The Distracted President, the Frustrated Prime Minister

 

by  Jennifer Rubin

You can imagine Bibi Netanyahu’s frustration: a nuclear-armed Iran is perhaps only a year away and all Obama wants to talk about is Jerusalem housing and proximity talks with intransigent Palestinians who are utterly unprepared for a “peace” deal. As this report makes clear, Bibi is struggling to get the American president to focus on the real issue:

“If you stop Iran from importing refined petroleum — that’s a fancy word for gasoline — then Iran simply doesn’t have refining capacity and this regime comes to a halt,” Netanyahu said on the morning [ABC Good Morning] program.

The U.S. is leading a push in the United Nations to apply another round of sanctions against Iran in an effort to stop it from pursuing a nuclear program that Western nations believe is aimed at building atomic weapons.

Tehran says its program is designed to produce electricity for civilian use.

Calling the standoff with Iran “the biggest issue facing our times,” Netanyahu said the international community could deliver “crippling sanctions,” without the support of China and Russia, both permanent members of the UN Security Council.

“You’re left doing it outside the Security Council,” Netanyahu said. “There’s a coalition of the willing and you can have very powerful sanctions.”

Asked whether Obama had given assurances Washington would go along with refined oil sanctions and other restrictions, Netanyahu said: “What the United States has said is that they’re determined to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons, and I think that’s an important statement.”

Well, that’s a “no” on oil sanctions, obviously. Obama is getting little push-back domestically for his lackadaisical attitude, and Bibi is having little success redirecting the Obami, who don’t have a real answer to the dilemma of Iran. So naturally, they’d rather talk about virtually anything else and spend their time on eye-catching summits. What is missing is that sense of urgency one would expect from an administration facing the most perilous national security challenge in a generation. But I suppose they don’t see it that way.

 

Jennifer Rubin

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

The strategic foundations of the US-Israel alliance

 

by  Caroline Glick

 

In honor of Israel's 62nd Independence Day, and in light of President Obama's repeated claims that US interests are best served by distancing itself from Israel, I decided to write the following essay explaining why a strong Israel is essential for US national security.

 

Israel's status as the US's most vital ally in the Middle East has been so widely recognized for so long that over the years, Israeli and American leaders alike have felt it unnecessary to explain what it is about the alliance that makes it so important for the US.

 

Today, as the Obama administration is openly distancing the US from Israel while giving the impression that Israel is a strategic impediment to the administration's attempts to strengthen its relations with the Arab world, recalling why Israel is the US's most important ally in the Middle East has become a matter of some urgency.

 

Much is made of the fact that Israel is a democracy. But we seldom consider why the fact that Israel is a representative democracy matters. The fact that Israel is a democracy means that its alliance with America reflects the will of the Israeli people. As such, it remains constant regardless of who is power in Jerusalem.

 

All of the US's other alliances in the Middle East are with authoritarian regimes whose people do not share the pro-American views of their leaders. The death of leaders or other political developments are liable to bring about rapid and dramatic changes in their relations with the US.

 

For instance, until 1979, Iran was one of the US's closest strategic allies in the region. Owing to the gap between the Iranian people and their leadership, the Islamic revolution put an end to the US-Iran alliance.

 

Egypt flipped from a bitter foe to an ally of the US when Gamal Abdel Nasser died in 1969. Octogenarian President Hosni Mubarak's encroaching death is liable to cause a similar shift in the opposite direction.

 

Instability in the Hashemite kingdom in Jordan and the Saudi regime could transform those countries from allies to adversaries.

 

 

Only Israel, where the government reflects the will of the people is a reliable, permanent US ally.

  

 America reaps the benefits of its alliance with Israel every day. As the US suffers from chronic intelligence gaps, Israel remains the US's most reliable source for accurate intelligence on the US's enemies in the region.

 

Israel is the US's only ally in the Middle East that always fights its own battles. Indeed, Israel has never asked the US for direct military assistance in time of war. Since the US and Israel share the same regional foes, when Israel is called upon to fight its enemies, its successes redound to the US's benefit.

 

Here it bears recalling Israel's June 1982 destruction of Syria's Soviet-made anti-aircraft batteries and the Syrian air force. Those stunning Israeli achievements were the first clear demonstration of the absolute superiority of US military technology over Soviet military technology. Many have argued that it was this Israeli demonstration of Soviet technological inferiority that convinced the Reagan administration it was possible to win the Cold War.

