BICOM ANALYSIS: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PRESIDENT BUSH'S MIDDLE EAST TOUR

Jan. 7, 2008

In just 45 days between November 2007 and January 2008, President Bush will not only have played host at Annapolis to the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships but will have also enjoyed their hospitality over three days in Jerusalem and the West Bank.  In the interim, his Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has appointed a new Special Envoy for Middle East Security, General James Jones, to handle the complex security challenges of a durable Israeli-Palestinian agreement[i], and played a leading role in the international donors conference in Paris.[ii]  This series of diplomatic overtures represent the some of the most visible developments to have been advanced by George W. Bush's White House since he took office in January 2001, and are the source of a renewed public discourse about the fate of Israeli-Palestinian peace.  But to what extent will Bush's visit serve to follow up the modest achievements reached in Maryland, and just how significant is his imminent tour of the region for Israel at this juncture?

Seven years on...
George W. Bush entered the White House in 2001 after having witnessed his predecessor Bill Clinton's ultimate failure, for all his immense efforts, to broker a peace accord at Camp David, and in the midst of what had shortly thereafter degenerated into the Second Intifada.  U.S. policy remained markedly disengaged and remarkably haphazard in the face of violent and escalating daily conflict, which then-secretary of state Colin Powell maintained was essentially for the parties themselves to resolve.  9/11, which globalised the phenomenon of Islamist radicalism, followed by a strategic suicide bombing campaign in which a packed Tel Aviv bar and Jerusalem shopping mall were blown up, naturally forced the Bush administration to intensify its role.  Publication of the Quartet's Road Map in April 2003 notwithstanding, the White House soon despaired at Yasser Arafat's lack of genuine tenacity to counter Palestinian terror.  Not until after Arafat's death and Israel's subsequent unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in August 2005 did the U.S. gradually begin to re-establish a facilitating role in a peace dialogue between Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert.[iii]

It might therefore be assumed that Bush's visit to Israel this week marks a screeching gear change in the final lap of a presidency in which his manoeuvring on Israel/Palestine has been conspicuously steered from the back seat throughout his two-term tenure.  Yet despite the tendency for White House incumbents to focus on foreign policy as they enter the lame-duck phase of their presidential tenure, Bush has not performed a bizarre policy u-turn after seven years of relative inertia.

Just as broader strategic considerations led to previous attempts to engage the Palestinian-Israeli situation, this is equally the case with the forthcoming nine-day visit, the bulk of which, notably, will be spent bolstering U.S. allies in Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Egypt.[iv]  A 'spontaneous' call on Iraq would also not be a huge surprise.

Iran will dominate the agenda
Whilst Baghdad's future will be discussed across the region, the primary issue on the table - both in the Gulf and Israel - is Iran.[v]  The U.S. president will be warmly received by the Arab oil emirates who are concerned about Iran's increasing regional influence and muscle-flexing.  Israel is keen to undo damage done by the November 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate, which, though its findings were initially misinterpreted by many, worryingly confirms that Iran is trying to master the nuclear enrichment process, at a level beyond that which would be necessary for producing electricity.  Israel simply cannot afford to allow policy to wither on a matter of an existential threat.  As a danger to global stability, sustained diplomatic isolation of Iran in spite of damage caused by the NIE report is a shared objective both of Israel and the White House.

As such, President Bush will be using his visit to reiterate his concerns about Iranian intentions and to set minds at rest that U.S. policy towards Tehran will remain unchanged so long as Iran continues to enrich uranium.  Furthermore, shoring up regional support in the Arab world, in order to be properly prepared for a potential future showdown with Iran if it fails to accede to UN demands, is at the heart of Bush's mission.[vi]

Annapolis as catalyst, but the schism persists
In addition to tackling Iran, Bush, flanked by Condoleezza Rice and National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley, will attempt to provide momentum for the Joint Understanding to which Israel and the Palestinians subscribed at Annapolis, which provided for the launching of immediate negotiations in an effort to conclude a two-state peace agreement before the end of 2008.[vii]  In that light, it is hoped that a visit from the world's most powerful leader will help reinvigorate bilateral talks.

