristics. In order to
successfully cope with these situations, there is no choice, with regard
to the force build-up, the doctrine and the training activities, but to
ensure that the various combat engineering units, including the assault
demolition units of the infantry formations, are always within reach,
to enable the ground maneuver to advance while overcoming obstacles, as
even a booby-trapped door at the entrance to a building is an obstacle –
not only a cluster of landmines and/or a complex explosive charge
assemblage.
The rural-urban area and its margins provide the opponent
with countless opportunities to saturate the area being defended with
many hundreds of obstacles, booby-traps and tactical surprises. The same
applies to the dense, fortified areas in Lebanon, referred to as
"nature reserves". In the latter case the terrain is admittedly open,
but it was intended to enable the terrorist organization to control its
activity, to defend its assets and to enable the launching of rockets
into Israeli territory when necessary.
The other element of the solution includes the various
technologies that we should continue to develop in order to provide the
forces operating in such "playgrounds" with a complete, diversified and
relevant "toolbox". I do not wish to elaborate needlessly with regard to
this particular issue – just present one or two examples to illustrate
the idea. IDF has invested substantially over the years in the
development and acquisition of "hurled" breaching systems designed to
clear a path through frontal minefields. These systems are mostly
statistical and have a robust effect – but they are not very accurate.
At this time there is a need for hurled systems that are less energetic
and much more accurate in order to deal effectively with the obstacle
systems deployed in the various areas I outlined above.
In conclusion: in the past, the combat engineering units,
in accordance with the force build-up and employment principles, adhered
to the rationale of providing a solution to broad frontal obstacle
systems whose structure and logic were well known. The combat doctrine
and operational concept were normally developed in accordance with that
need. This is no longer the case. Today, the combat zone must be
saturated with numerous combat engineering forces – smaller but better
equipped detachments, capable of providing solutions to the challenges
they face. I believe that this phenomenon will only expand, as that is
where the world of terrorist organizations is heading. They will take
advantage of the area available to them to their own benefit; they will
exploit the local population in that area as well as the fact that their
opponents are regular military forces, operating according to
structured commands in the full sense of the word. This paradigm must be
smashed in the positive sense of the word. We must "change phases",
revise our thought patterns and operating procedures and adapt the force
structure and employment to the new reality, and even more importantly –
to the reality that evolves all the time right in front of us. ž
Colonel (res.) Atai Shelach is a former senior
officer in the IDF Combat Engineering Corps. Among other positions, he
served as the commander of the YAHALOM Unit, as the commander of the IDF
Dignitary Protection Unit and as the commander of the IDF CBRN Warfare
Center. Today, he is the CEO of the Engineering Solutions Group (ESG).
Source: http://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/content/ground-obstacles-new-technologies-tactics-unlike-those-past
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.
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