Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood and Iran.

 

by Mehdi Khalaji

  

During a February trip to Iran, Hamas leader Khaled Mashal praised Iranian leaders for their support during the conflict in the Gaza Strip, a further indication of the strengthening ties between the Sunni Islamist group, which the United States has designated as a terrorist organization, and the Shiite regime in Tehran. Mashal's statements come on the heels of the U.S. Treasury Department's terrorist designations of al-Qaeda leaders and operatives sheltered in Iran. These latest examples of Sunni-Shiite cooperation raise new questions about whether Iran can improve its relationship with Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood.

While such a rapprochement appears unlikely, history suggests it is far from impossible. Iran has maintained informal ties to the Muslim Brotherhood for many years, and Shiite Islam probably has more appeal among Egyptian Sunnis than it does among Sunnis in other Arab countries. Iran's sharp criticism of Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak is also likely to resonate with Egyptian radicals under the thumb of the regime in Cairo. If Iran were to develop close relations with the Brotherhood, Iranian influence would grow considerably in the Arab world, giving Tehran a significant say among Arab radicals and, undoubtedly, producing dangerous developments for U.S. interests in the region.

 

Ties between Iran and Sunni Extremists

Egypt has long been suspicious of the connection between the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and Iran, based in large part on Iran's longstanding strong ties to Hamas -- an offshoot of the Brotherhood. The recent conflict in Gaza is likely to further arouse Cairo's suspicions. During the fighting, Iran was highly vocal in their support of Hamas, blasting the Egyptian government for its inaction. Hamas leader Khaled Mashal thanked Iran for its support of his organization, asserting that the "people of Gaza . . . have always appreciated the political and spiritual support of the Iranian leaders and nation." According to Iranian state television, Mashal reportedly said that "Iran has definitely played a big role in the victory of the people of Gaza and is a partner in that victory."

Iran has also forged stronger working relations with other Sunni extremists. According to the New York Times, Saudi authorities allege that the leader of "al-Qaeda in the Persian Gulf," Abdullah al-Qaraqi, lives and moves freely in Iran, along with more than a hundred Saudis working for him. The Treasury Department, in its recent enforcement action, announced that Saad bin Laden, son of Usama bin Laden, was arrested by Iranian authorities in early 2003 but that "[a]s of September 2008, it was possible that Saad bin Laden was no longer in Iranian custody." According to Director of National Intelligence Michael McConnell, Saad bin Laden is now most likely in Pakistan.

 

Prerevolutionary Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood

While the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and Iran do not have strong organizational ties, the Brotherhood has had a major impact on Islamic revivalism in Iran, a movement that sought to promote Islam not just as a religion but as an ideology governing all aspects of political, economic, and social life. Mujtaba Mirlowhi, known as Navvab Safavi, (1924-1955) was a young Iranian cleric who created the Society of Islam Devotees (SID) in the early 1940s and played a major role in connecting Shiite fundamentalism to Islamic fundamentalist movements in other countries. Like the founding fathers of Islamic revivalism in Egypt, SID believed that in order to fight the supremacy of the West, Muslims have to combat sectarianism, put the Shiite-Sunni conflict aside, and create a united Muslim front.

In 1954, at the invitation of Sayyed Qutb, then secretary of the Islamic summit and main intellectual of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Navvad Safavi traveled to Jordan and Egypt to meet its leaders. Under their influence, he became more attracted to the Palestinian cause. Before that time, there were few references to the Palestinian problem in Iranian society among clerics or lay (leftist) intellectuals and activists. After his return to Iran, he started a Palestinian campaign and collected promises from five thousand volunteers to deploy to the Palestinian territories to fight the Jews.

Perhaps even more important, in his short autobiography, Iran's current supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei describes becoming interested in political activities after he met Navvad Safavi in Mashhad, Iran. Before Iran's 1979 Islamic Revolution, Khamenei translated two books by Sayyed Qutb, Al-Mustaqbal li hadha al-Din (The Future of this Religion) and Al-Islam wa Mushkelat al-Hadharah (Islam and the Problems of Civilization).

 

The Islamic Revolution in the Brotherhood's Eyes

Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood at first cautiously welcomed the Ayatollah Khomeini-led Islamic revolution, which may have given the Brotherhood confidence that they too would be able to overthrow their country's secular regime. But after an Islamic radical assassinated Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat in 1981, the Brotherhood was forced to take a cautious attitude toward the Islamic Republic, at least in public. In January 1982, Umar Telmesani, then leader of the Brotherhood, told the Egyptian weekly magazine al-Msuwwar, "We supported him [Khomeini] politically, because an oppressed people had managed to get rid of an oppressive ruler and to regain their freedom, but from the doctrinal point of view, Sunnism is one thing and Shiism is another."

