The "Middle East and Terrorism" Blog was created in order to supply information about the implication of Arab countries and Iran in terrorism all over the world. Most of the articles in the blog are the result of objective scientific research or articles written by senior journalists.
From the Ethics of the Fathers: "He [Rabbi Tarfon] used to say, it is not incumbent upon you to complete the task, but you are not exempt from undertaking it."
The Druze village that is currently under attack is the town of Jaramana, which is on the outskirts of Damascus.
Druze people from Israel, the Golan Heights and Syria
use speakers and microphones to communicate across the Syrian-Golan
Heights border, after children and teens were killed at a soccer pitch
by a rocket Israel says was fired from Lebanon, near Majdal Shams, a
Druze village in the Golan Heights(photo credit: RICARDO MORAES/REUTERS)
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz instructed the IDF on Saturday evening to prepare to defend a Druze village in southern Syria after Syrian forces launched a security operation in the area.
Jaramana,
a Druze village on the outskirts of Damascus, has been the center of
unrest and clashes between Syrian security forces and local Druze
brigades.
"We
will not allow the terrorist regime of radical Islam in Syria to harm
the Druze," they said in a statement. "If the regime harms the Druze, it
will be harmed by us."
"We
are committed to our Druze brothers in Israel to do everything to
prevent harm to their Druze brothers in Syria, and we will take all
necessary steps to maintain their security."
On
Saturday, a member of Syria's security forces was reportedly killed in
clashes in the village between security forces and members of the local
'Jaramana Shield' brigade, Al-Araby reported.
Israeli
soldiers seen in the buffer zone which separates the Golan Heights and
Syria, February 27, 2025 (credit: JALAA MAREY/AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES)
Israel accused of 'tempting' Syria's Druze
Local
sources reported in February that the IDF had offered the Druze
population of southern Syria employment opportunities within Israel.
Sources from southern Syria in the al-Quneitra province spoke with the
Saudi news network Al-Arabiya, claiming that the IDF made "tempting offers" to the province's residents.
According to the report, sources in the al-Quneitra area claimed that the IDF offered the residents
the opportunity to work within Israel during the day and return home in
the evening, the same way that the Gazans were allowed to work in
Israel before October 7.
"The
IDF expressed to those who were offered work that it wanted to issue
entry permits that would enable them to enter Israel and work there,
just as it did with Palestinians who work in Israel," one southern
Syrian resident was quoted as saying.
Hamas: "We call on the international community to pressure Israel." • Jerusalem seeks to extend first phase of the deal by 42 days.
Israeli soldiers in Khan Yunis, the southern Gaza Strip, Jan. 14, 2024. Credit: IDF Spokesperson's Unit.
Hamas has refused to extend the first
phase of the hostage agreement with Israel and is demanding an immediate
transition to negotiations on Phase 2.
In a statement, Hamas declared: “With the
completion of the first phase of the ceasefire and prisoner exchange
agreement, we reaffirm our full commitment to implementing all terms of
the agreement across all its stages and details.”
The statement continued: “We call on the
international community to pressure Israel to fully commit to the
agreement and immediately enter Phase 2.”
Meanwhile, Israel is trying to extend the first phase of the agreement by an additional 42 days.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
unusually summoned an urgent security consultation for Friday evening,
following the return of the Israeli negotiation team from Cairo, earlier
than expected. This comes amid reports from Egypt that the negotiations
have stalled. According to the reports, Hamas has decided to reject
discussions on extending phase one of the hostage deal and insists on
talks that align with the framework for Phase 2, which includes an end
to the war.
The consultation is expected to include
most members of the negotiation team, including Strategic Affairs
Minister Ron Dermer, security agency chiefs and other key figures.
However, according to Israeli sources,
Hamas has not completely ruled out extending Phase 1 and has even put
forward demands for modifying the prisoner release formula for each
hostage. In other words, Hamas is open to an extension but under
stricter conditions.
Yet, Israel does not appear willing to
accommodate Hamas’s demands, maintaining the firm stance in the
negotiations that has led to some gains in recent weeks. Israel’s
position remains focused on extending Phase 1 by several more weeks,
during which hostages would be released in staggered groups of three to
four individuals, depending on their medical condition.
