UN Security Council Resolution 242.

 

Adopted: November 22, 1967

 

by Eli E. Hertz

 

Resolution 242 is the cornerstone for what it calls "a just and lasting peace." It calls for a negotiated solution based on "secure and recognized boundaries" – recognizing the flaws in Israel's previous temporary borders – the 1948 Armistice lines or the "Green Line"1 – by not calling upon Israel to withdraw from 'all occupied territories,' but rather "from territories occupied."

 

The United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 242 in 1967 following the Six-Day War.2 It followed Israel's takeover of the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip from Egypt, the Golan Heights from Syria, and the West Bank from Jordan. The resolution was to become the foundation for future peace negotiations. Yet contrary to Arab contentions, a careful examination of the resolution will show that it does not require Israel to return to the June 4, 1967 Armistice lines or "Green Line."

 

Resolution 242 was approved on November 22, 1967, more than five months after the war. Although Israel launched a pre-emptive and surprise strike at Egypt on June 5, 1967, this was a response to months of belligerent declarations and actions by its Arab neighbors that triggered the war: 465,000 enemy troops, more than 2,880 tanks and 810 aircrafts, preparing for war, surrounded Israel in the weeks leading up to June 5, 1967. In addition, Egypt had imposed an illegal blockade against Israeli shipping by closing the Straits of Tiran, the Israeli outlet to the Red Sea and Israel's only supply route to Asia – an act of aggression – in total violation of international law. In legal parlance, those hostile acts are recognized by the Law of Nations as a casus belli [Latin: Justification for acts of war].

 

The Arab measures went beyond mere power projection. Arab states did not plan merely to attack Israel to dominate it or grab territory; their objective was to destroy Israel. Their own words leave no doubt as to this intention. The Arabs meant to annihilate a neighboring state and fellow member of the UN by force of arms:3

 

• "We intend to open a general assault against Israel. This will be total war. Our basic aim will be to destroy Israel." (Egyptian President Gamal Abdel-Nasser, May 26, 1967)

• "The sole method we shall apply against Israel is total war, which will result in the extermination of Zionist existence." (Egyptian Radio, 'Voice of the Arabs,' May 18, 1967)

• "I, as a military man, believe that the time has come to enter into a battle of annihilation." (Syrian Defense Minister Hafez al-Assad, May 20, 1967)

• "The existence of Israel is an error which must be rectified. ... Our goal is clear – to wipe Israel off the map." (Iraqi President Abdur Rahman Aref, May 31, 1967)

Arab declarations about destroying Israel were made preceding the war when control over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (or Sinai and the Golan Heights) were not in Israel's hands, and no so-called Israeli occupation existed.

 

That is why the UN Security Council recognized that Israel had acquired the territory from Egypt, Jordan, and Syria not as a matter of aggression, but as an act of self-defense. That is also why Resolution 242 was passed under Chapter VI of the UN Charter rather than Chapter VII. As explained above, UN resolutions adopted under Chapter VI call on nations to negotiate settlements, while resolutions under the more stringent Chapter VII section deal with clear acts of aggression that allow the UN to enforce its resolutions upon any state seen as threatening the security of another state or states.

 

Although Resolution 242 refers to "the inadmissibility" of acquiring territory by war, a statement used in nearly all UN resolutions relating to Israel, Professor, Judge Stephen M. Schwebel, former President of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Hague, explains that the principle of "acquisition of territory by war is inadmissible" must be read together with other principles:

 

"… namely, that no legal right shall spring from a wrong, and the Charter principle that the Members of the United Nations shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State."

 

Resolution 242 immediately follows to emphasize the "need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every state in the area can live in security."

 

While Resolution 242 may call upon Israel to withdraw from territory it captured during the war, the UN recognized that Israel cannot return to the non-secure borders existing before the Six-Day War that invited aggression – frontiers that the usually mild-mannered and eloquent former Israeli diplomat, the late Abba Eban, branded "Auschwitz borders."

 

 

The Meaning of the Words "All" & "The"

 

As noted above, the UN adopted Resolution 242 in late November 1967, five months after the Six-Day War ended. It took that long because intense and deliberate negotiations were needed to carefully craft a document that met the Arabs' demand for a return of land, and Israel's requirement that the Arabs recognize Israel's legitimacy, to make a lasting peace.

 

It also took that long because each word in the resolution was deliberately chosen, and certain words were deliberately omitted, according to negotiators who drafted the resolution.

 

So although Arab officials claim Resolution 242 requires Israel to withdraw from all territory it captured in June 1967, nowhere in the resolution is that demand delineated. Nor did those involved in the negotiations and drafting of the resolution want such a requirement. Instead, they say Resolution 242 explicitly and intentionally omitted the terms 'the territories' or 'all territories.'

 

The wording of UN Resolution 242 clearly reflects the contention that none of the territories were occupied territories taken by force in an unjust war.

 

Because the Arabs were clearly the aggressors, nowhere in UN Security Council Resolutions 242 is Israel branded as an invader or unlawful occupier of the territories.

The minutes of the six month 'debate' over the wording of Resolution 242, as noted above, showing that draft resolutions attempted to brand Israel an aggressor and illegal occupier as a result of the 1967 Six-Day War, were all defeated by either the UN General Assembly or the Security Council.

 

Professor Eugene Rostow, then U.S. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, went on record in 1991 to make this clear:

 

"Resolution 242, which as undersecretary of state for political affairs between 1966 and 1969 I helped produce, calls on the parties to make peace and allows Israel to administer the territories it occupied in 1967 until 'a just and lasting peace in the Middle East' is achieved. When such a peace is made, Israel is required to withdraw its armed forces 'from territories' it occupied during the Six-Day War - not from 'the' territories nor from 'all' the territories, but from some of the territories, which included the Sinai Desert, the West Bank, the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip."

Professor Rostow continues and describes:

 

"Five-and-a-half months of vehement public diplomacy in 1967 made it perfectly clear what the missing definite article in Resolution 242 means. Ingeniously drafted resolutions calling for withdrawals from 'all' the territories were defeated in the Security Council and the General Assembly. Speaker after speaker made it explicit that Israel was not to be forced back to the 'fragile' and 'vulnerable' Armistice Demarcation Lines ['Green Line'], but should retire once peace was made to what Resolution 242 called 'secure and recognized' boundaries …"

 

Lord Caradon, then the United Kingdom Ambassador to the UN and the key drafter of the resolution, said several years later:

 

"We knew that the boundaries of '67 were not drawn as permanent frontiers; they were a cease-fire line of a couple decades earlier. We did not say the '67 boundaries must be forever."