The Muslim Brotherhood nonetheless continued to decry sectarian differences among Muslims, arguing that unity was necessary for the sake of jihad against the corrupt rulers and the West. In 1985, Telmesani wrote in the Egyptian magazine al-Dawa that "the convergence of Shiism and Sunnism is now an urgent task for the jurists." He added that "the contact between Muslim Brotherhood and [Iranian clerics] was not done in order to make Shiites convert to Sunni Islam, the main purpose was to comply with Islam's mission to converge the Islamic sects as much as possible."

There were points where the Brotherhood and Iran cooperated more openly. In 1988, for example, at the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq war, at the request of Muslim Brotherhood leader Shaikh Muhammad Ghazzali, the Iranians agreed to unilaterally release the Egyptian prisoners of war who had fought alongside the Iraqi army against Iran.

More recently, on January 28, Muhammad Mahdi Akef, the current leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, said in an interview with Mehr News Agency: "The Muslim Brotherhood supports the ideas and thoughts of the founder of Islamic Republic." He added "[Ayatollah] Khomeini's idea, especially with regard to the Palestinian issue, is the continuation of the Muslim Brotherhood's attitude toward fighting occupation."

 

Egypt under Shiites: Distant Past but Popular Memory

Egyptians are more receptive and positively disposed toward Shiism than other Sunni Arabs. One reason is the Fatimid Dynasty that was established in Egypt in the tenth century as an offshoot of the Shiite Ismaelite movement. The dynasty played an important role in the cross-fertilization between Iran and Egypt. The two centuries of Fatimid rule in Egypt marks a high point in the history of Islamic civilization in terms of economic development and cultural prosperity. Even the art in Fatimid Egypt was influenced by Iranian styles.

The Fatimid period left a lasting impression on Egyptians, and vestiges of the country's long-ago Shiite rulers are still seen in Egyptian openness to Shiite practices and traditions, a receptiveness not found anywhere else in the Sunni world. Egyptians still respect the symbols, icons, and sacred places of that period; for example, Egyptians believe that Hussain, the third Shiite Imam, and his family are buried in Cairo, not in Karbala, Iraq. For Sunni Egyptians the tombs of Hussain, Sayyeda Zainab (his sister), and Assayeda Sakina (his daughter) are the most sacred places in the world after Mecca and Medina. Also like their Shiite coreligionists, Sunnis in Cairo perform Ashura (the Shiite commemoration of the death of Hussain) each year. Furthermore, in nineteenth-century Egypt, the Persian language was accepted as a language of literature and science, reflected in the Persian-language newspapers available at the time.

Moreover, in addition to the influence of Egyptian political Islamists on Iranian clerics noted earlier, Iranian clerics in turn helped to shape Islamist revivalism in Egypt. One notable example is the nineteenth-century Islamist Sayyed Jamal al-Din Asadabadi, also known as al-Afghani. When he arrived in Egypt from his native Iran, he claimed to be an Afghan so he could pass himself off as a Sunni. His new ideology advocated the unity of Muslims and sought in "authentic Islam" answers to the ills of Muslim societies.

As a result of this history, for many years Shiism held some appeal in Egypt, despite the fact that Egyptians at the time of the Fatimids, and still today, are predominantly Sunnis.

 

Shiism in Contemporary Egypt

The appeal of Shiism has been dampened somewhat in recent years as the Egyptian government has grown increasingly nervous about what it perceives as a rising Shiite tide in the region. In response, the Egyptian government and the state media began waging a campaign against Shiism and Shiite symbols. In November 2005, Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak stated that "most Shiites are faithful to Iran, not to their own government." His comment provoked several Shiite demonstrations, including thousands of people in Najaf, a Shiite holy city in Iraq. Afterward, he explained that he meant that Shiites sympathize with Iran in terms of their religious, not political, viewpoint.

On several occasions, prominent Egyptian cleric Shaikh Yousef Qarzawi, a former member of the Brotherhood, warned about the "Shiite tide" and the missionary activities of Shiites and the Iranian government, especially in Egypt. He said that "the increasing infiltration of Shiism in Egypt may lead to a civil war like the one in Iraq." The Egyptian government has made efforts to mobilize powerful clerics and faculty associated with al-Azhar University against the Muslim Brotherhood in order to fight the tide of Shiism.

There are no reliable statistics about the number of Shiites in Egypt. Since Shiites are under pressure from the Egyptian government, most of them avoid publically admitting their faith. Some Western and Egyptian sources (like the Ibn Khaldun Research Center) indicate that Shiites constitute less than 1 percent of the Egyptian population (approximately 657,000). But Muhammad al-Darini, a prominent Sunni who converted to Shiism, puts the figure at 1.5 million.

