The Only Permissible Hatred?

by Barry Rubin

The chairman of Finland's branch of Amnesty International, Frank Johansson, wrote in his blog at a Finnish newspaper that Israel is a "scum state." It makes me recall a French ambassador who used a nastier word at a dinner party a couple of years back. And I've heard from several diplomats equivalent things over the years.

Isn't it something that in this day of Political Correctness and multiculturalism and humanitarian kindness that there is only one people and one country in the world that supposedly respectable Europeans don't hesitate to insult in the most vicious language? There is still one people to whom the alleged rules of non-stereotyping and anti-racism doesn't apply in many quarters.

Of course they would not dare to speak in this way of Iran or Sudan, Saudi Arabia or Syria, Venezuela or North Korea, Zimbabwe or Cuba, or for that matter Hamas or Hizballah, or other terrorists, torturers, murderers, and thieves in power. Greed? Fear? Support for repressive dictatorships that brandish populist and anti-Western rhetoric? Indeed, if such a person were to so criticize any other country in the world--from Albania through Zanzibar--he would be forced to resign immediately.

Might such people have some sense that this is just some new version of historic antisemitism? Well, one can only quote what Theodor Herzl wrote well over a century ago. As the twentieth century was about to begin,  Herzl noted something amazing. Despite advances in technology, transportation, and communication, one thing remained as it was when the Turks conquered Byzantium, Columbus set sail, and oxcarts were the main means of travel.

That one thing was antisemitism. Indeed, Herzl mournfully pointed out, "After a short breathing space...bad times have come again...not only in the backward countries...but also in those that are called civilized."

Now, here we are at the onset of the twenty-first century, the cycle is being repeated, and groups like Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the UN's human rights commission are in the vanguard.
Shame on them all.

 

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal.

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

Middle East Sandstorms and Tumbleweeds

 

by Yoram Ettinger,

 

The US evacuation of Iraq and the 2011 expected evacuation of Afghanistan – and President Obama's preoccupation with the Palestinian issue – remind me of the Texas colloquialism: "When you're smothered by a West Texas sandstorm, don't be preoccupied with the tumbleweeds."

 

In the beginning of 1990, President Bush believed in the New World Order theory, and pursued engagement with – and not defeat of – Saddam Hussein.  He considered the Palestinian issue as the root cause of Middle East turbulence, and therefore pressured Prime Minister Shamir for sweeping concessions.  However, Saddam's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 exposed the fallacy of "The New Middle East" and "The New World Order," sucking the US into a costly, bloody and prolonged quagmire.  

 

In 2010, President Obama believes that the USA should act within international consensus, aspiring to bring rogue regimes to the table rather than bringing them to submission.  He defines the Palestinian issue as the crux of Middle East violence, and therefore pressures Prime Minister Netanyahu for further groundbreaking concessions.

 

However, in 2010, Middle East sandstorms are growing increasingly lethal and put the Palestinian issue in perspective – a secondary priority for Arab regimes.  They highlight fundamental features of inter-Muslim/Arab politics, which clarify that US relations with Israel and with Arab countries are not a "Zero Sum Game."  Middle East sandstorms accentuate special security requirements, which result from the tempestuous nature of the region and underline the critical role played by the US posture of deterrence in bolstering regional and global sanity and stability. Intensifying Middle East uncertainty and volatility also reaffirm Israel's unique strategic features and highlight the growing potential of the mutually-beneficial US-Israel strategic cooperation. 

 

Irrespective of the Palestinian issue, the Arab-Israeli conflict and Israel's existence, the US is evacuating Iraq and will evacuate Afghanistan, while Iran is going nuclear - a nightmare for Persian Gulf, Middle East and global leaders.  Iraq's evacuation will destabilize the country, advance Iran's posture and destabilize Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other Gulf States.  Furthermore, the Saudi-Yemen border is boiling; inter-Muslim terrorism proliferates; post-Mubarak Egypt could follow the anti-US Turkish or even Iranian path; the Sudan and the Horn of Africa are saturated with conflicts; the Islamization of Turkey's policy fosters regional radicalization and Lebanon remains a target for a Syrian takeover and an arena for violent inter-Arab conflicts.  Additional intra-Muslim conflicts hemorrhage the region, facilitating Russian, Chinese and North Korean penetration of the region.  None of the above is impacted by the Israeli-Palestinian negotiation!

 

These conflicts shed light on 1,300 year old fundamental features of inter-Muslim/Arab reality: Islamic supremacy; autocracy/tyranny; violence as a norm to resolve conflicts and secure power; regime-change through the bullet and not through the ballot; sectarian, religious, ethnic, tribal and ideological violent conflicts; corruption; fragmentation; instability of regimes and alignments; volatility in shifts from peace to war and from conclusion to violation of agreements.  For instance, in 1969 and 1979, Libya and Iran were transformed via revolution from pro-US to anti-USA regimes.  In 1980 and in 1990, Iraq abrogated peace accords, invading Iran and Kuwait.  In 1990, pro-USA King Hussein collaborated with Saddam's invasion of Kuwait.  In 1993, the Oslo Accords were concluded and summarily violated by an unprecedented wave of Palestinian hate-education and terrorism.  In 2002, pro-USA Turkey switched over to the anti-USA, pro-Iran, pro-Syria, pro-Hezbollah and pro-Hamas camp. In 2003, a radical regime was trounced in Baghdad, but in 2011 Baghdad could become an active volcano, spreading lava throughout the region. 

 

The evacuation of Iraq turns attention to the exceptionally high security threshold required by Israel, resulting from the unpredictable, unstable, violent and volatile nature of the region and its regimes.  The more thorough the US evacuation, the higher the level of threat and uncertainty, and therefore the deeper the security significance of the Judea & Samaria mountain ridges – the "Golan Heights" protecting Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and the 9-15 mile sliver of Israel along the Mediterranean. 

 

The security, stability and sanity of the Middle East depend upon American determination and deterrence.  The evacuation of Iraq, without bringing terrorism to submission – along with hesitant USA policy toward Iran and North Korea – are perceived by rivals and enemies of the USA as lack of endurance, which was demonstrated by the US flight from Vietnam (1973), Beirut (1983) and Somalia (1993).  It undermines the USA posture of deterrence and pumps adrenalin into the veins of terrorists.