 

Referring to Resolution 242, Lord Caradon added:

"The essential phrase which is not sufficiently recognized is that withdrawal should take place to secure and recognized boundaries, and these words were very carefully chosen: they have to be secure and they have to be recognized. They will not be secure unless they are recognized. And that is why one has to work for agreement. This is essential. I would defend absolutely what we did. It was not for us to lay down exactly where the border should be. I know the 1967 border very well. It is not a satisfactory border, it is where troops had to stop in 1947, just where they happened to be that night, that is not a permanent boundary ... "

 

In a 1974 statement he said:

"It would have been wrong to demand that Israel return to its positions of 4 June 1967. … That's why we didn't demand that the Israelis return to them and I think we were right not to."

 

It is true, as Arab leaders correctly note, that certain suggested drafts of Resolution 242 exist that contain that tiny controversial "the" in reference to territories. Arab leaders say this proves that Israel must withdraw from all territories captured in 1967. However, those versions of the resolution are in French. Under international law, English-language versions are followed and accepted as the conclusive reference point, and French versions are not.

 

Arthur J. Goldberg,8 the U.S. Ambassador to the UN in 1967 and a key draftee of Resolution 242, stated:

 

"The notable omissions in language used to refer to withdrawal are the words the, all, and the June 5, 1967 lines. I refer to the English text of the resolution. The French and Soviet texts differ from the English in this respect, but the English text was voted on by the Security Council, and thus it is determinative. In other words, there is lacking a declaration requiring Israel to withdraw from the (or all the) territories occupied by it on and after June 5, 1967. Instead, the resolution stipulates withdrawal from occupied territories without defining the extent of withdrawal. And it can be inferred from the incorporation of the words secure and recognized boundaries that the territorial adjustments to be made by the parties in their peace settlements could encompass less than a complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied territories."

 

Political figures and international jurists have discussed the existence of "permissible" or "legal occupations." In a seminal article on this question, entitled What Weight to Conquest, Professor, Judge Schwebel wrote:

 

"A state [Israel] acting in lawful exercise of its right of self-defense may seize and occupy foreign territory as long as such seizure and occupation are necessary to its self-defense. … Where the prior holder of territory had seized that territory unlawfully, the state which subsequently takes that territory in the lawful exercise of self-defense has, against that prior holder, better title.

 

"As between Israel, acting defensively in 1948 and 1967, on the one hand, and her Arab neighbors, acting aggressively, in 1948 and 1967, on the other, Israel has the better title in the territory of what was Palestine, including the whole of Jerusalem, than do Jordan and Egypt."

 

Professor Julius Stone, a leading authority on the Law of Nations, has concurred, further clarifying:

"Territorial Rights Under International Law. ... By their [Arab countries] armed attacks against the State of Israel in 1948, 1967, and 1973, and by various acts of belligerency throughout this period, these Arab states flouted their basic obligations as United Nations members to refrain from threat or use of force against Israel's territorial integrity and political independence. These acts were in flagrant violation inter alia of Article 2(4) and paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of the same article."11

 

If the West Bank and Gaza were indeed occupied territory – belonging to someone else and unjustly seized by force – there could be no grounds for negotiating new borders.

 

 

Eli E. Hertz

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

Islamism 2.0.

 

by Daniel Pipes

To borrow a computer term, if Ayatollah Khomeini, Osama bin Laden, and Nidal Hasan represent Islamism 1.0, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (the prime minister of Turkey), Tariq Ramadan (a Swiss intellectual), and Keith Ellison (a U.S. congressman) represent Islamism 2.0. The former kill more people but the latter pose a greater threat to Western civilization.

The 1.0 version attacks those perceived as obstructing its goal of a society ruled by a global caliphate and totally regulated by the Shari'a (Islamic law). Islamism's original tactics, from totalitarian rule to mega-terrorism, encompass unlimited brutality. Three thousand dead in one attack? Bin Laden's search for atomic weaponry suggests the murderous toll could be a hundred or even a thousand times larger.

However, a review of the past three decades, since Islamism became a significant political force, finds that violence alone rarely works. Survivors of terrorism rarely capitulate to radical Islam – not after the assassination of Anwar el-Sadat in Egypt in 1981, nor the 9/11 attacks, the Bali bombings of 2002, the Madrid bombing of 2004, the Amman bombing of 2005, or the terrorist campaigns in Israel, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Terrorism does physical damage and kills and intimidates but it rarely overturns the existing order. Imagine Islamists had caused the devastation of Hurricane Katrina or the 2004 tsunami – what could these have lastingly achieved?

Non-terrorist violence aimed at applying the Shari'a does hardly better. Revolution (meaning, a wide-scale social revolt) took Islamists to power in just one place at one time - Iran in 1978–79. Likewise, coup d'état (a military overthrow) carried them to power just once – Sudan in 1989. Same for civil war – Afghanistan in 1996.

If the violence of Islamism 1.0 rarely succeeds in forwarding the Shari'a, the Islamism 2.0 strategy of working through the system does better. Islamists, adept at winning public opinion, represent the main opposition force in Muslim-majority countries such as Morocco, Egypt, Lebanon, and Kuwait. Islamists have enjoyed electoral success in Algeria in 1992, Bangladesh in 2001, Turkey in 2002, and Iraq in 2005.

Once in power, they can move the country toward Shari'a. As Mahmoud Ahmadinejad faces the wrath of Iranian street demonstrators and bin Laden cowers in a cave, Erdoğan basks in public approval, remakes the Republic of Turkey, and offers an enticing model for Islamists worldwide.

Recognizing this pattern, Al-Qaeda's once-leading theorist has publicly repudiated terrorism and adopted political means. Sayyid Imam al-Sharif (b. 1950, also known by the nom de guerre Dr. Fadl) was accused of helping assassinate Sadat. In 1988 he published a book that argued for perpetual, violent jihad against the West. With time, however, Sharif observed the inutility of violent attacks and instead advocated a strategy of infiltrating the state and influencing society.

