A Palestinian fiction - Gilad Sharon

by Gilad Sharon


Hat tip: Jean-Charles Bensoussan

The Palestinians hitched a ride on the back of Zionism. Many of them came here in the wake of the Zionists, to make a living from them

The idea behind the new bill allowing for the expulsion of a member of Knesset from the parliament is to limit an MK’s public expressions of identification with Palestinian nationalism and its violent manifestations. But the bill also raises a more basic question: Is Palestinian nationalism real or is it a fiction whose sole aim is to wipe us off the face of the Earth? The fact that the question affects us directly requires that we examine it closely. The fundamental aspiration, the ultimate dream, of every national movement is a state of its own. A little bigger, a little smaller – it doesn’t matter, just as long as it’s their own independent state. By definition, the purpose of a national movement is to work to realize that dream.

A quick review of Palestinian activities over the past hundred years reveals no evidence of any efforts of that sort. In Zionism’s early decades, there was no such thing as a Palestinian nation. At most, the Palestinians were a vestige of some pan-Arab nation, which also turned out to be an oriental fairy tale (pan-Arabism breathed its last with the death of Nasser).

Until the UN Partition Plan in 1947, Zionism devoted all its energy to creating national institutions and making preparations for the establishment of a state.

What were the Palestinians doing during that time? Were they also busy preparing for the founding of their state? No. Their efforts were directed entirely toward preventing the founding of ours.

Had they accepted the Partition Plan, they would now have a state the same age as Israel. All the territory they are demanding today – and more – would already belong to them, and there wouldn’t be a single Palestinian refugee. But they didn’t even consider that option. As far as they were concerned, their rejection of the plan was a foregone conclusion.

Why? Because they didn’t aspire to a state of their own. All they wanted was to thwart the establishment of ours.

Almost 70 years have elapsed, and there’s been no change in Palestinian aspirations. In the 19 years between the War of Independence and the Six Day War, they never established a state. In fact, Article 24 of the first Palestinian National Charter (the one they’d like to forget), published in east Jerusalem in 1964, states that the Palestine Liberation Organization “does not exercise any territorial sovereignty over the West Bank... [or] on the Gaza Strip.”

That was three years before the Six Day War. How is it that in their founding charter, the Palestinians declared they had no wish to rule over the very same land they are now demanding? The reason is that the results of the Six Day War are the pretext, not the cause, of Palestinian violence. That was here long before the war. It’s also the reason why Ehud Barak failed to reach an agreement with Yasser Arafat, and why Ehud Olmert failed to reach an agreement with Mahmoud Abbas, and why it will never be possible to reach an agreement with the Palestinians.

Is a nation whose members’ fondest dream is to be granted an identity card by the enemy really a nation? There are only three Muslim nations in the region: the Egyptians, the Persians, and the Turks.

All the rest are tribes at best. The Palestinians hitched a ride on the back of Zionism. Many of them came here in the wake of the Zionists, to make a living from them. Their spurious nationality is a by-product of Zionism. It wouldn’t have been invented if it weren’t for Zionism, and couldn’t survive without it.

When it comes right down to it, we have to do what’s best for us. That means not intermingling with them and not trusting them, because what matters to them is not their own benefit, but our destruction.


Translated by Sara Kitai.

Gilad Sharon

Source: http://m.jpost.com/#article=6022MjdERjE1RTAxQzExRUMxRDNDMUFDMDI4RjgwNDZCRkM=

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Thinking of Voting for Hillary? - Better Watch "Clinton Cash" first - Peter Schweizer/Breitbart

by Peter Schweizer/Breitbart

Be informed!

Clinton Cash: Documentary on Hillary and Bill Clinton Released on Breitbart News’ Website

Based on Peter Schweizer’s book, the documentary traces how the Clintons amassed their reported net worth of over $150 million after leaving the White House. It premiered on Breitbart Saturday and is mind-boggling.

Peter Schweizer/Breitbart

Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7LYRUOd_QoM&feature=youtu.be

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'What if the third Lebanon war breaks out tomorrow?' - Nadav Shragai

by Nadav Shragai

Ten years after the Second Lebanon War, top Israeli security officials try to identify the shortfalls of that calamitous war and draw conclusions for the next confrontation, which some view as inevitable • Everyone agrees: The next war must be shorter.

"In a war, an army must aspire to win," so stated the members of the Winograd Commission, which investigated the failures of the 2006 Second Lebanon War, 16 months after the war ended. The statement may appear to be obvious, but it seemed to have stopped being obvious during that war. Professors Yehezkel Dror and Ruth Gavison, together with retired generals Menachem Einan and Chaim Nadel, and retired justice Eliyahu Winograd clarified in their report that "if it is known in advance that there is no willingness or possibility of achieving victory, fighting, and even moves that could lead to war, should be avoided altogether."

Ten years after the Second Lebanon War, and eight years after these statements were written, revisiting this damning 629-page report teaches us above all that this little-quoted insight may have been at the crux of the failure. The fact that it wasn't obvious to the Israeli leadership about a decade ago was probably at the root of the many failures of the Second Lebanon War. It is also the key to understanding the chain of events that led up to what many still refer to as the "great missed opportunity," while others refer to it as a "resounding failure."

For the sake of historical accuracy, it is important to note that the first to identify this basic deficiency within the leadership in those days -- the absence of a clear desire for a decisive victory -- was Brig. Gen. (ret.) Aharon Levran, a high-ranking Military Intelligence officer in his past. Levran, who compiled countless research reports on military and security topics, was able to accurately identify immediately after the war the shortfalls in the IDF's operational capabilities as well as in the government's conduct. But what struck him most was this particular deficiency.

Today, still, 10 years on, Levran points to then-Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's address in New York about a year prior to the war as a warning sign that foreshadowed the calamity ahead. "Olmert," Levran recalls, "declared then that 'we are tired of fighting, tired of winning and tired of defeating our enemies.' Olmert also confessed in those days to his friend Daniel Abrams, as they stood in front of the ancient walls of Old City Jerusalem, that he was not willing to sacrifice his children's lives to defend [those walls]."

