Re: Abbas still says no.

 

Evelyn Gordon

The new preconditions for negotiations that Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas posed this week are, as Jonathan noted, equivalent to refusing to negotiate until there's nothing left to negotiate about. If talks cannot even start until the PA is granted every inch of the West Bank and East Jerusalem, that doesn't leave much to discuss. I also agree that Abbas's reluctance to talk stems partly from the knowledge that his own public would reject any deal Israel could actually sign.

However, another factor is at play here: refusing to talk has consistently proved a very successful Palestinian tactic. As chief Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat told Al-Dustour in June: "At first they told us we would run hospitals and schools, later they were willing to give us 66 percent, at Camp David they reached 90 percent and today they have reached 100 percent. Why then should we hurry?"

Erekat is correct: the offer Ehud Olmert made Abbas last year — to which Abbas never even responded until after Olmert left office, then finally rejected via the media — indeed gave the PA the territorial equivalent of 100 percent (with swaps).

What is noteworthy, however, is that these ever growing Israeli concessions occurred without a single parallel Palestinian concession. In 16 years, Palestinian positions haven't budged. The PA still insists on resettling 4.7 million descendants of refugees in Israel; it still won't recognize Israel as a Jewish state; it even rejects a 6 percent territorial swap for the settlement blocs.

In short, these concessions were not obtained through the normal give-and-take of negotiations, in which the parties inch closer by trading concessions. It has been a one-way street.

So how have Palestinians achieved these gains? By refusing to negotiate. Whenever Israel makes an offer, the PA just says "no," with no counteroffer. Then it waits for the world to pressure Israel into offering something more to "restart the talks." And Israel complies.

At Camp David in July 2000, for instance, mediator Bill Clinton lambasted Yasir Arafat for refusing to make Ehud Barak a counteroffer. But rather than press him to do so, Clinton proposed his own, far more generous deal in December 2000, offering the Palestinians 94 percent of the territory (compared with Barak's 88 percent), plus the Temple Mount. Barak, pressured by Washington, agreed; Arafat again said no. Barak then sweetened the offer again at Taba in January 2001.

Abbas's current tactic is identical: having rejected Olmert's offer without even a counterproposal, he now seeks to pocket Olmert's concessions, plus a few more (like eliminating the territorial swaps), and make them the starting point for the next round of non-negotiations.

You can't blame the Palestinians: any negotiator would rather get something for nothing. As long as they can do so, that's clearly their best strategy.

But you can blame the U.S. and Europe for letting them get away with it. Until the West stops demanding ever more Israeli concessions to "jump-start talks" and instead starts demanding that the Palestinians give something in exchange, no peace agreement will ever materialize.

 

Evelyn Gordon

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

The Palestinian Authority Sets its New Strategy: Tempts Obama Administration with Instant Peace if it Pressures Israel.

by Barry Rubin

We now have Mahmoud Abbas's answer regarding short-term Palestinian Authority (PA) strategy. He says that if Israel stops all construction now—in Jerusalem and the 3000 apartments being completed—and accepts in advance the 1967 borders and there will be peace within six months. This is the basic story we've been hearing since around 1988: one or more Israeli concessions and everyone will live happily ever after.

This is clearly bait being dangled for President Barack Obama, offering him an "easy" way out of his dilemma of not having any peace talks after almost a year in office: pressure Israel to give up more and you will look good, with plenty of photo opportunities of you presiding over Israel-PA talks.

Of course, what Abbas wants to do is to remove one of the main points of Israeli leverage, the borders to be agreed upon and the status of east Jerusalem. Moreover, is leaving out both the additional demands he will be demanding (all Palestinians who want to can go live in Israel) and all the Israeli demands he will be ignoring (recognition of Israel as a Jewish state, the end of the conflict and dropping all Palestinian claims, security guarantees, an unmilitarized Palestinian state, settling all refugees in Palestine).

In addition, of course, he can't speak for about half the people and territory he claims to represent, that is, the Gaza Strip. And by not holding elections and unilaterally extending his term, Abbas leaves the door open for some future Palestinian leadership saying he had no legitimate mandate to negotiate and therefore any agreement he made isn't binding.

Finally, he made one very big misstatement of fact, hoping—as usual—that the West pays no attention to what's said in Arabic. He claims that the PA has stopped incitement against Israel, in terms of urging violence and rejecting Israel's existence. While the PA is, of course, far better than Hamas on such matters, a very large dossier can be compiled on how that is a lie.

The question is what will the Obama Administration do? Is it going to press Israel for still more unilateral concessions so that the PA will come to talks and President Obama can claim a success? Will it try to get the PA to do something in terms of confidence-building measures or to talk without preconditions? Israel is certainly not going to accept the 1967 borders with absolutely no change before even talking with the PA (and probably not even as part of a peace agreement).

Indeed, it is now Obama administration policy that there need to be minor border modifications to accommodate the post-1967 changes on the ground. Moreover, Israel can say that if it stops all construction immediately, including in Jerusalem, the PA still won't talk so what's the point?

Incidentally, Abbas admitted that he never asked for an Israeli construction freeze before but is only doing so in the context of the Roadmap Plan. However, even after the Road Map, Abbas never made this a big issue until after Obama demanded the construction freeze. In objective terms, the president has no one to blame but himself for this mess, but of course he isn't going to blame himself. He has to blame either Israel or the PA. Which will it be?



Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal.

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

Point of View

 

by  Marc Prowisor

 

Many have asked that I give an update and my view of the Security situation in Yehuda and Shomron today. Not an easy task, due to the many mitigating factors that change every time a Government official - either here in Israel, an Arab or American - sneezes.

The simplest way to put it is that we are here in our communities in our heartland and there are many Arabs that want us out, (not all of the Arabs wish to see the Jews leave this area). It is important to remember, that they want and desire to be "Jew Free", doesn't apply just to Yehuda and Shomron, but all of Israel, this view is not held by all Arabs, but certainly most.

 

It is impossible to discuss the Security situation in Yehuda and Shomron without first reminding everybody that this conflict did not start yesterday. Whereas this is not the place to get into a history lesson, it is the place to remind everybody that ignorance regarding the conflict is the wrong foot to stand on. To quote a friend, "the Jewish –Arab conflict started when Jews decided to fight back".

 

I will discuss the situation today. Since Oslo, we have witnessed the birth of a new Arab army in the Middle East, that of the "Palestinian Authority", however this is not the only Arab Military body in this region. There are many branches to this tree, with each branch spreading out to even more factions. Fatah itself is divided into many factions based on regions and philosophies, i.e. Nablus, Ramallah and so on. The same principal applies to Hamas, of course from there we can add on the Jihad Islami, PFLP, Al Qaeda, the list goes on. Each of these "Units" claims their own agenda and "work load", but they do work also in accordance to the strategical and political whims of the two (Fatah and Hamas) leaderships.

 

The Operational and Tactical strength of all of these units has greatly increased and over the recent months and years and continues to rise to the point where they can be and are considered a "tangible" threat today - not just to our communities, but to the IDF as well. This due to the enormous funding, instruction and training they have and continue to receive from the rest of the Western world. It is no secret how the US, England and Canada have been involved with the upgrading of this new Arab army to it's current status. Lt General Keith Dayton, (The US man in charge of this venture) indeed has what to be proud of.

 

Besides all of the "regulars", there still exist numerous "independents" in the field, who are ready to attack at any minute they deem necessary and this presents an entirely separate threat level that must be not be ignored. Often downplayed in the mainstream media and International Threat Assessments, these "individual" cells have taken many lives and caused no fewer casualties than their bigger and better organized brothers. Adding to this is the fact that arms continue to flow in from various sources and continue to spread throughout the region due to the opening of the roadblocks (as a sign of good faith to the US). This all leads to an extremely volatile situation in Yehuda and Shomron. The IDF is still operating in order to capture terrorists, but these operations have been slashed due to an increasingly confused political situation on the ground. The uniforms have also changed, so not every terrorist is a "terrorist" anymore, He/She might now be a member of a new army or political wing making arrest more complicated.

 

Over the past year we have be seeing a significant increase in terrorist activity, although it is measured and restrained, never less it is present and enables us to gauge some of the risk and threat factors that we are and will be up against. The IDF and Israeli Security Services, Thank Gd, have been very successful in thwarting most of these attacks. Many of these incidents are probes, being used to measure our response. Where they may seem "trivial" enough, such as a stoning or Molotov cocktail, they supply the Arabs with much needed information regarding our security apparatus. Probes and attacks into the Communities have increased with a few ending in murderous rampages. Most thankfully are thwarted before any severe harm occurs, whether it is by the IDF or the communities' own First Response Teams.

 

We are witnessing serious efforts by the Arabs in the gathering of Intelligence about the communities, and their increased efforts and success at sabotaging many industrial and agricultural ventures. While we are enjoying a relative lull in terror compared to the earlier days of the Intifada, most Security Analysts have discussed and stated that this is simply the "quiet before the storm". Indeed the infighting going on between Hamas and Fatah serves us well but is also fueling the future flames that we will inevitably be pointed towards us in the not to distant future. Every day there are incidents, most that go unreported, but they do occur and people do get hurt. The efforts that the Jewish communities of Yehuda and Shomron have been showing beyond doubt has had a very positive affect on keeping terrorism down, not just in Yehuda and Shomron, but all of Israel. Though this is not politically correct to report, it is however a very big part of the picture in Israel.

 

This being a very short and minimal summary of the Arab build up, we can now move on to the Jewish side of the coin. Bear in mind that there are subjects that I will intentionally leave out due to security sensitivity regarding the IDF and our own Tactical Response, and the simple fact that I live in one of the communities and do not wish to divulge certain weakness that would place anyone in danger.

 

Much has been learned in the field of Community Security and First Response, simply by experience being our teacher, and we have had countless "professors". It is this experience and excellence that has made Israel and specifically these communities in Yehuda and Shomron the vanguard in the Homeland Security Field. Today in many of the communities there are teams who are well trained and well equipped, however there are still many who are not as fortunate. Equipment must be constantly maintained as it ages and over time must be replaced and/or upgraded. This also applies to members of First Response Teams. The weak link that is common to all of the regions and communities is the financial backbone holding up these teams. The IDF supplied the basic needs - that of weapons and simple bulletproof vests, some basic training, but that is all. It must be stated, these are official Response Teams and not private militias. They work in coordination with the IDF. Whereas it used to be that the IDF was solely responsible to secure our communities, they are now the backup in the event of a terror situation thanks to these brave civilians. The IDF realized that time of response in a terrorist infiltration is paramount. Every extra minute waiting for the army could cost lives. So, the creation of first response teams has significantly decreased the delay in responding to such incidents.  These first response teams and Security Chiefs are usually the first to arrive at the scene of a terror attack.

