by Mordechai Kedar
Read the article in the original עברית
Read the article in Italiano (translated by Yehudit Weisz, edited by Angelo Pezzana)
For about a week
now, Turkey has been in an uproar. Tens of thousands of demonstrators
have burst into the streets inf almost a hundred cities all over the
country, in noisy, audacious protest against the prime minister, Recep
Tayyip Erdoğan. A few people have been killed, about 1500 have been
injured and about 2000 arrested. The spectacles from the streets of
Turkey were reminiscent of the mass demonstrations of January 2011 in
Tunisia that eventually caused President bin 'Ali to flee, and in
al-Tahrir Square in Cairo, which resulted in the overthrow of Mubarak,
and the demonstrations in the beginning of what was called the "Arab
Spring" in Libya, Yemen, Bahrain and Syria. The question arises - is it
now Turkish society's turn to rid itself of Prime Minister Erdoğan and
perhaps the religious "Justice and Development Party " as well, which
has governed the country since 2002 as a single party, without need for a
coalition because it has a majority in parliament.
The
answer to the question is "probably not", that is, the rule of Erdoğan
and the Justice and Development Party does not seem to be in immediate
danger, for several reasons:
The
first and principal reason is that after all, Turkey is a democratic
country, even if its democracy is not perfect, and in a democratic
country, the prime minister is replaced by means of elections, not
demonstrations. In contrast to the Kurdish minority, the Turkish people,
in all of its sectors, sees Turkey as its country, and the government
is considered legitimate, despite the substantial criticism about how it
functions. There is not an overwhelming desire to overthrow the
government, but rather to improve the way it functions and correct the
direction in which it is pulling Turkish society. The slogans heard in
the demonstrations express the demonstrators' rage over the behavior
of Erdoğan, and actually, it is his personality that is the focus of the
demonstrations. One of the signs in the demonstrations showed Erdoğan
next to Hitler, both giving the Nazi salute, and for anyone who didn't
understand the image, "Erdoğan = Hitler" was written.
The
second reason is that the regime truly wants to turn down the flames,
and therefore on most days of the demonstrations and in most places,
there were no policemen positioned near the demonstrations, in order to
minimize as much as possible the contact with officials and to minimize
the potential for people to be injured, and indeed, by mid-week only a
small number of fatalities, about five, was reported, hundreds of
injured and about one thousand arrested. Compared to Egypt or other Arab
countries that have been afflicted by the "Arab Spring", the situation
in Turkey is much better, at least in this phase.
The
third reason that Erdoğan will remain in power is that the larger the
demonstrations against him, the more justified he will be - if he wants -
to bring out millions of Turks to demonstrate in support of him and his
performance. His supporters as well as his opposition know well that
during the past eleven years he has brought Turkey to a position of
economic power, certainly compared with Europe, which gave him a slap in
the face when it refused to allow Turkey to join the European Union. He
- the Islamist - took the refusal hard, because the real reason that
Turkey was not accepted to the Union is because Turkey is an Islamic
country, and Europe does not want to grant membership to 80 million
Muslims. For these past five years, since the beginning of the economic
crisis in 2008, Erdoğan has been smiling at Europe all the way to the
bank. If Turkey had been a member of the European Union it would have
had to support - among others - Greece, and there is nothing the Turks
want less than to support the Greeks.
For
the sake of comparison: In Turkey the GNP per person is about 14,000
dollars per year, while in Egypt it is less than half of that - about
6000. The distribution in Egypt is much worse than in Turkey; that's why
there are millions of people who live on 2 dollars per day, while in
Turkey the economic success pervades many strata of the population.
True, there are pockets of poverty in Turkey as well, but they do not
have the critical mass and their impoverishment is not severe enough -
as in Egypt - to bring millions into the streets to demonstrate against
the regime, because of their hunger and their poverty.
Dissatisfaction
The
demonstrations against Erdoğan stem from a sense among his opposition
that he has crossed the line in Turkey too, in a number of matters.