Israel has reportedly demanded that the
first release take place as early as Saturday in exchange for the
release of Palestinian prisoners under the existing formula (30
terrorists for each civilian, and 50 for each soldier, that is men under
age 50, which encompasses all remaining hostages believed to be alive),
as well as allowing additional caravans and mechanical equipment for
clearing debris to enter the Strip. Hamas, however, has reportedly not
agreed to this.
Mediators’ proposal: Hostage releases alongside talks on Phase 2
Israeli sources indicate that mediators
have presented additional proposals, including a parallel move where
staggered hostage releases would continue alongside discussions on the
next phase, including the possibility of a ceasefire agreement extending
until after Ramadan, which began on Friday evening.
Hamas, which has declared its part of the
deal completed, accuses Israel of violating the agreement by refusing to
withdraw from the Philadelphi Corridor along Gaza’s border with Egypt.
Israeli leaders, including the prime minister and defense minister, have
indeed stated that Israel has no intention of withdrawing from the
corridor.
The implication is that while Phase 1 has
officially ended, and in theory, the ceasefire should also come to an
end, Israeli assessments suggest that Hamas is highly reluctant to
resume hostilities. This creates an opportunity to push Hamas toward
agreeing to continued hostage releases while Israel simultaneously
prepares for a possible resumption of fighting.
The incoming IDF chief is devising a plan to “eradicate Hamas” with more than 50,000 soldiers and a reduction of aid, Israeli sources say.
IDF reservists at an assembly point near the border with Gaza during
"Operation Protective Edge" against terrorists in the Strip, July 19,
2014. Photo by Nati Shohat/Flash90.
Jerusalem is planning to resume the war in Gaza in four to six weeks in a decisive campaign to wipe out Hamas, The Washington Free Beacon reported on Friday.
The plan is to conquer the entire Gaza
Strip in one fell swoop with more than 50,000 soldiers, relocating the
civilian population to humanitarian zones, and waging a “ruthless ground
campaign” in terrorist-heavy areas that will receive no humanitarian
aid, the report suggests.
The campaign is to commence with heavy
aerial bombardments, followed by a reduction of the humanitarian aid
entering the Strip. Israel Defense Forces divisions would simultaneously
enter the Strip in the north, center and south, carving it into three
parts.
Citing several current and former Israeli
officials with knowledge of the matter, the news outlet reported that
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz
instructed incoming IDF Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. (res.) Eyal Zamir to develop the plan, which is projected for completion when he steps into office on Thursday.
The general estimates that the war will end in six months or less, per the report.
Brig. Gen. (res.) Amir Avivi, founder of
the Israel Defense and Security Forum (IDSF), is quoted as saying that
the war this time “is going to be decisive. Israel will use every tool
it has to conquer Gaza and eradicate Hamas.”
Col. (res.) Hezi Nehama, who during the war publicly endorsed the Generals’ Plan,
calling for the blockade of northern Gaza, said, according to the
report, “We’re going to see four to five divisions simultaneously attack
in the north, in the center and in the south, to occupy every area and
clear out the enemy. It will look different than what we saw in the war
until now.”
Professor Kobi Michael, a senior
researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) at Tel
Aviv University, said that outside the humanitarian zones, no external
aid will enter Gaza. “This will prevent Hamas from continuing to steal
all the humanitarian aid and will increase pressure on the group through
the local population,” he said.
The war could be paused if the Hamas
leadership agrees to free hostages, or if it agrees to disarm and go
into exile, the report adds.
Fifty-nine abductees remain captive in Gaza, at least 35 of them are believed to have died.
With Hamas also reportedly preparing for
the resumption of the war, the IDF has raised its alert level around the
Palestinian enclave.
Nehama said that Hezbollah’s weakened
position in Lebanon permits Israel to shift many of its forces southward
to deal with Hamas.
“We always had divisions in the north, and
now we don’t need divisions in the north because Hezbollah is not a
threat. So we can take those divisions and put them all in Gaza at the
same time, and this is very important,” he said.
According to Nehama, Zamir rejected the
latest plan formulated by outgoing IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi
Halevi as too timid.