 

The lower the military profile of the USA and the more volcanic the Middle East, the higher the added-value of the Jewish State as a credible, stable, battle-proven and democratic ally of the USA.  Israel is endowed with unique capabilities, which have benefited the US in the areas of intelligence (sharing with the USA more intelligence than all NATO countries combined), defense-industrial Research & Development, manufacturing, refurbishing and exports (promoting US military systems and providing the US with the largest battle-proven laboratory), counter-terrorism (sharing with the US Israel's unique experience) and operations (foiling coups in Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, destroying Iraq's nuclear reactor and Syria's nuclear plant, deterring rogue regimes, upgrading battle tactics, etc.).  Such unique Israeli potential becomes doubly pertinent in face of the expected 2011-2012 Middle East sandstorms.   

 

US-Israel mutual interests behoove a dramatically enhanced strategic cooperation, focusing on the larger Middle East and global context – and not on the narrower Palestinian context – which is critical to dire economic and security concerns of the US, Israel and the Free World. 

 

 

Yoram Ettinger,

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

Internet Revelations

 

by  Jennifer Rubin

 

Muslim youth glued to the computer screen. 60 percent Internet penetration. The literacy rate (not computer, but what’s on the page) is over 90 percent. Where is this outpost of modernity and intellectual freedom? Gaza. Yes, the supposed ”hell hole” of the Middle East — the alleged virtual prison — is doing quite a bit better than its Arab neighbors. And the oppressors whom the people must outwit are not the Israelis but Hamas:

One of our first meetings in Gaza was with a Palestinian student group begun by an NGO called Mercy Corps to encourage youth to get involved in their community. These students began using the Internet to organize their activities and broadcast their charitable mission. They posted short films, for example, about their campaign to bring food to poor areas. The group grew from 10 to over a thousand in just a few months.

Although the group was not overtly political, Hamas nevertheless deemed it a threat and demanded that it stop meeting. But these students were already connecting through the Internet in ways that Hamas cannot track. During our meeting, the discussion centered on how they protect themselves online using “tunneling software” and other techniques that prevent Hamas from identifying and targeting them.

And, oh by the way, one reason for the high level of Internet usage in Gaza is “the proximity of the Palestinian territories to Israel, which is the region’s leader in Internet development.” No need for esteem-building NASA programs for them.

To put it differently, Israel’s alleged “eyesore” puts to shame the rest of the “Muslim World.” Imagine how much better off Gazans would be if their fascistic Hamas jailers disappeared. The anti-Israel left have always gotten it wrong (on many counts, but one particularly relevant here). They want to “free” the territories from Israel? That, at this point, would be a disaster for Palestinians and Israelis alike. It’s Hamas that needs to be ousted. I bet those computer geeks would be happy about that.

 

Jennifer Rubin

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

Czech List: Sometimes Even A Conference Can Teach Vivid Political Realities

by Barry Rubin

I’m not a big fan of conferences. There’s nothing more repetitive than sitting in a panel where the presentations have interesting titles but are otherwise disappointing. Or listening to a speaker who may be very good but says absolutely nothing you don’t know already.

But sometimes you have fascinating experiences which are not exactly on the agenda. Here are three from a conference I attended in Prague a few years ago, each of which contains its own lessons. Incidentally, nothing about the below was off the record, though the names and some details have been omitted since this is about points, not personalities.

1. The German parliamentarian was well-dressed, angry, and red in the face. He raised his voice in righteous indignation. Why, he complained, were there a number of Israelis at the meeting but no Palestinians. Obviously he thought that he had caught the Czech hosts in some politically incorrect indiscretion.

After he finished his somewhat insulting remarks and sat down, one of the Czechs stood up and explained very politely that plenty of Palestinians had been invited; all expenses paid, and had accepted but had simply not shown up. That’s something I’ve seen plenty of times.

A Lesson: Why get rewarded for deciding not to succeed? Hamas refuses to act peacefully, and then is rewarded for having committed aggression and been soundly defeated as a result (2008-2009). Same applies for Hizballah (2006). The Palestinian Authority refuses to make peace and then is rewarded for alleged suffering under an occupation it has the power to end when it so wishes.

Recently, a reader made a startling suggestion to me that I think is a brilliant insight. In this day when not only equal opportunity but equal results is supposedly supposed (yes, that double use is deliberate) guaranteed, Israel is being “unfair” at doing so well socially and economically.

In past decades, the failure of a nation to achieve democracy or prosperity would have been attributed to its own choices. That’s a good thing because its people can then realize their mistakes, realize them, and succeed. Today, however, failure is often attributed to being a victim of racism, imperialism, and pure meanness.

Woody Allen allegedly said (it isn’t clear that he did) that 99 percent of life is showing up. Yes, indeed. Showing up and performing well. But in the counter-Calvinism of our time, material achievement is a proof of damnation.

The development theory of the 1950s and 1960s focused on how a country could achieve take-off to progress and prosperity. It is a model followed nowadays by China, South Korea, and some others.

The currently dominant view, at least in intellectual circles and among fashionable dictators and terrorists is the idea that underdevelopment is not a result of history, culture, society, and bad choices but of imperialist exploitation.  Instead of reforming yourself, the object is to wage war and other struggle to get the West to hand over the loot. This leads to violence, social intransigence, political stagnation, and failure. But at least it is a popular, rationalized failure.

2. The pompous American intellectual made a stirring speech about how great things were going in Afghanistan, a country he obviously knew nothing about. He was playing those Washington and academic games in which the lives of distant people are toyed with on the basis of book learning and theories. The fact that this particular fool happened to be conservative didn’t change anything in the usual pattern.

My Afghan friend, who had been analyzing his own country for years and seen, as he put it, half his family murdered by the Communists and the other half murdered by the Islamists, could take no more. He stood up and countered with facts and details. His talk was a devastating response. The police in Kabul wouldn’t leave their barracks to deal with violence. The war lords were out of control. Despite official optimism, Afghanistan was still Afghanistan and American plans were just illusions.