No real bilateral developments have occurred since Annapolis.  That no trilateral meeting is scheduled between Bush, Olmert and Abbas implies that the Americans are not going to be rolling up their sleeves to get bogged down in arbitration on borders or refugees.[viii]  Nonetheless, isolated Hamas officials in Gaza are mistaken to dismiss the visit as nothing more than a "photo opportunity."[ix]  Air Force One's arrival will shine the international media spotlight on peace talks once again, and President Bush will try to generate momentum through his words of support and show of solidarity with Olmert and Abbas.

This impetus is required.  Whilst a stagnant month is immaterial in the trajectory of this perennial conflict, it is less inconsequential in the scheme of the current talks, whose shelf life effectively expires when Bush vacates the Oval Office.[x]  Moreover, events on the ground, which the parties are trying to traverse without being overshadowed by them, have - perhaps inevitably - frustrated substantive progress.

The spanners being thrown in the works are not unfamiliar.  The "Har Homa crisis"[xi] sparked by plans to build new housing in the East Jerusalem neighbourhood has enabled the Palestinians to generate pressure on Olmert concerning Israeli settlements beyond the Green Line.  It also led President Bush to admit last week that settlement expansion is an "impediment" to the success of the revived peace efforts.[xii]  On the other hand, PA Prime Minister Salam Fayyad's own admission that Palestinian security forces are incapable at present of providing a viable security partnership is consistent with senior Israeli military analysis which contends that only due to the IDF's presence has the West Bank not fallen, like Gaza, into Hamas control.[xiii]  The shooting of two off-duty Israeli soldiers by members of the PA security forces last week has underscored that failure.[xiv]

The expansion of Jewish settlements is conveyed as being as rudimentary a problem to the Palestinians as are security concerns to the Israelis, although it is no secret that a future final status accord will likely incorporate some of the larger settlement blocs within Israel in exchange for other territory.  President Bush also alluded to the April 2004 communiqué he sent to former prime minister Ariel Sharon, stating that the reality on the ground will influence the determining of final borders.[xv]  Analysts are suggesting that during Bush's visit, Olmert may commit to more stringent supervision of construction within the Palestinian territories in exchange for recognition by the U.S. of Israel's security demands, which include freedom of military action in the West Bank during negotiations and security oversight of a future Palestinian state, including airspace and at borders.[xvi]

Peace and stability in the region
The third significant area in which Bush's efforts will be concentrated throughout his tour will be in maximising whatever broader regional support and stability can be extrapolated from Annapolis.[xvii]

In his meetings in the Gulf and in Sharm el-Sheikh, the U.S. will seek to harness a deeper, regional commitment to Tony Blair's project of strengthening Palestinian institutions that will provide economic and political security to a future Palestinian state.  Bush is set to accompany Blair on a tour of the initiatives he is heading up in the West Bank.  Arab support for the economic and political tracks of Israel-Palestinian negotiations, and for relations between Israel and the Arab world at large, will therefore also figure on the president's to-do list.[xviii]

Tick tock, tick tock...

For Prime Minister Olmert, the Bush visit is seen as a timely prelude to the release of the Winograd Committee's final report on the Second Lebanon War, which is expected to cast doubts over his leadership acumen.[xix]  The Israeli premier has weathered the storm since the war's end, in part due to subsequent diplomatic progress vis-à-vis the Palestinians.[xx]  He recognises that the two-state solution represents the only viable formula for peace, but political pressure within his governing coalition will intensify as he attempts to dismantle illegal outposts and halt settlement growth in the coming months.[xxi]  Meanwhile, the Palestinian security forces will have to become more effective if Olmert is to have a chance of success.  But undoubtedly, the American president's presence and all international support for his diplomatic endeavours are being warmly received in Jerusalem.

Such a lightning visit cannot possibly overcome the challenges that lie ahead for Israelis and Palestinians to resolve following Bush's departure.  Simply, elbow grease and determination will be required of the two parties.  As Israel's strongest ally, it is thought that any of the prospective candidates to supersede Bush will mediate if required.  Yet this president is mindful of his own clock ticking.  If a framework agreement on permanent status issues which is ultimately implemented after his departure from the Oval Office can at least be drawn up by the end of the year, George W. Bush would earn a place in Middle East history not only for the Iraq war but also for his part in orchestrating enduring political conciliation that was initiated on his watch.