“The next chief of staff didn’t like what
he heard,” Nehama relayed. “He told the prime minister and the defense
minister that he would present them with another plan, much more
aggressive and decisive with many more troops involved.”
With the Trump administration apparently
giving Jerusalem a blank check in its dealings with Hamas, the combat in
Gaza, if resumed, is expected to be waged with less restraint on the
part of Israel.
The Israeli Air Force was carrying out a new 'Sword of Damocles' operation as it was carrying out the 'Hannibal directive,' the IDF's probes found.
Israeli security forces on road 232 near the southern Israeli city of Sderot, October 7, 2023(photo credit: OREN BEN HAKOON/FLASH90)
The Air Force was carrying out “the Sword of Damocles” operation – a
code name only being revealed on Thursday for the first time - to attack many Hamas commanders
and their headquarters around 10:30 a.m. on October 7, 2023, just as it
was carrying out the “Hannibal Directive” of gunning down anything that
moved around the Israel-Gaza border.
The
Air Force has been questioned about if the forces it had invested in
attacking Hamas commanders deep in Gaza would have been better used to
defend the Gaza border and to attack Hamas invaders in Israeli villages.
Air Force sources hoped air power had been used 'differently' on October 7
Air
Force sources have said that they wish this air power had been used
differently on October 7, given that protecting the villages and the
border should have been a higher priority than killing top Hamas
officials.
Further,
Air Force sources indicated that had they known all of the information
being debated between IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Herzi Halevi and IDF
Southern Command Chief Maj.-Gen. Yaron Finkleman, such as the Israeli SIM cell phone cards which Hamas had activated in Gaza, they might have pushed for the aircraft to be used differently.
Israel Air Force jet after intercepting Iranian drones and missiles. April 14, 2024. (credit: IDF SPOKESPERSON'S UNIT)
In
contrast, IDF southern command sources have indicated that they believe
that the attack on the Hamas commanders and headquarters significantly
reduced the number of invaders who would have streamed into Israel
absent those attacks.
Some
sources said that there were concerns that tens of thousands or even
more Gazans might have invaded Israel, far more than the around 5,400
which actually attacked, and that activating the Sword of Damocles plan
was the right move even looking backwards.
Besides
that, essentially the Air Force took significant responsibility for
being a part of the failure on October 7, but also said that it was
simply not in the game.
The
general Air Force plan for that weekend was to have only one drone
watching over Gaza, as there was an assumption that there would be
various warnings and time to prepare if there would be any major change
in the stabilized situation.
While
Halevi ordered that the Air Force have additional aircraft nearby a few
hours before the invasion, and two more drones were directed toward
Gaza, lower down Air Force officers decided along with lower down
Operations Command officers to only move a fighter jet from Ramat David
base in the North to Ramon base, much closer to Gaza, on a delay of a
few hours from when the order was given.
It
turned out that the invasion started 90 minutes before the aircraft was
due to be finally moved as opposed to if it had been moved when Halevi
ordered, two hours before the invasion.
The lower down officers did not deem the order to be an emergency, as long as they complied within a reasonable amount of time.
The
Air Force said that it accomplished this in an impressive period of
only several hours, much faster than the pre-war estimated time.
Given
that most of Hamas’s forces had returned to Gaza with most of the
hostages it took by around 12:00, most of the Air Force simply could not
be ready in time.
The
Air Force said that it has approximately doubled – from around a dozen -
the number of aircraft to be available on short notice for helping with
a potential border invasion and that it will also integrate
old-fashioned guns onto some aircraft which can be used for flying low
and strafing a border area with machine gun fire.
On October 7, much of the Air Force was carrying heavier bombs
which could be used to destroy much more powerful damage to an enemy,
but which were too large to use in complex situations with Hamas
invaders and Israeli civilians in close proximity to each other.
Israeli pilots were afraid of striking hostages in Hannibal Directive
Further, the Air Force said that many pilots were reluctant about hitting potential hostages even after the Hannibal Directive was issued.
