The Muslim Brotherhood Inquiry: What's Happening? - Samuel Westrop

by Samuel Westrop

There are several reasons the British government may be publishing only the "principal findings" of the report. First, some of the information gathered will have been done so by the intelligence services, so there are assets and agreements to protect. Another is the possibility that by revealing the scope of the Muslim Brotherhood network in full, the government would be revealing its own partnerships with Brotherhood organizations, and providing insights into the vast amount of public funds that has filled the coffers of Brotherhood charities.

The British government will publish only the "principal findings" of an inquiry commissioned by the British government into the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood in Britain, according to a report in the Financial Times.

Although the former head of the MI6, Sir Richard Dearlove, has described the Brotherhood as being, "at heart, a terrorist organization," Brotherhood organizations in the UK have, nevertheless, long enjoyed the support of government ministers and taxpayers' money.

Previous media statements have indicated that the report written for the inquiry, first commissioned in April 2014, has since sparked a great deal of argument between government ministers and officials and has led to a lengthy delay.

The biggest point of contention has reportedly focused on concerns over the expected reaction of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates -- both of which have recently designated the Muslim Brotherhood and some of its front groups as terrorist organizations – if the inquiry's report is perceived to be a whitewash.

London, it seems, has long been an important hub for the Muslim Brotherhood. Over the past 50 years, Brotherhood members have established dozens of Muslim Brotherhood front organizations, including lobby groups, charities, think tanks, television channels and interfaith groups.

The secretary-general of the International Organization of the Muslim Brotherhood, for example, Ibrahim Munir, is a resident of London. In 2013, the Egyptian newspaper Al-Masry al-Youm reported that Munir was providing funds to the Egyptian Brotherhood through British Brotherhood groups such as the Muslim Welfare House -- but under the guise of fundraising for Palestinians in Gaza.

This government inquiry was established to examine not just the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood in Britain, but to understand better the workings of the worldwide Brotherhood network. This network is both big and nebulous. The inquiry sought to examine the network comprehensively, including the Brotherhood's collaboration with other Islamic groups, such as Jamaat-e-Islami, a South Asian Islamist network that also has a strong presence in Britain.

Why, then, has the report been delayed?

The question that has dominated most British media reports of the inquiry's findings has centered on the allegation of terrorism. The relationship between Western governments and the Brotherhood on this point has long appeared murky. In 2002, for instance, the United States government shut down the Holy Land Foundation, a Muslim Brotherhood fundraising group for the Hamas terrorist organization. And in 2011, FBI Director Robert Mueller told the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives: "I can say at the outset that elements of the Muslim Brotherhood both here and overseas have supported terrorism."

At the same time, however, both the Bush and Obama administrations also sought to woo the Muslim Brotherhood. One anonymous Palestinian official, quoted in Asharq Al-Awsat, claimed: "The Americans mistakenly think that moderate political Islam, represented by Muslim Brotherhood, would be able to combat radical Islam."

The inconsistency seems to have revolved around the Muslim Brotherhood's connection to Hamas. Although Hamas's 1988 covenant asserts that, "The Islamic Resistance Movement is one of the wings of Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine," Western governments have nevertheless treated Hamas and the Brotherhood as unconnected entities -- despite a wealth of evidence to the contrary.

In the United Kingdom, Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas networks appear to overlap heavily. In 2005, for instance, the British government handed over the running of London's Finsbury Park mosque to the Muslim Association of Britain [MAB]. The Muslim Association of Britain was founded by Muslim Brotherhood activists including Kemal Helbawi, who described the Israel-Palestinian conflict as "an absolute clash of civilisations; a satanic programme led by the Jews and those who support them, and a divine programme carried [out] by Hamas ... and the Islamic peoples in general."

One of the trustees appointed to run the Finsbury Park mosque was Muhammad Sawalha, a fugitive Hamas commander who, according to BBC reports, is "said to have masterminded much of Hamas's political and military strategy" from London. Yet the police and local government continue to fund the mosque with tens of thousands of pounds of taxpayers' money.

Muhammad Sawalha, a fugitive Hamas commander who is "said to have masterminded much of Hamas's political and military strategy" from London, is a trustee of the Finsbury Park mosque, which receives tens of thousands of pounds of taxpayers' money. (Image source: inminds YouTube video screenshot)

By ignoring both the operational and ideological relations between the Brotherhood and Hamas, Western governments have been able to claim a dedication to opposing terrorism while at the same time courting Islamist allies, ostensibly to help fight the jihadist threat. By 2009, for instance, the British government provided the Muslim Welfare House, mentioned earlier, with £48,000 of "counter-extremism" funds. To this day, leading Islamist charities, established by Brotherhood figures, continue to receive millions of pounds of taxpayers' money.

The Muslim Brotherhood, without Hamas, has worked hard to present itself as a benign organization. It is the government's apparent failure to demonstrate adequate evidence of connections to terrorism, some critics argue, that has led to the delay in publishing the inquiry's report. The prominent newspaper journalist, Peter Oborne, has claimed that the report "had discovered no grounds for proscribing the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist group... Publication of the report as originally written would infuriate the Prime Minister's Saudi allies -- and not just them. The United Arab Emirates have long been agitating for the defenestration of the Brothers.... The reason [for the delay] is simple: money, trade, oil, in a number of cases personal greed."

Peter Oborne, a supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood, was, in fact, echoing the line taken by the Brotherhood itself. British Brotherhood operatives, such as Anas Al-Tikriti, recently placed an advertisement in the Guardian newspaper that claimed, "this review is the result of pressure placed on the British government by undemocratic regimes abroad, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates." The letter was signed by a number of senior Brotherhood activists, MPs, Peers and journalists -- including Peter Oborne.

The "Saudi pressure" argument serves a useful purpose. There is not a lot that can undermine a government inquiry so much as an accusation of political leverage and foreign financial influence. Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE regard the Muslim Brotherhood as a threat, and would like to see it suppressed. But neither the Saudis nor the Emiratis are naïve: both have worked to influence the British government for decades and both know how Westminster works. Hence, both know that it is extremely unlikely that the British government would ban the Muslim Brotherhood.