The
first matter is cultural. Turkey is an arena in the battle between
Islamic tradition and the secular-nationalist heritage of Mustafa Kemal
"Atatürk" (the father of the Turks) who founded modern Turkey after the
defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War. With his rise to
power toward the end of 1923, he imposed a secular nationalist agenda on
the country, encouraged the drinking of alcohol and made "raki"
the national drink, despite its being alcoholic. He did away with
compulsory compliance with Islamic Shari'a, imposed civil marriage and
divorce upon the Turks, changed the written language from Arabic
characters to Latin characters, closed madrassas, dismissed
imams, forbade the wearing of turbans, encouraged women to walk in the
streets without a head covering, like the women in Europe, and promoted
the political and civil rights of women. His successor - President İsmet İnönü
- continued in his path until 1950. Thus, for almost 30 years the
citizens of Turkey underwent a difficult "educational program" intended
to strip them from "Islam" and garb them with a modern secularism that
would be liberal in every way, except for religion.
In parallel, the bazaar - the shuk -
developed as a result of several factors. These factors include
economic stability, a sense of "business first", European markets and
travelers who came in hordes to enjoy the pleasant climate, the inviting
beaches and the "everything is included" service. The military, the
parliament, the presidency and the high court all comprised a system
that was expected to "safeguard the constitution", meaning the secular
aspect of the state.
This
reeducation worked well in the cities, because there, the regime had an
effective presence, and the various branches of the regime could
monitor the application of the anti-Islamic laws and principles. In the
cities, a cultural elite developed that included people of the theater,
authors, poets, journalists, politicians, lawyers and doctors, as well
as academics, economists and accountants, with an impressive
representation of
women among this modern, "European" elite. As is the way of the elite in
the world demographically, this group has a low birth rate, mainly
because women usually have plans in addition to being a wife and mother.
Therefore, the average age of marriage is relatively high and the
number of offspring is low.
The
trend toward secularism was problematic in the villages, because there
the regime had a small and marginal footprint and tradition remained the
name of the game with them. The farther that a village was from an
urban center, the more traditional were its residents, and as a result
of this, the birth rate in the villages remains high. Thus, for 90 years
- four generations - since Atatürk began the cultural revolution, the
secular citizens have become a minority in Turkey and traditionalists
have become the majority. This fact was expressed in parliament
when Necmettin Erbakan's religious "Welfare Party" won the elections in
1996. The secular sector did not accept their defeat and demanded the
high court - a secular stronghold in those days - to outlaw the
religious party. The court did so, and Erbakan was forced to quit in
1997.
About
six years afterward, in 2003, his student, Erdoğan, assumed power after
winning a majority in parliament with his "Justice and Development"
Party. Most of the secular sectors were left out of the loop
politically, and for Erdoğan and his friends it was a sort of revenge
for the tens of years when the religious were sidelined and oppressed.
Since the Islamic party rose to power it has made changes in the Turkish
public arena: the Islamic courts were brought back to deal with matters
of divorce, women were allowed to enter universities with head
coverings and attempts were made to forbid abortions and the drinking of
alcohol. The secular officers of the military were replaced with those who
were faithful to the Islamic regime, and parallel changes were made in
the high court following a referendum that paved the way for such changes.
The
secular sectors object to these Islamic processes, and for the past 11
years they have been trying to stop the process by which Islam is
gradually resuming the position that it occupied before the defeat of
the Ottoman Empire. The restless youth who burst into the streets a week
ago carried banners that were red, the color of the Turkish nation; in
contrast, the banners that the adherents of Islam carried in their
demonstrations against the war in Iraq in 2003 were colored green. The
red nationalist versus the green Islamic, and in the struggle for the
Turkish culture, color indicates your cultural identity.
Dictatorial Traits
The
second matter that brought the demonstrators into the streets was
Erdoğan's dictatorial behavior: in recent years he has sent almost a
hundred journalists to prison because of their criticism of him. The
government of Turkey, under his leadership, monitored what Turkish
Internet users put on social networks, mostly Facebook and Twitter. The
police permits itself to put down demonstrations against Erdoğan
ruthlessly and mercilessly, using gas mixed with water and even rubber
coated bullets that cause much pain, even if they don't kill. In recent
demonstrations one demonstrator lost his eye as a result of being hit by
a rubber coated bullet. Erdoğan's crude and raucous style angers many,
many Turks, who feel degraded by his arrogance.