 

The motivation in the community's remains very high, as it is essentially their own lives and those of their family at stake. Training by the IDF is minimal and most teams will train on their own, being either sponsored by their regional council or private donors. If there is a weakness to these teams, it is due to the continuous budgetary cuts by the Defense Ministry to the overall community defense structure. These cuts are across the board and are increasing the Risk and Threat Levels these communities are facing.

 

Politics of course is a factor that we all must deal with, however the main difference in Israel, is that any sign of weakness provides motivation to our enemies. This combined with the increasing supply and funding of the various Arab Terror organizations by Western Governments in Yehuda and Shomron, makes for one deadly cocktail.

 

The IDF is currently removing many soldiers that guard communities and their security is, in turn falling mostly upon their own shoulders. This cut is also affecting the budgets that were supplied to the communities and regions in the Communication, Tactical and Perimeter fields. The lacking that these cuts have created is being filled by the continued support, effort and work of the local population and supportive Jewish Communities and Individuals abroad.

 

In summation, what is happening is such. The lines are being drawn and redrawn daily for a future conflict once again in the region. The North is seeing a total and increased rearming by Hizbullah, soon to be the recipient of new US arms and drones that will be sent to the Lebanese Army and funneled south, The South is witnessing a rearmed Hamas, whose reign of Terror will reach Tel Aviv, and last but certainly not least, the Heartland of our people, Yehuda and Shomron, will bear the brunt of the latest Arab Army in the Middle East whose arms will reach out in an attempt to strangle the center of the country, it is only a matter of time before the Arabs of the Galil create unrest as well.

I know that we are a strong people and can bear anything they can throw at us, and we can and will defeat any enemy. My main concern is the cost – in lives lost.

 

I am not using Fear or Guilt tactics here to get a point across. I have tried to supply a simple yet accurate analysis of the current security situation that is based on the region, the peoples, and the history, as well as the ever increasing component of extreme Islam in the Western world and "Homegrown" Islamic Terrorists.

 

Of course if the entire Arab and Muslim world change their collective mind regarding Israel's existence as a Jewish State, then I readily admit to being wrong.

 

Marc Prowisor

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

Two Big Developments: Hillary Announces Start of Sanctions Push, Arab Poll Says Iran is Bigger Threat than Israel.

 

by Barry Rubin

It may well be that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has given the signal for the new phase of U.S. policy toward Iran. On December 14, she said that the engagement policy with Tehran hadn’t worked and now it needs to press for additional sanctions.

Either this is her attempt to lobby for a tougher line against other administration officials or it's the long-awaited start of the sanctions made necessary by the looming of the administration’s own end-of-the-year deadline to get a deal with Iran or impose more sanctions.

Trying to negotiate, she said, has "produced very little" so "additional pressure is going to be called for."

Her phrasing was interesting, almost as if she was taking a poke at rivals in the administration who are reluctant to take action. "I don't think anyone can doubt that our outreach has produced very little in terms of any kind of a positive response from the Iranians," Clinton said, as if daring someone in the White House to disagree?

So what is the administration going to do? Try to get the UN and EU to support more sanctions. Here the administration likes to claim that its popularity and patient (arguably too patient) coalition-building will bring broad support.

Yet there’s another development that shows the opposite may be true. An important meeting to discuss sanctions, set for December 22, has been postponed at China’s request. As an AP account put it:

“Russia in recent days has moved away from suggesting it would support [sanctions]. And recent statements from Chinese officials indicate that Beijing has not changed its traditional opposition to new sanctions. While Russia and China signed on to three previous sets of UN sanctions against Iran, they also forced their Western Security Council partners to water them down substantially.”

Note that the administration keeps claiming that Moscow and Peking are on board. We are going to see something quite different when the negotiations get serious in January and February.

Buried in a paragraph of an obscure article is explosively important news. A survey of people in 18 Arabic-speaking countries commissioned by a Qatari group—and not fully released yet-- found that a majority see Iran as a bigger threat to their security than Israel and one-third believing Iran is as big a threat as Israel.

This is of historic importance and, of course, reflects reality. This doesn’t mean the Arab attitude toward Israel is going to change drastically, but it does indicate that the real main demand of Arabs toward the West is not making instant Israel-Palestinian peace but protecting them from Iran’s extremist Islamist regime. Western policymakers should take note.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal.

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

Abbas Still Says No to Talks but Everyone Still Blames Bibi.

 

by  Jonathan Tobin

The decision of the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to agree to a freeze on building homes in Jewish settlements in the West Bank has earned him little credit either in Europe or among his country’s Arab foes. Rather than respond to Israel’s gesture aimed at re-starting peace talks, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas raised the ante today by telling the PLO Central Council that he won’t engage in talks unless the international community recognize the 1967 lines as the borders of a Palestinian state and unless Israel halt all construction work not only in the settlements but also in Israel’s capital Jerusalem. In other words, until the Israelis make concessions that ensure that nothing be left to negotiate about, he won’t engage in negotiations.