All that said, it is still possible to ignore Hamas and nevertheless link the Brotherhood to violence. In September 2010, the Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, Mohamed Badie, advocated violent jihad against the United States, and declared that, "the improvement and change that the [Muslim] nation seeks can only be attained through jihad and sacrifice and by raising a jihadi generation that pursues death just as the enemies pursue life... The U.S. is now experiencing the beginning of its end, and is heading towards its demise." In 2013, Muslim Brotherhood members and supporters in Egypt attacked 70 Coptic Christian churches, and more than 1000 homes and businesses of Coptic Christian families were torched.

Banning the Brotherhood, however, is difficult for another reason. Security analyst Lorenzo Vidino writes:

"Muslim Brotherhood-linked groups in each country work according to a common vision -- but in complete operational independence, making the Brotherhood an informal global movement. It's what makes designating the whole movement a terrorist organisation virtually impossible in the UK, as authorities knew from the very beginning. But the lack of a ban does not equal an exoneration or an endorsement -- hardly the general tone of the review."

If the delay in the report's release has been the product of political wrangling at all, the debate within Westminster is most likely over the influence of the Brotherhood upon extremism and radicalization, and with which groups the government should continue to work.

There is already some indication that changes are taking place. On December 18, 2014, the government announced publicly that two Brotherhood-linked Islamic charities, Islamic Help and the Muslim Charities Forum, were to lose their government grants over links to extremism. The Department for Communities and Local Government stated that it would not fund any group "linked to individuals who fuel hatred, division and violence." This loss of funding followed a Gatestone Institute report investigating the Muslim Charities Forum's links to extremism, which was subsequently picked up by mainstream British media.

Also in December, Islamic Relief, after being placed on terror lists by both the governments of the UAE and Israel, published an "independent audit," claiming there was "absolutely no evidence" to link the charity to terrorism.

The British government, which has provided over £3 million of funding to Islamic Relief since 2013, offered little comment, but did publish, at the end of December, a document revealing that the UK government would match £5 million of donations to Islamic Relief until 2016.

Herein lies the contradiction. The Muslim Charities Forum is essentially a project of Islamic Relief. The present chairman of the Muslim Charities Forum, in fact, is Hany El Banna, who founded Islamic Relief, the leading member body of the Muslim Charities Forum. Islamic Relief, as the Gatestone Institute has previously revealed, has given platforms to the same extremists as those promoted by the Muslim Charities Forum, an act that led to its loss of funding. Why would the British government discard one charity while embracing the other? Is this perhaps a sign of further sleight-of-hand to come? Rather than sanction the Brotherhood as a whole, is the government likely in future to work only with sections of the Islamist network?

We have seen such posturing before. In 2009, Britain's Labour government cut ties with the Muslim Council of Britain after some of its officials became signatories to the Istanbul Declaration, a document that calls for attacks on British soldiers and Jewish communities. The government has continued, however, to work with and fund interfaith groups partly managed by MCB figures and Istanbul Declaration signatories.

There are several reasons the British government may be publishing only the "principal findings" of the report. First, some of the information gathered will have been done so by the intelligence services, so there are assets and agreements to protect. Another is the possibility that by revealing the scope of the Muslim Brotherhood network in full, the government would be revealing its own partnerships with Brotherhood organizations, and providing insights into the vast amount of public funds that has filled the coffers of Brotherhood charities.

In spite of the expectedly unexciting report, the global Muslim Brotherhood still seems worried. Even the most benign report could damage the legitimacy upon which the Brotherhood thrives. Although unlikely, visas for Brotherhood residents in Britain could be revoked, and the report could produce a domino effect -- sparking inquiries in other European countries. Evidently, the Brotherhood attaches great importance to its political and diplomatic connections and influence.

Because of the uncertainty surrounding the report, media misinformation and Brotherhood propaganda have been spreading. Back in April 2014, the British government's announcement of the inquiry produced a great deal of noise. The actual scope of the inquiry and the possible consequences, however, were left to the imaginations of the many commentators and conspiracy theorists.

Consequently, just as the full findings of the report are unclear, so is its significance. If certain sections of the Brotherhood are declared unsuitable, it seems that the report might provide a useful opportunity for the British government -- aided by new statutory powers for the Charity Commission and proposed new counter-extremism powers -- to crack down on those parts of the Muslim Brotherhood which serve to accrue financial and political support for Hamas.


Thus far, for the government, the Muslim Brotherhood inquiry has been a PR disaster. The eventual publication of the inquiry's report could provide an opportunity for the British government to end its continued support and funding for Britain's Muslim Brotherhood charities, and to stop treating Brotherhood operatives as representatives of Britain's Muslim community. It would indeed be a shame if the only outcome of the inquiry were an even cozier realignment with the Muslim Brotherhood's activities.


Samuel Westrop

Source: http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/5137/muslim-brotherhood-inquiry

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

The Video OBAMA Didn’t Want To Get Out… Israel Video Network

by Israel Video Network

What is Obama's true agenda regarding the Jewish State and the Islamist regimes who are working to destroy it?

Israel Video Network

Source: http://www.israelvideonetwork.com/the-video-obama-didnt-want-to-get-out/

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Erdoğan's Grand Ambitions - Burak Bekdil

by Burak Bekdil

For now, Turks seem to have ignored the worst corruption scandal in their political history, but there are no guarantees that they will keep the stunning events of last December out of their memories forever.

Once the best of allies, Fethullah Gülen (right), in self-exile in rural Pennsylvania, and Turkish prime minister Erdoğan openly clashed in 2013 over what looked like a power-sharing matter.