In a recent book, he condemned the use of force against Muslims ("Every drop of blood that was shed or is being shed in Afghanistan and Iraq is the responsibility of bin Laden and Zawahiri and their followers") and even against non-Muslims (9/11 was counterproductive, for "what good is it if you destroy one of your enemy's buildings, and he destroys one of your countries? What good is it if you kill one of his people, and he kills a thousand of yours?").

Sharif's evolution from theorist of terrorism to advocate of lawful transformation echoes a much broader shift; accordingly, as author Lawrence Wright notes, his defection poses a "terrible threat" to Al-Qaeda. Other once-violent Islamist organizations in Algeria, Egypt, and Syria have recognized the potential of lawful Islamism and largely renounced violence. One also sees a parallel shift in Western countries; Ramadan and Ellison represent a burgeoning trend.

(What one might call Islamism 1.5 – a combination of hard and soft means, of external and internal approaches – also works. It involves lawful Islamists softening up the enemy, then violent elements seizing power. The Hamas takeover of Gaza proved that such a combination can work: win elections in 2006, then stage a violent insurrection in 2007. Similar processes are possibly underway in Pakistan. The United Kingdom might be undergoing the opposite process, whereby violence creates a political opening.)

In conclusion, only Islamists, not fascists or communists, have gone well beyond crude force to win public support and develop a 2.0 version. Because this aspect of Islamism undermines traditional values and destroys freedoms, it may threaten civilized life even more than does 1.0's brutality.

 

Daniel Pipes  is director of the Middle East Forum and Taube distinguished visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution of Stanford University.

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

Unilateral Moves and Countermoves.

 

by Evelyn Gordon

Interviewed by BBC Arabic this weekend, Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas denied reports that he would seek UN Security Council approval for unilaterally declaring a Palestinian state. Rather, he said, "We will turn to the United Nations and the Security Council to strengthen what has been agreed on in the road map and approved by the Security Council, a two-state solution based on the June 4, 1967 borders."

That may sound innocuous. But in fact, Security Council acquiescence to this proposal would both radically alter the current international position and demolish the already faltering principle that the talks' outcome should not be prejudiced by unilateral action.

While most of the world already believes the 1967 lines should be the final border, the formal basis for the talks remains Security Council Resolution 242, which says no such thing. This resolution purposefully required an Israeli withdrawal only from "territories" captured in 1967, not "the territories" or "all the territories." As Lord Caradon, the British UN ambassador who drafted 242, explained, "It would have been wrong to demand that Israel return to its positions of June 4, 1967, because those positions were undesirable and artificial." America's then UN ambassador, Arthur Goldberg, similarly said the two omitted words "were not accidental …. the resolution speaks of withdrawal from occupied territories without defining the extent of withdrawal." This was equally clear to the Soviet Union and Arab states, which is why they unsuccessfully pushed to include those extra words.

Formally, therefore, the final border is subject to negotiations: The Palestinians can seek the 1967 lines, but Israel is free to seek to retain parts of the territories. However, should the council endorse "a two-state solution based on the June 4, 1967 borders," this would no longer be true: Instead, the world would have formally adopted the Palestinian position in a binding resolution — thereby blatantly prejudicing the outcome of the talks.

Ironically, this could force Israel to respond with accelerated unilateral action of its own: settlement construction, and perhaps even formal annexation. A major spur to continued settlement construction in recent years has been the escalating international pressure on Israel to withdraw to the 1967 lines, which led Jerusalem to conclude that its only chance of retaining areas it deems critical for its security was to put so many people there that moving them would be impossible. If this pressure switched from de facto to de jure, more aggressive Israeli countermeasures might become necessary.

In contrast, had the world really treated the border as negotiable rather than openly backed the Palestinian position, Israel could have agreed to freeze settlement construction, because creating "facts on the ground" would not have been necessary to protect its interests.

An escalating war of unilateral moves and countermoves would not be conducive to any agreement. That might not disturb Abbas, who has repeatedly demonstrated a preference for dictated rather than negotiated solutions. But it ought to disturb all those Security Council members who claim to view an Israeli-Palestinian agreement as top priority.

 

Evelyn Gordon

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

Obama's General Says: Syria Allied with Al-Qaida, Attacking U.S.; White House Says: Is that a Problem?

by Barry Rubin

Does anyone read the newspapers in the U.S. government? How about checking out the dispatches coming from its generals in the field? Here’s a news story which tells all.

A Reuters’ dispatch from Iraq interviews the commander of U.S. forces there. What’s he say?

Al-Qaida is joining forces with Saddam Hussein’s supporters.

And where are both al-Qaida’s forces fighting in Iraq and Saddam’s backers headquartered with lots of money stolen from Iraq? Syria.

Syria? So Damascus is now allied with al-Qaida, the perpetrators of the September 11 attack to kill Americans and defeat the United States in Iraq? Is that right, general?:

“Investigations into massive suicide bombings in Baghdad on Oct. 25, in which more than 150 people died, indicated that explosives or fighters were coming across from Syria, U.S. General Ray Odierno also said.”

So, again, Syria is letting al-Qaida and Saddamist terrorists come in, get armed and trained, cross the border in Iraq, and run back for safe haven. Right, general?:

“The U.S. commander's comments reinforced accusations by the government of Shi'ite Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki that al Qaeda and former Baathists were working together to undermine improved security and elections expected to be held in January. Maliki's government has also accused neighboring Syria of giving a safe haven to Baathists plotting attacks in Iraq.”

Yes, that’s what I said, right? And do remember that the Obama Administration has refused to support Iraq’s complaints against Syria. Are the Syrians helping kill a lot of people?:

“Overall violence in Iraq has fallen sharply in the past 18 months and November so far has experienced one of the lowest civilian casualty levels since the 2003 U.S. invasion. But attacks by suspected Sunni Islamist insurgents like al Qaeda remain common. The twin suicide bombings in Baghdad on Oct. 25 devastated the Justice Ministry and the Baghdad governorate headquarters, while two similar suicide bombings on Aug. 19 killed almost 100 people at the foreign and finance ministries.”

So violence is continuing. As U.S. forces withdraw someone is trying to wreck the situation there so that the U.S. departure looks like defeat. Wonder who?