 

In both military and non-military spheres, Israeli technological achievements - often developed with US support - are shared with America. The benefits the US has gained from Israeli technological advances in everything from medical equipment to microchips to pilotless aircraft are without peer worldwide.

 

Beyond the daily benefits the US enjoys from its close ties with Israel, the US has three fundamental, permanent, vital national security interests in the Middle East. A strong Israel is a prerequisite for securing all of these interests.

 

America's three permanent strategic interests in the Middle East are as follows:

 

1 - Ensuring the smooth flow of affordable petroleum products from the region to global consumers through the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Aden and the Suez Canal.

 

2 - Preventing the most radical regimes, sub-state and non-state actors from acquiring the means to cause catastrophic harm.

 

3 - Maintaining the US's capacity to project its power to the region.

 

A strong Israel is the best guarantor of all of these interests. Indeed, the stronger Israel is, the more secure these vital American interests are. Three permanent and unique aspects to Israel's regional position dictate this state of affairs.

 

1 - As the first target of the most radical regimes and radical sub-state actors in the region, Israel has a permanent, existential interest in preventing these regimes and sub-state actors from acquiring the means to cause catastrophic harm.

 

 

Israel's 1981 airstrike that destroyed Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor prevented Iraq from acquiring nuclear weapons. Despite US condemnation at the time, the US later acknowledged that the strike was a necessary precondition to the success of Operation Desert Storm ten years later. Richard Cheney - who served as secretary of defense during Operation Desert Storm - has stated that if Iraq had been a nuclear power in 1991, the US would have been hard pressed to eject Saddam Hussein's Iraqi army from Kuwait and so block his regime from asserting control over oil supplies in the Persian Gulf.

 

2 - Israel is a non-expansionist state and its neighbors know it. In its 62 year history, Israel has only controlled territory vital for its national security and territory that was legally allotted to it in the 1922 League of Nations Mandate which has never been abrogated or superseded.

 

Israel's strength, which it has used only in self-defense, is inherently non-threatening. Far from destabilizing the region, a strong Israel stabilizes the Middle East by deterring the most radical actors from attacking.

 

In 1970, Israel blocked Syria's bid to use the PLO to overthrow the Hashemite regime in Jordan. Israel's threat to attack Syria not only saved the Hashemites then, it has deterred Syria from attempting to overthrow the Jordanian regime ever since.

 

Similarly, Israel's neighbors understand that its purported nuclear arsenal is a weapon of national survival and hence they view it as non-threatening. This is the reason Israel's alleged nuclear arsenal has never spurred a regional nuclear arms race.

 

In stark contrast, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, a regional nuclear arms race will ensue immediately.

 

Although they will never admit it, Israel's non-radical neighbors feel more secure when Israel is strong. On the other hand, the region's most radical regimes and non-state actors will always seek to emasculate Israel.

 

3-- Since as the Jewish state Israel is the regional bogeyman, no Arab state will agree to form a permanent alliance with it. Hence, Israel will never be in a position to join forces with another nation against a third nation.

 

In contrast, the Egyptian-Syrian United Arab Republic of the 1960s was formed to attack Israel. Today, the Syrian-Iranian alliance is an inherently aggressive alliance against Israel and the non-radical Arab states in the region. Recognizing the stabilizing force of a strong Israel, the moderate states of the region prefer for Israel to remain strong.

 

From the US's perspective, far from impairing its alliance-making capabilities in the region, by providing military assistance to Israel, America isn't just strengthening the most stabilizing force in the region. It is showing all states and non-state actors in the greater Middle East it is trustworthy.

 

On the other hand, every time the US seeks to attenuate its ties with Israel, it is viewed as an untrustworthy ally by the nations of the Middle East. US hostility towards Israel causes Israel's neighbors to hedge their bets by distancing themselves from the US lest America abandon them to their neighboring adversaries.

 

A strong Israel empowers the relatively moderate actors in the region to stand up to the radical actors in the region because they trust Israel to keep the radicals in check. Today's regional balance of power in which the moderates have the upper hand over the radicals is predicated on a strong Israel.

