by Col (Res.) Dr. Raphael G. Bouchnik-Chen
The “Deal of the Century” suggests that a triangle of Israeli Arab communities that were disputed by Israel and Transjordan during the 1949 armistice negotiations can become part of the state of Palestine at such time as the state is established.
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| Residential and shopping area dating to 3rd-2nd century BCE, Beit Guvrin, Israel, photo via Wikipedia |
BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 1,450, February 17, 2020
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: The
“Deal of the Century” suggests that a triangle of Israeli Arab
communities that were disputed by Israel and Transjordan during the 1949
armistice negotiations can become part of the state of Palestine at
such time as the state is established. This suggestion has raised the
ire of Israeli Arabs and Jews who view it as an attempt at population
“transfer”, though no residents due to come under Palestinian
jurisdiction will be required to leave their homes. It is also
historically suspect, as it depends on a faulty reading of the history
of the armistice negotiations.
The “Peace to Prosperity” document, published by
the White House on January 28, 2020, contains a suggestion for an area
it calls the “Triangle Communities”:
The Triangle Communities consist of Kafr Qara, Ar’ara, Baqa al-Gharbiyye, Umm al Fahm, Qalansawe, Tayibe, Kafr Qasim, Tira, Kafr Bara and Aquila. These communities, which largely self-identify as Palestinian, were originally designated to fall under Jordanian control during the negotiations of the Armistice Line of 1949, but ultimately were retained by Israel for military reasons that have since been mitigated. The Vision contemplates the possibility, subject to agreement of the parties, that the borders of Israel will be redrawn such that the Triangle Communities become part of the State of Palestine. In this agreement, the civil rights of the residents of the Triangle Communities would be subject to the applicable laws and judicial rulings of the relevant authorities.
Not surprisingly, this “vision” drew harsh
criticism—not only from Israeli Arabs, but also from Israeli Jews. The
proposition smacks of an attempt at “transfer”; i.e., an attempt to “get
rid of” a substantial number of Arabs who hold Israeli citizenship.
Much of the Arab-Israeli community identifies as
Palestinian, but only a marginal percentage of that community actively
supports the Palestinian struggle in contrast to the fiery rhetoric of
their Knesset representatives.
Whether or not the American suggestion is a
welcome one to the Israeli Arabs who live in the “Triangle”, it is based
on a faulty reading of history.
As soon as the armistice agreement with Egypt was
signed on January 12, 1949, arrangements were made to start negotiations
between Israel and Transjordan. The process was to be simple: each
country was to send a delegation to Rhodes, where the negotiations were
to take place under the guidance of Ralph Bunche. On March 1, while the
Foreign Ministry and the IDF were in the process of negotiation, Lieut.
Col. Moshe Dayan and Reuven Shiloah, one of FM Moshe Sharett’s most
experienced and closest advisers, were sent to Rhodes.
A few days after the start of negotiations with
Transjordan, Israeli PM David Ben-Gurion received a personal message
from King Abdullah saying he wished to negotiate the terms of the
armistice with Israel in secret and in person. He hinted that he could
not fully trust his delegation at Rhodes to negotiate as he wanted them
to.
The King asked the Israeli government to send
representatives to him at Shuneh, his winter palace, not far from the
eastern shore of the Dead Sea. He insisted on absolute secrecy from the
press, the public, the other Arab states, and his own delegates at
Rhodes. It was agreed that the talks at Rhodes should continue as a
façade.
Ben-Gurion instructed Gen. Yigael Yadin (then
Chief of Operations at IDF GHQ) and Walter Eytan, DG of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, to meet with the King and reach an agreement with him
directly. Both had been involved in negotiating the armistice with the
Egyptians at Rhodes. (Joining them was a young officer, Yehoshafat
Harkabi, who served as interpreter.)
In the course of the fighting between May and July
1948, the Arab Legion had cut off the Wadi Ara road—the direct link
between Tel Aviv and the Galilee—and entrenched itself firmly in the
hills above it to the northwest.