By June 2015, the Turks will have gone to the ballot box three times in a span of fifteen months: local polls in March 2014, the presidential race in August 2014, and parliamentary elections next June 2015. Turkey's ruling Islamists, under the roof of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP), are probably heading for their ninth electoral victory in thirteen years. But in the longer term, a simple win may not suffice to keep afloat this coalition of Islamists, conservatives, Sunni supremacists, business cronies, and liberals. AKP's ambitions go beyond winning elections, and although it remains the most powerful political grouping in Turkey, with its votes now possibly at a saturation point, the party may be vulnerable to potential externalities. For now, Turks seem to have ignored the worst corruption scandal in their political history,[1] but there are no guarantees that they will keep the stunning events of last December out of their memories forever.[2]

A Family Feud

Something "Nordic," i.e., political transparency and lack of tolerance for nepotism and corruption, appeared briefly in the notoriously corrupt Crescent and Star in December 2013. 

Along with nearly fifty other high-profile suspects, police arrested the sons of three cabinet ministers, including that of the interior minister, on charges of corruption.[3] But a few hours later, everything was back to normal: Five police chiefs in charge of the operation, along with dozens of other officers whom government bigwigs thought may have been their accomplices, had been removed from duty.[4]

The Gülen network's "dangerous rise to power" had begun to unnerve Erdoğan.

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his nomenklatura rarely disappoint. After the first shock, they announced their verdict on the affair: The arrested were innocent before trial. They had not even examined any of the prosecution's evidence which, by law, must be secret until court proceedings open. But they were certain that the investigation was the work of the clandestine network operated by the powerful Muslim cleric Fethullah Gülen and his men in the police force and judiciary.[5] Once the best of allies, Gülen, in self-exile in rural Pennsylvania, and Erdoğan had openly clashed earlier in 2013 over what looked like a power-sharing matter.[6] Gülen, whose Hizmet movement runs hundreds of charter schools in the United States and more than eighty other countries, had his men systematically running up the ladders of Turkey's bureaucracy under Erdoğan's nod. Ideological differences and the Gülen network's "dangerous rise to power" had already begun to unnerve Erdoğan in 2011. Last year, AKP passed legislation to close down all private tutorial schools in Turkey. A quarter of those schools belonged to Hizmet.[7]

Female supporters of the ruling Turkish AK Party wear masks of Prime Minister Erdoğan during an election rally in Konya, March 31, 2014. Erdoğan's government faced a sweeping corruption scandal in December 2013 when police arrested the sons of three cabinet ministers along with nearly fifty other high-profile suspects on charges of corruption. Instead of a cold reception at the peak of the corruption scandal, Erdoğan was given a hero's welcome by party loyalists across Turkey.

The police officers involved in the affair were removed from duty one by one, but that was not the end of Erdoğan's troubles. Unknown sources began to upload recordings of telephone conversations to various social media platforms—conversations that in any decent country could cause a public uproar and bring the collapse of any government. The recordings detailed how Erdoğan controlled the media; how his business cronies donated vast amounts of money to his son's foundation; how the son, despite orders from Erdoğan, was unable to get rid of stacks of cash he kept at his home; and how Erdoğan ordered businessmen to buy newspapers or to sack journalists.[8] Erdoğan denied any wrongdoing and claimed that all the audio material on the Internet was a "montage."[9] Thousands of pages of evidence the police had produced after several months of technical and physical surveillance were all declared bogus and the work of dark forces.

By March 2014, Erdoğan was clearly nervous as his former and powerful friend had now become a powerful foe. Gülen's men were knocking on every door in the Anatolian heartland, a traditional Erdoğan stronghold, to convince voters not to vote for a corrupt man.[10] About ten days before the elections, senior Hizmet figures privately claimed that Erdoğan's vote would drop to around 35 percent, from nearly 50 percent in 2011. They were underestimating Turkish pragmatism and overestimating ethics in Turkish society.

Erdoğan Is the Average Turk's Mirror Image

My 2006 analysis offered this assessment:

The average Justice and Development Party (AKP) politician is the mirror image of the average Turkish voter: devoutly Muslim but pragmatist, anti-Western in genes but pro-European Union in anticipation of economic/political benefits, collectivist in theory but individualist in practice, and moralist when "the other" goes corrupt but tolerant [to corruption] when "we" do. Hence, the unusually large margin of tolerance for corruption and malgovernance in Turkey.
All that, however, does not change the typology of the average Turkish voter, the one who is willing to tolerate corruption as long as things go smoothly for him, his family, friends, and their families and friends.[11]

Instead of a cold reception at the peak of the corruption scandal, Erdoğan was given a hero's welcome by party loyalists across Turkey, including a bizarre-looking group who greeted the prime minister after having wrapped themselves in white clothes, which symbolize death in Islamic tradition. The message was clear: "We're with you to the death!"[12]

Meanwhile, the list of usual suspects Erdoğan claimed were trying to topple his government by means of a coup was getting bigger and richer in humor. Shortly before the March polls, the list included "intergalactic conspirators, dark forces, most of the Western hemisphere's prominent news outlets, Jewish diaspora, Germany's national carrier, Germany, the U.S. ambassador to Ankara, the United States, the interest rate lobby, financiers, traders, and the robotic lobby, and the preacher lobby [the Gülen movement]."[13]

Erdoğan traditionally wins half of the Kurdish votes.

In reality, in 2014, Turkey's sociopolitical demography became an even more fertile ground for the AKP than it was before. It was not for nothing that Erdoğan has prescribed that every Turkish family should have at least three and "even four or five" children each. Erdoğan knew that every new, jobless young man would either end up at a religious order or turn up at the ballot box as a pious but poor Muslim voting for the AKP, or both. The Turkish population is estimated to be five-to six times larger than the Kurdish. So, mathematically speaking, greater Kurdish birth rates do not mean greater Kurdish preeminence. Also, more importantly, it is a fact that Erdoğan traditionally wins half of the Kurdish votes, too. So, he would not mind if his prescription is also followed by Kurds.