 

On the other hand, when Israel is weakened the radical forces are emboldened to threaten the status quo. Regional stability is thrown asunder. Wars become more likely. Attacks on oil resources increase. The most radical sub-state actors and regimes are emboldened.

 

To the extent that the two-state solution assumes that Israel must contract itself to within the indefensible 1949 ceasefire lines, and allow a hostile Palestinian state allied with terrorist organizations to take power in the areas it vacates, the two-state solution is predicated on making Israel weak and empowering radicals. In light of this, the two-state solution as presently constituted is antithetical to America's most vital strategic interests in the Middle East.

 

When we bear in mind the foundations for the US's alliance with Israel, it is obvious that US support for Israel over the years has been the most cost-effective national security investment in post-World War II US history.

 

 

Caroline Glick

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

Israel Prepares for the Enemy It Faces

 

by Jennifer Rubin

In contrast with the Obama administration, which perpetually talks down the potential for a military strike, Israeli officials are beginning to talk openly about such action. The Wall Street Journal reports:

The Israeli security establishment is divided over whether it needs Washington’s blessing if Israel decides to attack Iran, Israeli officials say, as the U.S. campaign for sanctions drags on and Tehran steadily develops greater nuclear capability.

Some senior Israeli officials say in interviews that they see signs Washington may be willing to live with a nuclear-armed Iran, an eventuality that Israel says it won’t accept. Compounding Israeli concerns were U.S. statements this past weekend that underscored U.S. resistance to a military option. Defense Secretary Robert Gates on Sunday discussed a memo to National Security Adviser James Jones warning that the U.S. needed new strategies, including how to contain a nuclear Iran—suggesting that Iran could reach nuclear capability without any foreign military force trying to stop it.

Until now Bibi has played along both with the Obama engagement gambit and the sanctions effort, but we now hear that “Israeli officials have increasingly voiced frustration over the slow pace of diplomatic efforts to get sanctions in place.” We are, after all, running out of time. The concern for the Israelis tells us much about the state of U.S.-Israel relations and the real weak link in going after Iranian nuclear capabilities:

Many Israeli military experts say Israel can easily cope with any military retaliation by Iran in response to a strike. Iran’s medium-range rockets would cause damage and casualties in Israel, but they aren’t very accurate, and Israel’s sophisticated missile-defense system would likely knock many out midflight. Israel has similarly proved it can handle attacks against Israel by Hezbollah and Hamas. Israel also hosts a contingent of U.S. troops attached to a radar system to help give early warning against incoming rocket attacks.

More worrying to Israeli strategic planners examining possible attack scenarios is the possibility that Iran would respond to an Israeli attack by ramping up support to groups battling U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, according to recently retired officials familiar with the military’s thinking on Iran. If American soldiers start dying in greater numbers as a result of an Israeli unilateral attack, Americans could turn against Israel.

The debate and planning go on within Israel, which, unlike the U.S. president, does not have the luxury of procrastination or the ability to wish away the looming threat it faces.

Meanwhile, a newly released unclassified report on Iran’s military and terrorist activities is worth a read, especially the description of its foreign policy goals and tools — “diplomacy, economic leverage, soft power, and active sponsorship of terrorist and paramilitary groups are the tools Iran uses to drive its aggressive foreign policy.” Left unsaid is the lunacy of expecting that such a regime would voluntarily — unless its survival were threatened — give up the most powerful tools it could acquire: nuclear weapons. Also of note is the section on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Qod Forces, which are “well established in the Middle East and North Africa, and recent years have witnessed an increased presence in Latin America, particularly Venezuela.” The report also details “Iranian Support to Terrorists and Regional Military Groups” — the very sorts of groups Obama said he is most concerned might acquire a nuclear weapon.

So the gap between the Israelis’ planning and ours is vast, as is the mismatch between the nature of the Iranian regime and our chosen strategy for thwarting its nuclear ambitions. Whatever the merits and risks of a military strike, at least Israel is focused on the real world that confronts it and an enemy determined to use every weapon to undermine and destroy the Jewish state. As for the United States, our meandering, slow walk through engagement and toward itty-bitty sanctions seems spectacularly unsuited to blocking the ambitions of the regime described in the report.

 

Jennifer Rubin

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

SCUDs and Syria

 

by Elliott Abrams

Israel has a legal right and a moral obligation to keep Syrian arms out of Lebanon.