 

[i] 'Announcement of General James Jones as Special Envoy for Middle East Security', Secretary Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Department of State, 28 November 2007.

[ii] 'Remarks at the Palestinian Donors Conference', Secretary Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Department of State, 17 December 2007.

[iii] Freedman, R. O. (2005), 'The Bush Administration and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Record of its First Four Years', The Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9: 1 (4), Gloria Centre: IDC, Herzliya.

[iv] 'Israel, PA to form special committee to tackle core issues', Barak Ravid, Haaretz, 6 January 2008.

[v] 'Bush to propose ME plan to combat Iran', Mark Weiss, The Jerusalem Post/AP, 6 January 2008.

[vi] 'Bush: Take down the outposts', Jerusalem Post, 3 January 2008.

[vii] 'Bush to make first presidential visit to Israel', Ewen McAskill, The Guardian, 20 December 2007.

[viii] 'A friend to Olmert indeed', Aluf Benn, Haaretz, 6 January 2008.

[ix] 'Hamas dismisses Bush Mideast visit as "photo op"', Reuters, 5 January 2008.

[x] 'Editor's Notes: The asymmetry confronting Bush', David Horovitz, The Jerusalem Post, 3 January 2008; 'Meetings of the minds', Aluf Benn and Shmuel Rosner, Haaretz, 4 January 2008.

[xi] 'The Har Homa test', Akiva Eldar, Haaretz, undated.

[xii] 'Bush: Expansion of settlements hindering peace talks', YNet News, 4 January 2008.

[xiii] 'Editor's Notes: The asymmetry confronting Bush', David Horovitz, The Jerusalem Post, 3 January 2008.

[xiv] 'Israeli soldiers slain hiking in West Bank', Ken Ellingwood, Baltimore Sun, 29 December 2007; 'Hikers killed in West Bank shooting were soldiers on leave', Efrat Weiss, YNet News, 28 December 2007.

[xv] 'President W. Bush's letter to PM, Ariel Sharon', Israel Prime Minister's Office, 14 April 2004.

[xvi] 'Israel Seeks Understanding With Bush Over Its Security', Mohammed Mar'i, Arab News, 4 January 2008.

[xvii] 'Bush: Expansion of settlements hindering peace talks', YNet News, 4 January 2008.

[xviii] 'Meetings of the minds', Aluf Benn and Shmuel Rosner, Haaretz, 4 January 2008.

[xix] 'Analysis: Saving himself, and Olmert?', Herb Keinon, The Jerusalem Post, 3 January 2008.

[xx] 'Analysis: Saving himself, and Olmert?', Herb Keinon, The Jerusalem Post, 3 January 2008.

[xxi] 'Now's not the time', Aluf Benn, Haaretz, 3 January 2008; 'The cupboard is bare', Yoel Marcus, Haaretz, 4 January 2008; 'Lieberman threatens to leave gov't if core issues discussed', The Jerusalem Post, 6 January 2008; 'Israel offers settlement concessions ahead of Bush visit: report', Yahoo News, 28 December 2008; 'Nudged by Bush, Israel Talks of Removing Illegal Outposts', Steven Erlanger, The New York Times, 5 January 2008; 'Prime Minister to promise Bush: We'll deal with W. Bank outposts', Barak Ravid and Avi Issacharoff, Haaretz, 7 January 2008.

 

 

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

The Region: The president's last year in office.

by Barry Rubin
Jerusalem Post, Jan. 6, 2008

What should President George W. Bush, currently visiting the Middle East, expect to achieve during his last year in office, even as the American people choose his successor?

The answer could not possibly be objectively clearer, yet subjectively more obscure. The gap between the real Middle East versus how it is perceived by all too many people in Washington and in the academic-journalistic elite is far too wide.

Three quick examples are useful to underline this point: First, the Annapolis summit was hailed throughout America and the West as a big success. In the region, however, less than one-fifth of Israelis and Palestinians thought it had done any good. People here knew better.