Turkey by the Numbers

Turkey was not in good shape by any internationally-accepted criteria, except for a steadily growing economy. There are only three Turkish universities in the world's top 500.[14] The infant mortality rate in Turkey is a grim 17 per 1,000 live births[15] while 24 percent of children aged 10 to 14 are in the labor market in Turkey.[16] Per capita health spending is one-tenth of Italy's. According to the World Economic Forum's Global Gender Gap Report, Turkey ranks 120 in a list of 136 countries.[17] Press freedom in Turkey, according to Freedom House's world map, falls into the red zone of "not free."[18] And the World Press Freedom Index of Reporters Without Borders puts Turkey's world ranking at 154.[19]

But there is one globally credible index that sums it all up. The United Nations Development Program's Human Development Report, a comparative measure of life expectancy, education, standards of living, and quality of life, reveals whether a country is developed, developing, or underdeveloped. On that index, Turkey ranks 69, with about a $10,000 per capita income.[20]

The Winner Wins Again

On March 30, 2014, Erdoğan's AKP emerged as the winner, garnering 43.3 percent of the national vote, based on votes cast for city councils in which voters choose "a party" not a municipal candidate. But it was a slightly bitter victory. Erdoğan had managed to defeat his rivals despite a slew of embarrassing scandals but was given a polite warning. His votes had dropped to 43.3 percent from 49.8 percent in 2011 as two million fewer Turks voted for him.

This was important because Erdoğan's longer-term game plan is to amend the constitution to launch an executive presidency instead of the present largely symbolic powers the president has now. To take any constitutional amendment to referendum, a party would need at least 330 seats in parliament. If March 30 were a parliamentary election instead of municipal, with 43.3 percent of the vote, Erdoğan would only have won around 290 parliamentary seats.

Ahmet Davutoğlu (right), formerly Erdoğan's foreign minister, happily took the job of prime minister and pledged absolute loyalty to Erdoğan.

All the same, 43.3 percent was good enough to convince him that he should run for the presidency on August 10. In order to defeat Erdoğan, two main opposition parties, the social democrat Republican People's Party (CHP) and the right-wing Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), agreed on a joint candidate, conservative professor Ekmeleddin Ihsanoğlu, who had run the Saudi-sponsored Organization of the Islamic Conference. The opposition strategists had calculated that a conservative candidate could snatch votes from Erdoğan's grassroots supporters. Maybe he did, but it appears he lost more from CHP's left-wing and social democratic grassroots.

Erdoğan won 51.8 percent of the vote while Ihsanoğlu finished at 38 percent. Erdoğan had succeeded in becoming Turkey's twelfth president. During his presidential campaign, Erdoğan already signaled that he would be an unconventional "running and sweating" president, an explicit reference to his intention to force the limits of the constitution through executive powers. All he needed was a new prime minister to succeed him, someone to whom he could entrust the executive branch and whose strings he could pull from the presidential palace. That man was Ahmet Davutoğlu, his foreign minister. Davutoğlu happily took the job and pledged absolute loyalty to Erdoğan.[21]

Behind the Numbers

The March 30 and August 10 elections require more detailed analysis to understand what really lies behind what looks like a simple victory for AKP. The following table helps explain where AKP's popularity stands today in comparison to when it first emerged on the political scene in 2002.

The table at right shows that AKP's votes doubled in number between 2002 and 2014 from nearly eleven million to more than twenty-one million. But caution is required. Despite this sharp increase, votes cast for Erdoğan in presidential elections do not reflect votes for the party. First, some Turks outside the AKP base (especially from among the nationalists and non-AKP Islamists) voted for Erdoğan due to ideology and his personal charisma. Second, some fiercely anti-Erdoğan Turks also voted for him, calculating that he would pose less danger to Turkey if he took up the largely symbolic post of presidency and gave up his executive powers as prime minister. Third, the voter turnout in August was exceptionally low (74 percent, compared to nearly 90 percent in March), which resulted in a slender 51.8 percent for Erdoğan. Many opposition voters did not show up, expecting that Erdoğan would win.

Another careful analysis is required to understand how Erdoğan's popularity changed since 2011 when it peaked. In 2011, AKP won 21.4 million votes, or 49.8 percent when the total number of voters was 50.2 million. Between 2011 and 2014, some 2.5 million new voters were registered, bringing the total number of voters to 52.7 million. If in the March 30 elections AKP (or Erdoğan) had maintained the same level of support as in 2011, the party would have garnered 26.2 million votes. Instead, its votes stood at 19.4 million—a loss of 6.8 million. This assumption excludes invalid votes but does not change the fact that AKP lost a significant number of votes despite what it portrays as an overwhelming election victory. There has been widespread speculation about election fraud, but none has been officially or independently proven. A report by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe expressed "a certain level of confidence in the electoral process."[22]

"Champion of Turkey's Greatness"

In the days when the world's foreign policy intelligentsia had the habit of mentioning Davutoğlu's name with euphemisms such as "Turkey's Kissinger," "champion of Turkey's greatness," and "always the hero of his own narrative," this author referred to him as "Dr. Strangelove," "The Man Who Made Tomorrow," or "The Man Who Rides the Thunder." Turkey's foreign policy under Davutoğlu was "a not-so-funny Turkish opera buffa with the main characters resembling those of [Miguel de] Cervantes's famous book."[23]

Davutoğlu is otherwise known to be a fine gentleman: an honest, modest, hard-working man who wants the best for his nation—though not always in the most realistic way. His tolerance for dissenting opinion is considerably more Western compared to Erdoğan's. Davutoğlu is also Turkey's first prime minister—after the late Bülent Ecevit—who is entirely free of any corruption allegations. In other words, Davutoğlu is Mr. Clean.

Erdoğan remains unchallenged: The opposition is weak.

Unfortunately, the fundamentals of Davutoğlu's foreign policy will not miraculously metamorphose from blind ideology into reason. Previously, Turkey essentially had two foreign ministers, Erdoğan and Davutoğlu; now it will have three with the appointment of EU minister, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, as foreign minister.

It is out of the question that the third man will devise his own foreign policy independent of Erdoğan and Davutoğlu: It will be old wine in a new bottle. So from now on, three gentlemen, instead of two, will be fighting coup makers in the Middle East if they oppose the Muslim Brotherhood, hoping to pray at the al-Aqsa mosque in the "Palestinian capital Jerusalem," working to depose Syria's Bashar Assad, maintaining a game of pretension between the neo-Ottomans and the Iranian regime, aggressively seeking Iranian regional hegemony, and working day and night for the advancement of Turkish Sunni Islamism in former Ottoman lands.

