by Zalman Shoval
In an interview leading
up to his visit to Israel, U.S. President Barack Obama confirmed that
the U.S. opposes the Palestinians' conditions for renewing negotiations,
according to which Israel would freeze all construction beyond the
Green Line. By rejecting this precondition, Obama got onto the same page
as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. But at the same time, he also
made it clear that this should not be interpreted as U.S. acquiescence
to continued settlement construction.
The president's remarks
reflect the traditional American stance regarding Israeli activities in
the territories. There have been in the past, and still are, different
shades to the American approach, not only for construction in the
territories, which stem from U.N. Resolution 242, but also with respect
to the sanctity of the Green Line.
Former Presidents
Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, each in his own
particular style and with his own arguments, justified changes to this
line as being good for Israel, stemming largely from security concerns.
Even former President
Jimmy Carter agreed that an outline for Palestinian autonomy must
include "special security zones" that would remain under Israeli
control. Reagan explicitly said in a speech to the U.N. in 1982: "In the
pre-1967 borders Israel was barely 10 miles wide at its narrowest
point. The bulk of Israel's population lived within artillery range of
hostile Arab armies. I am not about to ask Israel to live that way
again."
Bush agreed with then
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon on the issue of "blocs," and I heard Clinton
at a meeting in Washington just a few years ago, even if he was no
longer president, say that the U.S. has no problem with Israeli measures
exercised for security reasons.
Clearly, the above
statements, and other similar ones, should be viewed as a consensus for
Israel to act in any way on the security issue. But when it comes to the
most friendly government to Israel, it is difficult to avoid getting
the impression that Israeli policy and advocacy is not always emphasized
enough from the security angle. The only one who really does this is
Netanyahu himself, consistently explaining Israel's positions and
demands as they relate to security concerns. Perhaps this is because in
some circles, emphasis on security and the need for defensible borders
is understood as almost blasphemous, and a blow to the value of our
historic right to the Land of Israel. However, anyone who searches
deeply into the history of "security borders" and their various
meanings, will discover that even in the old days when borders were
drawn by geography, even if it was described differently in words, there
were also strategic political concerns involved.
Shortly after the
Six-Day War, when then Defense Minister Moshe Dayan visited the area
where the Gilo neighborhood was later built, and someone reminded him
that he was beyond the Green Line, he stared at the ground and said, "I
do not see a green line." Already in the early days after the war, the
government decided to create a new strategic physical reality, to
prevent the isolation or separation of Jerusalem from the coast, ensure
strategic depth along the Jordan River, prevent any potential enemy from
cutting Israel in half, and prevent any possible damage to Ben-Gurion
International Airport from the hilltops beyond the Green Line.
Construction in certain places in the territories is an important
component of this effort to ensure security for Israel.
It's true that the
modern battlefield is radically different today. But particularly in
this new reality, when Israeli territory is limited, physical boundaries
between us and the enemy are all the more important.
Let's not be naive and argue that
every Jew living in Judea and Samaria is there for security reasons,
but the opposite is not true either. An Israeli presence beyond the
Green Line is intimately tied to Israel's security needs.
Zalman Shoval
Source: http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_opinion.php?id=3781
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.
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