Abbas, whose term in office will probably be extended without holding an election because his Fatah Party knows it might lose to the Islamists of Hamas, has been telegraphing his lack of interest in talks all year. Given the fact that the Palestinian public still won’t accept any deal with Israel no matter where the borders are set, it’s not likely that this will change. Having turned down a Palestinian state in virtually all of the territories as well as East Jerusalem when former Israeli leader Ehud Olmert offered it last year, it’s hard to understand why anyone would think the supposedly moderate Abbas would make peace now. But the focus of pressure and international speculation about peaceful intentions continues to be put on Netanyahu, not on the Palestinians.

Thus the conceit of Ethan Bronner’s latest “Mideast Memo” in the New York Times, which ponders the sincerity of Netanyahu’s desire for peace. The notion that Netanyahu is possibly undergoing some kind of conversion to a love for peace is, of course, absurd. His formal embrace this past summer of a two-state solution was a departure but he has always been on record as favoring a negotiated settlement to the conflict. The question is whether or not he’s willing to bend to the dictates of the West as to borders or the terms of Palestinian statehood, not whether a peace agreement would provide the Palestinians with sovereignty over part of the country.

But the frustrating aspect of this discussion isn’t so much in the condescension toward Netanyahu, but rather in the way the peace process is framed—that is, in such a way as to put the entire onus on Israel to make concessions, while the Palestinians continue complete refusal to accept the concept of peace with a Jewish state is virtually ignored. The point is, rather than wasting time worrying whether editorial writers at Ha’aretz or President Shimon Peres think Netanyahu is sincere, foreign correspondents based in Israel might want to spend a little more time paying attention to the fact that the political culture of the Palestinians makes peace an impossibility even for their allegedly moderate leader.

 

Jonathan Tobin

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

Has Hizbullah Changed? The 7th Hizbullah General Conference and Its Continued Ideology of Resistance.

 

by Brig.-Gen. (ret.) Dr. Shimon Shapira

 

• Some Western analysts believe the political manifesto published in the wake of Hizbullah's 7th General Conference at the end of November 2009 represented a fundamental change in Hizbullah policy.
• While its link to Iran as the ultimate source of authority was not mentioned in this or any previous political manifesto, this link - that is part of Hizbullah's essence - appeared in the "Open Letter" (Resala Maftuha) of 1985, which remains the founding manifesto of Hizbullah and continues to serve as the movement's ideological basis.
• The preface to the latest manifesto describes the decline of the United States as the sole superpower and the retreat of American power throughout the world. In reflection of these global changes, Hizbullah offers its resistance to Israel and the United States as the model for emulation throughout the world.
• Hizbullah's vigorous insistence that it retain an army of its own that does not heed the authority of the state but rather the representative of Iran's leader in Lebanon makes a mockery of the clauses in the political manifesto about Lebanon being the eternal homeland. Furthermore, by building a state-like system parallel to that of the Lebanese state, and one that relies on aid and funding from Iran and Syria, Hizbullah does not contribute to the strengthening of Lebanon.
• The decision of the Lebanese government to recognize the continued legitimate existence of Hizbullah's armed militia demonstrates less a case that Hizbullah underwent a process of "Lebanonization," but rather that the Lebanese state has undergone a process of "Hizbullazation."
• Hizbullah's alleged move toward pragmatism is based to a large extent on an Iranian decision to create a new atmosphere in Lebanon that will allow it to work unmolested. Iran is looking for strict silence in the Lebanese arena in order to enable Hizbullah to reconstruct its strategic capabilities (including long-range rockets and missiles) in Lebanon in order to make use of these capabilities at a time to be determined by Tehran.

 

Hizbullah wound up its clandestine 7th General Conference at the end of November 2009 that took place and lasted about four months. Hassan Nasrallah was again chosen to be Hizbullah's general secretary and, as with previous conferences, the movement published a political manifesto. Some Western analysts believe the manifesto represented a fundamental change in Hizbullah policy. Indeed, a few days after it was proclaimed, British Foreign Secretary David Miliband told the Beirut Daily Star, "carefully considered contact with Hizbullah's politicians, including its MPs, will best advance our objective of the group rejecting violence to play a constructive role in Lebanese politics."¹ Later, British spokesmen denied they had changed their policy toward Hizbullah.

Hizbullah's 6th General Conference was convened in 2004 and, according to the movement's bylaws, the 7th General Conference was to have convened in 2007. However, due to the Second Lebanon War and the debates and internal struggles that erupted in its wake within Hizbullah, together with the death of Hizbullah military commander Imad Mughniyeh in a car bombing in Damascus in February 2008, the conference was postponed twice and was finally convened in 2009.²

 

Hizbullah's Leadership

Anyone proposing that Hizbullah has fundamentally changed should carefully examine the organization's leaders elected by the 7th General Conference. The newly elected Shura Council is comprised of:

• Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah - Secretary-General
• Sheikh Naim Qassem - Deputy Secretary-General
• Sayyed Hashem Safi al-Din - Head of the "Shura Council Executive"
• Sheikh Mohammed Yazbek - Head of the Spiritual Body
• Sayyed Ibrahim Amin al-Sayyed - Head of the Political Council
• MP Haj Mohammed Raad - Head of the Loyalty to Resistance Bloc (the Hizbullah faction in the Lebanese Parliament)
• Hussein Khalil - Political Assistant to the Secretary-General
• The name of the member of the leadership who replaced Imad Mughniyeh, who headed the Jihad Council - the supreme military body - and represented it in the Hizbullah leadership, was not publicized for security reasons.