But Davutoğlu could be Erdoğan's unwilling gift to Turkey, especially if Davutoğlu, with his intellectual honesty, reviewed the applicability of twenty-first-century Turkish Sunni supremacy in former Ottoman lands. Or if he stopped viewing Ankara's foreign relations with the former Ottoman lands as domestic Turkish affairs. Or if he stopped believing that he has a holy mission to correct the "incorrect" flow of history.[24]

Everything May Not Be Coming up Roses

Ostensibly, everything in the house of AKP proceeds perfectly. The party is heading for its ninth election victory within thirteen years, a first time in Turkish political history. Erdoğan remains unchallenged: The opposition is weak, to put it mildly. Turks continue to admire the president despite embarrassing graft scandals. He won the presidential election in the first round as he promised. He has a loyal man as prime minister in Davutoğlu, who is not likely to object to his leader's de facto executive presidency and one-man show. Davutoğlu is known to every Turk, and to nearly half of them, he is the champion of a foreign policy that promises the revival of their collapsed imperial power. He is pro-Hamas and anti-Israeli, a perfect recipe for popularity at the ballot box. And luckily, on September 20, 2014, Davutoğlu made a heroic start when the jihadist group Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) released forty-six Turkish hostages and the three Iraqi consulate employees it had held since it attacked the Turkish consulate in Mosul on June 11.[25] No doubt, Davutoğlu was the darling of all Turks when he smiled and posed for the cameras together with the cheerful hostages, which included the consul general, disembarking the plane that took them to safety and the embrace of their loved ones.[26] "Only Davutoğlu could snatch them from the jihadists unharmed," one taxi driver told this author after their release. As he kept driving, he added: "Don't misunderstand, sir. I have never voted for AKP. I dislike Erdoğan. I am a nationalist. But I think I will vote for Davutoğlu next year." What more could a fresh contender hope for?

But this is only a partial narrative. As noted, election results suggest that the AKP's votes may now have saturated at around twenty million, and there is no meaningful sociopolitical data explaining why AKP's vote should significantly rise under Davutoğlu. With an increasing number of Turks qualifying to vote next June, AKP's nationwide vote may be pressured down between what it won in March (43.3 percent) and the critical 40 percent threshold.

Davutoğlu may appeal to some Turks, but others will be loyal only to Erdoğan and not even to his choice of the prime minister. "I will never vote for anyone other than Erdoğan," a waiter at a fancy Ankara restaurant told me. "Davutoğlu can only be his second-in-command, and I don't want to vote for a second-in-command. I will abstain and wait for the next presidential elections [2019] to vote for Erdoğan again."

Not only that. To get Davutoğlu elected as prime minister at a party convention, Erdoğan had to exact an important sacrifice: that of Abdullah Gül, his predecessor at the presidential palace, the second most powerful AKP figure, and Erdoğan's closest political comrade since the late 1990s. Gül, along with Erdoğan, was the co-founder of AKP. He is always a calm voice. But apparently his wife is not. In an unusual protest, Hayrünnisa Gül spoke to journalists, shortly before the couple vacated the presidential palace, and angrily complained that "our devout comrades have betrayed us; they made us sorry, and I'll never forgive them for that."[27] She revealed a potentially major crack.

Abdullah Gül (right), a co-founder of the AKP, was completely sidelined by his closest political associate, Erdoğan. In an unusual protest, Gül's wife Hayrünnisa (left) spoke to journalists when her husband was forced to vacate the presidential palace and angrily complained that "our devout comrades have betrayed us."

Gül, jobless for the moment, declared earlier that he is "too young to retire."[28] Completely sidelined by his closest political associate, the always-patient Gül will most probably wait to become a center of attraction for other disgruntled AKP members. Under a self-imposed party rule, no AKP member of parliament can run for the house for more than three uninterrupted terms.[29] That means more than seventy AKP bigwigs, including several present and former cabinet heavyweights, will have to retire, like Gül, in June. And, like Gül, they are too young to disappear from the political scene.

Despite reassuring statements from party leaders that "within AKP there will never be a split,"[30] most political observers think that these assurances indicate the party indeed fears a split. Some politicians speculate that a recently-launched, center-right party, the Center Party (MP), will house disgruntled AKP politicians "if Davutoğlu perform[s] worse than Erdoğan expects him to" next June.[31] A critical threshold could be if AKP's vote drops to 40 percent or below.

Erdoğan prefers to be a fully constitutional president, not one his opponents can accuse of violating the constitution.

Even if there is no split between Turkey's conservatives under the roof of AKP, Erdoğan's broader plans may face two serious challenges. Erdoğan's first ambition is that Davutoğlu wins enough seats (at least 330 out of 550) to amend the constitution[32] and launch a de facto executive system that would give Erdoğan what he wants. If, as noted above, AKP's votes stand around 43 percent, it will probably win around 290 seats. Even if AKP wins support for any constitutional amendment from Kurdish members of parliament (who traditionally win 20-25 seats), this will not suffice to pave the way for Erdoğan's grand design.

Erdoğan's (and his new prime minister's) explicit struggle to win a constitutional majority in the June elections is proof that he is not comfortable with his current position despite his control of all levers of government and his disregard of the constitution. He wants a one-man show and does not want to be dependent on an ally. There are a number of reasons for this: First, the president is keenly aware that an undetermined part of AKP's popularity stems from his own personal charisma, and he does not know how well another man will perform in the future, no matter how much he supports him. Second, Erdoğan prefers to be a fully constitutional president, not one his opponents can constantly accuse of violating the constitution. Third, he fears that the present setting may one day be susceptible to inner strife and a split. He fully trusts Davutoğlu for the moment, but he once fully trusted Gülen, too. The chances that Davutoğlu may turn into a foe are slim but do exist. Erdoğan has never hidden his desire to avoid what he calls a "double-headed" administration (i.e., a government run by two people).[33] Still, in a span of less than two months, Erdoğan and Davutoğlu have made totally contradictory statements on various issues.