In
addition, the Air Force probe said that generally pilots receive highly
specific information of where and what to attack and that: Most Air
Force officers were not in the South due to vacations, those that were
had a similar lack of full understanding of the constantly evolving
situation, and the IDF Southern Command was similarly “blind” to how
multi-pronged the invasion was.
The Air Force would carry out around 945 attacks with helicopters firing 11,000 times.
Out of 1,600 killed Hamas fighters, the Air Force estimates that it killed around 1,000.
157
Israelis were rescued by Air Force special forces Unit 669 and in at
least two cases – at the IDF Nahal Oz position and near the “Black
Arrow” and Miflasim village area – Air Force interventions scared away
or killed Hamas invaders who were about to kill more Israelis.
According
to the Air Force, some of its top aircraft which got into the air
fairly quickly, were assigned to stay in the air near critical
infrastructure areas, or were kept near the northern border lest
Hezbollah stage a second invasion, and not to help with the defense of
the southern border.
Bar was told by Halevi very early in the morning that he should be sending aircraft northward in case Hezbollah intervened.
Air
Force sources said that had Hezbollah invaded, which almost happened,
and the Air Force had not been ready in the North, it would have faced
even harsher questions than it did about not being ready in the South.
Besides
the fact that lots of the Air Force’s serious power was sent northward
or to guard critical infrastructure sites, the Air Force probe also
showed that its plans for reinforcing border areas downplayed Gaza and
had its aircraft stationed too far away.
In
one case where the Air Force tried to take the initiative based on
pre-war intelligence and to attack without concrete real-time updated
intelligence, it attacked a tunnel which officers thought Hamas might
use to send fighters into Nativ Haasara. It turned out later that no
Hamas fighters had been there.
Next,
Hamas’s 3,889 rocket attacks in a short period of time exhausted the
Iron Dome supplies in the South, leading to only less protection, which
in turn meant that many southern runways were hit and required repairs.
The Hannibal Directive is a controversial policy wherein the IDF works to stop hostages from being taken at all costs, allegedly including targeting the hostage.
IDF troops operate in the Gaza Strip. July 1, 2024.(photo credit: IDF SPOKESPERSON'S UNIT)
The Hannibal Directive is one of the most infamous practices commonly ascribed to the IDF.
This
highly controversial procedure was instituted for the sole purpose of
preventing enemy combatants - by any means necessary - from ever taking
Israelis hostage.
While
the full text of the directive is unknown, and any mention of it was
suppressed by the IDF censor until 2003, the directive's existence is
widely known, and sources have claimed that the exact details have
changed several times over the years.
One
common accusation levied towards the Hannibal Directive, however, is
that it allows the IDF to go to extreme measures to prevent any captives
from being taken, including either putting their own troops in harms
way or deliberately attacking Israeli forces to prevent their capture.
This has proved very divisive, even among Israeli soldiers themselves.
And now, with the IDF probes into the events of October 7
revealing the military's use of the Hannibal Directive on October 7,
the infamous Israeli military protocol has once again been thrust into
the spotlight.
HOW FAR should the government go to ‘bring home its boys’? (credit: Chaim Goldberg/Flash90)
But what really is the Hannibal Directive? Why was it made? And what happens when the directive is followed?
Here is everything you need to know.
What is the Hannibal Directive?
The
Hannibal Directive was reportedly created in the 1980s in response to
the increased efforts by terrorist groups to take Israeli soldiers
captive. These terrorist groups would use their hostages as bargaining
chips in prisoner exchanges, where Israel would have to release a
disproportionate amount of security prisoners in exchange for their
captured soldiers.
Throughout
its history, despite often holding the position of not negotiating with
terrorists, Israel has made many disproportionate prisoner swaps,
releasing thousands of security prisoners, many of whom serve life
sentences for plotting or committing violent and fatal terrorist
attacks, in exchange for just a few captives.
Maj-Gen. (ret.) Yaakov Amidror,
at the time of its creation, was a senior IDF intelligence officer and
helped develop the Hannibal Directive. Speaking to journalist Dan
Ephron, he explained that Israel releasing so many prisoners in deals
created two issues. First, terrorist groups began to prioritize
hostage-taking, knowing the potential value even one hostage had.