According to recent news stories, Israel believes that Syria is supplying SCUD missiles to Hezbollah terrorists in Lebanon. Should Israel bomb Syria to stop them? As the charges and threats from both sides multiply, the story of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 is worth recalling.

On Aug. 11, 2006, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1701 as part of an effort to end the war then raging in Lebanon between Israeli and Hezbollah forces. The resolution was the product of long negotiations involving primarily the United States, France, and the governments of Israel and Lebanon. The final text made crystal clear — over and over — that supply of weaponry by Syria to Hezbollah was prohibited. Relevant provisions of the text read as follows:

The Security Council, . . .

Welcoming the efforts of the Lebanese Prime Minister and the commitment of the Government of Lebanon . . . to extend its authority over its territory, through its own legitimate armed forces, such that there will be no weapons without the consent of the Government of Lebanon . . .

Emphasizes the importance of the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory . . . for it to exercise its full sovereignty, so that there will be no weapons without the consent of the Government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the Government of Lebanon . . .

Calls upon the Government of Lebanon to secure its borders and other entry points to prevent the entry in Lebanon without its consent of arms or related materiel . . .

Decides further that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent, by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft . . . the sale or supply to any entity or individual in Lebanon of arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, whether or not originating in their territories.

If the text seems clear, and even repetitive, to us now, it was less so at the time. As the resolution was being drafted and debated, the government of Israel approached the U.S. government to ask for a critical clarification. Suppose Syria violates the resolution, the Israelis asked? Do you agree with us that Israel will have the right to bomb any truck caravan carrying missiles or rockets from Syria into Lebanon for Hezbollah? And the answer was as clear as the question: Yes. With that now understood, Israel said it would go along with Resolution 1701 and begin to withdraw from Lebanon.

Without access to the most recent Israeli and U.S. intelligence, we do not know whether Syria has indeed shipped SCUDs — capable of reaching Tel Aviv and all of Israel's cities — to Hezbollah. Nor do we know whether other news stories are accurate in claiming that Israel asked U.S. permission to bomb such a supply caravan, and was told no. It seems unlikely; in such circumstances it would be very unusual for Israel to ask permission, any more than it asked permission to bomb the North Korean–supplied nuclear reactor Syria was constructing.

But such stories harm U.S.-Israel relations, and reduce deterrence against Syria. It would be far better for both Israel and the United States to make it clear now: The supply of SCUDs to Hezbollah is a violation of Resolution 1701, and Israel has the right to act to prevent it, both under 1701 and as an exercise of the right of self-defense. It should also be made clear that if Israel strikes, it will have U.S. support, and we will veto any Security Council resolution criticizing Israel for doing so.

Some people believe that sending a U.S. ambassador to Syria, for the first time since 2005, will be useful, because he will be able to deliver messages to the Assad regime. But the best message we could send right now does not require an ambassador in Damascus, just clarity in Washington: Sending SCUDs to Hezbollah will not be tolerated, and Israeli military actions taken to prevent it will have full American support. 

Elliott Abrams is a senior fellow for Middle Eastern studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. He served as the deputy national-security adviser handling Middle Eastern affairs in the George W. Bush administration.

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

Bill Clinton Explains How Middle East Utopia is Just Around the Corner, Just Tell Israel and Palestinians How to Make Peace

By Barry Rubin

It’s truly amazing what some people say about the Middle East without anyone noticing the inaccuracies and contradictions. An interview former President Bill Clinton gave to the ABC news’ program “This Week” is a wonderful example of this situation.

As a friend of mine who's a policy analyst just put it in evaluating another, roughly similar article: "Everyone should have views that approximate reality. There's still plenty of room for argument within that space."


I will now show, point by point, how almost everything Clinton said, however, is outside that space. Still, Clinton—who was an okay president—is savvy enough to make one terrific argument which shows he really does understand the shortcomings of Obama Administration policy.

Of course, as a fellow former president, a Democrat, and husband of a certain secretary of state, Clinton isn’t going to trash the current government’s stances. But his statements force him into saying some very silly things. I will give you one point for each of them you spot. Read each paragraph, think of one or more major problems with it, and then read my analysis.