Levran had doubts from the get go regarding such a prime minister's ability to lead, not to mention aspire to victory. He notes that the "spirit of 'we are tired of fighting and defeating our enemies' permeated the ranks of the military as well, and manifested itself in the vagueness of the orders and guidelines."

Initially, Levran was considered an extremist in his views. But the members of the Winograd Commission, who deliberated for a long time, also came away with the impression that the "IDF conducted itself in this war in a way that indicated that the fear of casualties was the key factor driving operational considerations."

The committee noted that the "determination to complete the mission and fight to the death to achieve it" was the military objective that was most eroded. 

Just recently, former Deputy IDF Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Moshe Kaplinsky, who served in that post during the Second Lebanon War, conceded that "the interesting questions are, 'Why did this happen to us?' and, 'Could this happen to us again tomorrow morning?'" He was referring to the IDF's less than stellar performance during the war.

A third of the residents left

A reminder: The Second Lebanon War lasted 34 days. It began with a cross-border abduction orchestrated by Hezbollah. Two IDF soldiers were snatched and three were killed. The incident sparked a massive Israeli air campaign, followed by a hesitant ground operation dogged by weeks of uncertainty and severe internal strife -- whether or not to strike, to what extent, how deep, etc.

During the course of the war, 89,000 reserves soldiers were called up. But at no point were there more than 10,000 troops on Lebanese soil. The trauma of the First Lebanon War hovered in the background -- the protracted involvement and, finally, the hasty withdrawal in 2000, which Hezbollah interpreted as running away in defeat.

Hezbollah started firing projectiles at the Israeli homefront at the very start of the war. The Galilee region was targeted, as was Haifa, with longer-range rockets. This fire killed 44 civilians and 12 soldiers, and an additional 2,000 civilians were wounded. About a third of the residents of northern Israel fled their homes and took refuge in the center and south. Property damage was extensive.

In the ground actions within Lebanon, 107 soldiers were killed and another 628 were wounded.

Despite quite a few displays of heroism, it quickly became clear that the IDF ground forces were ill-prepared for combat. The years of ongoing conflict with the Palestinians, chiefly the Second Intifada, had eroded the military's readiness to confront an enemy like Hezbollah. Despite the IDF's unsatisfactory performance, according to the post-war investigations, Israel killed more than 1,500 Hezbollah fighters, destroyed combat-supporting civilian infrastructure across Lebanon and dealt crippling blows to the Lebanese cities. Entire quarters were demolished. Roads and bridges sustained extensive damage. Refineries and airports were bombed. The economic damage was estimated by Lebanon to be $100 billion. The fighting resulted in the deaths of hundreds of Lebanese civilians and thousands sustained injuries.

In hindsight, 10 years later, the public now judges the war mainly based on its two chief results: the relative calm, unprecedented in length (it must be said), that the war achieved along the Lebanese border, and Hezbollah's equally unprecedented rearming and strength building. Today, Hezbollah has some 130,000 launchers covering almost all of Israel.

Today, the public discourse focuses mainly on the question of deterrence, the IDF's capabilities then and now, the government's conduct and the role played by external players like Syria, Lebanon and Iran in influencing Hezbollah's future plans.

The big mistake

Maj. Gen. Giora Eiland, who served as the head of the National Security Council in the years leading up to the war and resigned six months before it began, feels that the ongoing debate over the gains and losses of the war has run its course. "The main question is whether we've learned what we needed to learn in order to handle the third Lebanon war better than we did the second," he says.

Eiland believes that "astoundingly, the biggest mistake of the Second Lebanon War isn't even mentioned in the Winograd report."

In his view, the biggest mistake was the strategic assumption in Israel that Hezbollah was the chief enemy. "For too many weeks, the Lebanese government, the Lebanese army and the Lebanese infrastructure were off limits," he recalls. "The result was that the world didn't care too much about the fighting. The battle continued for 34 days and as far as the world was concerned, it could have gone on for 34 more. The fact that Israel and Hezbollah were killing one another didn't raise any special concerns. If Lebanon, as a state, were to take a hit sooner, or take a wider hit, the war would have been much shorter.

"Today everyone agrees that a shorter war is in Israel's best interests, but what if the third Lebanon war breaks out tomorrow?" Eiland wonders. "Will it be short?

"Ostensibly, we have gotten better. We learned from our mistakes, improved our attack and defense capabilities, but there is a thing called 'relative power,' and when I posit the IDF against Hezbollah, we may have improved, but in terms of overall military ability, Hezbollah has improved more. They have far more missiles than they had then, with far longer range. They can easily strike any point in the country. Their warheads are larger. Their camouflage in the field is constructed better, and the accuracy of their missiles has improved," he explains.

"A precision missile can strike your most vulnerable assets -- be it an airport or a hospital or a port or a power station," he continues. "The State of Israel is a small country with a handful of national assets whose location is well known. The outcome of such a strike can be very bad."

"If the third Lebanon war lasts 34 days like the Second Lebanon War did," Eiland concludes, "the result will be several times worse because no matter how many Hezbollah operatives we kill in comparison to Second Lebanon, the damage on our side will be greater, and we will not be able to call it a success."

Eiland says that the solution lies with the Lebanese government: "Hezbollah enjoys full sponsorship from the state, and if Israel refrains from dealing a painful enough response to the state sponsor, the failure will repeat itself. The obvious conclusion, at least to me, is that if the third Lebanon war breaks out tomorrow, it has to bring about a war between the State of Israel and the state of Lebanon, not under wraps, but in a declared, formal manner."

Q: Why?

"Because the State of Israel will have trouble destroying more than 100,000 rockets, but it can, in a matter of days, inflict intolerable damage on the state of Lebanon, and that is our big advantage. No one in the world wants to see destruction in Lebanon. Not the Lebanese people themselves, who are a hedonistic people unlike the residents of Gaza; and not Hezbollah, not Syria, and certainly not Iran. Even the Saudis will be upset after having invested an enormous fortune into Lebanese infrastructure. The Americans and the French, who, among others, built the Lebanese army, will get riled up too. If all these countries believe that Lebanon is facing terrible destruction, and if the next war begins with a critical blow to the Lebanese national infrastructure and the Lebanese military, the world will cry out for a cease-fire after three days, not 34.