Second, many in the US have hailed what seems to be a de-escalation of American pressure on Iran over the nuclear issue. The response by Gulf Arab states, though, has been to conclude that America is weak and retreating, followed by their escalated efforts to make their own appeasement deal with Teheran.

Third, the same is true for Syria, where American efforts at conciliation have emboldened Damascus and demoralized the Lebanese moderates resisting Syrian domination.

THE FOLLOWING points are very much in the interests of both the United States and Bush personally:

       Don't promise to resolve the Arab-Israel conflict in 2008. It isn't going to happen, and these words will be used to ridicule you in 2009. Over-promising doesn't build confidence but makes the radicals more eager to sabotage you and the moderates more passive, letting you do all the work.

        

       Use the leverage you have with the Palestinian Authority and Fatah to press them toward changing their ways. Giving billions of dollars with no strings attached is a formula not only for wasting the money, but for ensuring that the PA is thrown out by Hamas. Demand that the PA do something about stopping terror and ending incitement.

       Keep the US-Israel relationship strong. Sacrificing Israel's defensive needs will not make anyone else in the region love you and will not make the radicals less popular or aggressive.

        

       Don't fool around with the nonsensical idea that Iran and Syria can be split. The alliance benefits both too much and, after all, they think they are winning. And if you try, and fail, to manipulate those who are far better at manipulating the West, you will only persuade the next president to give up even more in exchange for nothing.

       Before you leave office, precisely because you believe that the situation in Iraq is improving, begin a transition to the next step. Give your successor the basis for continuing that strategy. If you don't, the next president will probably be tempted to withdraw as proof of doing a better job than you did.

        

       Remember that Europe is not the same as it was, especially given the election of Francois Sarkozy in France, along with good cooperation with Britain and Germany. The United States can work with Europe on a tougher policy toward Syria, Iran and Hamas in a way not possible in the past.

       While, of course, your goal is to build an alliance with moderate (relative to Syria at least) Arab states, don't ever forget that these regimes will do as little as possible to help you. And do keep in mind that it is their own survival, not the Arab-Israeli conflict, that motivates them, despite what they (or the State Department) might say.

        

       Whatever you do, don't sell out Lebanon. The Lebanese government and its supporters are the most courageous and moderate regime in the Arab world today. Lebanon's survival free of control by Iran, Syria and Hizbullah is one of the most vital US interests. And Lebanon's fall is the worst defeat in the region you could suffer in the next year.

        

       Keep up your deep-seated moral conviction that it is wrong and dangerous to whitewash terrorists driven by an aggressive ideology as being misguided souls who must be won over by kindness and confidence-building measures.

        

       Don't forget that Iran's possession of nuclear weapons is the most dangerous scenario in the Middle East for US interests. Not only might Teheran use the bombs, but a nuclear-armed Iran would lead the region just as Saddam Hussein would have done if he'd kept Kuwait back in 1991.

       Finally, and ultimately most important, talk to your probable successors - and be persuasive. One of the most disheartening aspects of US foreign policy is the failure to properly transmit experience. Many people still don't understand that your failure to intervene energetically on Arab-Israeli issues for your first term is because you saw what happened to president Bill Clinton and remembered what he told you.

 

IN THE EYES of many Americans, what the November 2008 election will show is that the invasion of Iraq was a big mistake. Far worse, everything learned due to the Cold War's end - the victory over Saddam Hussein in 1991, the failed Arab-Israeli peace process, and September 11 is in jeopardy of being forgotten.

Antagonism over Iraq should not be allowed to discredit the need for a strong policy that confronts extremist forces. For you, the best-case outcome would be having a legacy judged on that basis, as the president who stood up after September 11 to the challenge of a new anti-American threat. Adopting some of your enemies' worst ideas will neither win their respect nor help the Middle East.

The writer is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center at IDC Herzliya and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal. His latest book is The Truth About Syria.

 

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

Back to the Mishnah

I was in seventh grade when my parents apparently decided that it was time for me to start studying Talmud.  So a couple of times a week, I'd get pulled from some other class and go sit in a closet-sized room with a kind, quiet man from the old country, and we'd open the first chapter of Bava Metzia.  We started with the Mishnah, the way you're supposed to, and he made me memorize it (the way you're supposed to). 