Aside from the members of the Shura Council, Hizbullah has not published the names of other officeholders in the movement and close associates have made it clear that no substantial change has occurred in the movement's structure and leadership.³ It would seem that whatever changes occurred involved primarily second and third echelon officeholders in the party hierarchy as well as in the intra-party administrative frameworks at the unit and subunit levels. These changes were intended to incorporate new people into the leadership of the militia in order to infuse the ranks of Hizbullah with new blood.

It is plausible to assume that Nasrallah viewed changes in Hizbullah's military framework following the Second Lebanon War and the death of Imad Mughniyeh to be among the 7th Conference's top priorities, in order to rehabilitate and strengthen Hizbullah's military power and to prepare for the next conflict with Israel. Concomitantly, Nasrallah sought to contend with the penetration of Hizbullah ranks by Israeli intelligence, whose footprints are periodically discovered.

 

The Political Manifesto

On November 30, 2009, Hizbullah's new political manifesto⁴ was read by Hassan Nasrallah from a hiding place and was projected on giant screens at a press conference in Beirut.

As with previous political manifestos,⁵ the new manifesto - 32 pages long and published in a sky blue binding - reflected the changing political reality in which Hizbullah operated and the process of Hizbullah's integration into the Lebanese state and its institutions. While the theoretical-ideological foundation focusing on the link to Iran as the source of authority (wali al-fakih) was not mentioned in any of these manifestos, this link - that is part of Hizbullah's essence - appeared in the "Open Letter" (Resala Maftuha) of 1985, which bore the portraits of Imam Khomeini and Sheikh Raghib Harb.⁶ The Open Letter of 1985 remains, at least formally, the founding manifesto of Hizbullah and continues to serve as the movement's ideological basis.

The preface to the latest manifesto emphasizes that it was intended to present Hizbullah's political position within the framework of the international and Lebanese reality in which Hizbullah was operating. This reality includes historical changes presaging the decline of the United States as the sole superpower, the collapse of financial markets in the United States and worldwide, and the confusion and impotence of the American economy. All this, claimed the manifesto, presages the retreat of American power throughout the world and the beginning of the accelerated decline of Israel. In reflection of these global changes, Hizbullah offers its resistance to Israel and the United States as the perfect solution. In its view, resistance has become an international value that constitutes a source of inspiration and a model for emulation to all those who aspire to freedom and independence throughout the world.

The first chapter of the manifesto surveys American aspirations for global hegemony since World War II and concludes:

There is no doubt that the American Terrorism is the origin of all terrorism in this world. The Bush administration has turned the United States into a threat menacing the whole world on all levels and dimensions, and if an international survey was to be made, the U.S. would turn out to be the most hated in the world. 

The second chapter deals with Hizbullah's status in Lebanon, and here we observe a significant change in Hizbullah's position toward the Lebanese state:

Lebanon is our homeland and the homeland of our fathers and ancestors. It is also the homeland of our children, grandchildren, and future generations. It is the country to which we have given our most precious sacrifices for its independence and pride, dignity and freedom.

We want a unified Lebanon for all Lebanese alike. We oppose any kind of partition or federalism.

With regard to the resistance (muqawama), it emphasized that:

It derives from the eternal threat of Israel to Lebanon and the difficult circumstances arising from the absence of a Lebanese authority. These required a campaign to obtain a homeland via armed resistance. The crowning achievements are the liberation in 2000 and the historic victory in July 2006.

The manifesto does not deal with the issue of the continued existence of the Hizbullah militia. This is a fundamental issue that is not open to discussion from Hizbullah's standpoint. Thus, Nasrallah makes clear that it was impossible for Hizbullah to disarm.⁷ Instead, the Hizbullah leader emphasized that the main effort is now invested in:

creating a defense strategy that will be based on the integration of the resistance that will assist in the defense of the homeland, strengthen its security and stability, [and]...liberate what remains under "Israeli" occupation in the Shaba farms and Kfar Shouba hills and the Lebanese village of Ghajar, as well as liberating the detainees and missing people and martyrs' bodies.

With reference to the political regime in Lebanon, Hizbullah calls for the abolition of the political sectarianism on which the Lebanese state is predicated. Nasrallah explained at a press conference:

Let's be realistic, the abolition of political sectarianism in Lebanon is one of the most difficult issues....Unfortunately, many of those who call for and advocate the abolition of political sectarianism are not serious about the issue.

This committee may continue its dialogue for five, ten, twenty or even thirty years because, ultimately, no one can just simply describe a method of how to abolish political sectarianism....Possibly, after a long debate...we may reach the conclusion that realism necessitates that we accept sectarianism and that any efforts to the contrary would be a complete waste of time; that abolishing political sectarianism in this country is impossible.

The manifesto praises the excellent relations between Lebanon and Syria and views them as a mutual political, military, and economic necessity. It views Islamic Iran as a primary and important country and a chief supporter of the Palestinians. However, it includes no reference to Iran's supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei as being Hizbullah's source of authority, and does not mention Hizbullah's loyalty to the Iranian leadership.