"In this way, we can spare the tough losses from our homefront, which, today, with all of our advanced defense systems, is still vulnerable to Hezbollah's burgeoning threat."

Q: But ultimately, the Lebanese infrastructure did sustain a debilitating blow in the Second Lebanon War.

"Too little, too late. The blow should have come at the start, and it should have been much more painful."

Eiland reveals that he said these very things to Olmert when he served as the head of the National Security Council, during the then-prime minister's visit to the U.S. "I asked Olmert to raise the topic of Hezbollah in this kind of direction and in this particular angle in his meeting with the American president, but there were other issues that Olmert thought were more pressing."

Eiland also thinks that the Winograd Commission fell into a trap of details. "It went into tactical resolutions, but never raised its gaze to the strategic level and failed to ask the fundamental questions about the assumptions held by the government."

'No legitimacy for a pre-emptive strike'

Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Yadlin, the head of the Institute for National Security Studies and the man who served as the head of Military Intelligence during the Second Lebanon War, agrees with Eiland's perspective. Yadlin, too, thinks that "Lebanon was not made to pay the price it should have been made to pay."

"The State of Israel succumbed to international pressure and refrained from hitting Lebanon hard enough. The chief of staff and I recommended it, but the political echelon, headed by Olmert, decided against it," he says.

Yadlin stresses that one of the ways to ensure a shorter war next time is "to inflict more damage on the combat-supporting national Lebanese infrastructure, like electricity grids and transportation. Anyone who listened to my successor at Military Intelligence, Maj. Gen. Herzl Halevy, and heard him talk about how Lebanon will pay a heavy price if Hezbollah attacks us, realizes that this insight has been incorporated into our thinking."

Yadlin defines the outcome of the war as a missed opportunity "because we could have achieved the same results in a shorter time and at a lower cost, and also because Hezbollah has given itself the freedom to continue growing stronger after the war -- we didn't generate the legitimacy to stop it.

Yadlin thinks, however, that as long as Hezbollah maintains the calm, and as long as the citizens of Israel aren't in immediate danger, it would be wisest not to initiate a conflict. "Today, there is no legitimacy for a pre-emptive strike," he says. "A pre-emptive strike like in the [1967] Six-Day War should only be considered when a conflict is clearly inevitable. A pre-emptive strike like in the [1956] Suez Crisis would have no legitimacy in the world today.

"Despite everything," Yadlin clarifies, "our achievement was the establishment of strong deterrence -- we distanced Hezbollah from the frontline and ensured peace in the [Israeli] north with UNIFIL and the Lebanese army in the south [of Lebanon]. Today the deterrence is so powerful that Hezbollah, which would have taken every opportunity to abduct and target soldiers before the war, or fire Katyusha rockets, has shown restraint and refrained from retaliating for serious attacks it attributes to Israel. For example, the strikes that no one claims responsibility for, like the assassination of [Hezbollah military commander] Imad Mughniyeh."

Yadlin notes that "one of the reasons for the calm in the north is Iran. The Iranians didn't like what happened in 2006. Iran viewed Hezbollah, as it still does today, as a tool for deterrence and possible retaliation for a potential Israeli strike in Iran. That is why Hezbollah was essentially reprimanded [by Iran] at the beginning of the 2006 war. There is no doubt that the calm that has been maintained since has to do with the fact that Iran warned Hezbollah not to repeat that mistake. It is also safe to assume that Hezbollah, which has been mired in fighting deep in Syria for the last five years, would prefer not to fight on an additional front." 

Yadlin believes that the IDF and Israel are currently far better prepared for a third Lebanon war, if and when it erupts, than they were for the second, in terms of training, planning and doctrine. 

'A juvenile mistake'

Israel Prize laureate Yehezkel Dror, a former professor of political science at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, was a member of the Winograd Commission, says that "one of the single best decisions made by former prime minister Olmert during the war was, in fact, not to extensively strike civilian infrastructure in Lebanon, the way the IDF chief of staff and others recommended.

"It would have made sense to target civilian infrastructure if the owners of the infrastructure, the Lebanese government, had any authority over Hezbollah. That was not the case at the time. Olmert instructed everyone to stop talking about it, and rightfully so. Incidentally, that is how he safeguarded our international support," he adds. 

However, Dror describes Israel's reliance on U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701 -- the cease-fire agreement that listed the conditions each side vowed to uphold -- as a "juvenile mistake." 

"It really didn't justify more Israeli victims," he says, with 10 years of hindsight. "The notion that a resolution with no military force to back it up would compel Syria and Iran and others to stop supplying Hezbollah with weapons is laughable. Sorry, it should make us cry. And it is delusional. Relying on words and formulations was naive. It was a blindness to suddenly trust in Security Council resolutions. The fact is that Hezbollah made a laughing stock out of this resolution. They have weapons and missiles like sand on a beach, and then-prime minister Olmert and his foreign minister, Tzipi Livni, are to blame for this naive approach.

"The only thing gained from the Second Lebanon War," Professor Dror claims, "is the full hotels [in northern Israel]. We achieved a tactical deterrence that could have equally been achieved in the first five days of the war, without victims, without exposing the homefront. It should have ended there. Our biggest defeat was showing the other side -- and ultimately Hamas -- that it is possible to target the Israeli homefront and get away with it without any real consequences. The Hezbollah command echelon, not to mention its leadership, escaped unscathed. Consequences are measured by the death and destruction of the command echelons. It is impossible to eradicate a movement like Hezbollah. What can be done is leave it with heavy losses. That is why the war should have ended after five days, and that would have been a good outcome, without the homefront being exposed. Or alternately, we should have gone in with a few divisions and reached critical mass. Neither of these things were done. It fell between the cracks somewhere in the middle. That is why I view the Second Lebanon War as being somewhere between a resounding failure and a terrible missed opportunity." 

Q: The leadership of that time often touts the now decade-long calm as an unprecedented achievement.

"The calm is tactical. There is no calm in the declarations being made against Israel, and certainly not in the rearming. There is calm because Hezbollah is busy in Syria, and there is calm because Iran, which controls Hezbollah, isn't interested in a flare up. There is also calm because they know that next time Israel will respond with more force. The calm is local and tactical. It is not strategic." 