 

This particular Mishnah, quite appropriate to the tenor of our times, is about how you divide things up when they are contested:

 

If two people are holding on to a tallit, this one saying, "I found it," and that one saying "I found it," this one saying "it's all mine," and that one saying "it's all mine," [then] this one takes an oath that he has a share of no less than half, and this one takes an oath that he has a share of no less than half, and they divide it [equally].

 

[But] if this one says "it's all mine" and that one says "half of it is mine," [then] the one who says "it's all mine" takes an oath that he has a share of no less than three quarters, and the one who says "half of it is mine" takes an oath that he has a share of no less than one quarter.  This one then takes three quarters, and that one gets one quarter.

 

I must not have been a terribly insightful seventh grader, because it took me a really long time (much longer than I'll admit in this setting) to realize that the tallit didn't necessarily have to mean a ritual garment, but that it could be anything.  With time, thankfully, I figured that out.  Even back then, though, it was clear that the Mishnah was seeking fairness.  If two people each claimed the whole thing, then the equitable thing to do was to divide it up evenly.  But if one claimed it all, and one claimed only half, dividing it equally would be to give no credence to the claim of the one who claimed everything.  So then, it was split 3:1.  Seems fair, doesn't it?

 

Fairness seems to be what Israel's leaders believe will settle the Mid-East conflict.  One land, claimed by two peoples.  Kind of sounds like the Mishnah, they apparently believe.  So the fair, equitable thing to do is to split it. 

 

But the Mishnah's notion of equity works only if both parties buy into those ground-rules, if what both sides want is fairness.   But what if equity isn't what both parties seek?  What if one party really wants the whole thing while the other party is still willing to compromise?  Perhaps the Mishnah then becomes irrelevant?

 

I don't think so.  Because, I've begun to think, you can read the Mishnah so that it's not only about fairness, or justice.  Perhaps we can read the Mishnah as hinting at a kind of realpolitik, about the need to figure out how the world really works if you're going to survive.  In that case, the Mishnah can be read like this: 

 

If you and someone else are bound to divide something up, and they agree to split it with you and offer to give you half, don't budge.  Claim the whole thing for yourself.  The more you claim, the more you'll get.  Forget fairness.  Once they offer you half, you just claim the whole thing.  You'll get a lot more that way.

 

Now, in fairness, that's not at all what the Mishnah really means.  But that does seem to be the tactic that the Palestinians have adopted, doesn't it?  They've figured it out - if you really want something, the smart thing to do is to claim the whole thing.  You're bound to get more than the honest fool who starts out with a bargaining position that asks for only half. 

 

This renewed Palestinian strategy became patently obvious in the weeks before and after the Annapolis summit.  Well, not from the summit itself, exactly, but from the "negotiations" (if they can be called that) before and after, and more precisely, from the Palestinian refusal to recognize Israel as a Jewish State.

 

While the Jewish character of the Jewish State may seem rather self-evident to many observers, to Abu Mazen and his band of merry men, matters are much less obvious.  Abu Mazen gave an interview to Israeli radio on December 1 in which he stated that there are two states in the area, Israel and Palestine.  "In Israel, there are Jews and others, and that is the only thing that we are willing to recognize."  In other words, Israel is for Jews and Arabs.  And Palestine is for ... Jews, too?  Of course not.  The plan is clear.

 

Yasser Abed Rabbo, a member of the PLO Executive Committee, always good for an entertaining quote, did not disappoint this time, either.  He remarked, "It is only a Zionist party that deals with Israel as a Jewish State, and we did not request to be a member of the international Zionist Movement."  OK, we'll make a note of that for future reference.

 

And Saeb Erekat, Abu Mazen's exquisitely-dressed chief negotiator, put matters even more bluntly:  "Israel can define itself how it sees fit, and if it wishes to call itself a Jewish state, so be it.  But the Palestinians will never acknowledge Israel's Jewish identity."  So far, nothing new.  But then Erekat went even further and stated to Israeli radio, "No State in the world connects its national identity to a religious identity." 