Nasrallah was asked at the press conference about the 1985 Open Letter that spoke of a single leadership for Iran and Hizbullah. He responded:

We have provided [in the new manifesto] a political document, but have not dealt with aspects of belief, ideology, or intellectual culture....Our position on the question of the source of authority (wali al-fakih) is an intellectual, ideological and religious one, and not a political position subject to review. 

In other words, according to Nasrallah, Hizbullah remains ideologically the same party it was back in 1985. Indeed, one analyst with a deep understanding of the Shiite group called the new Hizbullah political manifesto "a point-by-point expansion" of the principles laid out in its founding document in 1985.⁸

The third chapter of the manifesto deals with Palestine in the peace agreement process, the status of Jerusalem, and the Palestinian resistance. After determining that Zionism is a racist movement, Hizbullah makes it clear that the liberation of Palestinian lands including Jerusalem is a mission that is imposed upon the Arab and Islamic world. Hence it is clear that in its own self-appraisal, Hizbullah enjoys no special advantage or preferred status in leading the Palestinian struggle against Israel. At the same time, Hizbullah rejects any agreement with Israel that will be predicated on recognition of the legitimacy of its existence or any concessions on Palestinian lands. It was emphasized that this position is consistent, fixed and final, and there can be no retreat from it even if the entire world were to recognize Israel.

While the 7th Conference was taking place in Lebanon, its original architect, Ali-Akbar Mohtashemi-Pur, was staying in Damascus. Mohtashemi, who crossed the lines and joined the reformist camp, participated in a conclave of support for Palestine that took place at the shrine of Sayyida Zaynab, where he was attacked by Iranian representatives who were supporters of Ahmedinejad.⁹

 

Summary

As reflected in its political manifestos, Hizbullah has been focusing on consolidating its status within the internal Lebanese arena since 1992 when Hizbullah received the authorization of Iranian supreme leader Khamenei, its source of authority, and sent its representatives to Parliament, and in 2005 when it sent its representatives into the Lebanese government in the wake of the withdrawal of the Syrian army from Lebanon, in order to guarantee the continued existence of its independent military force.

The Lebanese flag, which was brutally trampled by Hizbullah during the 1980s, now occupies a place of honor alongside the yellow banner of Hizbullah. The impression is that Hizbullah has adopted the Lebanese state and in its self-appraisal has become an authentic representative of Lebanese national identity. There is a perpetual gap between the pragmatic spirit coming from the Hizbullah political manifesto and Lebanon's political reality. Hizbullah's vigorous position insisting that it retain an army of its own that does not heed the authority of the state but rather the representative of Iran's leader in Lebanon makes a mockery of the clauses in the political manifesto about Lebanon being the eternal homeland. Furthermore, by building a state-like system parallel to that of the Lebanese state, and one that relies on aid and funding from Iran and Syria, Hizbullah does not contribute to the strengthening and health of the Lebanese homeland that Nasrallah says he wants to preserve and nurture. Finally, the subversive conduct of Hizbullah, which acts against the interests of the Lebanese state and sends forth subversive and violent elements into nearby countries such as Iraq, Egypt, and Jordan, makes the concept of loyalty to the Lebanese homeland void of any content.

It would seem, therefore, that the decision of the Lebanese government headed by Saad Hariri to recognize the continued legitimate existence of Hizbullah's armed militia demonstrates less a case that Hizbullah underwent a process of "Lebanonization," but rather that the Lebanese state has undergone a process of "Hizbullazation." Parallel to adopting the Lebanese identity, Hizbullah preserves its essential link to Iran: its commitment to the Iranian leader as the source of authority surpasses any other commitment including on the political level. Hizbullah adopts decisions on war and peace taken by Iran, the sole recognized source of authority, and not only on theoretical and religious issues, as Nasrallah may wish to claim.

Hizbullah's alleged move toward pragmatism is based to a large extent on an Iranian decision to create a new atmosphere in Lebanon that will allow it to work unmolested. After the Second Lebanon War that erupted at Israel's initiative and caught Hizbullah by surprise, Iran ordered Hizbullah to restrain activities against Israel and intensify its integration into the political life of the Lebanese state. Iran is looking for strict silence in the Lebanese arena in order to enable Hizbullah to reconstruct its strategic capabilities (including long-range rockets and missiles) in Lebanon in order to deter Israel, and to make use of these capabilities at a time to be determined by Tehran in the event that deterrence fails. This is the main reason for the quiet prevailing in South Lebanon, and it seems that Israeli deterrence of Hizbullah plays only a minor role.

*     *     *

Notes

1. Josie Ensor, "Britain Open to Contacts with Hizbullah," Daily Star (Beirut), December 1, 2009.

2. As-Safir, November 24, 2009.

3. Ibid.

4. Al-Manar, November 30, 2009.

5. This manifesto joins a series of previous political manifestos that were published at the end of the general conferences that Hizbullah conducted in May 1993 (the 3rd Conference), summer 1995 (the 4th), summer 1998 (the 5th), in 2004 (the 6th), as well as the election manifestos for the parliamentary elections in which Hizbullah participated in 1992, 1996, 2000, and 2005. For an analysis of Hizbullah's political and election manifestos, see Shimon Shapira, Hezbollah between Iran and Lebanon (Tel Aviv: HaKibbutz Hameuhad, 2000), pp. 186-192.