Q: Is Israel right not to launch a pre-emptive strike on the massive weapons stores that currently pose a direct threat to the Israeli homefront? 

"I subscribe to the notion that weapons arsenals are not a good reason to go to war." 

Dror defines the continued activity of then-Defense Minister Amir Peretz (a defense minister who didn't understand the first thing about defense) in politics as nothing less than an outrage. He laments the fact that Olmert was not punished for his faulty conduct during the war but was removed from office for entirely different reasons (for which he is now serving time in prison). Only then-IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. (ret.) Dan Halutz "who didn't behave appropriately" paid the price that his offense warranted, he argues. 

Dror recalls how "people in positions of power, especially in local government, fled to central Israel. They got in their cars and ran away. Including mayors. I will not line them up in front of a firing squad, but they should have been punished, and they weren't. What they did was a betrayal of their duties during wartime." 

Q: How imminent is a third Lebanon war and, as far as you know, have the conclusions outlined in your report been internalized? 

"It is hard to assess the strategic picture as long as the Syrian situation and the Russian involvement there remains unclear. That is why we need to prepare for a host of possible eventualities. In the event of another war, we need to employ critical mass -- either do a little to teach a lesson or a lot to utterly destroy. In the next war, we need to prepare for cyberattacks as well. The homefront also needs to brace for Hezbollah's current arsenal."

Q: Is the homefront ready for the next war?

"I follow the State Comptroller's reports on the matter very closely, and I am not happy."

Dror believes, however, that the "political and military leadership today are far better than the leadership that led Israel in 2006 into the Second Lebanon War." In saying this, he stresses, "I am not taking any kind of stand in favor or against any particular policy. The current prime minister is much better than the one who was in power in then, and both of the last two defense ministers, [Moshe] Ya'alon and [Avigdor] Lieberman, are better than Peretz. The post of IDF chief of staff is also manned by someone who is far better suited for the job." 

Define 300 points

Former minister Dan Meridor, who has been involved in a range of Israeli defense questions throughout his public service, offers the Israeli public and its decision makers a different take on the Second Lebanon War, and the third Lebanon war as well for that matter, should it transpire. 

"Before the war, I said to many people, and they will all attest to this, that Israel cannot defeat an organization like Hezbollah. I said it based on my close familiarity with their capabilities and ours. Why do I bring it up now? Because it applies to our future as well. The threat of 100,000 Hezbollah rockets represents a shift in the war paradigm," Meridor says.

"We confronted and emerged victorious over the old threat of the Arab armies. The Egyptians have maintained peace with us for 40 years. Jordan is at peace with us. The Syrian military is in shambles. The balance of power is one of mutual homefront damage. We, like the U.S., are a state facing an organization. A state facing a non-state actor. This is a new era, and the equation has changed. The U.S. has invested and continues to invest millions in fighting al-Qaida and the Islamic State group, and Israel is dealing not with a formal military or state actors but rather organizations like Hezbollah and Hamas. In this kind of fighting there is no 'wham, bam, thank you ma'am.'

"The era of the 1967 Six-Day War is over. We learned that in Lebanon and in Gaza. The U.S. learned it in other places in the world. Defending borders is important, but it doesn't prevent the war from reaching the homefront." 

Q: So how do we deal with this changing equation? 

"Today, warfare is built on intelligence and pinpoint action, like the assassination of [Osama] bin Laden. We don't necessarily need to know where Hezbollah is keeping all of its 100,000 rockets. But we do have to define the 300 points that will completely devastate Hezbollah if we strike them." 

Meridor asserts that we didn't win but also didn't lose the Second Lebanon War. He believes that stopping short of deploying massive ground forces in Lebanon was not a mistake. "The infantry failed, and in my opinion, could not have possibly succeeded in stopping the rocket fire. A short, but powerful blow could have sufficed. The longer we continued, the more we understood the limitations of our power in the face of a non-state terrorist organization like Hezbollah. We set two objectives. The first was to achieve calm along the border -- that was achieved. The second was to prevent Hezbollah from rebuilding its arsenal, and in that we failed. A mutual threat emerged, and the mutual deterrence is still working." 

According to Meridor, "the existence of Hezbollah represents the erosion of nationalism and the rise of religion -- a huge historical shift that I call 'the return of God.' Hezbollah has grown strong not just because of what we did or didn't do, but also thanks to Iran. Because of our explicit or implied threat to strike Iran over the years, Iran has established a deterrent force along our northern border. On the other hand, our conduct during the Second Lebanon War, with all the failures pointed out by the Winograd Commission, jolted Hezbollah. [Hezbollah chief Hassan] Nasrallah once said that if he had known that Israel would respond the way it did, he would never have abducted and attacked those soldiers. They assumed that we would respond rationally. That was his mistake."

Q: What about the future?

"We need to prepare a defense response. That runs counter to the natural Israeli inclination, but there is nothing we can do. Defense alone will not cut it, but without defense we can't confront Hezbollah's rocket and missile threat, which has grown immensely. In recent years, Israel has built quite an impressive defense system, but it is not absolute, and it requires constant improvement and maintenance.

"We need to continue making every effort to prevent the next war. We need to prevent the other side from obtaining superior weapons, and in particular we need to understand this is not another war between armies in the sense of conquering land. The homefront is not in many respects the frontline. Both ours and theirs. It's terrible, but it is the reality. If we find ourselves embroiled in another war there, I oppose long-term seizure of territory, as opposed to localized commando raids and strikes, where it will hurt the other side most." 

'Another war is inevitable'

Maj. Gen. Eyal Ben Reuven, who commanded over the northern front during the Second Lebanon War, surmises that the next war with Hezbollah is inevitable. 

Ben Reuven was responsible for orchestrating the final 60 hours of the Second Lebanon War. He says that Hezbollah may be embroiled in fighting in Syria at the moment, but it is constantly preparing for a confrontation with Israel. "The lesson I learned for the future is that it is imperative to use force as quickly as possible, not gradually, in order to minimize or eliminate the threat of fire on the Israeli homefront as much as possible."