Al-Darini also claims that Egyptian Shiites are Twelvers, which is the type of Shiism practiced in Iran. But he denied any connection between the Shiite community and the Iranian government. "Iran does not have any kind of influence over us," al-Darini said. "Sometimes, even Iranians criticize us for some of our stances and statements. Everybody must know that Shiism is not originally an Iranian [sect], but an Arab one, while [the four traditional] Sunni schools stem from Iran." Part of the attraction of Shiism in modern Egypt is political rather than doctrinal in nature. Some young Egyptians see conversion to Shiism as a way of protesting the regime, much as thousands of Iranian Shiite youths convert each year to various other faiths partially in reaction to the Shiite nature of their government.

 

Conclusion

While a breakthrough in relations between the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and Tehran remains unlikely, the consequences for the United States of such a union would be very damaging. Iran remains focused on expanding its influence in the Persian Gulf and beyond, and connections to the strongest opposition party in the Middle East would be a great leap forward. The longstanding and growing ties between Iran and Hamas, as well as a look back at the relevant history, makes clear that U.S. policymakers should monitor this trend.
 

Mehdi Khalaji is a senior fellow at The Washington Institute, focusing on the role of politics in contemporary Shiite clericalism in Iran and Iraq.

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

Egypt is not going to stop the smuggling into Gaza.

 

by Efraim Inbar and Mordechai Kedar

  

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: Conventional wisdom posits that Egypt must and will play a central role in halting the smuggling of weapons from Sinai to Gaza. Yet this is unlikely — for strategic, political and Egyptian domestic reasons. Egypt does not mind if Hamas bleeds Israel a little; it gains domestically by indirectly aiding Hamas; gains internationally by playing a mediating role (in a conflict which it helps maintain on a "low flame"); and is incapable of stopping the Sinai Bedouins from continuing as the main weapons smugglers into Gaza. Thus, Israel would be imprudent to rely on Egypt to end the smuggling of weapons into Gaza.

 

The massive and continuous smuggling of weapons into Gaza from Egypt via the Sinai was a main cause of the recent war between Israel and Hamas. The international community realizes that this problem has to be tackled in order to prevent escalation in the future. Stopping the transfer of weapons to Hamas requires significant Egyptian cooperation and action, says conventional wisdom; and in the negotiations towards this week's ceasefire, Egypt indicated it would play such an expanded role.

 

Indeed, one of the clear winners of this conflict seems to be Egypt, whose mediating role received plaudits all around. Many heads of state jaunted off to meet President Mubarak, along with Israeli emissaries, underscoring the importance of Egypt in securing an end to the crisis in Gaza. Egypt also holds the keys to the Rafah Crossing into Gaza, whose opening is demanded by Hamas.

 

However, the expectation that Egypt will put an end to the traffic in the tunnels under the Egyptian-Gaza border is not realistic — for strategic, political and domestic reasons.

 

Strategic Advantage

At the strategic level, Egypt sees Israel as a competitor in the quest for hegemony in the Middle East, and has for years turned a blind eye to the arming of Hamas via the tunnels. Simply put, it had, and still has, an interest in bleeding Israel. In contrast to its rhetoric, Egypt is not interested in a resolution of the Arab-Israel conflict that will free Israel from an immense security burden and will allow the Jewish state to become even stronger than it is nowadays.

 

Power politics and balance-of-power is the prism through which the Egyptian leadership views the region. The continuation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict on a "low flame" serves best the Egyptian interest of keeping Israel not-too-strong and engaged in a conflict with the Palestinians.

 

Moreover, the "low flames" in Gaza and elsewhere in the Palestinian arena maintain an important role for Egypt as a "moderate leader" in the eyes of the international community, particularly in Washington.

 

Egyptian behavior is intriguing and cunning. After all, the development of "Hamastan" in Gaza poses a danger to Egypt too, since part of the weaponry going to Gaza could be redirected for the Moslem Brotherhood along the Nile; and Hamas is a role model for Egypt's Islamists. Similarly, the growing role of Iran in arming, training and financing the Hamas is a source of concern for the Egyptian regime.

Nevertheless, Egypt appears to have reached the conclusions that it cannot prevent Hamas rule in Gaza, and that Hamas' continuing rule actually is useful both against Israel and at home.

 

Indeed, Israel and Egypt both seem to have reconciled themselves to a long-term Hamas government in Gaza. Neither country can do much about it, although both prefer to see Hamas weakened. Egypt does not want to fan "high flames," while Israel needs Hamas to understand that Israel best be left alone. To a great extent, the international community also accepts the fragmentation of the Palestinian polity, and is not actively pursuing the goal of bringing Gaza under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority.