"If [Obama] decides to [issue his own peace plan], I will support it,” said Clinton, suggesting that such an action would be like what he did at the Camp David meeting and later in the Clinton peace plan, both in 2000.

What’s wrong with this?

Answer: Clinton did not really present his own peace plan in either case. On both occasions, he was presenting a plan which he had cleared with Israel’s prime minister. This was appropriate since the Israeli government had agreed to make some major concessions if it received certain things in return. In sharp contrast, however, Obama would be proposing a plan demanding Israeli concessions which not only hasn’t been approved by Israel’s government but which the president knows it would oppose.

Incidentally, as we will see in a moment Clinton knows—despite his support—that this is a serious mistake. If the president puts forward a plan both sides will reject he does no good and ends up looking very foolish. Moreover, what about Clinton's own experience: offering a great deal to the Palestinian Authority (PA) and watching them turn it down. Shouldn't he be warning Obama--and his spouse--more about how the PA is unwilling or unable to make peace?

Next, what’s wrong with this:

“We need to do something to deprive both sides of any excuse not to engage in serious negotiations."

Answer: If the goal is to get talks going, the way to do so is not to propose a comprehensive peace plan which both sides will certainly reject but to start with small things on which they can agree. To put forward such a plan would be the best “excuse not to engage in serious negotiations” of all!

But, by the way, might it be relevant that the PA has refused to talk for 15 months while Israel's government has been ready to meet during this entire period? So Clinton knows Israel is not looking for any excuse not to engage in serious negotiations. The PA is. But to be "even -handed," Clinton is covering up for PA intransigence. And who should know better about PA intransigence then the man who was humiliated by Yasir Arafat's refusal to make peace in 2000?

At this point, Clinton does give some good advice: “The current Israeli government, with its current coalition, almost certainly would reject it. And the argument is that that makes us look weak." Right. Why put forward a plan that’s going to be rejected. The Obama Administration already looks dangerously weak. Once both sides reject its plan, things will really be at a dead end.

But soon we are back in fantasyland. So what’s wrong with this:

Clinton said that solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would vastly reduce the level of terrorism in the region: “Half of the energy coming out of all this organization and money-raising for terror comes out of the allegations around the unresolved Palestinian issue."

What’s wrong with this?

Answer: Suppose you are the kind of Arab who supports terrorist groups politically and gives them money. Would a two-state compromise agreement make you stop doing that? Of course not, you would say that the Palestinian Authority had betrayed the Palestinians, Arabs, and Muslims, while the United States was a horrible enemy that had destroyed the chance for destroying Israel and creating a Palestinian Muslim Arab state from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean.

Consider Hamas. If an agreement was made leaving it aside, would it fold up? Stop terrorism? Cease receiving money? Lose all popular support? Forfeit the backing of Iran, Syria, and the Muslim Brotherhoods? And how in Hades are you going to have and implement such a solution without the Gaza Strip?

See if you can spot the pattern: King Abdallah of Jordan made a deal with Israel and was assassinated. President Anwar al-Sadat of Egypt made a deal with Israel and was assassinated. President Bashar Gemayel of Lebanon made a deal with Israel and was assassinated. Ah, "President" Mahmoud Abbas, please just sign right here and terrorism will just disappear. Nothing to worry about!

What planet is Bill Clinton living on if he believes this? Well, he probably doesn't believe it.

Next:

"If there were a Palestinian state working in partnership...it would be a whole different world. All the Arabs would identify with Israel. They'd have a political and economic partnership. The whole economic basis in the Middle East would shift from oil to ideas."

What’s wrong with this? (This is an easy one.)

Answer: First, it assumes a Palestinian state would be at total peace with Israel and would want to cooperate with it. This ignores Palestinian politics, public opinion, the composition of the Fatah leadership, and the large minority of those supporting Hamas and other radical groups (25 percent in the West Bank at minimum) who'd reject any such thing. It is quite possible (and that's putting it conservatively) that the Palestinian government would support (or even sponsor) continuous incitement to destroy Israel and view it as an enemy; cross-border raids; and requests for foreign Arab military aid. To analyze an Israel-Palestinian agreement as operating perfectly is a leap of faith far beyond any Olympic record.