Ben Reuven confesses that "we failed in the Second Lebanon War, which lasted 34 days, and we failed again in Operation Protective Edge, which lasted 51 days, mainly because of the government.

"Everything possible should be done to prevent another war, but after it erupts, we need to do everything possible to win it quickly," he argues. 

He recalls how "Meir Dagan told me after the war that two or three days after it broke out, he spoke to Olmert and begged him to use all the available force in order to win, but Olmert had an IDF chief who wanted more and more airstrikes, and Olmert was tempted to agree. When we finally launched a significant ground operation, toward the end of the war, it was after endless postponements, which had a dramatically adverse impact. I remember the GOC Northern Command Udi Adam going mad with every deferment, yelling at us, 'Get me the prime minister.' Then, on Friday, we launched the ground assault, when it was already obvious that we were headed for a cease-fire. That is how the war ended, but it is not how a war should end."

Nadav Shragai

Source: https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/8591/germany-open-door-migration

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Want to know Hillary's only qualification to be president? - J. Marsolo

by J. Marsolo

This is the first time that a presidential candidate has absolutely nothing to  offer. There is nothing in her background to suggest she is fit to be president.

The Hillary strategy to win is to destroy Donald Trump.  This was the theme of the convention, with each speaker attacking Trump.  Doug Schoen, who has run many Democrat campaigns, said on Fox that Hillary will spend two billion dollars in negative ads.

Hillary has nothing positive to offer.  Her record as secretary of state is a failure, from supporting the killing of Gaddafi, which caused Libya to descend into anarchy and become a haven for ISIS, to failing to provide the requested security at Benghazi, then doing nothing on the day of the attack and lying about its cause.  She actually, without shame, told the mother of Sean Smith that the attack was cause by a video.  This alone should be enough to disqualify and defeat her.  She should have been indicted for lying about the emails and endangering national security, but the director of the FBI gave her a pass.  Now we learn that the DNC worked with her to defeat Bernie so she could win.

Her record as a senator is that she voted for the Iraq War, which she now is trying to explain away.

Her record as first lady is a failed plan to have government run health care, scandal in firing the White House travel office workers to give the jobs to her friends, having FBI records of political opponents, covering up the sexual harassment by her husband, selling pardons, hiding billing records to hide her role in Whitewater, and generally lying about anything and everything.

Since 2000 she has used her political persona to amass $200 million in speaking fees, book deals, and whatever.
Her record as the governor’s wife in Arkansas was basically to use the governor’s office to steer business to the Rose Law Firm, and the sordid affairs of Whitewater.  Web Howell went to jail, Jim McDougall went to jail, Vince Foster killed himself, but Hillary keeps on making money.

Her record as an attorney was that she was fired from the Watergate Committee for ethics violation.  Dick Morris says she failed the D.C. bar exam.

As a law student, she associated with Saul Alinsky and the Black Panthers.

This is the first time that a presidential candidate has absolutely nothing to  offer. There is nothing in her background to suggest she is fit to be president.

At the convention the best that anyone could say, and the highpoint of the convention, is that she is a mother and a grandmother.

Thus we have candidate Hillary who has nothing to offer except she has a daughter and two grandchildren, and was not indicted.

So she will attack Trump every day.  Too bad she and Obama did not bring this focus and determination in fighting terrorism.

J. Marsolo

Source: http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2016/07/want_to_know_hillarys_only_qualification_to_be_president.html

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Time For Israel To Walk Away From US Aid - Caroline Glick

by Caroline Glick

...And better serve the country's security interests in the process.

Originally published by the Jerusalem Post. 


On Monday, acting head of the National Security Council Yaakov Nagel will sit down with his US counterpart, Susan Rice, and try to conclude negotiations about a new, multi-year defense assistance package.
We must all hope that he fails.

No clear Israeli interest will be advanced by concluding the aid deal presently on the table. 


Indeed, the deal now being discussed will cause Israel massive, long-term economic and strategic damage. This is true for a number of reasons.


First, there is the issue of the deal’s impact on Israel’s military industries, which are the backbone of Israel’s strategic independence.


Under the current defense package, which is set to expire next year, a quarter of the US aid Israel receives is converted to shekels and spent domestically. 


Reportedly, the deal now under negotiation will bar Israel from using any of the funds domestically.


The implications for our military industries are dire. Not only will thousands of Israelis lose their jobs. Israel’s capacity to develop its own weapons systems will be dangerously diminished.


Then there is the problem of joint projects.


Today, Israel receives additional US funds to develop joint projects, including the Iron Dome and David’s Sling short range missile and rocket defense programs. These programs were undertaken in response to threats that weren’t foreseen when the current deal was negotiated a decade ago.


According to reports, the deal now being negotiated denies Israel and the US the ability to fund jointly new projects or to provide supplemental funding for existing projects. All funding for all projects will be covered by the lump sum that is currently being negotiated.


Not only does this preclude new projects, it prevents Congress from exercising oversight over administration funding of existing joint projects with Israel. President Barack Obama has consistently tried to slash funding of missile defense programs, only to be overridden by Congress. Under the deal now on the table, Congress will be denied the power to override a hostile administration.


Given the obvious problems with the aid program currently being proposed by the Obama administration, there’s little wonder that until now, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has publicly stated that if necessary, Israel is ready to wait for the next administration. Some argue that Netanyahu’s apparent newfound interest in concluding negotiations on Obama’s terms owes to his fear that this is the best offer Israel is likely to get. Both Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump for various reasons, it is argued, will be less likely to offer significant increases in US military assistance.


Assuming this is accurate, the question becomes whether Israel has an interest in the assistance at all.


And so we come to the F-35.


For Israel, to a significant degree, the aid package on offer is about the F-35, the US’s fifth generation fighter, otherwise known as the Joint Strike Fighter.


Last month Defense Minister Avigdor Liberman and IAF Chief of Staff Brig.-Gen Tal Kelman flew to Texas to ceremonially “take possession” of Israel’s first two F-35s. Both aircraft are set to be delivered to Israel in December.


To date, the IAF has purchased 33 F-35s – all with US aid money. The IAF wants to purchase a total of 75 F-35s, which are supposed to replace the F-16s and the F-15s that the IAF currently fields.