 

Domestic Considerations

The two-faced policy being pursued by the Mubarak administration also serves a useful purpose in domestic Egyptian politics. In contrast to Europeans and other foreigners, Egyptian citizens easily recognize and comprehend their government's double-dealing. Everybody in Cairo understands that the government is facilitating the arming of Hamas; and turning a blind eye to the tunnels weakens the argument of the Islamic opposition that the government is cooperating with the Zionists. Moreover, curbing the traffic in the tunnels would worsen the economic situation in Gaza. Pictures of suffering in Gaza or of Palestinians climbing the fences to get into Egypt only help the Islamist opposition.

 

Realities in the Sinai

Finally, Egypt's double game is also result of a complex reality in the Sinai Peninsula. As with other Third World states, the Egyptian government is not fully in control of its territory. Thus, an international agreement on ending arms smuggling from Sinai into Gaza will face considerable problems of implementation, even if the Egyptian regime wants it to happen.

 

Notably, most of the smuggling into Gaza is led by Egyptian Bedouins who live in the northern Sinai. These tribes do not speak Egyptian Arabic, they are not really an integral part of Egyptian culture and society, and they do not subscribe to Egyptian political ethos. They make a living by smuggling women and drugs to Israel, as well as arms, ammunition, and missiles to the Gaza Strip.

 

Egyptian attempts to extend law and order to Bedouin areas have met armed resistance. Every time the Egyptian regime attempts to curtail the Bedouin smuggling activities, they carry out a terrorist attack on a Sinai resort, as has happened in Taba, Sharm el-Sheikh (twice), Nueiba, and Ras al-Satan. Such attacks negatively influence tourism to Egypt, an important source of income, and seem to be an effective way of "convincing" the Cairo authorities to live and let live.

 

Bribery, an important element in the Egyptian ways of doing business, also facilitates the smuggling of weapons into Gaza. Low-paid Egyptian officials in Sinai can hardly resist hefty bribes. A one-hundred-dollar bill does wonders with an Egyptian police officer at a Sinai roadblock who intercepts a truck packed with "pipes." The likelihood that policemen at Egyptian checkpoints will stop taking bribes from trucks transferring arms to Gaza is very low — unless the Egyptian government decides to heavily punish such behavior. Only execution of smugglers could have a deterring effect, but such a determined Egyptian government behavior is also unlikely.

 

Another hindering factor in any attempt to stop smuggling is the bureaucratic culture of Egypt. The cumbersome Egyptian bureaucracy is hardly effective. Even presidential decisions are watered-down as they pass through the ranks of the administration. Thus the chance that a presidential decision on a total curb in smuggling would be fully implemented at Sinai checkpoints remains slim. This is Egypt.

 

To illustrate the point: Several weeks ago, the Palestinians published a report that the Egyptians had started to seriously combat the smuggling tunnels between the Egyptian and Palestinian sides of Rafah. The Egyptians initiated an inquiry to discover "who" suddenly became so motivated, and discovered that it was an Egyptian official who did not receive a big enough reward from the tunnel operators and decided to teach them a lesson! The Egyptians immediately found a different posting for this hyperactive official.

 

Conclusion

Despite the current Egyptian anger at Hamas and the international prodding of Egypt to terminate the traffic in the tunnels from its territory into Gaza, a drastic change in Egyptian border control performance along its border with Gaza is unlikely. Therefore, it would be imprudent of Israel to rely on the Egyptians to significantly end weapons smuggling into Gaza.

 

This means that Israel will continue to face a significant Gaza security challenge, despite Operation Cast Lead. An important policy implication of this reality is that Israel must maintain freedom of action to bomb tunnels along the Philadelphi Corridor, or to destroy them by ground operations. This must be made crystal-clear to friends and foes alike.

 

 

Efraim Inbar is professor of political science at Bar-Ilan University and director of the Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies. Dr. Mordechai Kedar is a lecturer in Bar-Ilan University's Department of Arabic and a research associate at the BESA Center.

 

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

Homegrown threat against Saudi Arabia.

 

by Olivier Guitta

  

Saudi Arabia very recently released a list of eighty-five most wanted terrorists. Eighty-three of the individuals are Saudi nationals, the other two are Yemenis. These individuals are suspected of wanting to revive Al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia, attack oil facilities inside the kingdom and overthrow the monarchy. Because of the pedigree of the suspects, the Saudi regime is taking this threat very seriously.

Interestingly, out of the 85, fourteen had been previously detained at Guantanamo Bay and undergone the Saudi rehabilitation program for jihadists. This program that was trumpeted by Saudi authorities as extremely successful is obviously now showing its limits. Indeed rehabilitating hard-core jihadists is a huge challenge, especially when these individuals have been brainwashed since their early age.