"`We believe that there will be attempts to conduct more attacks between now and the elections because they want to destabilize those,’ Odierno said.”

And who might be making those attacks, general?

"`My experience is there probably was some movement of fighters or explosives coming from Syria,’" he said when asked if the investigations had indicated any links to Syria.”

Thank you. So, the Obama Administration’s military commander says Syria is behind massive attacks and working closely with Usama bin Ladin’s guys.

Has the president of the United States said anything about this? Has he made any criticism of Syria? Is he ready to break off engagement efforts with the dictatorship? Has he backed up Iraqi government requests for backing in demanding Syria stop facilitating such attacks and turn over those Iraqis responsible?

No, no, no, and again no.

If the Obama Administration is fighting a war against al-Qaida why is Syria, today that group‘s main organizational and military base in the Middle East getting away with allying to the people who murdered 3,000 Americans on September 11?

If the Obama Administration is fighting a war in Iraq why is it doing nothing about the main ally of the insurgents killing American soldiers and so many Iraqi civilians, trying to wreck your policy?

Not to mention Syria trying to take over Lebanon, allying with Iran, sponsoring Hamas and Hizballah, being a major sponsor of international terrorism, and trying to build nuclear weapons’ facilities secretly?

There is an old expression about fighting with one hand tied behind your back. The Obama Administration is waging a foreign policy with both hands tied behind its back, plugs in its ears, and a gag over its mouth.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal.

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

Don't run to Assad.

by Gabriel Siboni

The latest appeal by Syrian President Bashar Assad to renew negotiations with Israel, and statements on his people's readiness for peace, have once again brought peace talks with Damascus to the forefront.

The eager response by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, President Shimon Peres and Defense Minister Ehud Barak, who expressed their willingness to enter negotiations without preconditions as soon as possible, amply demonstrates how Assad is getting to eat the cake and have it too.

Syria has been brought back from the political cold only after indirect talks with Israel via Turkey were revealed. These talks gave the Syrian regime legitimacy, even though Syria continued on as a loyal member of the radical bloc. The talks boosted the ostracized regime, and the full extent of the strategic damage they have caused to Israel has yet to be fully understood. Syria was and is a disturber of regional balance, as American forces coping with its attempts to destabilize Iraq can testify.

Assad has several personal achievements of this kind to his credit: Syrian involvement in the assassination of Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri is well-known; Syria is developing chemical weapons of mass-destruction, and has tried to set up a nuclear reactor to achieve military nuclear capability.

Terrorist organizations over the years have found Syria to be a convenient and helpful host. Syria's deep involvement in Lebanon and its part in delivering advanced weapon systems to Hezbollah increase Lebanese instability, while providing backing for increased Iranian involvement. All these demonstrate how deeply Assad is implicated in the radical axis.

Some say that pulling Syria out of the Axis of Evil will improve Israel's overall strategic balance. But closer heed must be paid to the Syrian president's words. To him, peace with Israel means Israeli retreat from the Golan, while he maintains his strategic connection to Iran and other rogue states. Past experience shows that rapprochement attempts by Israel and parts of the international community don't make him moderate his positions, but rather convince him to believe he can have everything both ways.

Israeli decision-makers need to fundamentally review Israel's real interest in regard to Syria, while neutralizing the kind of strategic discourse that was relevant 30 years ago but is now hopelessly outdated.

The enemy, having realized it cannot conquer Israel, has chosen the path of resistance and attrition, with the aim of exhausting Israelis in the long run. This change proves the irrelevance of giving away assets in exchange for security arrangements and guarantees, demilitarization and the like.

A true peace agreement with Syria can only be discussed after Syria undergoes a profound and fundamental change. The desire to please the Damascus regime and go into talks will not help bring about such change.

Assad, whose supreme interest is preserving the Alawi reign, has a lot to lose. Israel must reach a strategic agreement with the American administration on the fundamental conditions for talks with Syria.

The first among them should be separation from the radical axis and from radical ideology. Syria, deep in the throes of an economic crisis and located in a problematic geo-strategic position, must choose a new path before peace talks can begin. Right now, Assad's haughty attitude is like he is living in a glass house and throwing stones in every direction.

Gabriel Siboni chairs the military research program at the Institute for National Security Studies.

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

When it Comes to Iran, President Obama Won't Hear "No" For an Answer.

by Barry Rubin

Question: What does Iran have to do to get across the fact that it isn’t making a deal on its nuclear program?

Secretary of State Hilary Clinton says she doesn’t consider the Iranian foreign minister’s statement that they aren’t making the deal to be “the final word.” The Obama Administration will give Tehran a few more chances—and probably a few more months—to stall in order to race ahead in their atom bomb program and to build up ways of overcoming any sanctions that are some day applied.

Indeed, the United States and five other powers are holding still another meeting to, in the words of EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana's spokeswoman "review the latest developments on the Iran nuclear issue." But since no one is concluding Iran is saying no, they won’t take one step toward higher sanctions.

Higher sanctions, you might remember, were supposed to come about in September 2009 under the Obama Administration's own original time table. You know when the deadline was for the multi-year European negotiations with Iran was? September 2007.

Now at the earliest sanctions probably wouldn’t come before, what, March 2010? Victory for the Iran regime.

Another great power statement says that Iran has "not responded positively" to the plan, "We are disappointed by the lack of follow-up," and "Iran has not engaged in an intensified dialogue and in particular has not accepted to have a new meeting."

I think Iran is trying to tell you something, guys. But since it isn’t in writing yet, well, they claim they can’t do anything. And of course the Iranian regime will--with U.S. government cooperation--draw this out as long as possible.

Memo to world leaders: Do you think they might be stalling for time?

Note something important here. It isn’t as if the minute they declare that Iran rejects any compromise or serious negotiations there will be stronger sanctions. Oh, no. At that point, the United States and Europeans will start meeting to figure out what sanctions to put on. Of course, they will disagree, the Russians and Chinese will water it down. The plan is also to bring in the entire EU which means, for example, that Spain or Sweden could slow down the process or force a reduction in the planned pressures on Tehran.

Now what is the president of the United States's response to all this? Hold onto your syntax:

"Iran has taken weeks now and has not shown its willingness to say yes to this proposal...and so as a consequence we have begun discussions with our international partners about the importance of having consequences."