 

Now that would seem a bit more difficult to argue.  I'm sure that the Queen Elizabeth would be surprised to hear that, since the web site of the Church of England specifically notes that "Her Majesty the Queen is the Supreme Governor of the Church of England, and ... she appoints archbishops, bishops and deans of cathedrals on the advice of the Prime Minister."

 

Perhaps, however, Erekat isn't terribly interested in the Church of England.  That's understandable; after all, one imagines that he's got a pretty full agenda.  But is he also uninterested in the Basic Law of the Palestinian Authority?  That, you would think, is pretty important to him, no?  Does he not recall Article IV? - "Islam is the official religion of Palestine." So much for "No State in the world connects its national identity to a religious identity." 

 

These comments from Yasser Abed Rabbo and Saeb Erekat are so nonsensical that you have to begin to ask yourself why intelligent people would reduce themselves to uttering such pablum.  What's going on?

 

What's going on, of course, is nothing new.  It's part of an ongoing Palestinian tactic to argue that the Jews have no real place here, that we invented our connection to the Land of Israel, and that our presence here - like that of the Crusaders - is both illegitimate and destined to end.  To return to the Mishnah, it's the Palestinians' way of saying, "It's all ours."

 

Arafat, himself, had perfected this strategy long before his death.  In an interview he gave to the London Arabic daily Al-Hayat on October 5, 2002, for example, he explained, "They found not a single stone proving that the Temple of Solomon was there, because historically the Temple was not in Palestine."  We'll make a note of that, too.

 

And other academics have picked up where Arafat left off.  Barnard College's Abu El-Haj, one who wrote a book in 2001 titled Facts on the Ground: Archaeological Practice and Territorial Self-Fashioning in Israeli Society, argues that Israeli archaeology has been a politically motivated, scientifically questionable undertaking, interested only in validating a "national origin myth."  (Despite numerous assertions that her scholarship was shoddy, Barnard recently decided to grant her tenure.) 

 

"Now," you might be tempted to say, "Isn't this all just a tempest in a teapot?"  After all, who really cares what Abu Mazen or Saeb Erekat say about Israel as a Jewish state?  Arafat is dead, and Abu El-Haj is pretty irrelevant to most of the world.  What's the big deal?  Let Israel call itself Jewish, and let the rest of the world say and believe what it chooses.  Why should we care?

 

We should care because these people are very strategic.  And what they're engaging in here isn't mere public relations.  What they're doing is preparing the ground for the next assault not just on the definition of Israel as a Jewish state, but on the Jewish state itself.  And if you believe, as I do, that without a Jewish state, the Jews have a bleak future, indeed, then what they're actually doing is preparing the next assault on the Jewish people, period.

 

How so?  The Palestinians have come to realize that they're not going to destroy Israel with suicide bombers and Kassams.  True, Nassrallah can put up a good fight in the summer of 2006, and lead Israel into paroxysms of self-doubt about the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of the IDF.  But even Nasrallah himself later admitted that "You ask me, if I had known on July 11 ... that the operation would lead to such a war, would I do it? I say no, absolutely not."  Without planes, without tanks, without the weaponry of Israel's army, they can train and train and do more and more damage, but they can't ultimately win.  (Iran poses a new sort of threat, of course, but one hopes that that will be dealt with unambiguously before too much more time passes.)  Suicide bombers and terrorists can make Israel miserable; but they can't destroy the state.

 

What then?  Well, the Palestinians have decided, the war can be won demographically instead of militarily. And one of the key ways of winning the demographic war is to deny Israel's Jewish character.  For if Israel is not a Jewish state, what reason could there possibly be not to allow the millions of Palestinian refugees back into Israel?  Israel's objection has been, of course, that doing so would turn Jews into a minority in Israel almost overnight.  As long as Israel is meant to be a Jewish state, that's a powerful argument.  But if Israel's not necessarily a Jewish state, then what difference does it make if Jews are a minority?  They're a minority in America; is that so terrible?  The only reason not to allow the refugees into Israel would be callousness, or worse, racism.  "Is racism what the Jews are all about?" Abu Mazen is getting ready to ask the world.  It's actually a pretty clever setup. 