Secondly, many of the prisoners who were being released would go on to
carry out major terrorist attacks. In fact, several of the terrorists
released in the 1985 Jibril deal were credited as having helped push
forward the first intifada just a few years later.
Reports indicate that there were already orders given as early as
1982 to prevent hostages from being captured by any means necessary,
with one Haaretz report claiming that some soldiers said they
were explicitly ordered to shoot at cars carrying captured soldiers even
at the risk of harming everyone inside.
However,
several highly controversial prisoner swaps with terrorist groups such
as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command,
most notably the Jibril deal that saw Israel release 1,150 security
prisoners for just three Israelis, would reportedly lead to a major
shift in policy.
In
1986, the IDF formally created the Hannibal Directive, reportedly by
Amidror alongside IDF officers Yossi Peled and Gabi Ashkenazi. The
order's details are unclear, but are widely acknowledge to include the
following:
Establishing security checkpoints
Damaging roads, bridges, and other infrastructure
Massive amounts of firepower used and directed at hostage-takers
The
idea behind this is that rather than needing to wait for approval from
higher up the chain of military command, IDF soldiers could act quickly
and automatically to any attempted abduction of a soldier.
The
exact details have always been disputed, however, with Amidror and
others having explained in media interviews that the directive allowed
to risk the life of soldiers, but did not allow for them to be killed.
The
origin of the name "Hannibal Directive" is itself unclear. According to
Amidror, who spoke to journalist and writer Dan Ephron, the name was
arbitrarily created by an IDF computer. However, in an article for Politico Magazine
in 2015, Ephron also drew the connection with the Carthaginian general
Hannibal, who when fighting Rome, rather than being taken capture, chose
to commit suicide via poison.
Amidror further elaborated the rationale behind
Why is the Hannibal Directive so controversial?
There are two main reasons for why the Hannibal Directive is so divisive both within Israel and internationally.
The
first is that it deliberately puts potential hostages at risk of being
killed by IDF fire. This was seen by many as unethical and viewing
Israelis as more expendable, as well as essentially requiring IDF
soldiers themselves to be responsible for the deaths of their comrades.
Prof.
Asa Kasher, who created the IDF code of ethics, has been critical of
the Hannibal Directive, claiming it violates the code of ethics promise
that wounded soldiers would never be left behind. Speaking to Haaretz,
Kasher criticized the Hannibal Directive, noting that the idea that
it's preferable for a soldier to be dead rather than taken hostage is
"monstrous."
The
second area of controversy is that the Hannibal Directive inherently
leads to increased risks of widespread destruction and civilian
casualties.
In
trying to stop soldiers from being taken hostage "by any means
necessary," the IDF utilizes extreme levels of firepower, ranging from
machine guns to artillery shells to airstrikes. This creates widespread
collateral damage and any civilians in the area can be put at risk.
When has the Hannibal Directive been used?
The
goal of the Hannibal Directive is, and always has been, to stop enemy
combatants from taking Israeli soldiers hostage. This has been
reportedly used on several different occasions.
However,
it became far more associated with IDF actions starting in 2006
following the capture of IDF Cpl. Gilad Schalit by Hamas terrorists on
June 25. The Hannibal Directive was instituted shortly after Schalit's
abduction, but to no avail. Following this, the procedure had to be
refined.
Several
incidents in the early 2000s saw the Hannibal Directive reportedly
implemented both near Gaza and near Lebanon when terrorists attempted to
take IDF soldiers hostage. However, it was during Operation Protective
Edge in 2014 that the Hannibal Directive became truly notorious.
At the time, terrorists in Gaza kidnapped IDF Lt. Hadar Goldin in Rafah on August 1, 2014, and the IDF responded immediately.
The
result was an incident that many, such as Amnesty International,
retroactively dubbed "Black Friday." During this incident, the IDF used
extreme measures to prevent Goldin's capture, carrying out massive air
bombardments and ground assaults on Rafah's residential areas.
The order to carry out the Hannibal Directive was given by then-Col. Ofer Winter. In an interview December 2014 with Yediot Aharonot,
Winter defended his actions. “Those who kidnap need to know they will
pay a price,” he said, and an officer under his command further noted,
“The fire was proportionate, and when they kidnap a soldier, all means
are kosher.”