A lesson: One would have thought that the arrogant fool would have been forever silenced by the graphic demonstration that he knew nothing and was speaking nonsense. Of course, such people are never influenced by that kind of humiliation. I’ve heard and read him since saying similar things. These “masters of the universe,” to use Tom Wolfe’s phrase—historically on the right but nowadays much more common on the left—think about their egos and careers, not the lives being affected by their prattling.

Nevertheless, the experience provided a stirring example of the difference between the real and fantasy worlds, between those who know and those who blow hot air, between those who merely articulate their ideological desires and those who have the courage to speak the truth.

I’m cynical enough to ask: Guess who gets the bigger honors and rewards? But not so pessimistic or craven to stop trying to do what’s right.

3. Its one thing to be a pacifist but quite another to talk like a pacifist while being a high-ranking official at the French Defense Ministry. The well-dressed, debonair, and relatively young man was explaining how nothing was worth fighting for, how conflict had to be avoided at virtually any cost. Naturally, he would object to my summary but it is nonetheless accurate.

I have a friend, though, who loves being provocative in a funny way. In personal life, he is a sweet and considerate person but he loves to play the role of the nasty, arrogant hardliner. You could see in his glittering eyes and slight smile that he saw a big fat target of opportunity.

And so as the French bureaucrat proclaimed that no one should go to war without prior approval of the UN, my friend stood up and pointed out that France had intervened dozens of times in Africa—overthrown governments, put down revolts, backed up oppressive regimes—without any reference to the UN whatsoever.

Up on stage, the French guy was livid, totally losing his temper, rose menacingly, and as I remember it threatened to punch out my friend. The spiritual man of peace had instantly turned into macho man cruising for a bruising. I think someone physically restrained him.

A lesson: When others advise that you have no right of self-defense, are using excessive force, and similar such stuff, note how ferocious they become and totally indifferent to moral or legal considerations when their interests are at stake.

 

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal.

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

Islam's doctrines of deception

by Raymond Ibrahim

To better understand Islam, one must appreciate the thoroughly legalistic nature of the religion. According to sharia (Islamic law) every conceivable human act is categorised as being either forbidden, discouraged, permissible, recommended, or obligatory.

"Common sense" or "universal opinion" has little to do with Islam's notions of right and wrong. Only what Allah (through the Quran) and his prophet Muhammad (through the Hadith) have to say about any given issue matters; and how Islam's greatest theologians and jurists – collectively known as the ulema, literally, "they who know" – have articulated it.

According to sharia, in certain situations, deception – also known as 'taqiyya', based on Quranic terminology, – is not only permitted but sometimes obligatory. For instance, contrary to early Christian history, Muslims who must choose between either recanting Islam or being put to death are not only permitted to lie by pretending to have apostatised, but many jurists have decreed that, according to Quran 4:29, Muslims are obligated to lie in such instances.
Origins of taqiyya

As a doctrine, taqiyya was first codified by Shia Muslims, primarily as a result of their historical experience. Long insisting that the caliphate rightly belonged to the prophet Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law, Ali (and subsequently his descendents), the Shia were a vocal and powerful branch of Islam that emerged following Muhammad's death. After the internal Islamic Fitna wars from the years 656 AD to 661 AD, however, the Shia became a minority branch, persecuted by mainstream Muslims or Sunnis – so-called because they follow the example or 'sunna' of Muhammad and his companions. Taqiyya became pivotal to Shia survival.

Interspersed among the much more numerous Sunnis, who currently make up approximately 90 per cent of the Islamic world, the Shia often performed taqiyya by pretending to be Sunnis externally, while maintaining Shia beliefs internally, as permitted by Quranic verse 16:106. Even today, especially in those Muslim states where there is little religious freedom, the Shia still practice taqiyya. In Saudi Arabia, for instance, Shias are deemed by many of the Sunni majority to be heretics, traitors and infidels and like other non-Sunni Muslims they are often persecuted.

Several of Saudi Arabia's highest clerics have even issued fatwas sanctioning the killing of Shias. As a result, figures on the Arabian kingdom's Shia population vary wildly from as low as 1 per cent to nearly 20 per cent. Many Shias living there obviously choose to conceal their religious identity. As a result of some 1,400 years of Shia taqiyya, the Sunnis often accuse the Shias of being habitual liars, insisting that taqiyya is ingrained in Shia culture.

Conversely, the Sunnis have historically had little reason to dissemble or conceal any aspect of their faith, which would have been deemed dishonorable, especially when dealing with their historic competitors and enemies, the Christians. From the start, Islam burst out of Arabia subjugating much of the known world, and, throughout the Middle Ages, threatened to engulf all of Christendom. In a world where might made right, the Sunnis had nothing to apologise for, much less to hide from the 'infidel'.

Paradoxically, however, today many Sunnis are finding themselves in the Shias' place: living as minorities in Western countries surrounded and governed by their traditional foes. The primary difference is that, extremist Sunnis and Shia tend to reject each other outright, as evidenced by the ongoing Sunni-Shia struggle in Iraq, whereas, in the West, where freedom of religion is guaranteed, Sunnis need only dissemble over a few aspects of their faith.
Articulation of taqiyya

According to the authoritative Arabic text, Al-Taqiyya Fi Al-Islam: "Taqiyya [deception] is of fundamental importance in Islam. Practically every Islamic sect agrees to it and practices it. We can go so far as to say that the practice of taqiyya is mainstream in Islam, and that those few sects not practicing it diverge from the mainstream...Taqiyya is very prevalent in Islamic politics, especially in the modern era."

The primary Quranic verse sanctioning deception with respect to non-Muslims states: "Let believers not take for friends and allies infidels instead of believers. Whoever does this shall have no relationship left with Allah – unless you but guard yourselves against them, taking precautions." (Quran 3:28; see also 2:173; 2:185; 4:29; 22:78; 40:28.)