6. For an analysis of the "Open Letter," see Shapira, pp. 126-8.

7. Abdul Rahman Al-Rashed, "Nasrallah: Prime Minister of Lebanon," Asharq Alawsat, December 7, 2009.

8. Tony Badran, "For Hezbollah, Lebanon Is an Afterthought," NowLebanon.com, December 8, 2009, http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=131055.

9. www.mowjcamp.com/article/id/64087.

 

Brig.-Gen. (ret.) Dr. Shimon Shapira is a senior research associate at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.

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Engaging With The Enemy.

 

by  Anna Borshchevskaya,

 

As Michel Suleiman visits the White House, it's time for Obama to rethink his foreign policy.

 

From his first day in office, President Barack Obama has made engagement the cornerstone of his foreign policy. "To those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history, but that we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist," the president declared in his inaugural address. It has not always worked as Obama hoped. When Lebanese President Michel Suleiman visits the White House on Monday, the unintended consequence of embracing unfettered engagement will be clear.

 

Obama prides himself on engagement, but too much can be a bad thing. By allowing any item on the agenda, the White House encourages partners and adversaries alike to take maximalist positions. Once on the agenda, any position can gain diplomatic legitimacy, and flexibility and compromise often rewards adversaries. Pro-democracy leaders and advocates who look to the U.S. for leadership and support for their cause will perceive such compromises as legitimizing demands of authoritarian regimes, taking away the hope for change and the belief in the ideals of freedom and democracy for which America stands.

 

Iran is a case in point: Wishing to show flexibility, Obama put Iran's demand for uranium enrichment on the table, effectively reversing three unanimous or near unanimous Security Council resolutions reaffirming the illegality of the Islamic Republic's program. Tehran promptly rejected Obama's deal but claimed victory because Obama had inadvertently affirmed Tehran's right to enrichment.

 

While Suleiman will not say as much, his visit will highlight how Obama's desire to engage Syria has undermined democracy in Lebanon. During the Bush administration, Washington, Paris and Riyadh cooperated to make Syria an international pariah. International pressure forced the United Nations to launch a Commission to investigate alleged Syrian complicity in the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, an event that unleashed the Cedar Revolution and culminated in the Syrian army's withdrawal from Lebanon after 29 years of occupation.

 

Obama, however, reversed Syria's diplomatic isolation, leaving the Lebanese leadership no choice but to work with Syria. As a result, he snatched defeat from the jaws of victory. Liberals and Lebanese nationalists rejoiced when Hezbollah failed to win a mandate in elections last June. But the celebration was short-lived. Hezbollah used its military strength to filibuster government formation and force the victors to reckon with it. Hezbollah's post-election threats and intransigence won it an extra cabinet seat and virtual veto power over government decisions.

 

According to a joke circulating in Beirut, "The birth of Lebanon's new government was so long and painful that, in the end, a Caesarean had to be performed. The obstetrician was Syria." The last straw in the failure of the March 14 Movement's quest to preserve Lebanese independence came on Dec. 2, when, lost behind the headlines of Obama's announcement of the Afghanistan surge, the Lebanese cabinet endorsed Hezbollah's right to arms.

 

How appropriate, then, that Hezbollah is at the top of Suleiman's agenda. A former head of the Lebanese army during the period of Syrian occupation, Suleiman will lobby Obama to reverse U.N. Security Council Resolution 1559, which two years before the outbreak of war called for the disbandment "of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militia." Instead of disbanding Hezbollah, Suleiman will argue that the Lebanese Army should simply integrate it. Rather than eliminate a group responsible for numerous terrorist attacks against American targets, Obama will be asked to acquiesce to its existence.

 

Suleiman will also seek military aid, hoping he will have better luck under Obama than he had under Bush, who, while active in support of Lebanon's efforts to assert its independence and protect itself from Syrian domination, worried that any U.S. weaponry provided to Beirut could fall into Hezbollah's possession.

 

If President Obama truly understands that there is "evil" in the world, as he said when he accepted the Nobel Peace Prize last week, he must recognize that sometimes dialogue does not work. Engagement with Syria may be well-intentioned, but the simple act of sitting down with Syria at the table has come at a high cost. How ironic that a quarter century after a Hezbollah terrorist drove a truck laden with the equivalent of 12,000 pounds of TNT into the Beirut barracks of U.S. Marines killing 241 soldiers on a peacekeeping mission a Lebanese president will request that a U.S. president ship arms, even if indirectly, to Hezbollah. Suleiman's visit should be a wakeup call.

 

 

Anna Borshchevskaya is a research analyst at the Peterson Institute for International Economics.

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

Europe says Jerusalem should be a Two-State capital.

by Soeren Kern

 

Are Europeans and Palestinians colluding to force Israel into accepting a Palestinian state?

 

The European Union on December 8 adopted a resolution that for the first time explicitly calls for Jerusalem to become the future capital of both a Palestinian state and Israel. Backing away at the last minute from a more controversial Swedish proposal to officially call for the division of Jerusalem, the EU endorsed a watered-down declaration that states: "If there is to be a genuine peace, a way must be found through negotiations to resolve the status of Jerusalem as the future capital of two states."