As Liberman made clear during his visit, whether Israel purchases them or not is entirely dependent on the aid deal.


We should not take them. We should walk away.


And we should walk away even if we receive nothing in exchange for the planes we reject.


The F-35 is a disaster of epic proportions, for the US first and foremost. If Israel agrees to base its next generation fighters on the F-35, it will be a disaster for us as well. Although it is late in the game, we need to cut our losses.


To date, the F-35 has cost the US $400 billion.


That is twice what it was supposed to cost. The project is already four years behind schedule and still in development. It won’t be operational until May 2018 – at the earliest.


The F-35 is a jet that was developed by a committee and tasked with doing everything. So it isn’t surprising that it doesn’t work. In February, J. Michael Gilmore, the director of the Pentagon’s Operational Test and Evaluation office, submitted a scathing report to Congress on the F-35 program.


It is worth going through just a few of his findings.


The F-35’s calling card is its stealth capacity.


According to the engineers at Lockheed Martin, the JSF is supposed to be all-but-invisible to radar systems. Its stealth system is supposed to be far superior to the stealth capabilities of its third generation predecessors.


But at present, its stealth systems do not work, and it is unclear whether they will ever work as planned.


First there is the problem with the JSF’s cooling systems. The JSF is too hot. To prevent its single engine from melting down in flight, pilots are forced to open its weapons bays at high speeds and altitudes every 10 minutes. When the weapons bays are open, the stealth systems do not work.


Then there is the software. The F-35 is considered one big flying computer. It uses over 20 million lines of computer code. These codes are supposed to make it the most maneuverable and stealthy aircraft in history. The problem is that the codes are defective. The software programs that enable the plane to fly, maneuver, and engage in combat are all defective. So are the software programs that control the plane’s stealth capabilities.


And fixing them is not a simple process.


The fixed software systems can’t simply be attached to existing hardware – or to existing planes. The planes themselves have to be rebuilt to adjust to the new software. So the models that have already been produced, including the two F-35s that are set for delivery in December, will all have to be rebuilt before they will be combat ready.


And as a panel of US defense and aviation experts that convened in late February following the publication of Gilmore’s report noted, that too will take time and cost hundreds of millions of dollars.


Another major problem is that the F-35’s nerve center is dysfunctional and there is no clear path to fixing it. The F-35 is controlled by the Autonomic Logistics Information System. The ALIS is a central computer system, located in the US.


All F-35s all over the world will be required to log into the ALIS system to upload computer files after each flight and to check flight readiness. The ALIS is supposed to identify broken parts and help speed up repairs and handle mission data uploads.


ALIS has the capacity to prevent F-35s from taking off. ALIS can lock out pilots and ground crews if it sees danger. If this happens, maintenance technicians have to convince the computer that they either dealt with the issues the computer identified or that it was a false alarm.

 
Dan Grazier, a member of that panel, whose deliberations were reported by This Week, warned that this power renders the entire F-35 fleet vulnerable to hackers. If someone were able to convince the computer that something was wrong across the fleet, they might be able to keep all the F-35s grounded. Although the damage wouldn’t be permanent, it could continue long enough to cause the US or an ally to lose a battle or fail a mission.


For Israel, this vulnerability is prohibitive even if ALIS is ever made to work. The significance of ALIS control over all F-35s worldwide is that the US – and anyone able to hack the US system – will control the IAF. It will operate at the pleasure of the US government, and those able to hack US computers. They will be able to ground IAF planes whenever they wish.


This critical problem was acknowledged obliquely by Lt.-Col. Yotam, the commander of Israel’s first F-35 or Adir squadron, in an interview with Israel Defense in April.


Lt.-Col. Yotam said, “The maintenance concept of the Adir is based on international management and logistics in terms of spare parts and maintenance echelons.”


Israeli experts note that although in theory Israel will be able to crack the ALIS code and override it, it will take years to develop such a capacity. In the meantime, the IAF will become a contract employee of the US government whose operation is subject to US approval on a flight by flight basis.


The US Air Force, Marines and Navy are all trying to figure out how to deal with the deficiencies of the F-35. There is a vague hope that the US will develop a different fifth generation fighter.


More F-18s and A-10s will likely be ordered. Deputy Defense Secretary Robert Work told Fighting Global that he foresees using the current batch of F-15s into the 2040s. In other words, the US Air Force will deploy 70-year-old planes alongside the defective F-35s.


This, of course, is a disaster for the US. And if Israel goes ahead with the F-35 project it will be an even bigger disaster for us.


Back when the Pentagon convinced the Shamir government to scrap the Lavi project and purchase the F-16, the argument that won the day was economic. The Lavi was simply too expensive.


Today, both economics and strategic arguments indicate that the opposite is the case, even if walking away involves ending US military aid.


If Israel cuts its losses and begins to develop a fifth generation jet fighter that meets its own specific needs, rather than one designed by a committee to meet other countries’ needs poorly, it will end up both far safer and far more prosperous than if it goes ahead with the F-35 project. It will produce a better plane, better suited for Israeli defense needs, and simultaneously stimulate the growth of Israeli military industries, providing jobs for thousands of Israelis.


If Israel walks away from the military assistance package currently under discussion, it will be in a position to sign joint development deals with the US and other governments on a project by project basis and so ensure that we develop the weapons systems we need, not the ones the US thinks we should have, as we need them. Just as India is investing billions of dollars in joint projects with Israel, so will the US in the future.


It is far from clear that the US can afford its $400b. white elephant. It is abundantly clear that Israel cannot afford it.


Whether or not a Trump or Clinton administration will be more forthcoming is really beside the point. The point is that the US aid deal is really a deal for Lockheed Martin, not for Israel. And we need to say no.

Caroline Glick is the Director of the David Horowitz Freedom Center's Israel Security Project and the Senior Contributing Editor of The Jerusalem Post. For more information on Ms. Glick's work, visit carolineglick.com.

Source: http://www.frontpagemag.com/fpm/263674/time-israel-walk-away-us-aid-caroline-glick

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Racially Incorrect Facts on Slavery: African Slave Traders - Jack Kerwick

by Jack Kerwick

The black roots of African slavery.

