by Prof. Eyal Zisser
The reality in Gaza has persisted for decades, perhaps dating back to the first Intifada and the subsequent Oslo Accords, which effectively shut the door on Gazans seeking to work in Israel.
The Gaza Strip 
dominated the headlines this week. At the beginning of the week, the 
State Comptroller issued his report criticizing the political and 
military leadership's handling of Operation Protective Edge. Then, IDF 
Military Intelligence Directorate commander Maj. Gen. Herzl Halevi said 
Gaza was on the verge of an economic collapse that could lead to renewed
 hostilities along the border. The week ended with Hamas' military wing 
declaring its determination to answer any Israeli action by retaliating,
 even if that retaliation is limited in scope, and even if it ends up 
drawing the sides into all-out conflict.
Interestingly, the 
comptroller's report on Gaza only created waves in the Israeli media -- 
in the Arab world, the report was largely ignored. A stark contrast to 
the Winograd report on the Second Lebanon War, which was appropriated by
 Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah who still uses it as proof of 
Hezbollah's "divine victory" over Israel. In this case, Hamas never even
 tried presenting Protective Edge as a victory or an achievement for the
 organization.
The important question 
from Israel's perspective, however, isn't of course what transpired on 
the Gaza border three years ago, but what could transpire in the coming 
months. It was in this context that Halevi voiced his concern over 
Gaza's dire economic situation. 
In this regard, it 
should be noted that the harsh reality in Gaza is not the outcome of the
 past few months, or even years. The reality in Gaza has persisted for 
decades, perhaps dating back to the first Intifada and the subsequent 
Oslo Accords, which effectively shut the door on Gazans seeking to work 
in Israel. The Gaza economy largely relies on broad financial aid from 
the United Nations, and more recently from Qatar as well. It goes 
without saying that Israel, too, gives Gaza water and electricity. 
Things are indeed dismal, but the situation in Gaza is better than in 
parts of the Arab world, certainly better than disaster areas such as 
Syria; and Gazans have it better than the millions of Syrian refugees in
 Lebanon and Jordan.
It is also worth 
mentioning that Hamas is fighting on more than one front, and that its 
conflict with Israel might not even be its top priority at the moment. 
To its south, there is Egypt, which does little to conceal its desire to
 settle a score with Hamas. Their relationship can only be described as 
one of mutual distrust. Alongside its clashes with Israel and Egypt, 
Hamas is also coping with jihadist-Salafi groups in Gaza that want to 
undermine and replace it. These groups are responsible for the lion's 
share of recent rocket attacks against Israel.
Hamas is currently 
being steered by a new leadership lacking in experience. The movement's 
current leaders hail from Hamas' military wing, which rushed to issue a 
warning this weekend that if Israel continues to strike Hamas targets in
 retaliation for rocket attacks, Hamas will feel free to force an 
equation like the one between Israel and Lebanon, where Israel's hands 
are effectively tied against Hezbollah. This declaration is undeniably 
disconcerting, because it indicates the direction Hamas wants to pursue,
 even if it appears to be trying to preserve calm along the border for 
the time being.
Ultimately, Operation Protective 
Edge teaches us that both sides can be dragged into a fight that neither
 side wants. For Israel, the Gaza war didn't happen because it failed to
 pursue diplomatic alternatives, of which Hamas can never be a part, but
 because it misunderstood the actions of the other side.
Prof. Eyal Zisser
Source: http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_opinion.php?id=18541
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