Can you imagine what would have been said if President George W. Bush, that fumblemouthed clown so unlike the brilliant articulate Obama had said "the importance of having consequences"? What does that phrase mean? Translation: I refuse to threaten Iran. I am reluctant to put on sanctions. I don't want to admit that engagement has failed. Where's the teleprompter?"

Now a new voice has been added asking for Obama to take tough action. that of Mohsen Makhmalbaf, international spokesman for Iran's main opposition movement. He urged Obama to increase  public support for Iranian dissidents and stop the regime from getting nuclear weapons.

Recall that Obama's claim that a tougher stance would hurt the opposition was a major reason for him refusing to condemn the election theft, speak out forcibly against the repression, and hit the regime harder. Well, obviously that's untrue.

But even Makhmalbaf, former campaign spokesman for presidential candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi, thinks the regime won't make a deal because, in his words, "If they agree not to pursue a nuclear bomb and start negotiations, they will lose their supporters. Definitely dialogue is better than war. ... But can you continue your dialogue without any results?"

Answer: Apparently yes.

Now here's where it gets really disgusting.

In 1983, 241 U.S. servicemen were killed in the bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in an operation backed by Iran and Syria, carried out by Hizballah and other Iranian agents. Two yars ago, a federal court ruled that Iran was indeed responsible and ordered that Tehran pay $2.65 billion in damages to families of those killed.

The Justice Department is arguing that implementing the decision "can have significant, detrimental impact on our foreign relations, as well as the reciprocal treatment of the United States and its extensive overseas property holdings."

Really? What is Iran going to do, seize the U.S. embassy and hold everyone hostage? Oh, they already did that. Support terrorist attacks against Americans in Iraq. Oh, they are doing that, too. Hold anti-American rallies and call the United States "the Great Satan?" Oh, too late.

What this Administration doesn't understand is the value of pressure, leverage, credibility, and lots of other diplomatic techniques. What it should do is: let the court decision be implemented and put on sanctions now. That would be a much better situation:

--Under more pressure the likelihood of its slowing down the program and bargaining will increase. Sure, they won't really make a deal but at least they will be more scared and cautious.

--If sanctions are increased, Iran's ability to move ahead quickly with the program and its other aggressive designs will be weakened.

--Seeing the West being tougher and the United States showing some real leadership, Arab and other states will take heart and will resist more themselves. Otherwise, they will rush--as is already happening--to appease Iran.

Otherwise, the U.S. government will just go on holding "discussions with our international partners about the importance of having consequences."  Unfortunately, for Iran Obama's policy has no consequences.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal.

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

Analysis: Virtual diplomacy, real damage.

by Jonathan Spyer

The statement by French President Nicolas Sarkozy in Riyadh last week expressing French willingness to mediate talks between Syria and Israel is the latest indication of Syria's emergence from diplomatic isolation.

 

Damascus has largely rebuilt its links with Europe and the Arab world. There is now a real possibility of a revival of indirect talks between Israel and Syria.

Such talks, if they take place, are almost certain to get nowhere.

Still, the near guarantee of failure of any talks does not render Sarkozy's offer insignificant. It is to be hoped that the Netanyahu government resists the temptation to reopen the Syrian track.

Why might the government be tempted to enter indirect negotiations with Syria at this point? It is an article of faith among European countries and in the current US administration that a peace process between Israel and one or other of its enemies is essential. Israel's international diplomatic position currently leaves a lot to be desired. The perceived US distancing from Israel has emboldened those very considerable elements in Europe who would like to see increased pressure on the Jewish state.

There appears to be little hope of substantive movement in stalled talks between Israel and the troubled, perhaps moribund Palestinian Authority. Talks with Syria could provide the illusion of diplomatic motion which could help alleviate claims that Israel represents an intransigent barrier to progress toward regional stability.

Why would such talks almost certainly fail? The formula for success in negotiations between Israel and Syria is no longer the '90s recipe of land for peace. A breakthrough in Jerusalem-Damascus negotiations would be predicated on the basis of "land for strategic realignment."

That is, Syria would be expected to abandon its regional alliance with Iran in return for Israeli territorial concessions on the Golan Heights.

Damascus, however, has made abundantly clear that such a realignment is not on the table. The reasons are fairly obvious. Syria's current stance of alliance with Iran gives the Damascus regime most of what it needs. Syria is seen as a vital part of any regional diplomatic process, because of its ability to spoil progress through its alignment with radical forces.

As Syria's recent rapprochement with Saudi Arabia and France suggests, keeping the alliance with Iran comes at very little cost. And there is a deeper sense that the Damascus regime is comfortable with its place in the Iranian alliance, which enables it to indulge in the nationalist chest-beating and poses of "resistance," which it enjoys.

So reviving the appearance of talks with Syria might seem a cost-free move for Israel. It could make the Europeans happier, diverting the oft-made (and incorrect) claims that Israel currently has the most right-wing government in its history. And it would almost certainly not lead to any potentially dangerous actual concessions to Damascus.

But this is not so. Restarting talks with Syria would not be cost-free.

Syria has emerged from isolation without in any way modifying its alliance with Iran, and its support for terror organizations in Lebanon, Iraq and among the Palestinians. This achievement is testimony not to any hidden diplomatic genius lurking among the Ba'athists of Damascus. Rather, it shows the weakness, confusion and disunity of those forces in the region and beyond it who might be expected to have an interest in challenging Iran and its allies in their bid for dominance of the Middle East.

Saudi Arabia in the last week suffered a stinging defeat at the hands of the Syrians in the Lebanese arena. The formation of the new Lebanese government represents an effective surrender of pro-Saudi forces in that country to the allies of Iran and Syria. Yet the Saudis are understood to be maintaining their improved relations with Damascus out of a shared desire to undermine the Maliki government in Iraq.

France, meanwhile, wishes to play an increased role in regional diplomacy and sees the revival of close relations with Damascus as a way to do this. France also (astonishingly) thinks that Syria could play a role in mediating with Iran over its nuclear program.

Both Paris and Riyadh have thus elected to place short-term gain over long term interest.