Ask yourself this: In all of the gazillions of lectures and tirades (there have, as to date, been no genuine conversations) on slavery, have you ever heard of the names of John Currantee and Ephraim Robin John? 

Such names—and there are many, many more—belong to a racially incorrect history of slavery, an historical account that threatens to rip asunder the ideological foundations of the Racism-Industrial-Complex (RIC), or Big Racism.

For centuries and centuries, courtesy of both Arabs and its indigenous peoples, slavery was endemic throughout the continent of Africa. Contrary to what contemporary mythical portraits like Roots would have us think, when Europeans began enslaving Africans in the 16^th century, they—unlike Arabs—would not invade villages to obtain slaves. Rather, they would have to trade with the African flesh peddlers.

John Currantee, of the Fante people, was one such “caboceer” or trader. Ephraim Robin John, who the Europeans called “King George,” was another.  The latter was the leader of the Efik people.  Both had reputations for being particularly “canny and ruthless dealers” of human beings.  Both were representative of African slave traders in two respects: They could communicate in several European and African languages, and they exploited the divisions between the Dutch, the English, and the French to maximize their profits.
These African traders invariably hailed from the most powerful tribes, tribes that would prey upon and conquer weaker peoples—who they would then sell off across the Atlantic.  About 50 percent of all such enslaved Africans were prisoners of war.  Roughly 30 percent were criminals or in debt.  The 20 remaining percent consisted of those who African slave traders would kidnap.

Yet the enslavers exerted as well considerable power over their European partners, for in addition to getting the price that they wanted for the product that they were peddling, these black merchants of black bodies would also compel Europeans to pay “gifts” or “customs fees” (“dashee”).

In The Fante and the Transatlantic Slave Trade, Rebecca Shumway writes that “in the very territory where the majority of fortified European castles were built, giving the appearance of European control, the Africans residing under those structures were actually exercising greater control over trade than was typical for coastal West Africa in this period.”  The Fante, as one reviewer aptly put it, “maintain[ed] the upper hand in their dealings with Europeans.”

As an indication of just how wide of the mark is the popular notion that whites “stole” Africans from their homes, it is worth noting that the British government, in order to strengthen their trading partnerships with Africans, even invited the sons of African slave traders to come to England so as to study English! Moreover, friendships developed between some European and African dealers.

The enslavement of Africans by Europeans was made possible by the fact that Africans first enslaved—and then sold—Africans to these Europeans.  Nor is it the case, as Big Racism would like for us to believe, that Europeans were uniquely cruel to their captives.  In point of fact, African slave traders not infrequently subjected those who they kidnapped to treatment that had few peers anywhere as far as mercilessness and savagery are concerned.

Dr. Alexander Falconbridge was a European who served as a surgeon aboard multiple slave ships that sailed from West Africa to the Caribbean during the last quarter of the 18^th century.  He would eventually become an abolitionist.  In 1788, he supplied the world with an all too rare account of the African participation in the slave trade.

Since “the black traders” take “extreme care” “to prevent the Europeans from gaining any intelligence” regarding the logistics involved in capturing slaves, Falconbridge drew his impressions—namely, that many, if not most, of the latter were abducted—from what he did observe directly as well as from the testimony of those Africans who had been captured.

One black captive, a man, told Falconbridge that he had been invited to drink with traders. As he proceeded to walk away, they seized him.  He broke free, but only to be hunted down by a “large dog” that “compelled him to submit.”  Dogs were used with regularity by African slave catchers.  As the man struggled in vain against the animal, his abductors, “being trained to the inhuman sport,” appeared to delight in his suffering.

A pregnant woman explained that she was returning home one evening from visiting with neighbors when traders seized upon her.  Since those Africans involved in slave trading increasingly traveled further and further into the interior to find human beings, this woman, like so many others, “had passed through the hands of several purchasers before she reached the ship.”

Falconbridge tells of a father and his son who, while tending to crops, were attacked, captured, and dragged off to be sold.  Another unsuspecting black man was invited by his companion to behold the gigantic European ships that were parked along the coast. Intrigued, he accepted the invitation.  Yet before he could realize that he had been manipulated, the soon-to-be slave was ambushed and taken on board the vessel.
It would be a mistake to think that the Africans didn’t have a sophisticated operation.  Falconbridge reports that traders would sail “up country” to “the fairs” in 20-30 canoes “capable of containing thirty or forty Negroes each” to purchase slaves. The canoes would be packed with “such goods” as were necessary for this purpose.  As the traders embarked, Falconbridge could see “colors flying” and “music playing;” it was a festive affair.

When the canoes return with their cargo, “the purchased Negroes are cleaned, and oiled with palm-oil [.]”  Then they are shown to the Europeans.

If, however, for whatever reasons, the captains passed on what the Africans were trying to sell, the latter would “beat those Negroes…and use them with great severity.” In a passage that is particularly revealing of the inhumanity of the treatment to which Africans would subject their own, Falconbridge writes: “It matters not whether they [the African slaves] are refused on account of age, illness, deformity, or for any other reason.”  Off the coast of New Calabar, what is today known as Nigeria, “the traders, when any of their Negroes have been objected to, have dropped their canoes under the stern of the vessel, and instantly be headed them, in sight of the captain” (italics added).

To repeat: Slaves that Europeans didn’t want African traders swiftly decapitated.

Don’t expect to hear about this in that “honest conversation” of race that the left assures us we need to have.

Jack Kerwick

Source: http://www.frontpagemag.com/fpm/263659/racially-incorrect-facts-slavery-african-slave-jack-kerwick

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Secular And Islamist Scholars Clash During Kuwaiti TV Debate On Arab Youth Engagement With Terror Organizations - MEMRI

by MEMRI

Dashti and Al-Manna argued that although the Islamic scholars repeatedly emphasized that they do not support ISIS, their statements are in line with ISIS ideology.

During a TV debate dedicated to the engagement of Arab youth with ISIS and other terror organizations, liberal activists Nasser Dashti and Ayed Al-Manna clashed with Islamic sheikhs Abdallah Al-Hamdan and Khaled Al-Sultan. The latter compared the extremism of the Islamist terror organizations to extremism he alleged exists among secular Arabs, saying that "the same crimes are committed by both camps." Dashti and Al-Manna argued that although the Islamic scholars repeatedly emphasized that they do not support ISIS, their statements are in line with ISIS ideology. Dashti concluded that the time has come to remove religion from public life in the Arab world and to confine it to the private sphere. The show aired on the Kuwaiti Al-Shahed TV on July 11.