Al-Tabari's (838-923 AD) Tafsir, or Quranic exegeses, is essentially a standard reference in the entire Muslim world. Regarding 3:28, he wrote: "If you [Muslims] are under their [infidels'] authority, fearing for yourselves, behave loyally to them, with your tongue, while harbouring inner animosity for them... Allah has forbidden believers from being friendly or on intimate terms with the infidels in place of believers – except when infidels are above them [in authority]. In such a scenario, let them act friendly towards them."

Regarding 3:28, the Islamic scholar Ibn Kathir (1301-1373) wrote: "Whoever at any time or place fears their [infidels'] evil, may protect himself through outward show."

As proof of this, he quotes Muhammad's companions. Abu Darda said: "Let us smile to the face of some people while our hearts curse them." Al-Hassan said: "Doing taqiyya is acceptable till the day of judgment [in perpetuity]."

Other prominent ulema, such as al- Qurtubi , al-Razi, and al-Arabi have extended taqiyya to cover deeds. Muslims can behave like infidels – from bowing down and worshipping idols and crosses to even exposing fellow Muslims' "weak spots" to the infidel enemy – anything short of actually killing a fellow Muslim.
War is deceit

None of this should be surprising considering that Muhammad himself, whose example as the "most perfect human" is to be tenaciously followed, took an expedient view on the issue of deception. For instance, Muhammad permitted deceit in three situations: to reconcile two or more quarreling parties; husband to wife and vice-versa; and in war (See Sahih Muslim B32N6303, deemed an "authentic" hadith).

During the Battle of the Trench (627 AD), which pitted Muhammad and his followers against several non-Muslim tribes collectively known as "the Confederates", a Confederate called Naim bin Masud went to the Muslim camp and converted to Islam. When Muhammad discovered the Confederates were unaware of Masud's conversion, he counseled him to return and try somehow to get his tribesmen to abandon the siege. "For war is deceit," Muhammad assured him.

Masud returned to the Confederates without their knowledge that he had switched sides and began giving his former kin and allies bad advice. He also went to great lengths to instigate quarrels between the various tribes until, thoroughly distrusting each other, they disbanded and lifted the siege. According to this account, deceit saved Islam during its embryonic stage (see Al-Taqiyya Fi Al-Islam; also, Ibn Ishaq's Sira, the earliest biography of Muhammad).

More demonstrative of the legitimacy of deception with respect to non-Muslims is the following account. A poet, Kab bin al-Ashruf, had offended Muhammad by making derogatory verse about Muslim women. Muhammad exclaimed in front of his followers: "Who will kill this man who has hurt Allah and his prophet?"

A young Muslim named Muhammad bin Maslama volunteered, but with the caveat that, in order to get close enough to Kab to assassinate him, he be allowed to lie to the poet. Muhammad agreed.

Maslama traveled to Kab and began denigrating Islam and Muhammad, carrying on this way till his disaffection became convincing enough for Kab to take him into his confidences. Soon thereafter, Maslama appeared with another Muslim and, while Kab's guard was down, they assaulted and killed him. They ran to Muhammad with Kab's head, to which the latter cried: "Allahu akbar" or "God is great" (see the hadith accounts of Sahih Bukhari and Ibn Sad).

The entire sequence of Quranic revelations are a testimony to taqiyya and, since Allah is believed to be the revealer of these verses, he ultimately is seen as the perpetrator of deceit. This is not surprising since Allah himself is often described in the Quran as the "best deceiver" or "schemer." (see 3:54, 8:30, 10:21). This phenomenon revolves around the fact that the Quran contains both peaceful and tolerant verses, as well as violent and intolerant ones.

The ulema were uncertain which verses to codify into sharia's worldview. For instance, should they use the one that states there is no coercion in religion (2:256), or the ones that command believers to fight all non-Muslims until they either convert or at least submit to Islam (9:5, 9:29)? To solve this quandary, they developed the doctrine of abrogation – naskh, supported by Quran 2:105. This essentially states that verses "revealed" later in Muhammad's career take precedence over those revealed earlier whenever there is a discrepancy.

Why the contradiction in the first place? The standard answer has been that, because Muhammad and his community were far outnumbered by the infidels in the early years of Islam, a message of peace and co-existence was in order. However, after Muhammad migrated to Medina and grew in military strength and numbers, the militant or intolerant verses were revealed, urging Muslims to go on the offensive.

According to this standard view, circumstance dictates which verses are to be implemented. When Muslims are weak, they should preach and behave according to the Meccan verses; when strong, they should go on the offensive, according to the Medinan verses. Many Islamic books extensively deal with the doctrine of abrogation, or Al-Nasikh Wa Al-Mansukh.
War is eternal

The fact that Islam legitimises deceit during war cannot be all that surprising; strategist Sun Tzu (c. 722-221 BC), Italian political philosopher Machiavelli (1469-1527) and English philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) all justified deceit in war.

However, according to all four recognised schools of Sunni jurisprudence, war against the infidel goes on in perpetuity, until "all chaos ceases, and all religion belongs to Allah" (Quran 8:39). According to the definitive Encyclopaedia of Islam (Brill Online edition): "The duty of the jihad exists as long as the universal domination of Islam has not been attained. Peace with non-Muslim nations is, therefore, a provisional state of affairs only; the chance of circumstances alone can justify it temporarily. Furthermore there can be no question of genuine peace treaties with these nations; only truces, whose duration ought not, in principle, to exceed ten years, are authorised. But even such truces are precarious, inasmuch as they can, before they expire, be repudiated unilaterally should it appear more profitable for Islam to resume the conflict."

The concept of obligatory jihad is best expressed by Islam's dichotomised worldview that pits Dar al Islam (House of Islam) against Dar al Harb (House of War or non-Muslims) until the former subsumes the latter. Muslim historian and philosopher, Ibn Khaldun (1332- 1406), articulated this division by saying: "In the Muslim community, holy war [jihad] is a religious duty, because of the universalism of the Muslim mission and the obligation to convert everybody to Islam either by persuasion or by force. The other religious groups did not have a universal mission, and the holy war was not a religious duty for them, save only for purposes of defence. But Islam is under obligation to gain power over other nations."