 

That's why this is not a tempest in a teapot.  That's why smart people like Abu Mazen, Yasser Abed Rabbo and Saeb Erekat utter what sound like idiotic sound bites.  They're not trying to win a debate; they're trying to win a war.  And as the Mishnah can be read to suggest, the more you claim, the more you'll get.  So we claim half, they claim the whole thing, and before you know it. ...

 

Back to the Mishnah.  Permit me one more reading, even further out on the proverbial interpretive limb, but still....  It's not about fairness, or justice.  It's not even about realpolitik and "street smarts."  It's about love - if you love this contested entity so deeply and such passion that you genuinely believe that it should all be yours, and deep in your heart, you can't imagine sharing it with anyone else, then your "opponent", who likes it and wants it - but doesn't love it - doesn't stand a chance.  Love always wins.

 

"What's love got to do with it?" one might ask, with apologies to Tina Turner.  Love has everything to do with it.  The non-compromising stance of the Palestinians may sound backward or unsophisticated to us, but to their own population, it communicates pure, unadulterated love, and a non-negotiable sense of entitlement.  "We love this land.  It's always been ours, and  no one else's.  We won't give it up.  It belongs to us, and only to us."  Exactly what we say when we love someone.

 

And on our side?  Love is not to be found in the abundance it used to be.  I had occasion to interview a small group of Israeli high school kids a short while back, for a friend in the States who needed the transcript for a project.  My only job was to sit around a table with them and talk to them, while a photographer snapped some shots, and a reporter fiddled with a tape recorder.

 

I'd never met any of these kids before they showed up at our apartment, but it was easy to get a read on the them.  Native Israelis, all.  Smart kids, nice kids.  Pretty sophisticated kids.  Kids from the best (very) modern religious high schools in Jerusalem.  Some boys, some girls.  So we talked about Israel, their dreams for Israel, the army, their future.

 

But as great as these kids were, I began to get nervous mid-way through the conversation.  I asked about the army.  Interestingly, the girls were going.  The boys ... less clear.  One tells us that his profile has him slotted for a non-combat role.  Perfectly legit, but it's clear that he's deeply relieved.  I'm not. 

 

The other boy says that he's not sure what he'll be doing.  Or that he's going to the army at all, for that matter.  He's definitely not going into a combat role.  Why?  Because he doesn't want to find himself in situations where he might be asked to do things that are morally questionable.  And maybe he won't go at all.  "Even if you avoid the army and just go out and work," he tells me with utter seriousness, "you're still supporting the State, because you're paying taxes." 

 

Right.  Why was I reminded of Yasser Abed Rabbo? 

 

So I push the kids.  Annapolis was just over, and the "Jewish State thing" was still brewing.  "Why do we need this State in the first place?" I asked them.  No answers.  "Well," I pushed, "what have people said about that question when you've discussed it in school?"  Still silence.  "No one's ever asked me that question before," one of them admits.  The others nod their heads. 

 

"Really?" I ask, trying to conceal my amazement.  You go to the very best religious schools, you're almost done with high school, and no one - not at any point - has ever raised the question of why the Jews need a State?  They all shake their heads.  Never. 

 

That's the rub.  The Palestinians get it, and are raising a generation of children to believe that not a single inch of this place is ours.  And we?  We're taking our best and brightest, in the best schools we have, and just don't talk about it.  Then, as they're about to graduate high school, someone asks them why the Jews need a state, and they are completely stumped.  They've never thought about it.  It's simply never occurred to them. 

 

It's that Mishnah thing again.  They're asking for it all, and our kids ... they've actually never been taught why they should ask for any of it, beyond the fact that they live here.  They were smart, these kids, but there wasn't a lot of passion.  "I live here."  "I was raised here."  "My parents moved here."  Why do I suspect that if I hadn't been in the room, and one of them had asked the others about a boyfriend or girlfriend, they would have had a lot more to say? 

 

Which leads us to Ehud Olmert's latest warning that we have to prepare ourselves for a divided Jerusalem.  "The world that is friendly to Israel ... that really supports Israel, when it speaks of the future, it speaks of Israel in terms of the '67 borders. It speaks of the division of Jerusalem," he told the Jerusalem Post in the issue printed on January 1. 