Then there is the equally awesome assumption that a bilateral agreement would make all that cultural-economic mistrust and hatred disappear overnight in Arab states. Egypt has been at peace with Israel for more than three decades with attitudes not changing. What about Muslim hatred of a Jewish state in the region and Arab nationalist horror at the idea of Israel’s continued existence? Arab states would still fear Israeli strategic and economic domination. The naïve idea of a Middle East shifting from oil to ideas, of the Arab rulers or masses "identifying" with Israel is not something that a former president should suggest as serious. It's not something any rational adult should predict.

Here’s another one:

"Look at what the Saudi Arabians are doing -- building six new towns. The UAE wins the international competition for the clean energy agency, and they're going to build a carbon-neutral city in the UAE. And nobody thinks about this. Dubai is the only country, with huge amounts of imported workers, that's actually passed legislation to give these immigrant workers a better deal in the Middle East. And they've got women in the government; they have a joint public-private decision-making process. Nobody knows anything about it. Why? Because of the Palestinian-Israeli thing."

What’s wrong with this?

Answer: Before saying anything else, it should be noted that Clinton has reportedly received a lot of money from Dubai, including millions for helping the ruler make investments and advising Dubai on its controversial attempt to buy a company managing U.S. ports. Isn't that a bit of a conflict of interests for him to talk about how great that place is and not even mentioning its recent financial collapse?

But back to the political issues. Well, of course people do know about events in the Gulf. But these are wealthy states rolling in oil dough. There's a lot of poverty in other Arab countries and developments in the Israel-Palestinian issue will have no effect on that. Equally, there's a lot of dictatorial regimes holding down populations which are not ready--to cite the words of a Jordanian king decades ago--to act like the Swiss. And in each country there's a life-and-death battle between regimes and revolutionary Islamists.

If anything, an unpopular peace agreement--and that's what it would be--is going to inflame these internal conflicts rather than soothe them. Indeed, if we see how Arab regimes use the conflict to distract passion and attention from getting rid of themselves, removing the conflict would increase instability in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and other places.

No, the Israel-Palestinian conflict is not the only problem, nor is the idea that if Arabs read more about how great Dubai is they would want to spend their time building nice environmentally cool cities instead of engaging in radical rhetoric or activities.

So what is Clinton talking about when he says, “Nobody knows anything” about this stuff? Is he implying that the Israel-Palestinian conflict will go away and millions of Arabs are going to say: Wow! Now I get it! Let’s have democracy, moderation, and equality for women!

But what about the Islamism thing, and the dictatorship thing, and the nationalist thing, and the Sunni-Shia thing, and all those other little things? Is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict the only factor keeping the region from being a utopia? Clinton suggests that it is.

Another one: If there was an Israeli-Palestinian agreement, “How could the Syrians stay out there alone—cooperating with the Iranians, and letting Hizballah people travel through Syria, and doing all the things they do?”

What’s wrong with that?

Answer: Where to begin! There's no real reason that the Syrians can't "stay out there alone." One reason is that they've been doing so for decades, regarding their siding with Iran against other Arab states. Another reason is that they won't be alone even among Arab states and political forces. They have Iran on their side, the strongest single Muslim-majority state in the region and soon to be a nuclear power. They have Hamas (which rules the Gaza Strip) and Hizballah (which runs much of Lebanon and has veto power over the government) and many other allies in that country. They sponsor the Sunni Iraqi insurgents and can depend on a huge slice of Arab and Muslim opinion. They also would have Qatar, Yemen, and Libya, while the Egyptian and Jordanian Muslim Brotherhoods would join forces with them, too.

The Iranians, Syrians, and many others would all denounce the agreement as treason. Oppositionists would try to assassinate any Arab leader who went along with it. There would be riots in every Arab capital.

Clinton seems to speak here as if he has no idea what makes Arab politics different from those in Western Europe.

If you think six of Clinton’s statements were right you can be a high-level Western policymaker; five right, a leading mainstream media pundit; four right, a professor of Middle East studies.

If, however, you understand why the six points made by Clinton which I highlighted were wrong you can write a blog just like this one, have no influence, and receive no honors whatsoever. None of the points you make will be repeated on television or in the most prestigious newspapers.

But there’s a consolation prize: History will prove you to be right.