This concept is highlighted by the fact that, based on the ten-year treaty of Hudaibiya , ratified between Muhammad and his Quraish opponents in Mecca (628), ten years is theoretically the maximum amount of time Muslims can be at peace with infidels (as indicated earlier by the Encyclopaedia of Islam). Based on Muhammad's example of breaking the treaty after two years, by citing a Quraish infraction, the sole function of the "peace-treaty" (hudna) is to buy weakened Muslims time to regroup for a renewed offensive. Muhammad is quoted in the Hadith saying: "If I take an oath and later find something else better, I do what is better and break my oath (see Sahih Bukhari V7B67N427)."

This might be what former PLO leader and Nobel Peace Prize winner Yasser Arafat meant when, after negotiating a peace treaty criticised by his opponents as conceding too much to Israel, he said in a mosque: "I see this agreement as being no more than the agreement signed between our Prophet Muhammad and the Quraish in Mecca."

On several occasions Hamas has made it clear that its ultimate aspiration is to see Israel destroyed. Under what context would it want to initiate a "temporary" peace with the Jewish state? When Osama bin Laden offered the US a truce, stressing that "we [Muslims] are a people that Allah has forbidden from double-crossing and lying," what was his ultimate intention?

Based on the above, these are instances of Muslim extremists feigning openness to the idea of peace simply in order to bide time.

If Islam must be in a constant state of war with the non-Muslim world – which need not be physical, as radicals among the ulema have classified several non-literal forms of jihad, such as "jihad-of-the-pen" (propaganda), and "money-jihad" (economic) – and if Muslims are permitted to lie and feign loyalty to the infidel to further their war efforts, offers of peace, tolerance or dialogue from extremist Muslim corners are called into question.
Religious obligation?

Following the terrorist attacks on the United States of 11 September 2001, a group of prominent Muslims wrote a letter to Americans saying that Islam is a tolerant religion that seeks to coexist with others.

Bin Laden castigated them, saying: "As to the relationship between Muslims and infidels, this is summarised by the Most High's Word: 'We renounce you. Enmity and hate shall forever reign between us – till you believe in Allah alone' [Quran 60:4]. So there is an enmity, evidenced by fierce hostility from the heart. And this fierce hostility – that is battle – ceases only if the infidel submits to the authority of Islam, or if his blood is forbidden from being shed [a dhimmi – a non-Muslim subject living as a "second-class" citizen in an Islamic state in accordance to Quran 9:29], or if Muslims are at that point in time weak and incapable [a circumstance under which taqiyya applies]. But if the hate at any time extinguishes from the heart, this is great apostasy! Such, then, is the basis and foundation of the relationship between the infidel and the Muslim. Battle, animosity and hatred, directed from the Muslim to the infidel, is the foundation of our religion. And we consider this a justice and kindness to them."

This hostile world view is traceable to Islam's schools of jurisprudence. When addressing Western audiences, however, Bin Laden's tone significantly changes. He lists any number of grievances as reasons for fighting the West – from Israeli policies towards Palestinians to the Western exploitation of women and US failure to sign the Kyoto protocol – never alluding to fighting the US simply because it is an infidel entity that must be subjugated. He often initiates his messages to the West by saying: "Reciprocal treatment is part of justice."

This is a clear instance of taqiyya, as Bin Laden is not only waging a physical jihad, but one of propaganda. Convincing the West that the current conflict is entirely its fault garners him and his cause more sympathy. Conversely, he also knows that if his Western audiences were to realise that, all real or imagined political grievances aside, according to the Islamic worldview delineated earlier, which bin Laden does accept, nothing short of their submission to Islam can ever bring peace, his propaganda campaign would be compromised. As a result there is constant lying, "for war is deceit".

If Bin Laden's words and actions represent an individual case of taqiyya, they raise questions about Saudi Arabia's recent initiatives for "dialogue". Saudi Arabia closely follows sharia. For instance, the Saudi government will not allow the construction of churches or synagogues on its land; Bibles are banned and burned. Christians engaged in any kind of missionary activity are arrested, tortured, and sometimes killed. Muslim converts to Christianity can be put to death in the kingdom.

Despite such limitations on religious freedom, the Saudis have been pushing for more dialogue between Muslims and non-Muslims. At the most recent inter-faith conference in Madrid in July 2008, King Abdullah asserted: "Islam is a religion of moderation and tolerance, a message that calls for constructive dialogue among followers of all religions."

Days later, it was revealed that Saudi children's textbooks still call Christians and Jews "infidels", "hated enemies" and "pigs and swine". A multiple-choice test in a book for fourth-graders asks: "Who is a 'true' Muslim?" The correct answer is not the man who prays and fasts, but rather: "A man who worships God alone, loves the believers and hates the infidels". These infidels are the same people the Saudis want dialogue with. This raises the question of whether, when Saudis call for dialogue, they are merely following Muhammad's companion Abu Darda's advice: "Let us smile to the face of some people while our hearts curse them"?

There is also a philosophical – more particularly, epistemological – problem with taqiyya. Anyone who truly believes that no less an authority than God justifies and, through his prophet's example, sometimes even encourages deception, will not experience any ethical qualms or dilemmas about lying. This is especially true if the human mind is indeed a tabula rasa shaped by environment and education. Deception becomes second nature.

Consider the case of former Al-Qaeda operative, Ali Mohammad. Despite being entrenched in the highest echelons of the terrorism network, Mohammed's confidence at dissembling enabled him to become a CIA agent and FBI informant for years. People who knew him regarded him "with fear and awe for his incredible self-confidence, his inability to be intimidated, absolute ruthless determination to destroy the enemies of Islam, and his zealous belief in the tenets of militant Islamic fundamentalism", according to Steven Emerson. Indeed, this sentiment sums it all up: for a zealous belief in Islam's tenets, which, as has been described above, legitimises deception, will certainly go a long way in creating incredible self-confidence when deceiving one's enemies.
Exposing a doctrine

All of the above is an exposition on doctrine and its various manifestations, not an assertion on the actual practices of the average Muslim. The deciding question is how literally any given Muslim follows sharia and its worldview.