 

He may be right about how the world sees the situation.  And for calling it like he sees it, he surely can't really be faulted.

 

But even if he's completely convinced that we have no choice (which is far from obvious to many others), where is the sense of pain, of loss, of regret?  Where's the love for a city that Jews have dreamed of for thousands of years?  Where's the plea at the end of the Seder, "Next Year in Jerusalem," or the yearning of the kedushah on Shabbat morning, "When will You reign in Zion, may it be speedily in our day"?  Where's the love, the almost erotic longing in Shuli Natan's rendition of "Jerusalem of Gold"? 

 

Is this just about borders?  About agreements?  About international approval?  Or is it about thousands of years of dreaming, of yearning, and more recently, of incredible courage in the battles to have those dreams come true? 

 

You do hear love these days, passion for Jerusalem, an unwillingness to cede it.  But you hear it from the Palestinians, who're even putting stickers (in Hebrew) with the Arabic word for Jerusalem on the Kassams they're firing into Israel.  They know what they want, they know what they love, they know what they won't live without. 

 

Which bring us back to the Mishnah, and its warning of who wins the day.  Reread for our times, it's not about fairness, or equity.  (Those require two sides that play by the same rules.)  It's about realpolitik, and yes, it's about love.  It's about the obvious fact that if you want to survive in this part of the world, you can't just roll over and play dead, compromising on your eternal city while they're still denying that you have a right to be here at all.  Because around here, things work differently.  Indeed, pay close enough attention, and you learn that you could re-write the Mishnah this way: 

 

If two peoples claim a land, and one side claims all, while the other side claims half. ... In the Middle East, the side that claims only half might as well start packing.

 

POLL OF SAUDIS:

DON'T LIKE JEWS AND CHRISTIANS, WANT ISRAEL DESTROYED AND SAUDIS TO HAVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS

 

Opinion polls among Saudi citizens are extremely rare. This survey was conducted for Terror Free Tomorrow by D3 Systems of Vienna, Virginia and KA Europe SPRL. Interviews were conducted by phone from a facility in a country neighboring Saudi Arabia.

 

The survey was conducted in Arabic, among a random national sample of 1,004 Saudi Arabian citizens aged 18 and older. Among the results:

 

Please tell me your opinion of each group of people. Is your opinion very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable?

 

Iranians

Very Favorable: 23.4%

Somewhat Favorable: 27.9%

Somewhat Unfavorable: 15.5%

Very Unfavorable: 24.0%

Refused: 2.5%

Don't Know: 6.7%

 

Jews

Very Favorable: 2.1%

Somewhat Favorable: 3.9%

Somewhat Unfavorable: 7.0%

Very Unfavorable 81.7%

Refused: 4.1%

Don't Know: 1.1%

 

Christians

Very Favorable: 13.7%

Somewhat Favorable: 25.5%

Somewhat Unfavorable: 14.0%

Very Unfavorable: 40.3%

Refused: 2.5%

Don't Know: 4.1%

 

If all diplomatic means fail to stop the Iranian government from developing nuclear weapons, would you favor the United States and other countries accepting a nuclear-armed Iran, or would you favor the United States and other countries taking military action against Iran to try and prevent the Iranians from having nuclear weapons?

 

Favor US Accepting A Nuclear Armed Iran: 26.6%

Favor US and Other Countries Taking Military Action to Prevent Nuclear Armed Iran: 38.1%

Refused to answer: 19.9%

Don't Know: 15.4%

 

Please listen as I read the following statements and tell me which is closest to your own opinion?

 

I would favor a peace treaty recognizing the State of Israel, if an independent Palestinian state is established: 29.6%

 

I oppose any peace treaty recognizing the State of Israel, and I favor all Arabs continuing to fight until there is no State of Israel in the Middle East: 51.3%

 

Refused to answer: 13.2%

Don't Know: 5.9%

 

Do you favor or oppose the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia developing nuclear weapons?

 

Strongly Favor: 34.7%

Somewhat Favor: 17.3%

Somewhat Oppose: 12.1%

Strongly Oppose: 19.1%

Refused to answer: 9.3%

Don't Know: 7.5%