The
agreement that Erdoğan reached lately with the Kurdish leader, Abdullah
Öcalan, also angered many of those who see the Turkish nation and its
rights as overriding principles. They see this agreement as a surrender
to Kurdish terror, and from their point of view any surrender to the
Kurds harms the Turkish character of the country.
Erdoğan's foreign policy also gets a significant amount of criticism
: his opponents are convinced that his involvement in Syria has
worsened the chaos there, and Turkey has
lost out in Arab world markets where Syria served as a bridge to them.
The Syrian refugees in Turkey - approximately two hundred thousand and
most probably more - are a burden on the Turkish budget, and the tension
on
the border between Turkey and Syria does not contribute to the quiet
necessary for economic prosperity. Many secular Turks view with disfavor
Erdoğan's support of the Syrian rebels, who identify with al-Qaeda,
just as they object to his blatant sympathy with the Hamas movement in
Gaza, and they accuse him of creating the Mavi Marmara affair. They do
not agree with the Israeli response, which was, in their opinion,
unreasonably exaggerated, but in parallel there are more than a few
among them who think that the event began as an unjustified provocation
by Erdoğan.
Erdoğan's
raucous style of speaking, the dismissive way he relates to his
political opposition, his attention to religious trappings and his
activist foreign policy towards the Middle East arouses concerns among
his opposition that he is trying to restore the Ottoman Empire and
become a modern-day sultan. These concerns have increased in the past
two years as he began to transfer authorities from the prime minister to
the president, with the intention that he will be elected president in
2014 having the authority to rule like the president of the United
States, France and Brazil, who serve as executive heads of their
countries.
The Taksim Events
The Taksim Quarter is the center of Istanbul and the stronghold of the modern nationalist state. In the center is Ğezi
Park with hundreds of ancient trees, which Atatürk liked to walk among.
Plans to improve the place include building a mosque and uprooting
trees, which seemed to secular citizens like an Islamic blow to the
symbols of secularism and Turkish nationalism. This blow was the straw
that broke the camel's back, the spark that ignited the secular public
and sent it into the streets, to defend Taksim Square with their bodies,
to defend the symbols of the nation, the culture, the arts, democracy
and the right to speak and express criticism.
There
are rumors that among those who benefit from the changes in Taksim
Square are two real estate agents who are personally close to Erdoğan .
This kind of rumor creates the impression that the regime is rotten and
corrupt, and that it gives away the national symbols in exchange for
friendship with the prime minister.
Erdoğan
blames foreigners for stirring up the masses against him, and uses
conspiracy theory in his defense. "Communists", he calls them, and his
spokesmen claim that those who are stirring up demonstrations are no
more than a handful of people on the fringe, who belong to the radical
Left. The Turkish media minimize their coverage of the events of last
week so as not to give free publicity to the initiators of the
demonstrations and so that the public will not be encouraged to continue
with them. Erdoğan himself transmits a "business as usual" attitude and
went out this week for a tour of the countries of North Africa. He is
also supposed to go to Gaza during the month, in clear defiance of the
president of the United States whose Secretary of State - John Kerry -
tried to dissuade him from doing so.
What's Next?
As
things seem now, the demonstrations do not endanger the government in
Turkey, and don't significantly damage Erdoğan's image. There are
analysts who claim that the demonstrations even strengthen his position
among the religious groups, because they fear the resurgence of the
secular and their return to power. Here I share with my readers what I
heard myself, when I visited Turkey last summer and met with senior
people from the ruling religious party. There were those among them who
expressed considerable resentment about the crude style of the prime
minister, his impulsiveness, the arrogant way he relates to anyone
outside of his inner circle, and the raucousness that he has brought
into the political discourse of the country. They also disagree with the
way he relates to Israel. Some of them even claimed that they are
embarrassed by him, but they have no choice but to support him because
he knows how to excite the masses; a different leader might be pale and
unattractive and the result would be the return of the seculars to
power.