So-called "moderate" Muslims – or, more specifically, secularised Muslims – do not closely adhere to sharia, and therefore have little to dissemble about. On the other hand, "radical" Muslims who closely observe sharia law, which splits the world into two perpetually warring halves, will always have a "divinely sanctioned" right to deceive, until "all chaos ceases, and all religion belongs to Allah" (Quran 8:39).


Raymond Ibrahim
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Why Incitement is Ignored

 

by Dore Gold  

 

Richard Holbrooke is probably the most accomplished and experienced US diplomat that served in recent years in the US Department of State, and therefore his ideas should be seriously considered. He is responsible for the greatest achievement of the Clinton administration in foreign policy--the Dayton Agreement that ended the Bosnian War. Before that, he had served as the US ambassador to Germany, assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs and then assistant secretary of state for European affairs. He also became the US ambassador to the UN and was regarded as the leading candidate to be Secretary of State, had Hillary Clinton won the presidency in 2008.
 
In his book on his role in achieving the Dayton Accords, Holbrooke considers why the war in Bosnia erupted. He raises the theory that was widely cited in intellectual circles in the 1990's that the war in the Balkans  was due to "ancient hatreds" between Serbs, Croats, and Muslims. But then he dismisses this theory completely and argues instead that the hatred that fed the conflict had been deliberately inflamed. He writes that there was a deliberate policy of incitement by the Serbian leadership through Belgrade Television, which spread ethnic hatred "like an epidemic." In short, incitement was not a symptom of the Balkan Wars but rather, according to Holbrooke, it was a root cause.
 
In the Arab-Israeli conflict, incitement has not been taken as seriously. Formally, there are many clauses on incitement throughout the Oslo Agreements, especially the 1995 Interim Agreement. The parties are legally bound to abstain from incitement and hostile propaganda. They were supposed to foster "mutual understanding and tolerance." The first phase of the 2003 Roadmap calls on "all Palestinian institutions to end incitement against Israel." But in practice many of these clauses were dormant. Israeli governments put the greatest attention to the most politically explosive issues like borders and security. The most senior officials in the Prime Minister's office were involved in those committees and not in the incitement committee. There were those who undoubtedly felt that  if Israel complained about incitement, it would be perceived that it was looking for an excuse to get out of the peace process and not make any concessions.
 
Dennis Ross wrote an 800 page book, The Missing Peace, in which he tried to analyze why the Oslo Agreements failed. He criticized the US for ignoring the issue of Palestinian incitement: "The Palestinians' systematic incitement in their media, an educational system that bred hatred, and the glorification of violence made Israelis feel that their real purpose was not peace."  He insists that any peace process in the future must be based on a code of conduct that prohibits behavior contradicts the peacemaking. Ross is extremely open in explaining the reasons why the US did not deal with the incitement issue. Washington was always afraid of halting the peace process. It did not want to confront Arafat and mistakenly accepted his arguments that he was too weak. But Ross warns that there cannot be successful negotiations if there is one environment at the peace table and another environment in the streets.
 
The most extreme case of incitement that has been on the international agenda in recent years is incitement to genocide, which is war crime under Article 3 of the 1948 Genocide Convention. The UN Tribunal on Rwanda actually convicted three Hutu leaders for incitement to genocide in December 2003 , showing how seriously this issue is taken.  When a leading Hamas member, Yunis al-Astal, who serves in the Gaza Parliament, called for incinerating the Jews (mahraka), Israel has every reason to use the laws against genocidal incitement, as well. 

Incitement does not have to be as extreme as direct incitement to mass murder, as in the Rwandan or Hamas cases. There are clear cases of incitement to violence, alone, perpetrated by the Palestinian Authority alone. For example,  Palestinian Media Watch reported that Palestinian Authority Television carried a report on July 8 and July 15 of a Palestinian child saying that the Sixth Fatah Conference of August 2009 was important because it made "us aware...that we will be combatants and wage resistance against the Israelis." One of the strongest elements in any effort to promote violence is to advocate the demonization of an opponent. In this spirit the PA's senior religious leader characterized Jews as the "enemies of God," It is impossible to seriously advance peace when Palestinian institutions and official media are still calling for a return to war.

Incitement can also involve denying the legitimacy of the other side. Israel and the PLO exchanged letters of mutual recognition in 1993 which was supposed to improve how the parties related to each other. When the PA educational system prints maps that show Israeli cities as part of Palestine, that might not promote violence, but it is undoubtedly a form of incitement. On many occasions the attacks on the legitimacy of Israel are prevalent in Palestinian mosques, as well. Unfortunately this kind of activity continues under the Palestinian Authority.

The Israeli government has decided to take the issue of Palestinian incitement seriously and has appointed officials to monitor what the Palestinian leadership is saying. In his joint press conference with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on July 6, President Obama voiced his concern with the incitement issue: " I think it's very important that the Palestinians not look for excuses for incitement." Israel has a strong foundation today for demanding at the negotiating table zero tolerance for continuing incitement by any agency of the Palestinian Authority. This is not a side issue that can be ignored but goes at the root any meaningful peacemaking. 

 

Dore Gold

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

Abbas & Fayyad: Do They Have a Mandate?

 

by Khaled Abu Toameh

 

A president whose term in office expired a long time ago, and a prime minister who won about 2% of the vote when he ran in an election, have now been invited by the US Administration to hold direct peace talks with Israel on behalf of the Palestinians.

Mahmoud Abbas, the president, and Salam Fayyad, his prime minister, have even won the "backing" of two key decision-making bodies that are largely controlled by their supporters: the PLO Executive Committee and the Fatah Central Committee.

The 18-member PLO Executive Committee, which met in Ramallah last week to approve the Palestinians' participation in the direct talks with Israel, is dominated by unelected veteran officials.

 

Only nine PLO officials attended the meeting. The PLO constitution requires a minimum of 12 members for a quorum. This means that, contrary to reports in the Palestinian and international media, Abbas and Fayyad do not have the support of the PLO committee to negotiate directly with Israel.

