by Habtom Ghebrezghiabher
How Iran is turning the Red Sea’s geography, armed networks and strategic chokepoints into a regional power advantage.
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The warning was on the wall for years. The capture of Mokha, a port city on the Red Sea coast of Yemen, is the consequence. And it’s not surprising. The answer must therefore be regional, territorial and aimed at defeating the Houthi military machine and dismantling the network behind it.
The Houthi seizure of Mokha, their control of Perim Island—a piece of land inside the Bab el-Mandeb itself—and their defeat of Yemeni forces backed by Saudi Arabia are not simply another development in Yemen’s war.
It is the latest result of a strategy that allowed an Iranian-backed Islamist armed militia to transform itself from a small insurgency into a territorial and military force along Yemen’s Red Sea coast.
Iran planned this strategy and succeeded. By building the Houthi military machine, Tehran turned an allied militia into a territorial force capable of exerting power over Bab el-Mandeb. Iran now has strategic leverage over both of the region’s critical maritime chokepoints: the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb.
Since 2015, Saudi Arabia failed to defeat the Houthis. The 2022 Saudi Arabia-Houthi truce froze the conflict without dismantling the Houthi military structure. The years that followed gave the movement time to strengthen its forces and expand its regional network. The 2025 U.S.-Houthi ceasefire repeated the fundamental error from another direction: Military pressure was reduced without eliminating the military organization that had created the Red Sea threat.
Mokha and Perim Island give the Houthis a stronger position near Bab el-Mandeb and greater leverage over the maritime corridor linking the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden.
This is a global security problem with direct consequences for Saudi Arabia, the Gulf, the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa and Israel.
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has reportedly pressed U.S. President Donald Trump for U.S. strikes against the Houthis, while Washington has so far resisted direct military intervention.
The security threat at the Red Sea extends far beyond the Houthis, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. It is increasingly becoming a single strategic theater where developments on the Arabian side interact with armed networks and political instability on the African side.
Yemeni forces have reported finding Somali al-Shabaab fighters among Houthi casualties in the battle for control of Mokha. The relationship has involved transfers of technological expertise, drones, missiles and other military capabilities, while al-Shabaab fighters have participated in the Houthis’ war.
The Eritrean dictator Isaias Afwerki has long maintained a deeply anti-Israel and anti-American posture while cultivating ties with Iran and the Houthis. Remarkably, after decades of avoiding international interviews, his foreign minister, Osman Saleh, emerged publicly following the Houthi victory to defend Asmara’s position, declaring that there is “no military solution” in Yemen while attacking Israel’s presence and strategic role in the Red Sea.
Eritrea has previously provided Iran with strategic access to the Red Sea, including the presence of the Iranian military vessel Saviz in Eritrean waters while supporting Iranian operations around Yemen. Afwerki has repeatedly refused to condemn Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Israel.
Thousands of Somali soldiers were trained in Eritrea before returning to Somalia, and some have reportedly joined al-Shabaab. Whether any of the fighters now appearing alongside the Houthis previously passed through Eritrean training programs is a question that should be investigated seriously.
With Iranian support and the cooperation of the Eritrean dictator, the Houthi model of asymmetric warfare and armed-network expansion is spreading across the Red Sea into Sudan.
The Houthis are consolidating military power on the Arabian side; al-Shabaab is developing links with them across the Gulf of Aden; Sudan remains vulnerable to Islamist networks and Iranian influence; and Afwerki’s Eritrea occupies the coastline directly opposite Yemen.
Hormuz pressures the Gulf. Bab el-Mandeb pressures the Red Sea. Together, they create a strategic vulnerability extending from the Persian Gulf through the Arabian Peninsula and into the Suez corridor.
The military objective must be territorial, backed by regional alliances, airpower, naval power and ground capability: Destroy the Houthi military machine and remove its ability to control strategic territory along the Red Sea.
Regional forces must provide the ground component and hold territory—that means Yemeni forces supported by countries with the capability and strategic interest to defeat the Houthis. Ethiopia and Eritrea, under a different regime, are ideal candidates for this. Horn of Africa countries are among those most directly exposed to this threat and have more at stake in Bab el-Mandeb than almost any others.
This is where Eritrea’s future becomes strategically decisive. Afwerki’s Eritrea is part of today’s problem. A post-Afwerki Eritrea could become part of tomorrow’s solution. Its coastline, military geography and proximity to Yemen and Sudan could make it a valuable partner in a future Red Sea security architecture, if its strategic orientation changes with the end of Afwerki’s rule.
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states have the financial capacity. The United States and NATO can provide intelligence, airpower, naval power and coordination. Israel brings intelligence and precision-strike capabilities critical to dismantling Iranian and Houthi military infrastructure.
Saudi Arabia and the UAE cannot afford rivalry in Yemen and Sudan; they must align against the expanding regional network. Riyadh must stop opposing the UAE in Sudan—leaving the country open to Iran and the Eritrean dictator’s ambitions—and stop opposing Somaliland, a potentially valuable Red Sea partner. Saudi Arabia must also stop being hostile to Israel.
For Israel, this is not simply a Houthi problem. The network is replicating the Houthi model in Sudan, bringing an Iranian-aligned threat closer to Israel. The threat is no longer only to Israeli shipping or Eilat; it could put the entire country within range of missiles and drones launched from Sudan.
The Houthis’ advance toward Bab el-Mandeb is not simply a Saudi problem, even though Saudi Arabia bears responsibility for many of the strategic mistakes that allowed the Houthi threat to grow.
This is a global security problem with direct consequences for Saudi Arabia, the Gulf, the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa and Israel. They must act together to defeat the Houthi military machine and dismantle the regional network before it takes control of the Red Sea and threatens the region from both shores.
Habtom Ghebrezghiabher, Ph.D., from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, is an expert on geopolitical and security dynamics in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region.
Source: https://www.jns.org/opinion/habtom-ghebrezghiabher/mokha-is-a-warning-the-houthis-are-coming-for-bab-el-mandeb
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