by Amir Taheri
According to some usually reliable sources, the US, having rejected the idea of a meeting between President Donald J. Trump and Putin in Budapest, is working on a framework for talks aimed at halting the war. What that phrase might mean isn't quite clear.
The current phase started in February 2022, with what looked like a full Russian invasion. But that was only a sequel to the invasion and occupation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014. That episode was itself a sequel to another politico-military operation two years earlier...
According to some usually reliable sources, the US, having rejected the idea of a meeting between President Donald J. Trump and Putin in Budapest, is working on a framework for talks aimed at halting the war. What that phrase might mean isn't quite clear.
How long might the war in Ukraine last?
This was a question discussed and debated at a recent conclave in Paris of historians and strategic experts from different backgrounds. The real answer not given at the meeting was another question: how long is a piece of string?
The current phase started in February 2022, with what looked like a full Russian invasion. But that was only a sequel to the invasion and occupation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014. That episode was itself a sequel to another politico-military operation two years earlier to impose a Russian stooge as president of Ukraine while pouring in Russian troops into Sevastopol to force Kiev to sign a long lease for a Russian aero-naval base.
And all that is just recent history.
Ukraine's trials and terrors followed what had been the pattern in broader European history of long armed conflicts such as the 100 Years War and the 30 Years War. In a continent torn apart by religious, sectarian, racial and dynastic divisions, war was the rule and peace the exception. It was only in the 20th century that Europe puffed the dream-pipe of relatively short wars.
As things stand today, the war in Ukraine may last many more years. It has already been factored into the overall pattern of global politics in the sense that all those directly or indirectly involved have managed to minimize the damage it does to their interests while maximizing the benefit they can draw from it. Despite heavy human and material losses, the principal protagonists, Russia and Ukraine, appear to be far from the threshold of pain that could force either to raise the white flag.
Russia cannot win the war because President Vladimir Putin isn't mentally prepared to switch to a higher gear with a massive dose of boots on the ground.
Sticking to an air war, chiefly with the use of drones, Russian generals cannot offer the classical three Cs of war: conquer, cleanse and control. Even in the 25 percent of Ukrainian territory already seized, none of those three Cs has been fully achieved.
A similar fate happened to the Russian "special military operation" in Syria as well.
There, too, years of bombing transformed many Syrian cities into piles of rubble while killing tens of thousands of civilians without granting Putin even the ghost of a victory.
At the same time, Russia cannot lose this war either. For that could mean the end of Putin and Putinism.
There is also little chance of Ukraine being visited by a surprise "savior" to get Russia off the hook with minimum loss of face, as Ahmad al-Sharaa did in Syria.
Despite repeated assertions by President Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukraine, too, is in no position to either sign a blank check for Putin or to recapture territories lost.
All in all, what could be called the cruising speed of this strange war may seem suitable to all concerned. The US reasserts its position as the only "indispensable power" capable of offering a game-changer when and where it chooses.
China is benefiting from cut-price Russian oil and gas while extending its influence in Central Asia in the absence of the historical Russian rival.
The Europeans are also using the war as an excuse to launch a massive military buildup, while Russia continues to bleed in both a real and metaphorical sense. One sign that the European Union may be banking on a long war came this week with the letter of intent signed by France to supply up to 100 Rafale fighters to Ukraine. Since the warplanes cannot be built and Ukrainian pilots trained in less than three years, it is clear that Paris expects the war to continue at least until 2029.
Yet, despite the grim tableau just painted, talk of peace, or at least an end to the war, hasn't gone away.
According to some usually reliable sources, the US, having rejected the idea of a meeting between President Donald J. Trump and Putin in Budapest, is working on a framework for talks aimed at halting the war. What that phrase might mean isn't quite clear.
However, if we accept the existence of a Trump method, as seen in several recent cases of halting military conflicts, the US may be seeking something between a ceasefire, which is by definition punctual and for a fixed period, and full and lasting peace, which may not be easy to achieve.
That "something in between" could be marketed as an armistice, a term with enough historic and diplomatic credentials to save face for all involved by freezing the situation on the ground while negotiations on modalities of a permanent settlement are arranged, without being subject to a time guillotine.
There are indications that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan may have been cast to do part of the footwork needed in that direction. Zelensky's latest talks with Erdogan appear to endorse that view, while Putin, too, has obliquely welcomed the Turkish intervention, if only to ward off a charge of kowtowing to Trump.
All that, however, may turn out to be nothing but another peace mirage. Yet the US has at least two major cards to play to make it happen.
The first, supplying Ukraine with Tomahawk missiles, has appeared and disappeared in news bulletins like the Cheshire cat's smile.
A decision to bring in the Tomahawks could be as much of a game-changer in this war as sending Stinger missiles to the mujahedin was in Afghanistan in the 1980s. With a range of up to 2,500 kilometers, Tomahawk missiles would put almost all of "useful" Russia, including Moscow and Saint Petersburg, within range of attacks from Ukraine. (It is just 762 kilometers from Kyiv to Moscow.)
The second card that Trump could play is to ignore the five-year extension that President Joe Biden granted for the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) that had ended the arms race between the US and the then USSR, saving the latter from diplomatic loss of face and economic hardship.
The current dicey state of the Russian economy would make another arms race at high gear highly costly, if not suicidal, for Putin.
An American armistice scheme, that is to say a fishtail halt to the fighting, might tempt Putin for another reason: his old dream of decoupling the US and the EU even on so crucial an issue as European security.
A mirage? Perhaps. But one not to be totally ruled out.
Gatestone Institute would like to thank the author for his kind permission to reprint this article in slightly different form from Asharq Al-Awsat. He graciously serves as Chairman of Gatestone Europe.
Amir Taheri was the executive editor-in-chief of the daily Kayhan
in Iran from 1972 to 1979. He has worked at or written for innumerable
publications, published eleven books, and has been a columnist for Asharq Al-Awsat since 1987.
Source: https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/22069/ukraine-the-peace-mirage
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