Optional note: Please understand that there is absolutely nothing about any of the above arguments that is liberal or conservative, left or right. It is all sheer analysis of regional politics and political culture. These are conclusions that everyone should be able to reach no matter what their personal viewpoint, party affiliations, or nationality. There is no greater disservice one can do to one's people (or audience) than to feed them nonsense which will lead to serious strategic indigestion later.


Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal.

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

The Palestinians: Why Salam Fayyad Cannot Deliver

by Khaled Abu Toameh

Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Salam Fayyad may be a good man with good intentions, but those who think that he will be able to persuade the Palestinians to make peace with Israel are deluding themselves.

In Palestinian culture, it is more important if one graduates from an Israeli prison than from the University of Texas at Austin.

Fayyad never spent a day in an Israeli jail. Nor did he or any of his sons take an active role in the "struggle" against Israel.

The first question that people would ask Fayyad -- when and if he runs in a new election -- is, "What sacrifices did you make in the struggle against Israel?"

Palestinians will want to know if Fayyad has ever been detained or targeted in any other way by Israel. They would want to know if any of Fayyad's sons had participated in demonstrations or attacks against Israel. This is why Palestinians who have sat in Israeli prisons for security offenses now hold senior positions in the Palestinian Authority.

Many Palestinians see Fayyad as someone who was "imposed" on them by Americans and Europeans and are willing to accept him as long as he is dealing only with the economy and infrastructure. But Fayyad, who appears to be more popular in Washington and London than in the Gaza Strip's Jabalya refugee camp or Hebron in the West Bank, will never be able to sell a peace agreement with Israel to his people.

In the parliamentary election that took place in January 2006, Fayyad ran as an independent candidate at the head of a party called "Third Way". His number two was the prominent Palestinian spokeswoman Hanan Ashrawi. The party got less than two percent of the votes. Like Fayyad, Ashrawi never spent a day in an Israeli prison. Nor had she or her daughters been involved in anti-Israel violence. This is the main reason "Third Way" did not appeal to the Palestinians. Because both Fayyad and Ashrawi lived and studied abroad for many years, they still have no grassroots following in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Fayyad's "Third Way" won only two seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council, turning him and Ashrawi into lawmakers. But shortly after the election, a sharp dispute erupted between the two and Ashrawi chose to break away. Since then, "Third Way" has been a one-man party headed by Fayyad. The party has since been completely paralyzed, and some say it no longer even exists.

If Fayyad runs in a new election, both he and his party are unlikely to get more than the two percent again that they got in the last vote. While he may have done wonderful things for the economy in the West Bank, Fayyad continues to lack popular support. Moreover, the two major parties in the Palestinian arena, Fatah and Hamas, have a common interest in preventing Fayyad from rising to power.

Fatah, whose followers control large parts of the West Bank, views Fayyad as a major threat to its power. In fact, Fatah officials have long been accusing Fayyad of working, with the help of the Americans and Israelis, to undermine Fatah's authority in the West Bank. Fayyad has been accused, among other things, of cutting off funds to Fatah figures and institutions. On a number of occasions, disgruntled Fatah activists have distributed leaflets denouncing Fayyad as a "collaborator" with Israel.

Hamas, at the other end, considers itself to be at war with the Fayyad government. The Islamic movement has held Fayyad responsible for the massive crackdown on its members and institutions in the West Bank over the past three years. Hamas has even demanded that Fayyad be removed from his post as a pre-condition for achieving "national unity" with Fatah.

 

Khaled Abu Toameh

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

Syria - a hard nut to crack

 

by  Neville Teller

 

In its first heady days of power, the Obama administration plunged into the turmoil of the Middle East with high hopes. "Engagement" was the key word. The new president would hold out the hand of US reconciliation to the Muslim world in general, and to Iran and Syria in particular.

The Muslim world has been less than impressed with Washington's achievements in the region so far, and the administration's recent sharp words to Israel, and even sharper demands on her, have failed, at least so far, to change the perception of US ineptitude and weakness of purpose. The most obvious result of the recent cooling of US-Israeli relations has been the call from Jordan's King Abdullah this week for even tougher action against Israel.

As for the hopes of US-Iranian reconciliation, they were rebuffed from the word go by President Ahmadinejad. It is sometimes forgotten that in March 2009 Barack Obama broke new ground by addressing a video directly to the Iranian people on their New Year (Nowruz). In it he spoke of a new beginning and emphasised that his administration was committed to diplomacy.