Israel's
attack on Rafah to try and save Goldin resulted in as many as 200
Palestinian civilians killed, and Goldin not being rescued. Instead, he
was killed, and his body continues to be held by Hamas at the time of
writing.
Two
years later, the Hannibal Directive was once again activated when two
soldiers of the IDF's Oketz Unit accidentally entered the Kalandiya
Refugee Camp. However, no one was killed in the resulting military
action.
In
2019, then-head of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Qasem
Soleimani explained to Iranian state TV that the Hannibal Directive has
caused terrorist groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas to take extra
precautions in their attempts to take hostages to avoid the IDF killing
the captured Israelis.
However,
in 2016, then-IDF chief of staff Gadi Eisenkot announced that the
Hannibal Directive would be revoked, being replaced by other directives
to handle hostage-taking situations, while clearly specifying that they
would not attempt to or risk hitting the captive.
However, this seems to have changed following the events of October 7, 2023.
Has the Hannibal Directive been used in the Israel-Hamas War?
Since
October 7, where Hamas took hundreds of Israelis captive after
launching an attack on southern Israel, many reports have claimed the
IDF has been using the Hannibal Directive once again.
According to a report by Ynet,
Israelis who were taken hostage and then released claimed that IDF
helicopters deliberately targeted them as they were being taken into
Gaza, which was further backed up by claims from Channel 12 that IDF
troops attacked a vehicle carrying hostages, killing one.
Further reports by Haaretz, The New York Times, and the Associated Press,
among other outlets, claimed that the IDF fired tank shells at
buildings known to contain hostages, killing most of them as a result.
The IDF officer responsible for that, Brig.-Gen Barak Hiram, was cleared
of all charges for the incident.
Yediot Aharonot
further reported as a result of an investigation that the IDF had
applied the Hannibal Directive in practice, if not in name, ordering
that hostage-takers be stopped by any means necessary. In addition, the
IDF would later say that there were incidents of friendly fire.
Further reports by outlets such as Haaretz and ABC News (Australia)
elaborated on these claims, noting that many IDF soldiers carried out
the Hannibal Directive, notably tank crews firing at vehicles that could
have had hostages on them.
Information
released on February 27, 2025 following a probe into the events of
October 7, 2023, further confirmed that the Hannibal Directive was
implemented in the morning of October 7, with soldiers told to gun down
anything that moved along the border.
Air
Force pilots were also ordered to carry out the Hannibal Directive.
However, the Air Force said its pilots were reluctant about hitting
potential hostages.
The
potential use of the Hannibal Directive on October 7 is a marked change
from the norm, as if true, it would now mean that it applied to
civilian hostages, rather than just soldiers.
Speaking to ABC News (Australia), Kasher noted that the Hannibal Directive was not supposed to apply to civilian hostages.
"Killing
the civilian in order to foil the attempted abduction is really [wrong]
… everyone understands that that's way outside of what is allowed in a
democracy," he told the outlet, adding, "That's insane, it's not the
nature of a democracy, it's not the nature of the IDF, it's not the
nature of the command."
DIPLOMATIC AFFAIRS: “Lebanon, by the way, could actually mobilize and come into the Abraham Peace Accords, as could potentially Syria," said Witkoff, but is this possible?
PROTESTERS HOLD placards and flags during a rally
against antisemitism at The Domain in February 2024 in Sydney. According
to data gathered by the Executive Council of Australian Jewry, the
number of antisemitic incidents in the country jumped to 2,062 in the 12
months to September 2024(photo credit: LISA MAREE WILLIAMS/GETTY IMAGES)
The
conventional wisdom points to Saudi Arabia, and intense efforts to make
this happen continue, even though the Saudis insist it won’t happen
until Israel guarantees a pathway to a Palestinian state – an idea that,
in light of October 7, will be extremely difficult, to say the least,
to sell to the Israeli public.
Another
oft-mentioned candidate is Indonesia, the world’s most populous Muslim
state, though not an Arab one. However, nothing significant has happened
on that front for some time.