The Saudi regime has at this point a lot of introspection to do since its education system is at fault along with the hyper-present extremist and intolerant Wahhabism. It is no coincidence that among foreign jihadists in Iraq fighting coalition troops, the Saudis were the largest group. Most of these jihadists were between 18 and 25 and upon their deaths, preachers would visit their families in Saudi Arabia to underline the virtues of jihad and to confirm their son's martyrdom and his place in paradise.

A telling example of how the regime had radicalized a generation of youngsters is that of Abdallah Thabet, a 34-year-old literature teacher. Thabet was born in a tribal world, in a village in the Assir region near the Yemen border, where people lived without Wahhabi influence. This until 1979 when after the siege of Mecca, the regime decided to empower the radical religious clerics who started to spread their propaganda throughout the kingdom. Thabet affirms that throughout Saudi Arabia, fired up by the religious rhetoric, high school students, as well as students, were radicalized and in some cases plunged into violence. He was one of them, wanting to restoring the caliphate and viewing Osama Bin Laden as one of his heroes. Thabet left his family to head two clandestine cells that launched raids "against non-believers". Inspired by his jihadist years, Thabet wrote a novel entitled "The 20th terrorist". Out of the 19 terrorists involved in the 9/11 attacks, 15 were Saudi, many of whom came from the Assir area. Thabet wanted to show in his book how so many young Saudis plunged into terrorism. Indeed, in the real world, some of its former companions are or were fighting in Iraq, or clandestinely preparing attacks in Saudi Arabia.

The role of the Saudi education system in radicalizing its youth is not a secret. Two weeks ago the Saudi Al Watan published a column entitled: "Who is behind the deviants" - for information, deviant is the word used in Saudi Arabia to describe terrorists-. In this column, the author clearly places the blame on the education system that teaches youngsters to memorize the Koran but not to learn much in other disciplines. He also noted that radical preachers have the upper hand throughout the kingdom and pollute the minds of the youth with extremist ideas.

The situation has been so dire that it looks like that, now after 30 years, Saudi authorities are realizing the hugeness of the problem. The tipping point was clearly the fact that some of its own citizens that joined Al Qaeda are very determined to overthrow the monarchy. So that is why for instance Saudi Deputy Minister of Education and Teaching for boys (coeducation is forbidden in Arabia), Mohammed Said Maliss, ordered the removal of certain radical and extremist books from school libraries and education centers. Among these books is one about Sayyed Qutb, one of the most influential Islamist thinkers who serves as a reference to Al-Qaeda and other Islamist terrorist groups. Another book now banned clearly calls for Jihad, in the name of Islam.

The second step taken by the regime was the reshuffling of the government that took place on Feb. 14. Most importantly was the replacement of the hardcore Wahhabi Education Minister Abdullah Bin Saleh al-Obaid by prince Faisal bin Abdullah, that is viewed as more moderate. Time will tell if the new incoming Education Minister will really reform the system and get rid once and for all of the extremist views that permeates the school curriculum. Faisal will have at his disposal huge amount of funds since the education minister gets about one quarter of the Saudi budget.

King Abdullah also fired the head of the religious police, the "Mutawaa" which ensures proper application of the Islamic Sharia law. The Mutawaa has been criticized for its heavy hand: back in August, the site Aafaq.org reported that a member of the force murdered his own sister after learning she had converted to Christianity. He stoned and burned her and cut her tongue, leaving her agonizing until death. The assassin is currently in custody, and authorities are trying to stifle the case for fear of the reaction of international opinion. Indeed, such revelations are damaging for Saudi Arabia's image.

The recent moves implemented by the regime are little tiny steps to tackle the problem of extremism in the kingdom. It might be way too little too late because so many mostly young men have been poisoned by radical ideas. Interestingly enough, Riyadh never listened when the West pointed out the risks of playing fire. But now that the threat is against the regime, they seem to be more attentive.
 

 

Olivier Guitta is an Adjunct Fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and a foreign affairs and counterterrorism consultant.

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

Living with Cancer, living with Islam.

 

by Sultan Knish

  

99 percent of Muslims are Muslims because their many times over great-grandfather was living in a village someplace when a group of men with swords marched in, and declared that they were all going to become Muslims now, or die horribly. Unless he was smart enough to get on board by being one of the men with the swords, and take home his share of the loot and slaves.

Today these people would be known as Muslim extremists. Back then they were just known as Muslims.