The original proposal drafted by Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt, a well-known pro-Palestinian activist whose country currently holds the six-month rotating presidency of the EU, had called for the creation of a "State of Palestine with East Jerusalem as its capital." Israeli officials, angry over EU efforts to prejudge the outcome of issues reserved for permanent status negotiations, persuaded French diplomats to remove the offending text, as well as other references to a Palestinian state that would comprise "the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and Gaza."

Israel has always maintained that Jerusalem will remain its undivided capital, regardless of any future peace settlement with the Palestinians. This has been the declared policy of all Israeli governments, left or right.

The EU statement, which comes just days after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced a 10-month freeze on construction in West Bank settlements, will be viewed by many as a European attempt to preempt any possible resumption of Middle East peace talks by helping the Palestinians improve their negotiating position vis-à-vis Israel.

Although the 27-member EU has limited clout as a diplomatic player in the Arab-Israel conflict, the EU is the biggest donor of financial assistance to Palestinian Authority, which has been accused of diverting the money to promote terror against Israel. The EU statement, which is predictably one-sided, could end up disincentivizing a new round of negotiations. Indeed, Palestinians may well be emboldened by the EU's tacit acceptance of their key positions and be led to believe that if they hold out longer, the EU will support them on other core issues as well.

The EU resolution is overwhelmingly supportive of Palestinian statehood. For example, paragraph 3 of the EU text states:

The EU stands ready to further develop its bilateral relations with the Palestinian Authority reflecting shared interests, including in the framework of the European Neighborhood Policy. Recalling the Berlin declaration, the Council also reiterates its support for negotiations leading to Palestinian statehood, all efforts and steps to that end and its readiness, when appropriate, to recognize a Palestinian state. It will continue to assist Palestinian statebuilding, including through its CSDP [EU Common Security and Defense Policy] missions and within the Quartet. The EU fully supports the implementation of the Palestinian Authority's Government Plan "Palestine, Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State" as an important contribution to this end and will work for enhanced international support for this plan.

The EU resolution also puts the onus exclusively on Israel to revive the peace process. For example, paragraph 6 states:

The [European] Council reiterates that settlements, the separation barrier where built on occupied land, demolition of homes and evictions are illegal under international law, constitute an obstacle to peace and threaten to make a two-state solution impossible. The Council urges the government of Israel to immediately end all settlement activities, in East Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank and including natural growth, and to dismantle all outposts erected since March 2001.

And the EU resolution presupposes the future status of Jerusalem. Paragraph 8 states:

The Council is deeply concerned about the situation in East Jerusalem. In view of recent incidents, it calls on all parties to refrain from provocative actions. The European Council recalls that it has never recognized the annexation of East Jerusalem. If there is to be a genuine peace, a way must be found through negotiations to resolve the status of Jerusalem as the future capital of two states. The Council calls for the reopening of Palestinian institutions in Jerusalem in accordance with the Roadmap. It also calls on the Israeli government to cease all discriminatory treatment of Palestinians in East Jerusalem.

At the same time, the EU statement says nothing about the Palestinian refusal to recognize and respect Israel as a Jewish state; nor does it request Palestinians to accept Israel's offer to return to the negotiating table.

Not surprisingly, Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad has hailed the EU statement, saying it marks an important stage on the road to Palestinians establishing an independent state with its capital in East Jerusalem.

Chief Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat says the EU statement will help to demarcate the borders of a future Palestinian state. "The statement is very important and essential, we can rely on it during our diplomatic movement to gain a massive European consensus and support over the demarcation of a future Palestinian state in the Security Council," Erekat told Voice of Palestine Radio.

Israeli officials believe the Palestinians are orchestrating a diplomatic campaign with Europe to coerce Israel into accepting the establishment of a Palestinian state. Military Intelligence chief Amos Yadlin, Shin Bet chief Yuval Diskin, and other top defense officials say the Palestinian Authority is working with the EU to force Israel into a settlement "from above."

In the meantime, EU-Israeli relations are likely to remain tense. Ireland, for example, is fuming over Netanyahu's refusal to allow Irish Foreign Minister Micheál Martin, a notorious critic of Israel, from entering the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip. Netanyahu says high-profile diplomats will be banned from entering Gaza because he believes such visits grant legitimacy to Hamas, which seized the coastal strip by force in 2007.

Sweden is also angry with Israel. In August 2009, the Swedish newspaper Aftonbladet published an article that called for an investigation into claims that Israeli soldiers harvested organs from dead Palestinians. Bildt has refused to condemn the article, saying Sweden has a "free press." Instead, he canceled a visit to Israel, which was scheduled for September.

Bildt is now furious that Israel successfully convinced France to block his effort to create a Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem. He said Israel should desist from trying to divide the EU, which he insists is a "cohesive and clear force" on global issues, including the Middle East.

Bildt's comments were in response to those made by Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, who said that Bildt wanted to present the EU declaration as his achievement before Sweden's six-month EU presidency ends on December 31. "Sweden, which is completing its term as holder of the EU rotating presidency without any achievements or any significant returns, tried toward the end of its term to steal the show and steal the vote. That didn't succeed," Lieberman told Israel Radio.

 

Soeren Kern

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