by Jonathan Spyer
Little noticed by western media, this conservative Sunni alliance against Iran and Sunni Islamism has been under construction for some time.
Originally published under the title "Lines in the Sand."
If Arab cartoonists have it right, the Saudi-led break with Qatar could be lasting. 
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The
 decision by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Egypt and 
Yemen to cut off diplomatic relations with Qatar is the latest step in 
the re-emergence of a clearly defined US-led Sunni Arab bloc of states. 
The task of this alliance is to roll back Iranian influence and 
advancement in the region, and to battle against the forces of Sunni 
political Islam.
Little
 noticed by western media, this conservative Sunni alliance against Iran
 and Sunni Islamism has been under construction for some time.
Saudi
 Arabia and the UAE were the first to recognize the new regime of 
General Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi following the military coup on July 3, 
2013. Financial support from both countries has been crucial in ensuring
 the avoidance of economic disaster in Egypt.
The
 Saudis and Emiratis were the moving force behind the interventions into
 Bahrain in 2011 and Yemen in 2015. In both cases, the intention was to 
prevent the advance of Iranian interests.
The conservative Arab alliance against Iran and Sunni Islamism has been under construction for some time. 
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Both
 Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates maintained high levels of 
military spending over the last half decade, in spite of low oil prices.
 The two countries have sagely invested in air power and special 
operations forces – the areas most relevant to the type of wars being 
fought at present in the Middle East.
The results have been visible over the last two years.
The
 intervention to prevent the advance of the Iran-supported Ansar Allah 
militia toward the strategically crucial Bab el-Mandeb Strait was the 
first real "outing" for Gulf Arab non-proxy military power (Operation 
Peninsula Shield into Bahrain in 2011 was a police action against 
popular unrest).
An Emirati vessel hit by missiles in the Bab El-Mandeb strait on October 1, 2016. 
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The
 results in Yemen have been mixed, but by no means constitute the 
debacle that the intervention has been presented as in some quarters. 
The Houthis remain in control of Sana'a, the Yemeni capital. But the 
nightmare scenario in which an Iran-supported force acquired control of 
the narrow Bab El-Mandeb strait, through which all shipping between the 
Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea must pass, was avoided. Emirati and Saudi 
special operations forces played a key role in the fighting.
In
 Libya, Emirati air power, employed in support of General Khalifa 
Haftar's Libyan National Army, has played an important part in Haftar's 
fight against Islamist militants. The Emiratis built a forward air base,
 al-Khadim, in Marj province 100 km from Benghazi. AT-802 light attack 
aircraft and UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters operate from the base, 
according to satellite imagery published by IHS Jane's.
However,
 the election of Donald Trump appears to have sharply increased the 
scope and ambitions of the pro-US Gulf Arab states. It is clear that 
they identify a similar regional outlook to their own in Trump and key 
figures around him. This raises the possibility of a more assertive and 
clearly defined strategy regarding both the Iranian and Sunni Islamist 
adversaries.
At
 the Riyadh meeting on May 21st, 55 Muslim majority countries signed a 
declaration pledging to establish a "a reserve force of 34,000 troops to
 support operations against terrorist organizations in Iraq and Syria 
when needed."
According
 to the final communique from the summit, the leaders present "confirmed
 their absolute rejection of the practices of the Iranian regime 
designed to destabilize the security and stability of the region and the
 world at large and for its continuing support for terrorism and 
extremism," and accused Teheran of maintaining a "dangerous ballistic 
missiles program" and of "continuing interference in the domestic 
affairs of other countries." A third of the document was devoted to 
criticism of Iranian regional activities.
The election of Donald Trump appears to have sharply increased the scope and ambitions of the pro-US Gulf Arab states. 
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The
 signing of the "Riyadh Declaration" took place following the visit of 
Donald Trump to Riyadh. Trump, in his speech at the summit, accused Iran
 of "spreading destruction and chaos across the region."
Declarations
 by Gulf states have not always been followed by concerted action on the
 ground, of course. But with the current emergent stand-off between 
pro-western and pro-Iranian forces in eastern Syria, and the incremental
 loss of territory by the Islamic State in that area, it is not hard to 
think of the type of roles which a standing Gulf Arab "counter-terror" 
force would play, for example, in holding and administering Sunni Arab 
areas in cooperation with local forces.
An
 additional, un-stated assumption behind the emergence of this bloc is 
that the energies of the Arab uprisings that began in late 2010 are 
largely spent. A bloc led by Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Sisi's Egypt will
 not seek to mobilize the revolutionary energies of populations. Rather,
 as with that of the Iranians, this alliance will be a top-down affair, 
featuring regular and semi-regular military forces carefully commanded 
and controlled from above.
In
 this regard, it is interesting to note that the main "casualty" of the 
emergence of this alliance is Qatar, the country which above all others 
sought to fan the flames of the uprisings. Qatar, through its support 
for Muslim Brotherhood associated movements and via its enormously 
influential al-Jazeera satellite channel, tried to turn the energies of 
the Sunni Arab masses in Syria, Egypt and the Palestinian territories 
into political power and influence for itself (while, of course, harshly
 suppressing any attempts by its own largely non-citizen population to 
claim rights). This project has failed.
The lines of confrontation between the two central power blocs in the region are now more clearly drawn. 
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For
 a moment, a large Sunni Islamist bloc based on Qatari money and Muslim 
Brotherhood power seemed to be emerging. MB-associated parties 
controlled Cairo, Ankara, Tunis and Gaza. Similar movements seemed 
plausibly within reach of Damascus. But this bloc proved stillborn and 
little of it now remains.
The
 hour of the revenge of Doha's Gulf neighbors has thus arrived. The 
shunting aside of little Qatar, however, is ultimately only a detail in 
the larger picture. What is more significant is the re-emergence of an 
overt alliance of Sunni Arab states under US leadership, following the 
development of military capabilities in relevant areas, and with the 
stated intention of challenging the Iranian regional advance and Sunni 
political Islam. It remains to be seen what this bloc will be able to 
achieve re its stated aims. But the lines of confrontation between the 
two central power blocs in the region are now more clearly drawn than at
 any time in recent years.
Jonathan Spyer, a fellow at the Middle East Forum, is director of the Rubin Center for Research in International Affairs and author of The Transforming Fire: The Rise of the Israel-Islamist Conflict (Continuum, 2011).
Source: http://www.meforum.org/6754/a-pro-american-arab-alliance
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Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.
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