 

With regards to the Central Council of Fatah, it remains unclear whether its 21 members ever endorsed the US invitation to hold direct talks with Israel.

 

Elections for the committee were held on July 8, 2009. The results of the vote, which has been denounced by many Fatah officials as unfair, was that only Abbas loyalists were elected.

 

Some of the committee members have even issued contradictory statements over the past few weeks regarding the direct talks. In the beginning, most of them seemed to oppose such talks unless Israel agreed to stop settlement construction and recognized the 1967 lines as the future borders of a Palestinian state.

 

Now, however, most of the committee members appear to have changed their minds -- clearly as a result of immense US pressure on Abbas and the Palestinian leadership.

It is not easy for a committee member who receives his or her salary from the Palestinian government to speak out in public on controversial matters.

 

So here is a president whose term in office expired in January 2009 -- and who has won the backing of only some of his traditional loyalists -- preparing to negotiate with Israel about extremely important issues such as borders, refugees, Jerusalem, settlements and security.

 

As if it is not enough that Abbas and Fayyad do not have a real mandate from their people, now they are going to lose what is left of their credibility as they appear to have "succumbed" to the outside pressure.

 

Abbas is in power because George W. Bush and Condaleeza Rice back then told him to stay, even though his term in office had expired.

 

Fayyad, who ran in the January 2006 parliamentary election at the head of the Third Way list, won only two seats. His number two, Hanan Ashrawi, has since abandoned him, making him the head of a one-man list.

 

Abbas was forced to appoint Fayyad as prime minister only because of pressure from the Americans and Europeans, who threatened to suspend financial aid to the Palestinian Authority if the Palestinian president failed to comply.

 

Fayyad's government was never approved by the Palestinian parliament, known as the Palestinian Legislative Council, as required by the Palestinian Basic Law. Parliamentary life in the Palestinian territories has anyway been completely paralyzed ever since Hamas forced the Palestinian Authority out of the Gaza Strip.

 

Officials in Ramallah say that the Palestinian leadership is being dragged, against its will, to the negotiating table with Israel. They say that the only reason the Palestinians agreed to hold unconditional talks with Israel is because of threats and pressure from the Americans and Europeans.

 

Over the past few months, Abbas and Fayyad had been telling their people that there would be no direct talks with Israel unless their conditions are fulfilled. Now, however, they have been forced to drop all their conditions and are being pressured to the negotiating table by Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama.

 

Besides, who said that Abbas and Fayyad would be able to sell any agreement to a majority of Palestinians? How can any Palestinian buy an agreement from them after they told their people that they are going to the talks only because the Americans and Europeans threatened to cut off financial aid?

 

Any agreement Abbas and Fayyad bring back home will be seen by many Palestinians as the fruit of "extortion" and "threats" and not as the result of peace talks that were conducted in good faith.

 

Leaders who do not have a clear mandate from their people will not be able to strike any deal with Israel, particularly when it concerns explosive issues such as Jerusalem, refugees and settlements. The Palestinian leadership's decision to negotiate directly with Israel unconditionally has already enraged many Palestinians across the political spectrum.

 

Abbas and Fayyad are nonetheless not stupid. The two are well aware of the fact that they do not have a mandate to sign any agreement with Israel. This is why they will search for any excuse to withdraw from the direct talks and blame Israel for the failure of the peace process.

 

Under the current circumstances, it would have been better had the US Administration thought twice before issuing the invitation for the peace talks.

 

 

 

Khaled Abu Toameh

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

So You Want to Hold Direct Talks? First, Study Palestinian Politics

 

by Barry Rubin

While explaining how the U.S. and European effort to start direct talks was going to fail because it neglected to consider Palestinian politics and ideology, I'm still amazed by how rapidly this point was proven. Briefly, the Palestinian Authority continues to be dominated by the politics of rejectionism and the fact that Hamas rules almost half of the land it purports to speak for must be taken into account.

Sure enough, even before the official PA acceptance of the U.S. invitation to direct talks, we've seen these developments:

--Hamas announces that since it totally rejects direct talks (much less any peace with Israel) as treason, it is stopping its own negotiations with the PA for cooperation or merger. This shows clearly that the PA cannot reach any deal with Israel (even if it wanted to do so) and deliver on its commitments because of the Hamas factor. Do also remember that not only does Hamas run the Gaza Strip but also has a very large base of support in the PA-ruled West Bank.

--Far from welcoming talks and expressing his eagerness to make peace and live alongside Israel, PA leader Mahmoud Abbas explains that he only requested permission from his true masters (the Fatah leadership) to go to talks for one month. It should be clearly understood that the Fatah leaders include three groups: old companions of Yasir Arafat, ideological hardliners, and perhaps about ten percent relative moderates. It doesn't want to make a permanent compromise peace with Israel.

--Some Fatah leaders are claiming that even this one-month permission isn't valid since there wasn't a quorum at the relevant meeting. In some cases, leaders stayed away on purpose so they could block direct negotiations.

--Other PA and Fatah leaders are unhappy that the U.S. officials claimed there were no preconditions for direct talks since the Palestinians wanted to be given everything (especially the 1967 borders and a state whether or not negotiations succeeded) in advance. Basically, they only want to accept a state from Western hands without any real compromises with Israel (recognition of Israel as a Jewish state, permanent end of conflict, settlement of all Palestinian refugees in Palestine, border changes, non-militarization, and security guarantees).

--It is also being pointed out in Palestinian circles that Mahmoud Abbas has been an unelected leader of the PA for two years, since elections were cancelled by him. The current government thus lacks legitimacy and a mandate to make any deal.

This is only the beginning! Ask me some time about how the PLO handled Jordan's King Hussein in the 1980s when he tried to get it to make peace with Israel. Briefly, it kept playing bureaucratic games about preconditions, contradictory statements, and failure to keep commitments until he gave up. The same story has repeatedly foiled peacemaking efforts.

None of this makes sense unless the observer comprehends that Israel wants peace with a two-state solution; the Palestinian leaderships want total victory and Israel's destruction. They will make no agreement and accept no state unless convinced that it won't make it impossible for them to get everything eventually. I'm sad to explain this and wish the facts were otherwise. But they aren't.