The bigger picture of the Israeli and broader Western interest in the region requires the containment and ultimately the rolling back of the currently emboldened Iranian-led alliance. Reviving the prospect of Israeli territorial concessions to Syria, at a time when Damascus is engaged in sponsoring organizations engaged in proxy war with Israel and others would be to reward aggression.

It would furnish an additional argument in the armory of Iran and its supporters who maintain, not without reason, that the camp facing them is weak and responds to pressure by making concessions.

The Obama administration has so far held off from joining in the rush to make up with Syria. Washington has sent a series of visitors to Damascus and is preparing to appoint a new ambassador. But the sanctions remain in place, and the administration appears mindful of Syrian actions in Iraq, Lebanon and among the Palestinians.

The administration has failed, nevertheless, to articulate a clear understanding of the current strategic picture in the region. The building of clarity in this regard represents a core strategic interest for Israel. It would be mistaken to sacrifice this interest on the altar of any short-term alleviation of pressure resulting from a revival of virtual diplomacy with the Assad regime.

Jonathan Spyer  is a senior research fellow at the Global Research in International Affairs Center, IDC, Herzliya.

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

 

Analyzing Warstuff.

by Yaacov Lozowick

Where do you go if you're an American general, say, or a British one, and your troops in Iraq or Afghanistan are encountering a new type of homemade but lethal weapon, and you need some advice on what it's made from so as the better to defend yourself?

To Israel, of course. The Israelis have this unit, run by a mad scientist, who collects bit of ordnance, learns everything possible about it, and makes useful recommendations.

RECENTLY, THE AMERICAN MILITARY BEGAN STUDYING THE IDF EXPERIENCE. "THEY NEVER IMAGINED IEDS LIKE THAT. THEY'RE STILL BACK IN THE 1980S, FIGHTING THE SOVIETS. THEY'RE MAKING THIS HUGE REVIEW AND CAME TO US TO LEARN EVERYTHING ABOUT THE MATERIALS AND HOW TO TAKE THE THINGS APART," SAYS TUVAL.

DELEGATES FROM OTHER ARMIES FIGHTING IN AFGHANISTAN, INCLUDING THE BRITISH, ITALIANS AND GERMANS, HAVE ALSO VISITED THE LAB TO STUDY THE THREATS AHEAD. BRITISH EXPERTS, THIS TIME FROM SCOTLAND YARD, ALSO VISITED THE LAB IN 2005 TO LEARN THE TYPES OF EXPLOSIVES USED IN THE 2005 LONDON BOMBINGS, WHICH WERE DIFFERENT FROM BOMBS THEY KNEW FROM THE IRA.

So far, so not surprising. The part I found of special interest, however, was this one:

IN OTHER CASES, THE LAB IS REQUESTED TO PRODUCE RESULTS IN REAL TIME. DURING OPERATION CAST LEAD THE LAB DEDUCED FROM SHRAPNEL EMBEDDED IN A PARATROOP OFFICER'S HELMET THAT HE WAS NOT INJURED BY AN IED BUT BY A SNIPER'S BULLET, THUS MAKING THE ARMY AWARE A SNIPER WAS OPERATING IN THAT AREA.

Interesting, isn't it? The troops in the field and their commanders weren't sure what was going on, so the forensic fellows back near Tel Aviv figured out there must be a Palestinian sniper hidden nearby. Just the kind of thing the foreign observers and bearers of human rights in vain always know better about than the professionals who are there at the time.

 

Yaacov Lozowick
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

Nidal Hasan and Fort Hood.

 

A Study in Muslim Doctrine

by Raymond Ibrahim

One of the difficulties in discussing Islam's more troubling doctrines is that they have an anachronistic, even otherworldly, feel to them; that is, unless actively and openly upheld by Muslims, non-Muslims, particularly of the Western variety, tend to see them as abstract theory, not standard practice for today. In fact, some Westerners have difficulties acknowledging even those problematic doctrines that are openly upheld by Muslims — such as jihad. How much more when the doctrines in question are subtle, or stealthy, in nature?

Enter Nidal Malik Hasan, the psychiatrist, U.S. Army major, and "observant Muslim who prayed daily," who recently went on a shooting rampage at Fort Hood, killing thirteen Americans (including a pregnant woman). While the media wonders in exasperation why he did it, offering the same old tired and trite reasons — he was "picked on," he was "mentally unbalanced" — the fact is his behavior comports well with certain Islamic doctrines. As such, it behooves Americans to take a moment and familiarize themselves with the esotericisms of Islam.

Note: Any number of ulema (Muslim scholars) have expounded the following doctrines. However, since jihadi icon and theoretician Ayman Zawahiri, al-Qaeda's number two, has also addressed many of these doctrines in his treatises, including by quoting several authoritative ulema, I will primarily rely on excerpts from The Al Qaeda Reader (AQR), for those readers who wish to source, and read in context, the following quotes in one volume.

 

Wala' wa Bara'

Perhaps best translated as "loyalty and enmity," this doctrine requires Muslims to maintain absolute loyalty to Islam and one another, while disavowing, even hating (e.g., Koran 60:4), all things un-Islamic — including persons (a.k.a. "infidels"). This theme has ample support in the Koran, hadith, and rulings of the ulema, that is, usul al-fiqh (roots of Muslim jurisprudence). In fact, Zawahiri has written a fifty-page treatise entitled "Loyalty and Enmity" (AQR, p. 63-115).

One of the many Koranic verses on which he relies warns Muslims against "taking the Jews and Christians as friends and allies … whoever among you takes them for friends and allies, he is surely one of them" (Koran 5:51), i.e., he becomes an infidel. The plain meaning of this verse alone — other verses, such as 3:28, 4:144, and 6:40 follow this theme — and its implications for today can hardly be clearer. According to one of the most authoritative Muslim exegetes, al-Tabari (838-923), Koran 5:51 means that the Muslim who "allies with them [non-Muslims] and enables them against the believers, that same one is a member of their faith and community" (AQR, p. 71).

Sheikh al-Islam, Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328), takes the concept of loyalty one step further when he tells Muslims that they are "obligated to befriend a believer — even if he is oppressive and violent towards you and must be hostile to the infidel, even if he is liberal and kind to you" (AQR, p. 84).

