by Zvika Klein
The new haredi draft bill softens personal sanctions, allowing draft evaders to regularize their status around age 26. This flexibility draws sharp criticism from the opposition.
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MK Boaz Bismuth circulated a new version of the haredi draft bill to members of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee on Thursday, ahead of debates expected to begin next week.
The updated proposal immediately drew sharp criticism from both the opposition and parts of the coalition, and renewed the broader argument over equality in sharing the burden of service after the October 7 massacre and more than two years of war.
This explainer sets out what is in the bill, how it differs from previous drafts, and why it has become so contentious.
What is the bill trying to achieve?
The bill is the latest attempt to create a permanent legal framework for the enlistment or exemption of haredi men, after the High Court of Justice ruled that the state may not continue granting sweeping exemptions without a clear legal basis and without addressing inequality in conscription.Bismuth, the current chair of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, presented his proposal as a “realistic” compromise that takes into account the IDF’s manpower needs, the ongoing security situation, and the political and social sensitivities around the haredi community.
The numbers: annual targets for haredi enlistment
The draft sets five years of recruitment targets for haredi men, with the first “year” lasting a year and a half. According to the circulated text, the targets are: Year 1 (18 months): 8,160 recruits; Year 2: 6,840; Year 3: 7,920; Year 4: 8,500; Year 5: more than half of the relevant haredi age cohort, estimated at roughly 7,000–9,000 young men, depending on the size of the year group.The bill also cancels all draft orders issued to haredim since 2023, effectively resetting the system and granting a kind of retroactive “amnesty” to those who received call-up notices under the previous legal vacuum. Supporters say this is necessary to restore order and avoid chaos.
Opponents say it rewards non-compliance and sends a problematic message to soldiers and reservists who continued to serve.
A major difference in the Bismuth draft is the removal of any binding quota for combat roles.
Earlier outlines, including one advanced this summer by former committee chair Yuli Edelstein, required a fixed percentage of haredi recruits to serve in combat or combat-support units.
Bismuth’s version abolishes that requirement. There is no legal obligation to place haredi recruits in front-line roles.
Critics from the opposition, as well as the coalition, claimed that without a combat quota, the state cannot meet its numerical targets, while keeping most haredim far from the battlefield, which undermines the idea of an equal sharing of risk.
Supporters counter that the IDF itself has limited capacity to integrate large numbers of new combat soldiers quickly, and that many haredim are more likely to agree to non-combat tracks, at least in the initial years.
The bill also introduces a limited recognition of “civil-security service”. Up to 10% of the annual draft target could be fulfilled through service in bodies such as the police, the Prison Service or other security-related frameworks.
In addition, men who grew up in the haredi school system but have since become less observant would still be counted toward the haredi quota if they enlist. That inflates the apparent level of haredi participation, but it reflects the reality that the boundary between “haredi” and “ex-haredi” is often blurred.
Sanctions on individuals and yeshivot
The bill retains personal sanctions on draft evaders, but narrows and softens them.Sanctions would apply only up to around age 26 (some versions mention 23 for certain measures). After that age, a man who did not enlist would age out of the sanction regime and could regularize his civil status.
The tools available to the state include: Suspension or denial of a driver’s license for those who ignore draft procedures, restrictions on leaving the country and limits on work beyond defined study hours.
Previous drafts discussed broader financial penalties, such as restricting tax benefits or public scholarships. Bismuth’s bill takes a more moderate approach, something the coalition argues is necessary to avoid a frontal clash with the haredi public and its rabbinic leadership.
For yeshivot, state funding would be linked to meeting at least 75% of the recruitment targets attributed to their students. Institutions that fail to reach that threshold would face budget cuts.
However, there is no provision for full funding cutoffs and no intrusive mechanisms such as biometric time clocks that were considered in harsher proposals. This is another point of criticism from those who argue that without strong financial leverage, the law will remain largely declarative.
How is this different from Yuli Edelstein’s earlier draft?
The main difference between Edelstein’s outline and Bismuth’s draft is one of philosophy and emphasis. Edelstein promoted a tougher, more “IDF-first” model focused on real military enlistment, clear combat quotas and strong enforcement, even at the cost of a coalition crisis.Bismuth’s draft leans toward a more flexible, gradual model that seeks to avoid a political explosion, especially with parts of the haredi leadership already signalling resistance.
In addition, Edelstein’s numbers started lower and climbed gradually over five or six years. Bismuth starts with a higher headline number, but stretches the first period over 18 months and leaves the fifth-year target somewhat vague, defined as “more than half” of the cohort.
Another difference relates to combat service: Edelstein insisted on a significant combat share. Bismuth removed that requirement entirely, relying on the IDF’s internal placement policies rather than the law.
There are also differences in the sphere of oversight and sanctions: Edelstein’s concept included stricter supervision of yeshivot and more severe budgetary consequences. Bismuth’s version prefers incentives and partial cuts over dramatic confrontations with major Torah institutions.
Supporters of Edelstein’s line say the new bill essentially turns into a “draft-evasion law” that gives legal cover to continued non-service. Backers of Bismuth respond that Edelstein’s plan was politically impossible and could have collapsed the coalition without necessarily increasing enlistment on the ground.
Why is it so controversial, and what happens next?
Opposition leaders have already lined up against the bill. Yair Lapid has called it a “disgrace,” Avigdor Liberman terms it a “draft-dodging law,” and Benny Gantz and Gadi Eisenkot have spoken of a “national disgrace” that offends combat soldiers and reservists who have spent the last two years on the front lines.Some opposition parties are again talking about advancing a bill to dissolve the Knesset over the draft issue.
From the haredi side, mainstream factions are carefully studying the text and debating its implications. Hard-line groups such as the “Jerusalem Faction” reject any step that could normalize enlistment, while others fear that once a framework is in place, the numbers and enforcement could be tightened in future years.
Religious Zionist parties have said they will only support a law that produces “real and rapid” enlistment, and have not yet committed to backing Bismuth’s formula.
Next week’s committee hearings will therefore not only be a technical discussion of clauses and numbers, but also a political test.
The government must find a formula that satisfies the High Court’s demands for equality before the law, keeps the coalition intact, and does not deepen already raw social divisions between those who serve and those who do not. Whether Bismuth’s draft can do all three is now at the heart of the debate.
Zvika Klein
Source: https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-876449
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