Now, along comes Steve Witkoff, US President Donald Trump’s
Middle East envoy, who, at an American Jewish Committee event in
Washington, voiced optimism about Saudi Arabia ultimately joining the
Accords – which already include Israel, the United Arab Emirates,
Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan – before raising two unexpected candidates:
Lebanon and Syria.
“Lebanon,
by the way, could actually mobilize and come into the Abraham Peace
Accords, as could potentially Syria. So, so many profound changes are
happening,” he said.
SIGNING THE Abraham Accords (from L): Bahrain’s Foreign Affairs
Minister Abdullatif bin Rashid Al-Zayan; Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu; US president Donald Trump; and the UAE’s Minister of Foreign
Affairs and International Cooperation Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan, at
the White House, Sept. 15, (credit: Avi Ohayon/GPO)
Is
he serious? Or is this Trumpian overreach, akin to an AI-generated
video the president posted on his social media account this week of a
reconstructed Gaza – looking a lot like Las Vegas – with him and Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu lounging poolside, shirtless and with
cocktails in hand?
Witkoff
did not elaborate, but profound changes are indeed under way. Most
significantly, both Lebanon and Syria are pulling farther away from
Iran’s orbit with each passing day – something that, for Israel, is
nothing less than a blessing.
Lebanon asserts its independence
That Lebanon
is asserting its independence is evident in various ways: electing a
president and prime minister not to Iran’s liking, preventing Iranian
planes full of cash for Hezbollah from landing at Beirut’s airport, and
statements made by President Joseph Aoun to the speaker of Iran’s
parliament, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who was in Lebanon Sunday for the
funeral of assassinated Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah.
The
meeting was cordial, but afterward, the Lebanese president’s office
posted this statement on X:“Lebanon is tired of others’ wars, and the
unity of the Lebanese is the best way to confront any loss or
aggression. Lebanon paid a heavy price for the Palestinian cause. It
supports what was issued by the recent Riyadh summit regarding the
two-state solution.”
In
other words, Aoun bluntly told the Iranians – who, through Hezbollah
and with a lifeline from Assad’s Syria, have long dominated Lebanon –
that Beirut no longer wants to be a pawn in Iran’s long game against the
Jewish state.
Does that mean Lebanon is a real candidate for normalization, as Witkoff suggested? Not so fast.
YET,
AS former deputy national security adviser for foreign policy Orna
Mizrahi noted this week at an Institute for National Security Studies
conference in Tel Aviv, if last year the talk was of threats coming from
Lebanon, this year the discussion is about opportunities.
Mizrahi,
a senior INSS researcher, said there are two key opportunities for
Israel: one regarding Hezbollah, the other concerning the Lebanese
government.
On
Hezbollah, she said that after the blows it sustained from Israel, the
group is significantly weakened. Israel now has the opportunity to
preserve that situation and even make it worse, altering the balance of
power.
What is working in Israel's favor?
Several factors are working here in Israel’s favor.
First,
Mizrahi said, Israel’s “state of mind” has changed – it is no longer
willing to tolerate Hezbollah’s military buildup as it had in the past.
“It
is impossible for anyone to adopt a policy of tolerance,” she said.
“And I think that will bring different behavior by both the military and
political echelon regarding that front.”
This
shift is already evident in the number of times Israel has taken action
against Hezbollah since the ceasefire went into effect on November 27
to ensure it is being honored.
Mizrahi
explained that the ceasefire agreement grants Israel a degree of
freedom: if the Lebanese Army and UNIFIL do not act against Hezbollah’s
buildup, and after Israel alerts a US-led mechanism, it can intervene to
prevent Hezbollah from rebuilding its capabilities or violating the
agreement.
The
second major factor is that Israel now has strong, significant,
unstinting American backing. “Not only from Trump,” she said, “but also
because there is an American general in the mechanism who understands
Israel’s position and challenges.”
As
for Lebanon itself, Mizrahi cautioned that talk of normalization and
its inclusion in the Abraham Accords is premature, though that is a
vision for the future.
“I
think we are only at the very beginning of this, and it depends on how
Lebanon’s new leadership will succeed in stabilizing itself and dealing
with the challenges presented by Hezbollah, and not be dragged into
another civil war.”