Erdoğan's second ambition—which he has declared publicly several times—is to raise "devout[ly Islamic] generations."[34] Later, in defense of his words, the president said, "Don't expect a conservative party to raise atheist generations."[35]

Erdoğan and his comrades have always won. But they are always tense. Often, they look pensive and unhappy. They are angry, always ready to pick a fight. Full command over nearly one half of Turkey will not satisfy them. They want to win the other half, the half they privately envy, the same half that smartly teases them and laughs at their childish "[Islamic] cause." That half—the human half—enjoys living life, defends the right to sin, and does not want to create a fake country, ostensibly dry and sin-free, but really a half-wet and sinful land. The AKP's leaders secretly know that theirs is a losing war, despite impressive victories at every political battle fought.

Burak Bekdil, a Middle East Forum Associate Fellow, is an Ankara-based columnist for Hürriyet Daily News. He has also written for the U.S. weekly Defense News since 1997.

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[1] Sol Portal (Istanbul), Dec. 17, 2013, June 24, 2014; Ana Sayfa, "Darbenin Degil Rezilligin Tarihi," Asal Medya (Istanbul), June 24, 2014.
[2] Sol Portal, Dec. 20, 2013; Mehmet Yilmaz, "Bu nasıl ustalik anlayan var mi?" Hürriyet (Istanbul), Jan. 3, 2014.
[3] Sol Portal, Dec. 17, Dec. 18, Dec. 19, Dec. 20, 2013.
[4] Ibid., Dec. 17, Dec. 18, Dec. 19, Dec. 22, 2013; Yilmaz, "Hadi Gelin 'Büyük Fotoğrapha' Bakalım."
[5] Al-Monitor (Washington, D.C.), Aug. 16, 2013; Ulusal Kanal (Istanbul), Nov. 15, 2013.
[6] Al-Jazeera TV (Doha), Jan. 30, 2014; Avrupa-Postasi (Hamburg), Nov. 20, 2013.
[7] Al-Jazeera TV, Nov. 21, 2013; Milliyet (Istanbul), Nov. 26, 2013; The Wall Street Journal, Nov. 27, 2013; Hürriyet (Istanbul), Dec. 3, 2013.
[8] "Yalçın Akdoğan ile Nermin Yurteri Ses kaydı 2," You Tube, Mar. 11, 2014; Zaman (Istanbul), Feb. 13, 2014; Radikal (Istanbul), Feb. 2, 2014.
[9] "Başbakan Erdoğan: Ses Kaydi Montaj Dedi Showhaber," Vidivodo, accessed Oct. 7, 2014; NTVMSNBC, Feb. 25, 2014.
[10] Anadolu Ajansı (Ankara), Mar. 19, 2014; AK Party website, Mar. 24, 2014.
[11] Burak Bekdil, "Why Is AKP the Mirror Image of the Average Voter?" Hürriyet, Mar. 29, 2006
[12] Today's Zaman (Istanbul), Dec. 23, 2013.
[13] Burak Bekdil, "There is a thief!" Hürriyet, Mar. 7, 2014.
[14] "World University Rankings, 2013-14," Times Higher Education (London), accessed Oct. 13, 2014.
[15] "Mortality rate, infant," World Bank, Washington, D.C., accessed Oct. 8, 2014.
[16] "Child Labour Persists around the World: More than 13 Percent of Children 10-14 Are Employed," International Labour Organization, Geneva, June 10, 1996.
[17] Gender Gap Report 2013 (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2013), p. 10.
[18] "Turkey," Freedom in the World, Freedom House, Washington, D.C., accessed Oct. 27, 2014.
[19] "Eastern Europe and Central Asia: Authoritarian Regional Models," World Press Freedom Index 2014, Reporters Without Borders, Washington, D.C., accessed Oct. 8, 2014.
[20] Human Development Report (New York: U.N. Development Programme, 2014) p. 40.
[21] Al-Jazeera TV, Aug. 27, 2014.
[22] "Republic of Turkey, Presidential Election, 10 August 2014," Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Warsaw, May 7-9, 2014.
[23] Hürriyet, Sept. 13, 2011.
[24] "Turkey's Foreign Policy Objectives in a Changing World," Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., Feb. 10, 2012.
[25] The Guardian (London), June 11, 2014.
[26] Reuters, Sept. 20, 2014.
[27] "Hayrünnisa Gül: Bizi çok üzdüler asıl intifadayı ben başlatacağım," You Tube, Aug. 20, 2014; Murat Yetkın, "Hayrünnisa Gül: Asıl intifadayı ben başlatacağım," Radikal, Aug. 8, 2014.
[28] Sabah (Istanbul), Jan. 30, 2013.
[29] Parti Tuzuğu, AK Parti, 2002.
[30] Analız Merkezı (Istanbul), Apr. 13, 2014; Medyagündem (Istanbul), July 31, 2012.
[31] Zaman, July 7, 2014; Sözcü Gazetesi (Istanbul), June 10, 2014.
[32] "Anayasa için kritik eşik 330," Hürriyet, accessed Oct. 14, 2014; Zaman, Oct. 12, 2012.
[33] Hürriyet, Oct. 21, 2014.
[34] Ibid., Feb. 2, 2012.
[35] Ibid., Feb. 2, 2012.


Burak Bekdil, a Middle East Forum Associate Fellow, is an Ankara-based columnist for Hürriyet Daily News. He has also written for the U.S. weekly Defense News since 1997.

Source: http://www.meforum.org/4910/erdogan-akp-ambitions

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Krauthammer on How Israel Tension Raises Questions on Iran [VIDEO] - Megyn Kelly and Charles Krauthammer

by Megyn Kelly and Charles Krauthammer

Megyn Kelly Interviews Charles Krauthammer on the state of Israel-US relations

Megyn Kelly and Charles Krauthammer

Source: http://www.israelvideonetwork.com/krauthammer-on-how-israel-tension-raises-questions-on-iran/

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Quebec Islamist Networks Exposed - Sonia Bailey

by Sonia Bailey

Islamist networks are quietly establishing a presence throughout the province of Quebec in the cities of Montreal, Sherbrooke and Trois-Rivieres.  This astounding and disturbing story broke earlier this week on the front page of Montreal’s Le Journal de Montréal, followed by four pages of highly detailed information provided by two investigative journalists. So far, the English mainstream leftist media has barely batted an eyelash at this breaking news.