But there's a new Gold Rush in the West now as Western scholars, academics and politicians look around for something that isn't there-- a way to co-exist with Islam. Except it's not a Gold Rush but a Fool's Gold Rush, because when it comes to Islam, co-existence has never been on the table. Islam is a religion that from its earliest days was spread by the sword of Mohammed, and then by various Caliphs, Emirs, Sultans, assorted warlords and rulers.

Religions that spread like that are no more interested in achieving co-existence, than telemarketers are interested in Do Not Call lists. It puts them out of business. Even the current boom due to "interest in Islam" can be traced back to 19 Muslims flying several planes into two major US cities with a death toll in the thousands. Minus the planes and with a much higher death toll, that is generally how people get "interested" in Islam in the first place.

When Muslim leaders talk about co-existence, what they really mean is "Stop bombing us long enough to let us destroy you."

This of course hasn't stopped well meaning Westerners from trying to find ways to get along with cancer. Like living with Cancer, living with Islam is a dead end proposition. You either go for Chemotherapy or sooner or later you wind up lying face up on a steel table with a toe tag on your foot. Except in this case the toe tag will be a Koran.

Like Cancer, Islam is a devouring entity that exists to consume, leaving destruction and misery in its wake. You cannot live with it, your choices are to either die, or force it out of your body. The West has currently pushed Button 1 while assuming that any moment now, the Cancer will turn moderate, and become willing to talk about how it can be integrated with the rest of the body.

France has banned Hijabs, Holland is looking at immigration, America has selected a leader from a Muslim background, and Cancer is laughing its ass off at the whole spectacle. It knows all this is nothing more than one of the Kubler-Ross stages of death, and that the West is still stuck on Bargaining.

We'll give you complete equality, social services, a good deal of respect, a seat at the table, the privilege to censor anything that offends you and the right to beat and rape as many women as you want -- so long as you agree to be our friends. That kind of thing naturally doesn't work.

Giving people who already view you as subhuman carte blanche to do whatever they want, isn't going to endear them to you. Just ask the Jews sitting in ghettos during WW2 and hoping that cooperating with the Nazis would avoid the worst from happening. Submission to people who already place no value on your life is death. When you do that you might as well take an ad out in the Dhimmi Personals Section.

There is of course such a thing as a Moderate Muslims, but moderate Muslims aren't a movement, they're just individuals who aren't very good Muslims -- much like Jews who eat Pork or Catholics who have abortions. There are plenty of both, particularly in well off countries where religion isn't a big deal anymore, but self-indulgence is. By no coincidence those are also the places you're likely to find moderate Muslims, whose moderation consists of not being very good Muslims.

You can co-exist with Moderate Muslims because they really do want most of the same things you do, a house in the suburbs, a steady paycheck and Cable TV. Of course then their sons head to a Madrassa in Pakistan, and next thing you know they're on the plane back with a box cutter.
 

AND THAT'S THE PROBLEM WITH CONFUSING SELF-INDULGENCE WITH MODERATION. The pendulum on self-indulgence always swings back to the extreme sooner or later, just as it did in Iran, just as it will in Egypt. Prosperity always breeds discontent and disgust among the very sons of those who enjoy it. It certainly did in the West producing the likes of Lenin and Ayers.

The problem is that Western anti-materialists are socialists. Muslim anti-materialists are Muslims. And so while Socialists and Muslims do their best to shake hands, the Muslim has a dagger palmed in his hand. The socialist has a copy of Das Kapital in his. It wasn't even an even match in the early 20th century. It certainly isn't an even match now, as even a casual observer of the European scene can't help but notice.

While we think of Muslims as a cultural problem, they think of us as a demographic problem. We think the solution is teaching them to be moderate. They think the solution is teaching those of us who survive to be slaves. And guess who's currently ahead on points?

 

Sultan Knish

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

Does Turkey Still Belong in NATO?

 

by Daniel Pipes

Smack on its 60^th anniversary, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization finds itself facing a completely novel problem – that of radical Islam, as represented by the Republic of Turkey, within its own ranks.

Ankara joined NATO in 1951 and shortly after Turkish forces fought valiantly with the allies in Korea. Turks stood tough against the Soviet Union for decades. Following the United States, Turkey has the second-largest number of troops in the alliance.

With the end of the Cold War, NATO's mission changed and some saw Islamism as the new strategic enemy. Already in 1995, NATO Secretary General Willy Claes compared Islamism to the historic foe: "Fundamentalism is at least as dangerous as communism was." With the Cold War over, he added, "Islamic militancy has emerged as perhaps the single gravest threat to the NATO alliance and to Western security."

Indeed, NATO first invoked Article 5 of its charter, calling on "collective self-defense," to go to war against the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001, responding to the 9/11 attacks launched from that country.

