by Maj. Gen. (ret.) Yaakov Amidror
Operation Protective
Edge, which ended after 50 days of fighting and without the toppling of
the Hamas regime in the Gaza Strip, has left many people frustrated.
This feeling stems from
two reasons: the first is the Jewish tendency to see the glass half
empty -- we never seem to be happy with what we have. Many times it is
that feeling that pushes us to do better and the Gaza campaign is no
exception, so Gaza's rulers should be well aware of the fact that in
this case, our glass is three-quarters full. The second reason is a gap
in expectations. Many were under the impression that Israel had set out
to topple the Hamas government in Gaza, or that is should have at least
declared it to be an operational objective. This mistaken impression can
be attributed to the fact that no one explained how such a mission
could be accomplished.
I have explained in the
past that once Hamas' terror tunnels were destroyed, the government
faced two options, and that it had to choose between seizing control of
the Gaza Strip, as a way of ousting Hamas, or gradually intensifying the
military campaign until a cease-fire agreement was reached.
The various statements
calling to "cut off the snake's head," "deal Hamas a surprising blow" or
"bolster Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas' position," were
nothing but empty slogans that failed to explain how those goals should
be achieved. After all, the military did not need the public's advice
on how to carry out the operation on the ground or how to target senior
Hamas operatives.
Some had tried to be
clearer, speaking of the need to "dissect the Strip" or "seize Gaza's
command and control centers and its weapons manufacturing sites," but
these suggestions did not take into account Gaza's unique nature.
"Dissecting" the Strip would only be the prelude to a wide-scale ground
operation -- otherwise there would be no point to it. Gaza's north is
relatively independent from its south, and the move would have made
Israeli soldiers vulnerable from all directions. As for seizing the
various command and control centers and weapon mills in Gaza -- that
would be impossible without first seizing control of most of its urban
areas, as these sites are scattered across the Strip.
Once it was decided not
to seize control of the Gaza Strip, that rule should have been upheld
adamantly. That is why it would have been wrong to heed the demands for a
wide-scale ground operation, which might have produced heroes and
headlines, as well as several Hamas casualties, but it would have
contributed nothing to the operation's results -- maybe even the
opposite.
Such a move could have
caused more harm than good. Had we chosen to embark on a ground
operation only to eventually withdraw the troops as part of an
agreement, and after having suffered multiple casualties, everyone would
have asked why we decided to go into Gaza in the first place, and Hamas
would have declared a victory over said withdrawal.
Israel made sure to
reiterate the truth: The operational objective -- other than eradicating
the terror tunnel's threat -- was striking an agreement based on the
principle of "quiet will be met with quiet." Once it was made clear that
Hamas had set its sights higher, demanding things like an airport and a
seaport, Israel did the right thing by saying that if the negotiations
were about more than a truce, then it too had a demand, namely the full
demilitarization of the Gaza Strip. After all, if we were to discuss
more of Hamas' demands, it was only fair to discuss more of Israel's
demands as well.
Had the cabinet ordered
the IDF to seize control of the Gaza Strip there is no doubt it would
have executed that order in full and without hesitation, but there is no
doubt that the decision that was eventually made was legitimate; some
would say prudent and wise.
I do not wish to debate
which of the two moves would have been better, or whether this was a
choice between two evils. The important thing to remember is that once
the decision was made, those making it were wise to stand their ground
and refrain from zigzagging between options, which would have been a big
mistake.
I am not frustrated by
the results of Operation Protective Edge because I understand Israel's
objectives: dealing Hamas a debilitating blow, eradicating the terror
tunnels, and rejecting any change in the status quo that defines
Israel's relations with Gaza and the limitations imposed on the Strip.
Having achieved all of
this, I have no problem with the operation's results -- although I also
have no doubt that we need to start preparing for the next Gaza
campaign.
Maj. Gen. (res.) Yaakov
Amidror is a former national security adviser and a senior fellow at the
Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.
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