by Israel Hayom Staff
As of today, Iran could produce sufficient quantity of uranium for a nuclear bomb with its installed centrifuges and low enriched uranium stockpiles in as little as one month, a report by the U.S. Institute for Science and International Security has found.
                                            Will Iran soon be able to 
arm its long range missile with nuclear warheads?                       
                         
                                                 
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As of today, Iran could "break out" and 
produce a sufficient quantity of uranium for a nuclear bomb by using its
 installed centrifuges and low enriched uranium stockpiles in as little 
as one month, a report by the U.S. Institute for Science and 
International Security has found.
Using its existing equipment and uranium 
stockpiles, Iran could produce "sufficient quantity in as little as 
approximately 1.0-1.6 months, if it uses all its near 20 percent low 
enriched hexafluoride stockpile. Using only 3.5 percent LEU, Iran would 
need at least 1.9 to 2.2 months and could make approximately 4 
sufficient quantities of weapons grade uranium using all its existing 
3.5 percent low enriched uranium stockpile," the report from the highly 
respected organization states. 
In a paper entitled "Iranian Breakout Estimates, Updated September 2013", authors Patrick Migliorini, David Albright, Houston Wood, and Christina 
Walrond write that since their last report in October 2012, Iran has 
steadily expanded the number of centrifuges installed at both its Fordow
 and Natanz gas centrifuge plants. 
Additionally, the report states, Iran has 
started installing its more advanced centrifuge model, the IR-2m 
centrifuge, at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant. It is these 
"substantial changes" which have merited the group to update its 
previous breakout estimates of the time Iran would need to produce one 
significant quantity of weapon-grade uranium.
The report states that if Iran successfully 
produced enough weapons grade iranium for a nuclear weapon, the ensuing 
weaponization process might not be detectable until Iran tested its 
nuclear device underground or otherwise revealed its acquisition of 
nuclear weapons. "Therefore, the most practical strategy to prevent Iran
 from obtaining nuclear weapons is to prevent it from accumulating 
sufficient nuclear explosive material, particularly in secret or without
 adequate warning. This strategy depends on knowing how quickly Iran 
could make weapons grade uranium," the report states.
Assuming Iran possessed covert nuclear 
facilities with "optimized cascade structure and very good centrifuge 
performance, it is possible that Iran could use a covert plant to break 
out in as little as approximately one to two weeks," the report states.
The Institute recommends that nuclear 
negotiations be guided by "the need to lengthen breakout times 
significantly from their current values. A reasonable minimum breakout 
time should be six months or preferably longer. If breakout took greater
 than or equal to six months, the IAEA could clearly detect 
It is long before sufficient quantity is 
produced, and the international community would have time to marshal a 
response to stop Iran producing enough weapons grade uranium for a 
nuclear weapon." 
      Israel Hayom Staff
Source: http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_article.php?id=12833
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.
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