Click here to view this clip on MEMRI TV

Nasser Dashti: "The religious heritage is the cause of the cultural and ideological catastrophes from which we are suffering.

[...]

"I pay no attention to the fatwas of all those religious sheikhs. These fatwas have ripped our countries and our peoples apart, have sown destruction and discord, and have led people astray. In the wake of these fatwas, we have seen nothing but ignorance, bombings, takfir, and ethnic cleansing."

[...]

Khaled Al-Sultan: "We are experiencing two kinds of extremism - religious extremism, on the one hand, and extremism in leniency and indifference toward religion, on the other hand. The same crimes are committed by both camps. Many of the (terror) incidents you are seeing in the world today... In America, for example, a man killed his mother, his wife, and his three daughters. Was that man religious?! Was he a Muslim?!"

Dashti: "That's pure evil."

Al-Sultan: "That man was an atheist. He wasn't religious.

[...]

"It's true that our interpretation of Islamic texts is based on an erroneous understanding."

[...]

Dashti: "How can an erroneous understanding continue for over 14 centuries? How come only the Islamic nation finds it difficult to understand its heritage and its religious texts?

[...]

"The Quran does not speak. People do. These are religious texts... Let me give you an example of a nice verse: 'Whoever kills a soul unless for another soul - it is as if he has killed all of Mankind.' The verse that immediately follows reads: 'The penalty for those who wage war against Allah and His Messenger...' Go on, complete the verse. It is that 'they be killed or crucified or their hands and feet be cut on alternate sides.' Look what kind of verse immediately follows the (positive) verse. The religious texts, the heritage, and the interpretations contain good and evil at the same time, and that is a problem."

[...]

Ayed Al-Manna: "The Muslims in America, in Britain, in France, in Canada, and in China - how come they do not slaughter one another? Aren't there Muslims there too?"

Nasser Dashti: "Why do the Muslims dream of emigrating to the infidel countries?"

Abdallahy Khizam Al-Hamdan: "What my colleague Dr. Khaled Al-Sultan said is based on principles."

Host: "What Nasser Dashti said is also based on principles."

Al-Hamdan: "No, it is devoid of principles."

Host: 'You are claiming that what he said is devoid of principles?"

Al-Hamdan: "What Mr. Dashti said is as empty as can be."

Host: "So you claim that his words are empty?"

Al-Hamdan: "Very empty. They are not based on principles."

Host: "What about Dr. Ayed Al-Manna? Some of the things he said are correct, and some need to be corrected."

[...]

Dashti: "People are always saying that ISIS does not represent Islam, that the militias do not represent Islam..."

Al-Sultan: "True, they don't."

Dashti: "But if you asked Dr. Al-Sultan here about apostates, he would say that apostates should be killed. The People of the Book? He'd say that they should pay the jizya in humiliation. What about polytheists? They should be fought."

Al-Sultan: "These are all violations, like running a red light..."

Dashti: "When someone commits a traffic violation, he pays a fine. He doesn't get executed."

Al-Sultan: "The Ministry of the Interior is in charge of dealing with traffic violations, and it sends the perpetrator to court."

Al-Sultan: "These are all violations, like running a red light..."

Dashti: "When someone commits a traffic violation, he pays a fine. He doesn't get executed."

Al-Sultan: "The Ministry of the Interior is in charge of dealing with traffic violations, and it sends the perpetrator to court. Who decides in those cases of apostasy and executions? The ruler, the judge. I don't allow myself or you to..."

Dashti: "Are you comparing a traffic violation to the killing of someone who left his religion?!"

[...]

Al-Sultan: "According to the Shari'a, (an apostate) should be killed.

Dashti: The People of the Book should pay the jizya tax?"

Al-Sultan: "Yes."

Dashti: "'In humiliation'"?

Al-Sultan: "Yes, in humiliation. So what? We pay for visas 'in humiliation,' so what?"

Dashti: "Do you get smacked on the back of your head while paying for your visas?"

Al-Sultan: "'In humiliation' does not mean being beaten."

Dashti: "The viewers can search on Google or in Lisan Al-Arab what 'humiliation' means."

Al-Sultan: "Fine. Go check the word in the Lisan Al-Arab dictionary. It's like when you go to an embassy and pay for a visa, whether you like it or not."

[...]

Al-Mahdan: "Good people, we do not support ISIS..."

Al-Manna: "You're done supporting them?"

Al-Mahdan: "Let me finish."

Al-Manna: "You're done with them?"

Al-Mahdan: "We do not support ISIS. Not today, not yesterday, and not tomorrow.

[...]

"What does Allah want? He wants his shari'a to be implemented. Along comes a human being and defies Allah with his mind. He defies the Creator who created this mind."

Al-Manna: "That's exactly what ISIS is saying. Why don't you support them and that's it? That is exactly what they say. You want an Islamic state, and they have declared one. Why don't you support them?"

[...]

Dashti: "With regard to the question why our youth are being led astray, I believe that the reason is the concept of the Hereafter, which is instilled in their minds, with all the stories of the Paradise virgins and so on, and at the same time it is the result of fatwas and heritage that prohibit all the innocent pleasures in their lives. They banned music, signing, theater, sculpture, love... Everything. Such a person has nothing to lose in this world.

[...]

"So far, my two colleagues have not denounced the fundamentals of ISIS. They share with ISIS the fundamentals and ideological means - the Islamic punishments, the implementation of the shari'a, and the desire for an Islamic state - but they employ appeasing words: 'true Islam,' 'the people in charge'... I believe that the time has come for us to adopt the secular, rational, scientific approach, and to remove religion from public life and confine it to the private sphere. Every person is free to understand his religion as he sees fit, and he is free to change his religion, to adopt any school of thought or religion, and to spread his ideas in keeping with the modern rules of human rights."

View The Clip

MEMRI

Source: http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/5597.htm

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