More recently, former Spanish prime minister José María Aznar

 argues that "Islamist terrorism is a new shared threat of a global nature that places the very existence of NATO's members at risk" and advocates that the alliance focus on combating "Islamic jihadism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction." He calls for "placing the war against Islamic jihadism at the center of the Allied strategy."

Claes and Aznar are right; but their vision is now in jeopardy, for Islamists have penetrated the 28-state alliance, as was dramatically illustrated in recent days.

 As the term of Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer concludes in July, a consensus had emerged to make Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, 56, his successor. But Fogh Rasmussen was in office in early 2006, when the Muhammad cartoon crisis erupted and he insisted that as prime minister he had no authority to tell a private newspaper what not to publish. This position won him much criticism from Muslims, including Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who instructed Fogh Rasmussen at the time that "Freedoms have limits, what is sacred should be respected."

When Fogh Rasmussen came up for the NATO post, Erdoğan continued his grudge, saying that his government looks "negatively" on Fogh Rasmussen's candidacy because, Erdoğan explained, "I asked for a meeting of Islamic leaders in his country to explain what is going on and he refrained from doing that. So how can I expect him to contribute to peace?"

Eventually, Fogh Rasmussen was selected as the consensus candidate, but at a steep price. The Dane won the job only after engaging in intensive negotiations with Turkish president Abdullah Gül hosted by Barack Obama. Fogh Rasmussen promised to appoint at least two Turks and publicly to address Muslim concerns about his response to the cartoons. More broadly, Erdoğan announced. Obama "gave us guarantees" concerning Turkish reservations about Fogh Rasmussen.

The hoops that Fogh Rasmussen had to jump through to win Ankara's support can be inferred from his cringe-inducing, dhimmi-like remarks on winning the appointment: "As secretary general of NATO, I will make a very clear outreach to the Muslim world to ensure cooperation and intensify dialogue with the Muslim world. I consider Turkey a very important ally and strategic partner and I will cooperate with them in our endeavors to ensure the best cooperation with Muslim world."

We appear to be witnessing the emergence not of a robust NATO following the Claes-Aznar model, one leading the fight against radical Islam, but an institution hobbled from within, incapable of standing up to the main strategic threat for fear of offending a member government.

Nor is Islamism NATO's only problem with Turkey. In what is emerging as a Middle Eastern cold war, with Tehran leading one faction and Riyadh the other, Ankara has repeatedly sided with the former – hosting Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, advocating for Iran's nuclear program, developing an Iranian oil field, transferring Iranian arms to Hezbollah, openly supporting Hamas, viciously condemning Israel, and turning Turkish public opinion against the United States.

Noting these changes, columnist Caroline Glick urges Washington to "float the notion of removing Turkey from NATO." The Obama administration is not about to do that; but before Ankara renders NATO toothless, dispassionate observers should carefully think this argument through.

 

 

Daniel Pipes
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

The Arab “friends” of the U.S.A.

 

Arabs in general and Islamic Jihad, al-Qaeda in particular share a religious hatred of the United States.

 "Official" as well as unofficial Palestinian groups remain sworn enemies of the United States. All Palestinian terror groups, including the American-supported Fatah "government" of the Palestinian Authority, are quietly but very determinably expanding ties to al-Qaeda. There is no doubt about this. Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad and al-Qaeda all share a deep ideological and religious hatred of the United States. Operationalizing this common antipathy, these kindred foes have now gone beyond a mere conceptual affinity to active field cooperation. Indeed, with growing commitments to shared weaponry and information as well as to the joint establishment of safe houses and crucial tactical resources, such ties could soon produce nuclear and/or biological mass-destruction attacks against major American cities. This video was produced in Kuweit :

http://www.tangle.com/view_video.php?viewkey=0861ff3eabea1ceb73e4

 

Glimmers of Hope in Great Britain.

 

by David J. Rusin

Because the Islamist project has reached a far more advanced stage in Europe, events there often serve as warnings to America about how not to deal with the challenges that lie ahead. Thus it is quite refreshing to be able to highlight a few positive developments in Britain that the United States should consider emulating.

First, there is growing realization that the UK's old strategy of empowering nonviolent Islamists, assumed to "possess the necessary 'street cred'" to marginalize violent Islamists, has been a disaster. A report by Policy Exchange argues that the government is "underwriting the very Islamist ideology which spawns an illiberal, intolerant, and anti-Western worldview":

"Not only is it failing to achieve its stated objectives; in many places it is actually making the situation worse," they said. "A new generation is being radicalized, sometimes with the very funds that are supposed to be countering radicalization."

[…]

The problem has been caused by the link between violent and nonviolent extremism being "habitually underplayed in official documents produced by central government, local government, and the police."