Erdoğan
will have to draw conclusions from the demonstrations even if they
stop, because if he continues to behave as he has behaved until now the
demonstrations might continue and even strengthen. If this happens
Turkey will pay a high economical price because of reduced tourism,
since tourists don't set foot in unstable countries (Look at Egypt,
Tunisia and Syria).
It
is reasonable to assume that in the near future, Erdoğan will be more
responsive to people from his party who disagree with his style of
speaking and his control of every small matter. It could be that he will
even free some of the journalists from prison. In the situation created
following the demonstrations it will be difficult for him to continue
with his changes to the constitution that are intended to strengthen the
position of president at the expense of the prime minister, because the
public is more aware today than in the past of his aspirations to amass
power and perhaps become the sultan of the Neo-Ottoman Turkish Empire.
Can
Erdoğan make a basic change to the country? To his behavior? To his
personality? It is reasonable to assume that he cannot, and therefore,
in the future, the streets of Turkey will probably see more cases of
demonstrations, violence, wounded and killed, and each time the
questions will arise: Is Turkey really a democracy? Do the ruling elite
know how to protect the civil rights of those who are not part of it?
Doesn't this country have more peaceful and orderly ways to influence
the regime's behavior in a legitimate way ?
It
seems that more than a few more years will pass until Turkey becomes an
inseparable part of European culture, but until that happens, Europe
apparently will become an integral part of Islamic culture...
=======================================================
An Alternate Opinion
Those
who research Islam have differences of opinion about whether there can
be a nexus between the requirements of Islam and democratic values.
Islam is divine law, while democracy is based on laws created by a
legislative body. Divine law is permanent, while parliamentary law is
relatively transitory. Islam determines punishments such as cutting off
the hand of a thief while democracy tries to rehabilitate him. In Islam
the state is the main mechanism for imposing the commandments of
religion (Shari'a) while democracy prefers a separation of religion and
state. In Islam the religious figure rules in the name of Allah (as in
Iran) and democracy is led by a group of elected individuals in the name
of the people.
Despite
this, Turkey is an example that shows, especially after 2002, that
there is a nexus between Islam and democracy, and the proof is Erdoğan's
Justice and Development Party: a democratic ruling party in an Islamic state.
It
could be that the events of the past week shatter the Turkish example
too, because difficult questions do arise from them: Is the rage of the
secular citizens directed against Erdoğan personally or against the
Islamic culture that he represents? And if he is so democratic, why does
his opposition equate him with Hitler and the Nazis? And why does he
need to use such violent and undemocratic means to break up the
demonstrations that should be allowed in a democracy? And perhaps all
this "democracy" of his was only a means to take control of the state
and then to impose Islam upon it? And if he puts journalists in prison
because they criticized him, will he allow politicians to criticize him
when it is time for the next elections?
All of these doubts are an expression of the fear that actually a nexus between Islam and democracy is
not possible, and even the Turkish example worked for only a limited
time period. Meanwhile, an Israeli has written a book on Turkey entitled
"Demo-Islam" and it will be interesting to see if the theory will stand
up to the test of reality.
===============
Dr. Kedar is available for lectures
Dr. Mordechai Kedar (Mordechai.Kedar@biu.ac.il) is an Israeli scholar of Arabic and
Islam, a lecturer at Bar-Ilan University and the director of the Center for the
Study of the Middle East and Islam (under formation), Bar Ilan University,
Israel. He specializes in Islamic ideology and movements, the political
discourse of Arab countries, the Arabic mass media, and the Syrian domestic
arena.
Translated from Hebrew by Sally
Zahav with permission from the author.
Additional articles by Dr. Kedar
Source: The article is published in the framework of the Center
for the Study of the Middle East and Islam (under formation), Bar Ilan
University, Israel. Also published in Makor Rishon, a Hebrew weekly newspaper.
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the author.