by Emil Avdaliani
Israel has unique interests in each of the three component South Caucasus countries
The Caucasus region, University of Texas Library map, public domain, via Wikimedia Commons
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: One
might be excused for believing the South Caucasus to be of little
interest to Israel, as it does not border the Jewish state and hosts
several intractable conflicts. But Israel has unique interests in each
of the three component South Caucasus countries – interests that have
only grown as Iran’s influence has expanded following the lifting of
sanctions in 2016.
For most observers, the South Caucasus region
might not appear high on Israel’s foreign policy agenda. This is a
reasonable assumption, as none of the three states – Azerbaijan,
Armenia, and Georgia – borders Israel. Moreover, the region is a hotbed
of ethnic fighting, with three ongoing separatist conflicts in South
Ossetia, Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh further complicating political
stability. However, the South Caucasus’ strategic location, which lies
on the one hand between Central Asia and eastern Europe, and on the
other between Russia and the Middle East – has drawn regional players to
seek greater influence in the territory. Those players are usually
Turkey, Russia, and the EU, and their interest might logically appear to
overwhelm any potential influence Israel might have in the region.
Yet over the past year, Israel has intensified its
foreign policy moves towards each of the South Caucasian states. Each
country interests Israel for its own particular reasons. For example,
prior to 2008, the Georgian army was largely supplied with Israeli
military technologies. However, the Russo-Georgian war that broke out in
August 2008 caused Israeli exports to cease, as Russia was angry that
its small neighbor was able to boast such advanced military
capabilities.
Beyond military ties, Georgia interests Israel
from an economic standpoint: Israeli investments play an important role
in Georgia’s economy. Moreover, Georgia is geopolitically important,
insofar as it has several large ports on its Black Sea shoreline that
can easily be used for commercial and military purposes.
In the case of Armenia, Israel’s relations have
been somewhat distant for more than a decade. This was due primarily to
Israel’s rather strong ties with Yerevan’s two biggest geopolitical
rivals, Azerbaijan and Turkey. However, a shift in bilateral relations
was made apparent recently when a senior Israeli official visited
Yerevan. Tzachi Hanegbi, Israel’s Minister for Regional
Cooperation, visited Armenia on July 25-26, 2017 for talks with senior
Armenian officials. Hanegbi is a key figure in Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu’s ruling Likud party and has held ministerial positions for
two decades. He said his visit was intended as a step forward in
relations to make the Armenia-Israeli “friendship mutually beneficial in
many fields.” His was the first visit by a senior Israeli official to
Armenia since 2012.
One of the major bones of contention between
Armenia and Israel is Israeli arms shipments to Azerbaijan. Those
supplies played an important role in last year’s “April war” between
Armenia and Azerbaijan. After Azerbaijan took several frontline posts in
a surprise attack on April 2, 2016, Armenian forces undertook a
counteroffensive – but Israeli-supplied Harop suicide drones and Spike
anti-tank missiles helped Azerbaijani forces thwart that counterattack.
This brings us to Israel-Azerbaijan relations. In
late 2016, reports circulated that Baku was planning to buy Israeli
“Iron Dome” capabilities to better counter Armenian attacks. Beyond
those military ties, Azerbaijan is important to Israel for its large oil
resources. In the event of need, the country could potentially become
Israel’s major oil supplier.
Thus Israel’s relations with each of the three
South Caucasian states depends on specific economic and military
interests – interests that are contained within a complex wider context.
Each state has its own relations with its larger neighbors, Russia and
Turkey. Israeli diplomacy must navigate difficult political terrain
where a misstep could cause Israel’s ties with Turkey or Russia to
deteriorate.
With that in mind, there is another likely reason
why Israel’s diplomacy in regard to the South Caucasus has become more
active over the past year or so. That reason is Iran.
Historically, from the Achaemenids to the
Sasanians in the ancient period and through the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, Iran, under various dynasties, has aspired to a
major role in the South Caucasus. When, after the Cold War, sanctions
were placed on Tehran’s nuclear program, Iran was constrained in the
expansion of its role in this region.
However, sanctions were officially lifted in 2016.
The Trump administration, while pressuring Tehran, seems unlikely to
change course in the near future towards a re-imposition of sanctions.
Iran’s role in the region is thus set to increase. Although Russia and
Turkey will continue to exert major military and economic power in the
South Caucasus, developments suggest that Iran is increasing its
economic clout.
Iranian officials often meet their Georgian
counterparts to discuss trade corridors. For example, on June 6, the
heads of the Georgian, Iranian, and Azerbaijani railways discussed
launching a new South-West Transport Corridor where Georgia could play a
vital transit role connecting the Persian Gulf and India to Europe.
Tehran has also often expressed its willingness to
use the Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline and the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline,
and intends to increase trade with the South Caucasus countries. It has
stated on several occasions that trade with Georgia, Armenia, and
Azerbaijan will grow from approximately $1 billion to more than $2.5
billion.
Iran has taken steps to establish itself on the
Black Sea coast. In late 2016, it was agreed that Iran and Georgia will
construct, through a joint venture, various oil reproduction facilities
near Georgia’s Black Sea town of Supsa, on approximately 1.2 square
kilometers of land. Tehran and Yerevan have also held talks on the
possibility of constructing a $3.7 billion railway through Armenia to
Georgia’s Black Sea coast.
Another area of involvement for Iran could be the
simmering Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In the early 1990s, there were
unsuccessful attempts by the Iranian government to mediate it. Since
both Armenia and Azerbaijan border Iran, it is natural that Tehran seeks
to play a bigger role in the settlement of this conflict.
In the case of Azerbaijan, Iran wants to involve
it in a common economic corridor together with Russia and also limit
Israel’s cooperation with Baku. Tehran has often accused Azerbaijan of
allowing the Israeli military to use its territory to observe Iran’s
actions.
Thus, it can be argued that Israel’s foreign
policy is diversified towards the South Caucasus states. Moreover, in
the last year or so, Israel has expanded its diplomatic activities in
the region to coincide with Iran’s stepped-up efforts towards Georgia,
Azerbaijan, and Armenia.
BESA Center Perspectives Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family
Emil Avdaliani teaches history and international relations at Tbilisi State University and Ilia State University. He has worked for various international consulting companies and currently publishes articles focused on military and political developments across the former Soviet space.
Source: https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/israel-south-caucasus/
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