Second, Britain has launched a new strategy that recognizes the importance of opposing nonviolent Islamism. Among the updated criteria for defining Islamic extremists:

• They advocate a caliphate, a pan-Islamic state encompassing many countries.
• They promote Shari'a law.
• They believe in jihad, or armed resistance, anywhere in the world.

Third, the government has suspended ties with the Muslim Council of Britain — think CAIR with a cockney accent — after one of its senior officials signed a document interpreted as "advocating attacks on the Royal Navy if it tries to stop arms for Hamas being smuggled into Gaza." The government has reinforced the break by pledging to focus its efforts on mosques and smaller groups. Sadiq Khan, the minister for community cohesion, said, "The days of lazy politicians just speaking to one or two powerful community groups or leaders are gone."

America could learn from these changes of direction. While the FBI has cut off CAIR, other Islamist bodies are still welcome in Washington. Moreover, there has been little discernable movement to reach out to smaller organizations representing mainstream Muslims.

Advice for the feds: Contact a few of those Muslims who disowned CAIR publicly this week. They will be some of your best allies in protecting America against the threat of radical Islam, while helping our nation avoid the mistakes that Britain now must correct the hard way.

 

David J. Rusin
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

How the British fought Arab terror in Jenin.

 

by Dr. Rafael Medoff

 

"Demolishing the homes of Arab civilians"  "Shooting handcuffed prisoners" "Forcing local Arabs to test areas where mines may have been planted" These sound like the sort of accusations made by British and other European officials concerning Israel´s recent actions in Jenin. In fact, they are descriptions from official British documents concerning the methods used by the British authorities to combat Palestinian Arab terrorism in Jenin and elsewhere in 1938.

 

The documents were declassified by London in 1989. They provide details of the British Mandatory government's response to the assassination of a British district commissioner by a Palestinian Arab terrorist in Jenin in the summer of 1938. Even after the suspected assassin was captured (and then shot dead while allegedly trying to escape), the British authorities decided that "a large portion of the town should be blown up" as punishment. On August 25 of that year, a British convoy brought 4,200 kilos of explosives to Jenin for that purpose. In the Jenin operation and on other occasions, local Arabs were forced to drive "mine-sweeping taxis" ahead of British vehicles in areas where Palestinian Arab terrorists were believed to have planted mines, in order "to reduce [British] land mine casualties." The British authorities frequently used these and similar methods to combat Palestinian Arab terrorism in the late 1930s. British forces responded to the presence of terrorists in the Arab village of Miar, north of Haifa, by blowing up house after house in October 1938. "When the troops left, there was little else remaining of the once busy village except a pile of mangled masonry," the New York Times reported. The declassified documents refer to an incident in Jaffa in which a handcuffed prisoner was shot by the British police.

Under Emergency Regulation 19b, the British Mandate government could demolish any house located in a village where terrorists resided, even if that particular house had no direct connection to terrorist activity. Mandate official Hugh Foot later recalled: "When we thought that a village was harbouring rebels, we'd go there and mark one of the large houses. Then, if an incident was traced to that village, we'd blow up the house we'd marked." The High Commissioner for Palestine, Harold MacMichael, defended the practice: "The provision is drastic, but the situation has demanded drastic powers." MacMichael was furious over what he called the "grossly exaggerated accusations" that England's critics were circulating concerning British anti-terror tactics in Palestine. Arab allegations that British soldiers gouged out the eyes of Arab prisoners were quoted prominently in the Nazi German press and elsewhere.

The declassified documents also record discussions among officials of the Colonial Office concerning the anti-terror methods used in Palestine. Lord Dufferin remarked: "British lives are being lost and I don't think that we, from the security of Whitehall, can protest squeamishly about measures taken by the men in the frontline." Sir John Shuckburgh defended the tactics on the grounds that the British were confronted "NOT WITH A CHIVALROUS OPPONENT PLAYING THE GAME ACCORDING TO THE RULES, BUT WITH GANGSTERS AND MURDERERS."

There were many differences between British policy in the 1930s and Israeli policy today, but two stand out. THE FIRST  IS   that the British, faced with a level of Palestinian Arab terrorism considerably less lethal than that which Israel faces today, nevertheless utilized anti-terror methods considerably harsher than those used by Israeli forces. THE SECOND IS   that when the situation became unbearable, the British could go home; the Israelis, by contrast, have no other place to go.

 

 

Dr. Medoff is Visiting Scholar in the Jewish Studies Program at SUNY-Purchase. His most recent book is Baksheesh Diplomacy: Secret Negotiations Between American Jewish Leaders and Arab Officials on the Eve of World War II (Lexington Books, 2001).

 

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.