by Thaddeus G. McCotter
History shows regimes can turn mere survival into victory; America must ensure Iran cannot repeat Mao’s Korean War playbook.
In the continuing Iran conflict, voices on both sides of the American political spectrum have made the claim that the mullahs can score a strategic victory by merely surviving, especially if they can do so while retaining a semblance of control over the Strait of Hormuz. If these observers are right that Iran’s victory would not be “military” but “strategic,” one need not look far back in American history to find a precedent. At the start of the Korean War in June 1950, North Korean communists under the control of Kim Il-Sung crossed the 38th Parallel and attacked South Korea. Armed and encouraged by the Soviet Union, the North Koreans swiftly decimated South Korea’s defenders.
Prior to the invasion, the Truman administration had earlier denied South Korea’s request for armor, heavy artillery, and anti-tank weapons due to a concern that its leader, Syngman Rhee, would invade the north. Then, duly alarmed by North Korea’s rapid advance, President Truman made the decision to authorize $12 billion and deploy American troops—and ultimately the troops of 15 member nations of the UN—under the command of General Douglas MacArthur to stem the communist tide and save South Korea.
By October, MacArthur and his troops had not only stemmed the tide but had also pushed the North Koreans all the way back to the 38th Parallel. But, ignoring both President Truman’s order not to expand the war and the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) strategic interests, MacArthur decided to press on to the Yalu River. He believed the PRC would never enter the war and fight against America.
MacArthur was not alone in thinking it would be madness for the PRC to enter the war. There was dissension within the PRC’s inner circle. Only Mao, with the tepid support of Zhou Enlai, argued for attacking the Americans. In fact, Mao had already committed troops of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to fight in support of North Korea.
As Frank Dikötter related in The Tragedy of Liberation: A History of the Chinese Revolution 1945–1957, Mao’s reasoning was as follows:
Mao took a huge gamble. He hoped that America would not expand the war to China for fear of provoking the Soviets. He was also convinced that the Americans had no stomach for a prolonged war and would be no match for the millions of soldiers he was prepared to throw into the conflict. He believed that he would have to fight the Americans at some point, all the more so since Truman had sent the Seventh Fleet to protect Taiwan at the start of the Korean War. Fighting the imperialists in Korea would be easier than launching an amphibious assault on fortress Taiwan. Most of all, a hostile Korea on the Manchurian frontier would represent a serious security threat to the People’s Republic.
. . . Mao was ready to march in from Manchuria, reverse the rout and assume the leadership of the communist camp in Asia.
Claiming to be “volunteers,” hundreds of thousands of these troops began infiltrating North Korea. On November 25, they crossed the Yalu River and attacked, beginning the process of driving American and UN troops back down the peninsula.
By early 1951, General Matthew Ridgway had slowly, painfully regrouped the allied troops and once more turned the tide, driving the North Korean and Chinese troops back northward. By the summer, armistice talks began. It took two more bloody years, but the talks ultimately led to an armistice resulting in a ceasefire which remains in effect to this day, as does a legal state of war.
Neither Korean nation could claim victory. But there was a winner, as Dikötter assessed: “Despite the terrible human cost, Korea was Mao’s personal victory. He had pushed for war when his colleagues had wavered. His gamble paid off. China had brought the most powerful nation on earth to a standstill. China had stood up.”
It should also be mentioned that Mao’s gamble also solidified his control over the Chinese people. If Mao and his Communist Party and its PLA could fight the American military to a standstill, what could—and would—the regime do to unarmed Chinese dissidents?
True, there are differences between the Korean War and the present Iran conflict. Nonetheless, the possibility that, despite American military might, a regime might survive with key strategic interests preserved—if not advanced—and later thrive, while improbable, is not impossible. Indeed, it regrettably happened with the PRC during the Truman administration.
Today, in the instance of the Iran conflict, it is the duty of the Trump administration to ensure that this becomes not merely improbable, but impossible, lest the missteps of the Yalu River run through the Strait of Hormuz.
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Photo: A photo illustration taken in Nicosia on May 4, 2026, shows a person in front of a large screen displaying vessel movements in the Strait of Hormuz on a ship-tracking website. Iran's navy fired 'warning shots' at US warships in the Strait of Hormuz on May 4, state media said, after the American military sent cruisers into the Gulf as part of a plan to help trapped commercial vessels leave. Earlier, US President Donald Trump had announced a plan to guide ships from neutral countries out of the Gulf, saying it was a humanitarian effort to help their stranded crews. (Photo by AFP)
An American Greatness contributor, the Hon. Thaddeus G. McCotter (M.C., Ret.) served Michigan’s 11th Congressional district from 2003 to 2012. He served as Chair of the Republican House Policy Committee and as a member of the Financial Services, Joint Economic, Budget, Small Business, and International Relations Committees. Not a lobbyist, he is also a contributor to Chronicles, a frequent public speaker and moderator for public policy seminars, and a cohost of The John Batchelor Show, among sundry media appearances.
Thaddeus G. McCotter
Source: https://amgreatness.com/2026/05/09/will-the-yalu-river-run-through-the-strait-of-hormuz/
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