He repeated the exercise a few weeks ago. But this time, although still offering Iran's leaders engagement with the United States. his tone was a deal less conciliatory. “We are working with the international community to hold the Iranian government accountable," said Obama, "because they refuse to live up to their international obligations.”

And indeed, subsequently, he has done just that. His new and recently-announced nuclear policy specifically excludes "rogue states" like Iran from his new pledge of no initial nuclear strike, while at this week's nuclear summit in Washington he has succeeded in getting international agreement, with China notably demurring, to new United Nations sanctions against Iran for its persistent refusal to stop enriching uranium.

Where Syria is concerned, the Obama administration has persisted, well beyond the point of realistic expectation, with the belief that somehow the engagement policy will bear fruit. During her confirmation hearings in January 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that she and President Obama: "Believe that engaging directly with Syria increases the possibility of making progress on changing Syrian behaviour." Among the new administration's core demands would be ending support for terrorist groups; cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency; stopping the flow of weapons to Hizbollah; and respect for Lebanon's sovereignty and independence."

Sixteen months later, it is difficult to see progress on any of these areas. One American commentator recently suggested that the administration's policy of "engagement" appears to be morphing into "appeasement", as its efforts to woo Bashar al-Assad are repeatedly rebuffed. Yet the administration persisted. It was in January that President Obama decided to restore full diplomatic relations with Syria after a four-year gap. He appointed diplomat Robert Ford as US ambassador to Damascus.

Only three days ago the House of Representatives Foreign Relations Committee approved Ford's nomination, although three Republican senators registered their objection. At or around the same time, Israel's President, Shimon Peres, announced that Syria was delivering "accurate" Scud missiles to Hizbollah in Lebanon. The statement was backed by a Kuwaiti newspaper report of the transfer of truckloads of scud missiles from Syria to Hizbollah, in a shipment sanctioned by the Syrian government. Shortly after the allegation was made public, United States officials confirmed that Syria was supplying Hizbollah with ballistic missiles capable of inflicting heavy damage on Israel's cities.

As an immediate result senior Republican politicians are to press the US Congress to block plans to reappoint an ambassador to Syria. A full floor vote on the projected appointment may be delayed while the Israeli allegations are investigated.

Shimon Peres's use of the word "accurate" to describe the missiles being delivered to Hizbollah in Lebanon is interesting. The most advanced missile in the Scud series – the Scud D – has a shorter range than the Scud C (300 km as against 550 km), but carries a much greater payload and is accurate to within 50 metres as against the Scud C's 700 metres. Both would be capable of reaching Eilat, Israel's southernmost city, from the Lebanese-Israel border.

"Scuds are weapons in a league of their own," say Israeli security specialists. "This will be the first time that any terrorist-guerrilla group can boast of possessing ballistic missiles of the kind that are usually contained within the arsenals of organised armies."

Mind you, Israel's Arrow 3 anti-missile defence system, the result of numerous successful US-Israeli tests against Scuds and more sophisticated missile systems, would on the face of it be more than capable of offering a high level of protection against any such Hizbollah attack – but that is hardly the point. Syria does not seem inclined to abandon its decades-long ambition of achieving some sort of hegemony in the region.

Like his father before him, it seems that President Bashar al-Assad views the Middle East as divided into two camps: collaborators and rejectionists – those prepared to consider peace with Israel and a two-state solution to the Israel-Palestine problem, and those who will have no truck with concessions for the sake of peace. The return by Israel of the Golan to Syria dominated Bashar's father's thinking, and it remains a dominant factor in Syria's current political stance, but equally dominant is the old "Assad Doctrine" – the idea that the Arab nations could extract maximum concessions from Israel only by acting in concert. Implicit in the Assad Doctrine is the assumption that Damascus will play a leading role in such Arab negotiations.

Which might explain both Syria's persistent adherence to the Syria-Iran-Hamas-Hizbollah axis, and her continued rejection of Obama's moves towards "engagement".

But Obama's patience is not inexhaustible as his changing attitude to Iran has demonstrated. This latest evidence of Syria's recalcitrant adherence to the policy of terrorism may yet evoke a change in Washington's approach.

 

 

Neville Teller

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.