In ways, Hasan's life was a testimony to loyalty and enmity. According to his colleague, Dr. Finnell, Hasan "was very vocal about the war, very upfront about being a Muslim first and an American second." If his being "vocal about the war" is not enough to demonstrate unwavering loyalty to Islam, his insistence that he is first and foremost a Muslim is. Other evidence indicates that the primary factor that threw him "over the edge" was that he was being deployed to a Muslim country (Afghanistan) — his "worst nightmare."

According to a fellow Muslim convenience store owner who often spoke with Hasan, the thought that he might injure or kill Muslims "weighed heavily on him." Hasan also counseled a fellow Muslim not to join the U.S. Army, since "Muslims shouldn't kill Muslims," again, showing where his loyalty lies. Tabari's exegesis comes to mind: the Muslim who "allies with them [non-Muslims] and enables them against the believers, that same one is a member of their faith and community," i.e., he too becomes an infidel (AQR, p. 71).

Another source who spoke with Hasan notes that "in the Koran, you're not supposed to have alliances with Jews or Christian or others, and if you are killed in the military fighting against Muslims, you will go to hell."

At any rate, surely none of this should come as a surprise. In April 2005, another Muslim serving in the U.S. Army, Hasan Akbar, was convicted of murder for killing two American soldiers and wounding fourteen in a grenade attack in Kuwait. According to the AP, "he launched the attack because he was concerned U.S. troops would kill fellow Muslims in Iraq."

 

Taqiyya

This doctrine, which revolves around deceiving the infidel, is pivotal to upholding loyalty and enmity wherever and whenever Muslim minorities live among non-Muslim majorities. In fact, the Koran's primary justification for deception is in the context of loyalty: "Let believers [Muslims] not take for friends and allies infidels [non-Muslims] instead of believers. Whoever does this shall have no relationship left with God — unless you but guard yourselves against them, taking precautions" (Koran 3:28). In other words, when necessary, Muslims are permitted to feign friendship and loyalty to non-Muslims, or, in the words of Abu Darda, a pious companion of Muhammad, "We grin to the faces of some peoples, while our hearts curse them" (AQR, p. 73). Taqiyya's importance for upholding loyalty and enmity is evidenced by the fact that, just three pages into his treatise, Zawahiri has an entire section called "The Difference Between Befriending and Dissembling." There he shows that, while sincere friendship with non-Muslims is forbidden, insincere friendship — whenever beneficial to Muslims — is not.

Again, Zawahiri quotes that standard reference, Tabari, who explains Koran 3:28 as follows: "Only when you are in their [non-Muslims'] power, fearing for yourselves, are you to demonstrate friendship for them with your tongues, while harboring hostility toward them. But do not join them in the particulars of their infidelities, and do not aid them through any action against a Muslim" (AQR, p. 74).

And therein lies the limit of taqiyya: when the deceit, the charade begins to endanger the lives of fellow Muslims — whom, as we have seen, deserve first loyalty — it is forbidden. As Zawahiri concludes, the Muslim may pretend, so long as he does "not undertake any initiative to support them [non-Muslims], commit sin, or enable [them] through any deed or killing or fighting against Muslims" (AQR, p. 75).

Again, we are reminded that the "moment of truth" for Hasan, who seems to have led something of a double life — American major and psychiatrist by day, financial supporter of jihadi groups and associate of terrorists by night — is the fact that he was being deployed to Afghanistan, i.e., he would have been aiding non-Muslim Americans against fellow Muslims (remember, he was "a Muslim first and an American second"). He tried to prevent this, getting a lawyer, to no avail. Thus, since he had taken deceit to its doctrinal limit and was now being placed in a position where he would have to actually demonstrate his loyalty to Americans against Muslims, it appears he decided to take it to the next level (see doctrine below).

Incidentally, we also find that "he [Hasan] was going to be kind of the caretaker for [American] Muslim soldiers. Sometimes Muslim soldiers have a rift between what they're doing and their faith," according to Major Khalid Shabazz, an Army Muslim chaplain. "That person who is a leader needs to quell some of those fears and help them through that process."

This all sounds well and good, but what, precisely, does it mean? If, as we have seen, Islam clearly forbids Muslims from aiding infidels against fellow Muslims, and if being in the U.S. Army requires American Muslims to fight non-American Muslims now and again, how was Hasan — or any other observant Muslim — going to "quell some of those fears and help through that process"? How, if not by merely instructing them in the centuries-old arts of taqiyya?

 

Jihad

Amongst learned infidels, jihad is the most recognized and notorious of all Muslim doctrines. Literally meaning to "struggle" or "strive," jihad can take on any form, though its most native and praiseworthy expression revolves around fighting, and killing, the infidel enemy — even if it costs the Muslim fighter (the mujahid) his life: "Let those who would exchange the life of this world for the Hereafter fight in the path of Allah; whoever fights in the path of Allah — whether he dies or triumphs — we shall richly reward him" (Koran 4:74). And "Allah has purchased from the faithful their lives and possessions, and in return has promised them the Garden. They will fight in the path of Allah, killing and being killed" (Koran 9:111).

The hadith also has its fair share of anecdotes advocating the "one-man jihad." Zawahiri's treatise, "Jihad, Martyrdom, and the Killing of Innocents," (AQR p. 137-171), spends much time justifying the desperate solo jihad — otherwise known as the "martyrdom operation" — including by offering the following hadith: "A Muslim asked Muhammad, O Messenger of Allah! If I plunge myself into the ranks of the idolaters and fight till I am killed — what then, to heaven? He [Muhammad] said yes. So the man plunged himself into the ranks of the idolaters, fighting till he was slain" (AQR, p. 153).

The learned ulema agree. According to al-Qurtubi (d. 1273), "There is no wrong for a man to singlehandedly attack a mighty army — if he seeks martyrdom — provided he has the fortitude." Others indicate that one of the reasons making the one-man jihad permissible is that it serves to "terrify the foe" (AQR, p. 155).

And there it is: When all else failed, when Hasan's forthcoming deployment into Muslim land forced him to expose where his true loyalty (wala') lies, pretense (taqiyya) gave way to full-blown struggle (jihad). Hasan, who sacrificed many years to become a psychiatrist and a U.S. Army major, in the clear words of the Koran "exchange[d] the life of this world for the Hereafter." Evidence also indicates that he believed "martyrdom operations" were not only valid but laudable acts of courage, writing "YOUR INTENTION IS THE MAIN ISSUE" (capitals in original). Zawahiri puts it more articulately: "The deciding factor is … the intention." Is the mujahid killing himself "to service Islam [laudable martyrdom], or is it out of depression and despair [forbidden suicide]?" (AQR, p. 157).