According to this report prepared by Félix Séguin and Hugo Joncas of TVA Group and Le Journal Montréal respectively, sister publications owned by the Sun Media division of Quebecor Media,

“…two Islamist networks suspected of financing terrorist groups became the most important owners of buildings housing mosques and Muslim schools in Quebec, discovered by our investigative team.  The Muslim Association of Canada (MAC) and the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA-Canada) own properties that house seven places of worship and four private schools in Montreal, Sherbrooke and Trois-Rivieres.”

ISNA is a direct offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, the nucleus of Islamic terrorist movements that preach misogynistic, homophobic and anti-Semitic ideologies, and that call for a global Islamic empire or caliphate (already established by ISIS) ruled by Islamic or sharia law.  MAC, at one point, publicized its ties to the Muslim Brotherhood on its official website, but has since scrubbed it to reflect otherwise.

These Islamist organizations adhere to the 50-point Manifesto written by the Muslim Brotherhood’s founder Hassan al-Banna who opposes Western culture based on liberal-democratic values.  He advocated for an Islamic culture based on the Koran and other highly venerated Islamic texts that denounce the legitimacy of other religions, that oppose freedom of expression, and that seek the re-establishment of a caliphate and the global imposition of sharia law upon all.

Both MAC and ISNA are support entities that finance Islamist terrorist groups.  MAC finances the Palestinian terrorist group Hamas, listed by the Government of Canada as a terrorist organization in 2002, via the Muslim relief fund-collector International Relief Fund for the Afflicted and Needy-Canada (IRFAN-Canada).

PointdeBascule website writes “that in April 2011, IRFAN’s charitable status was revoked by Canada Revenue Agency after it concluded that, for the 2005-2009 period alone, IRFAN transferred  $14.6 million to Hamas.  In 2014, the Government of Canada listed IRFAN as a terrorist organization.”

“As for ISNA,” writes Hugo Joncas, “its charitable status has been withdrawn by Revenue Canada in 2013.  The tax department accuses ISNA of having sent $280,000 to Jamaat-e-Islami.  The military branch of this Pakistani organization, Hizbul Mujahideen, is recognized as a terrorist organization by the European Union.  It advocates the installation of an Islamic State in Indian Kashmir.”

In much the same way, ISNA-Canada’s American parent organization, ISNA, was found guilty in 2008 of transferring millions of dollars in funding to Hamas and other jihadi organizations to kill Israeli civilians through the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development in Texas, the U.S.’s largest Islamic charity at the time.

“According to Revenue Canada,” Joncas continues, “MAC owns property worth a total value of $31 million in the country.  Our investigation team found $14.5 million of it in Quebec.  As for ISNA, it entrusts its buildings to a subsidiary company, the Canadian Islamic Trust Foundation (CITF).  This organization has a large number of property assets worth $10 million throughout the country, of which $3.3 million is in the province.”

ISNA’s CITF owns the building in which the Muslim Centre of Quebec, located in Montreal’s West End, resides.  In the mosque, the investigative team found radical Islamic propaganda that defends “sharia law, Palestinian terrorism and suicide attacks.”  This information is accessible to the students whose elementary school, the Ecole Musulmane de Montreal -- subsidized by the government -- is connected to the mosque by a side entrance.

One of the texts found was a 100-page booklet, entitled Controversial Questions about Islam And Comments, which justifies and encourages all sharia practices, such as cutting the hand of thieves “from the wrist joint”, flogging for “illegal sexual intercourse”, stoning adulterers, wearing the hijab, and polygamy. 

Killing apostates is also acceptable, and according to the booklet, “is in a way similar to a person who agrees to become a citizen of a country, which implements capital punishment for certain crimes.”  Concepts such as freedom and human rights depicted in the above-mentioned book, are interpreted differently than they are in the West.

At the Islamic Cultural Association of Estrie in Sherbrooke, housed in a building also owned by ISNA’s CITF, another radical book entitled “Quelques Enseignements indispensables à tout musulman” (Some Essential Lessons for Every Muslim) was found in the mosque by the investigative team.  This book asserts that a wife must obey her husband, that homosexuality is a horrible sin, and that unbelievers are destined for hell.

These seven mosques and four Muslim private schools -- and possibly many others -- support, promote and perpetuate a radical Islamist ideology in Quebec that goes against what Canadian and Western values stand for.

At a time when radicalized Muslims are returning home from the Islamic State battlefields in Iraq and Syria with military training, killing Westerners in the homeland, why does the mainstream leftist media help subjugate Western civilization to sharia law by continuing to obsess over the right to print cartoons?

Instead of assaulting the right to freedom of expression, one of the fundamental rights of a truly free and democratic society, the mainstream media must start exposing the truth about radical Islamist organizations in the homeland and stand up for Western values.

Sonia Bailey

Source: http://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2015/01/quebec_islamist_networks_exposed.html

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

An Interview with Bassam Eid, Human Rights Activist, Part 1 - Maya Pollak

by Maya Pollak

The first of three installments. An interview with Bassam Eid, who tells of his life as a small boy in Jerusalem before the Six Day War and his experiences as a human rights activist covering the Arab-Israeli conflict. He speaks without distorting the truth about either side and is dedicated to the truth no less than he is to his people.

Translated from Hebrew by Sally Zahav

You might think that the things that Bassam Eid says would force him to go underground, or at least would make him constantly glance over his shoulder – but in reality, he seems relaxed as he emerges from the light rail into the center of chilly Jerusalem. Over a cup of espresso in the café where we agreed to meet, he immediately begins with an attack, without any unnecessary preliminary remarks.  “I think that if we prosecute Israel in The Hague for war crimes, we must also prosecute Hamas for war crimes against its own people”, says Eid. “Hamas served up the residents of Gaza on a silver platter for Israeli attack during Operation Protective Edge. They tried harder to defend themselves than to defend the population. And launching rockets into Israel – was done for the purpose of killing citizens, I have no doubt”.