The Israeli delegation had instructions to do all
it possibly could to have the Arab Legion retreat to the southeast of
this road and leave it in Israeli hands. As it stood, the Legion had the
IDF by the throat in that region, forcing traffic to move down longer
and more roundabout routes.
The Israeli government was prepared to pay for the
recovery of Wadi Ara, and the assumption was that the price would be
high. Surprisingly, the King agreed without hesitation to withdraw his
troops several miles to the southeast.
Walter Eytan discussed that remarkable development in his diary:
At the time I was amazed that he yielded so readily on a point of such importance for us, when he must have realized that he could demand a high price in return, but as the conversations with him went on, I began to understand (or to believe that I understood) his approach. In the whole of the Wadi Ara area there was not a single major Arab [town] or even village. There were perhaps six or eight villages, of which the largest was Umm-el-Fahm, and others called Ara, Arara and similar names quite unknown in the outside world…When we returned to Jerusalem and reported to Mr. Ben-Gurion and Mr. Sharett, they could hardly believe their ears.
To the King, who was keen to reach an agreement
with Israel, the road his Legion had cut led from nowhere to nowhere. In
his view, he was not really losing anything by conceding it, and it
could be worthwhile to make a gesture toward Israel.
It was an entirely different story, however, when
the two sides came to discuss the fate of three Arab towns, Qalqilya,
Tulkarem, and Beit Guvrin, the names of which were well known in the
Arab world.
The ceasefire had left the first two in the hands
of the Arab Legion and the third in Israel’s hands. While the Israelis
were anxious to secure possession of Tulkarem and Qalqilya, the King was
equally anxious to claim Beit Guvrin.
The Israeli argument for taking Tulkarem and
Qalqilya was twofold. The towns were in the Legion’s hands, but IDF
troops held their immediate outskirts—including their railroad stations,
which were not in the center of the towns but at their western limits.
The stations, which were on Israel’s main railroad line from Jerusalem
and Tel Aviv to Haifa, were perilously located within just a few yards
of Arab Legion posts.
The second argument was that the two towns’
cultivated fields lay on the Israeli side of the line, between the
towns themselves and the sea. Under the armistice, no one, military or
civilian, was allowed to cross the lines in either direction. Doing so
would bring about clashes with Israeli troops and endanger the armistice
and relations between the two countries.
The King saw these points and did not dispute
their validity, but he remained adamant. He had a fundamental reason for
not withdrawing the Arab Legion from the two towns. Eytan remembered
his explaining that “he could not allow it to be said throughout the
Arab world that he, an Arab King, had delivered Tulkarem and Qalqilya
into the hands of the Jews.” So Tulkarem and Qalqilya remained on the
Transjordan side of the line and Beit Guvrin on the Israel side.
When the time came to draw the map of the
armistice lines, the King called in a British officer, Lieut.-Col.
Coade, who completed this task together with Yadin. (Eytan recounted
that the thickness of the blue pencil they used to draw the lines, even
on a large map, created problems later on.)
The completed document was signed by both parties
and forwarded to the delegations at Rhodes, who incorporated it into the
official armistice agreement they were supposed to have been
negotiating.
The agreement was signed on April 3, 1949.
Immediately thereafter, King Abdullah annexed the West Bank and changed
the name of his country from Transjordan to Jordan.
One wonders whether the history of the so-called
“Triangle” was examined while the principles of the “Deal of the
Century” were being drawn up. The document claims that ”these
communities, which largely self-identify as Palestinian, were originally
designated to fall under Jordanian control during the negotiations of
the Armistice Line of 1949, but ultimately were retained by Israel for
military reasons that have since been mitigated.”
In fact, the armistice lines with Jordan were the
outcome of intensive bargaining with King Abdullah that led to a
territorial “deal” as a compromise. That deal left Tulkarem and Qalqilya
in Arab hands and the “Triangle” in Israeli hands.
The passage of time and demographic considerations
might have confused the Americans somewhat, though the Deal of the
Century is not in any case set in stone. According to Jared Kushner, the
plan is a pragmatic framework and is subject to modification.
Source: https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/israel-triangle-peace-plan/
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