A case can be made for current Western policies in terms of government self-interest (to look as if the leaders are making real accomplishments) and national self-interest (keep the issue quiet and be able to claim they are doing something to Arabs and Muslims in order to keep things quiet and get on with other priorities). It is doubtful, though, whether many anti-Western, pro-Islamist Arabs or Muslims are impressed into changing their views.  If these governments consciously know they are acting cynically this limits the damage.

But meanwhile, a lot of the study or analysis of the Middle East is like insisting that the moon is made of green cheese, then either ignoring or explaining away every astronomical observation and scientific experiment that showed this idea to be wrong.

For example, here's how The Economist puts it:

"Mr Abbas came close to agreement with Ehud Olmert, a former Israeli leader, at least on borders. He wants to pick up where he left off. But having pinned his political career on these talks, his credibility, and that of the Palestinian Authority he leads, may be weakened further if they seem a farce. Mr Netanyahu's intentions are still opaque."

Let's analyze this. The pattern in talks is that Israel makes an offer of what it will give in exchange for what it wants. The PA then responds: OK, we'll take your offers as concessions. We haven't made any. And that will be our starting point. So we will now discuss the additional unilateral concessions you will make while we don't offer anything.

The above paragraph may sound like a satire but it is precisely how things have worked repeatedly, without anyone in the Western media catching on.

The second part of The Economist quote is equally ludicrous.

 

Barry Rubin
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

If Israel Won’t Say It, Who Will?

 

by Evelyn Gordon

 

In yesterday's post, I discussed some of the negative consequences of Israel's habit of treating its own negotiating demands as unimportant. But there is another devastating consequence: its effect on international public opinion.

Take the latest Israel Project poll, which found that even in America, normally a pro-Israel bastion, only 45 percent of respondents believe Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's government is committed to peace, and only 51 percent — down from 63 percent last year — think America should support Israel.

The second finding isn't due solely to the first, but neither is it unrelated: even Americans who realize that peace isn't possible now expect Israel to be committed to it in principle.

So why do Americans think Netanyahu doesn't want peace? Well, everyone knows the Palestinians have demands that he refuses to meet (like a pre-negotiations commitment to the 1949 armistice lines); they say so constantly. But few people realize Israel has demands the Palestinians have consistently refused to meet because Israel doesn't say so.

To understand how deep this Israeli pathology runs, consider official Israel's response to a New York Times editorial earlier this month. The editorial urged Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas to begin direct talks with Israel but sympathized with the fear he "no doubt" feels that Netanyahu "will use the process to give the illusion of progress while never addressing Palestinian concerns about borders, security, refugees and the future of Jerusalem" — and that despite this, "the Palestinians will be blamed if negotiations fail."

Based on past experience, the reverse is far more likely: in previous talks, Israel made massive concessions on these issues while the Palestinian made no concessions at all to Israel's concerns, yet most of the world still blamed Israel. The Times, however, neglected to mention that possibility.

That a leading American paper doesn't recognize (or doesn't acknowledge) that Israel, too, has legitimate concerns that must be addressed, and so far haven't been, is problematic enough. Still, given the Times's pro-Palestinian bias, perhaps you can't expect anything better.

But it turns out you also can't expect anything better from Israel's own ambassador to the U.S. In the letter he wrote in response, Michael Oren correctly slammed the Times for implying that Netanyahu, rather than Abbas, has resisted direct talks until now; for ignoring "Israel's attempts, in 2000 and 2008," to address the Palestinians' final-status concerns, "only to be rebuffed by Palestinian leaders, including Mr. Abbas"; and for its ad hominem attack on Netanyahu (whom it termed a "master manipulator").

But he didn't say a word about Israel having concerns of its own on "borders, security, refugees, and the future of Jerusalem" that the Palestinians have repeatedly failed to address. And if Israel's own ambassador won't say so, who will?

This is precisely why most of the world does blame Israel for the failure of past talks. Everyone knows Israel has yet to satisfy Palestinian demands; the Palestinians proclaim this nonstop. But few people even know what Israel's demands are, let alone that the Palestinians have rejected every single one.

And unless Israel starts telling them, they never will.

 

 

Evelyn Gordon

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Direct Israel-Palestinian Talks: An Important Detail

 

by Barry Rubin

There's an important detail worth noting regarding the renewal of direct talks. According to the U.S. State Department, Israel's extension of the freeze on building within West Bank Jewish settlements and across the pre-1967 borders in Jerusalem is an issue to be discussed at the negotiations. In other words, renewing the freeze is not a precondition.

This is an important U.S. step to Israel's advantage and should be noted as such. Of course, Israel will come under intensive pressure to renew the freeze--otherwise, the U.S. side will argue, the talks will collapse--but can bargain to get something in exchange for doing so. From a mediator's standpoint, though, this is one more likely crisis that could wreck the negotiations.

Israel's question will be: What will the Palestinian Authority give in exchange for a renewed freeze? The Palestinian Authority will respond: absolutely nothing. Most likely, the United States would then have to step in and give Israel some concession or guarantee. The Israeli government will say: OK, and one thing we want is that if in a year the talks go nowhere or if they collapse you will not demand we continue the freeze.

By the way, the conventional wisdom is that if the talks collapse there will be a lot more violence. Sooner or later, over the next five years or so, there will perhaps be another intifada. But in the shorter run, Palestinian militants and Hamas will be relieved if the talks break down. Violence would be more likely if--and this isn't going to happen--they appeared to be succeeding and Hamas along with Fatah radicals are eager to stop the process.

Finally, regarding the idea that Arab states are always obsessed with helping the Palestinians, the United Arab Emirates, which gave the PA $174 million last year has offered nothing in 2010 while Saudi aid has allen from $241 million to only $30.6 million. That's a cut of almost $400 million from the PA's main Arab contributors. Others give very little. The PA's economic boom on the West Bank is being funded by Western taxpayers. Here's an interesting take on the Palestinian economy.

 

 

Barry Rubin
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.