(Unfortunately and, no doubt, much to Hasan's chagrin, infidel medics ensured his failure to achieve martyrdom.)

The greatest proof that, at least in his own mind, Hasan was waging a jihad is the fact that he utilized that immemorial jihadi war cry — Allahu Akbar! — which has served to terrify the infidel denizens of the world for centuries. Here's an example from Muslim history (circa the early 8th century): "The [non-Muslim] inhabitants of eastern Anatolia were filled with terror the likes of which they had never experienced before. All they saw were Muslims in their midst screaming 'Allahu Akbar!' Allah planted terror in their hearts. … The [non-Muslim] men were crucified over the course of 24 km" (from Tarikh al-Rusul wa al-Muluk).

Indeed, while the takbir (the formal term for "Allahu Akbar") can be used in various contexts, it is by far primarily used in a jihadi context, past and present. Nearly 1,400 years ago, Muhammad and the early Muslims cried "Allahu Akbar" immediately before attacking their infidel neighbors; eight years before the Fort Hood massacre, Mohamed Atta cried "Allahu Akbar" immediately before crashing a hijacked plane into one of the Twin Towers on 9/11. Even Bukhari, the most authoritative hadith compiler, has an entire chapter titled "The Recitation of Takbir [i.e., Allahu Akbar] in War."

Yet confusion abides. An AP report writes: "As if going off to war, Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan cleaned out his apartment, gave leftover frozen broccoli to one neighbor, and called another to thank him for his friendship — common courtesies and routines of the departing soldier. Instead, authorities say, he went on the killing spree that left thirteen people at Fort Hood, Texas, dead." Contrary to the tone of this excerpt, Hasan's actions were far from contradictory. After all, he was "going off to war."

Wala' wa bara,' taqiyya, and jihad all help explain Hasan's actions. Even so, other lesser-known aspects of Islam lend their support to the view that he was acting from an Islamist framework.

 

Sakina

Several people who encountered Hasan before, and even during, the time he went a-jihading note that he evinced an almost unnatural amount of calmness — certainly for one getting ready to go on a killing spree. No doubt, many will point to this as a sign that he was suffering from some sort of schizophrenic episode.

Yet the fact remains: according to jihadi lore, a feeling of tranquility and calmness is supposed to descend on the mujahid, especially during the most stressful moments of combat (see Koran 9:26 for confirmation). This is known as sakina (calmness, tranquility). Osama bin Laden himself often describes his experience of sakina during the Afghan-Soviet war: "Once I was only thirty meters away from the Russians and they were trying to capture me. I was under bombardment, but I was so peaceful in my heart that I fell asleep. Before a battle, Allah sends us sequina [sakina] — tranquility." Of course, whether Hasan experienced "true" sakina, or whether he was merely affecting to himself, is irrelevant. Rather, the point here is that, once again, that which appears inexplicable or indicative of "mental instability" can be explained through an Islamic paradigm.

 

Da'wa

According to Sharia law, Muslims are not permitted to voluntarily reside in non-Muslim nations, such as America, except under certain circumstances. One of these is if the Muslim is actively engaged in da'wa, that is, proselytizing; another is if he fights in the path of Allah, jihad. Both serve the same purpose: empowering Islam by numbers and territory, respectively. Merely living in infidel territory out of choice, however, because it offers a "better life," is forbidden. (To get an idea of how serious a matter it is for Muslims to reside in non-Muslims nations, see some online fatwas.)

Accordingly, we find that the observant Hasan, prior to his jihadi spree, was engaged in da'wa for years. In fact, he aggressively pursued it to the point that he was reprimanded by the authorities. Nor did he cease trying to proselytize — that is, trying to validate his living with infidels — until the day before he went on his rampage, when he gave his neighbor a copy of the Koran. Of course, many Westerners will project their notions of proselytism onto Hasan and see only a God-fearing man "altruistically" concerned for the souls of others. Unfortunately, even the business card he included with his Koran gifts is indicative of violence, as it stealthily introduces him as a "soldier of Allah." Moreover, the "altruistic" interpretation fails to take into account the sort of legalism observant Muslims such as Hasan often adhere to: if he literally believed he was "exchanging this life for the Hereafter," he most likely also believed that he had to justify his voluntary dwelling with infidels, hence the da'wa.

* * *

Soon following the Fort Hood massacre, FBI agent Brad Garrett explained Hasan's behavior as follows: "It's one of those things that he obviously went to kill a lot of people [jihad] and commit suicide [martyrdom]. Maybe in his own mind that he's saving future lives [Muslim loyalty]." Read with the bracketed concepts I supplied, Hasan's actions become logical and consistent — again, from an doctrinal point of view, that is, from a point of view the West, especially its leaders, are loath to explore and alacritous to ignore.

For example, "U.S. Rep. Andre Carson, an Indiana Democrat who is one of two Muslims serving in Congress, cautioned against focusing on the alleged shooter's religion [and thus its doctrines] and instead said the discussion should be about mental health issues."

Flagrant obfuscations aside, the facts remain: loyalty to Muslims and enmity for infidels (wala' wa bara'), a secretive double life (taqiyya), violence in the name of Allah (jihad) — all these can easily explain Hasan's violent rampage in Fort Hood.

The ultimate lesson? So long as Muslim doctrines are downplayed in the West, so long will warning signs, even concrete intelligence, be ignored, so long will such seemingly inexplicable incidents occur, so long will the media continue grasping for straws and Americans be "completely blindsided," so long will "Muslim grievance" be the default answer, so long will appeasement and concessions (domestically and internationally) be the only solution, so long will jihadis and Islamists grow emboldened and contemptuous, expecting more. Ad infinitum.

Conversely, if the Fort Hood massacre causes Americans to begin taking Islam's doctrines more seriously, the thirteen slain, while dying tragically, will not have died in vain.

Raymond Ibrahim is the associate director of the Middle East Forum and the author of The Al Qaeda Reader, translations of religious texts and propaganda

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.