The opinions of Eid, political commentator and human rights activist, are based on methodical research of Palestinians for years, including during the most recent fighting in Gaza. The evidence that he brings takes on a special significance since they are coming from a Palestinian.

“During the military operation, I made contact with several families from the area of Bayt Lahiyah. I heard from them that the IDF sent them SMS messages telling them to leave their houses, but the Hamas people prevented them from leaving and called them collaborators. As if to respond to the Israeli soldiers’ call to leave means that you are a collaborator. Hamas preferred that these people remain in their houses and be killed rather than flee to other places. This is terrible in my eyes.

“A friend of mine from the Gaza Strip sells me that four Hamas people came to him at 12 o’clock at night with a huge missile launcher, knocked on the door and asked him to leave the house because they wanted to use the roof to launch missiles into Israel. He told them that the children and women in the house were sleeping, and could not be turned out at such an hour. The next night the Hamas people returned, more of them this time, and beat him severely until he was forced to send everyone out of the house. They went up to the roof, launched missiles, and the next day the house was destroyed by the IDF. Armed groups are supposed to defend their people with their missiles and weapons, but Hamas defends its weapons using the citizens. And UNRWA closes its eyes to the deeds of Hamas, which hides missiles in the organization’s institutions”.

What is UNRWA’s angle?

“I think that UNRWA’s activism and hatred are a result of the rise of antisemitism in the world. As long as there is antisemitism, especially in Europe, UNRWA gains power as well as money. The rise of antisemitism in the world is no less dangerous than IS”.

Eid called himself “the spokesman of innocent victims” in an interview for the program “London and Kirshenbaum” on Channel 10, during Operation Protective Edge. Meanwhile, the number of those killed in the name of Islam has grown, in our area as well as outside of our area, as happened in France at the end of last week. “I expected an attack against Europe”, says Eid on the series of terror attacks that began with the slaughter of the editorial board at Charlie Hebdo. “For decades, Europe has supported the Arab dictatorships that created this terror. The Europeans will have to do some soul searching, both inwardly and with relation to those people who were oppressed with their monetary support”.

Will this event open the Europeans’ eyes or will nothing change?

“What happened at the editorial board in the newspaper in Paris is simply beyond comprehension, but unfortunately the Europeans will suffer an even longer and more terrible wave of terror. Europe is in the center of the radical Islamist organizations’ fight, and I am not sure that it will be able to deal appropriately with the predictable terror attacks”.

Did the publication of the caricature really insult the Muslims that much?

“It doesn’t seem to me that this was the real reason for the attack. I think that the Islamist terror organizations are trying to find reasons to justify their existence, and the caricature is simply an excuse”.

The future in exchange for rumors

Bassam Eid is a very angry man. He is angry with UNRWA, with Hamas, with the Palestinian Authority, with Israeli Arabs. It is a little bit difficult to contain the entire man with his opinions, especially when they are expressed calmly, in a pleasant Jerusalem café. One must make an effort to bear in mind that the speaker is a Muslim Palestinian who himself grew up in a refugee camp, someone that we would expect to express totally opposite opinions. But Eid is an anthropologist with a social platform who sees the Palestinian narrative as a chronicle of frequent and recurring errors. In the past he served as a researcher for Betselem, but today he does not identify with the organization. He is a consistent spokesman against acts that the Palestinian Authority carries out on its residents and on Israelis that violate human rights. His unconventional opinions have made him a popular interviewee in Israeli media, including the Haredi channels, and a favored guest lecturer in universities and conferences in Israel and abroad.

He is 56 years of age, the father of eight and grandfather of eight; everyone lives with him in the Bayt-Hanina neighborhood in north Jerusalem. In his childhood, his family lived in the area of the ruins of the Jewish Quarter of Jerusalem. They were nine children and he is the fourth. In 1966 the Jordanian government established the Shuafat Refugee Camp in north Jerusalem, next to the place where the French Hill neighborhood was later established. Five hundred Arab families that lived in the old city were evacuated to the new camp, including Eid’s family.

“My father did not hesitate to relocate because they said that UNRWA would give the families two-bedroom apartments and land for free”, he says. "The Jordanian soldiers even arranged to move all of our things. Father worked as a tailor in the old city, and he continued to go to his store in the Jewish Quarter even after we moved to Shuafat.

“Even today I still can’t get an explanation, from either Israeli or Arab experts as to why the Jordanian regime decided to relocate the families from the Jewish Quarter. I know that the houses in the Quarter were Jewish property and the Jews actually were returning to their homes. In the place where our house stood there is a haredi kindergarten today. In contrast, the Palestinians are always missing opportunities by moving to some place and not remaining in their place. In 1948 the Palestinians abandoned their houses because of rumors that the Jews were going to kill them, which was not at all true. We miss out on our future because of rumors".

The Shuafat of his childhood, he says, was different from that of today. “There was no crowding, the UNRWA people did many more positive activities then, and they would supply food to the residents for the entire year”. Eid was only nine when the Six Day War broke out. “On the very day that the war broke out I traveled from the camp to visit my aunt in the old city. Suddenly the war broke out and I stayed in the house for six days without going out. From time to time I heard shooting, for the first time in my life. I asked my aunt what it was, who was shooting whom, and she said that the Arabs were going to kill the Jews. I asked ‘what are Jews’, because I had never heard this word before, and my aunt answered that the Jews are man-eaters. I became even more afraid, and I asked if they would be coming to eat us.

“When the war was over my aunt sent me to bring food supplies, and then I saw for the first time in my life, soldiers with helmets. They spoke excellent Arabic. I went on foot from my aunt’s house to Shuafat, and on the way I saw dead bodies, apparently, mostly Jordanian soldiers. It was very frightening, shocking”.

Part 2: Life under Israeli rule and an invitation to join Betselem


Maya Pollak

Source:Makor Rishon, Issue 910 of the Diokan Section

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.