Israel,
she added, will also need wise policy. “They are not Zionists; they are
pro-Lebanese. We should not give a bear hug. Instead, we should enable
them to establish themselves in Lebanon, so that, ultimately, they can
arrive at a new reality with us.”
Normalization with Lebanon is still a long-term vision rather than an imminent possibility.
AS
FOR Syria, while in the past discussions on Syria focused only on
threat assessments, now there is some talk of potential opportunities.
The
fall of Bashar al-Assad has undeniably opened new possibilities, but as
INSS senior researcher Carmit Valensi said at the conference,
everything hinges on which direction the new president, Ahmed al-Sharaa,
chooses.
Valensi,
who, along with Itamar Rabinovich, coauthored Syrian Requiem: The Civil
War and its Aftermath, said it is too early to determine whether he
will follow the extremist, jihadist path he has walked before or take a
more pragmatic, stabilizing approach.
“The
defining characteristic of the region right now is uncertainty. There
are many question marks about Syria’s trajectory,” she said.
So
far, she noted, there have been some positive signs: a “quiet
transition,” no violence, the right rhetoric from the new government,
dialogue – including this week’s National Dialogue Conference in
Damascus – and engagement with minorities. She added that extreme
religious coercion has not surfaced – though there have been reports of
gender separation on buses in Damascus – and women have been appointed
to some government positions.
Valensi
said there are indicators that the country could go in either
direction, though for now things are slightly more positive.
Israel,
she said, must prepare for both scenarios: the rise of a jihadist,
Islamist regime or the emergence of a moderate, pragmatic Syria.
Regarding
the first scenario – where the country sinks into chaos and violence
that has the potential to spill over into Israel – Valensi explained
that Israel’s immediate deployment of troops to the buffer zone along
the border and on the Syrian Hermon was aimed at preventing radicalized
forces from seizing control of those areas. It is also explains why
Israel swiftly destroyed large parts of the Syrian army and its weapons
stockpiles within days of Assad’s fall.
There
is importance in the military action Israel has taken, she said.
Netanyahu declared on Sunday that Israel would not allow Syria’s new
army or the axis that led to Assad’s fall to “enter the area south of
Damascus.” He also demanded “the full demilitarization of southern Syria
from troops of the new Syrian regime in Quneitra, Deraa, and Suwayda
provinces.”
But Valensi emphasized that Israel must also prepare for the possibility of a moderate Syria.
“We
cannot only rely on military tools, but should also hope to translate
the very impressive achievements we have had on many fronts, including
in Syria, into diplomatic achievements,” she said.
“We
cannot keep IDF forces in southern Syria forever,” Valensi added. “The
longer the presence remains, the likelihood of the first scenario
winning out will increase, and though we are not the top priority of the
new government – which has to deal with many challenges – we will not
only draw fire but also be at the top of the agenda.”
That
shift may already be taking place. A statement with 18 points emerged
from Tuesday’s National Dialogue Conference, where 600 attendees were
called together to help guide the process of transition.
After
a clause calling for preserving the unity of the Syrian Arab Republic,
the second point was a condemnation of “the Israeli incursion into
Syrian territory as a flagrant violation of the sovereignty of the
Syrian state.”
The
statement demanded Israel’s “unconditional withdrawal” and rejected
“the provocative statements of the Israeli prime minister.” It called on
the international community and regional organizations to assume their
responsibilities toward the Syrian people and “stop the aggression and
violations.”
Predictably, the statement said nothing of Turkish troops who have moved into large swaths of the country.
The
next day, Sharaa visited Jordan, where Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi,
as always, fanned the flames. “We condemn the Israeli aggression on our
sisterly Syria as a flagrant violation of international law and a
dangerous escalation that will only contribute to fueling tension and
conflict.”
What
Safadi and the Syrians fail to grasp is that October 7 changed Israel.
The country will no longer allow forces dedicated to its destruction to
build up on its borders. The IDF’s move into southern Syria reflects
that policy. Israel will not withdraw until it is clear which path Syria
is taking – toward extremism or pragmatism.
Israel must lay down its conditions
“Israel
needs to set conditions and be clear in its Syrian strategy, and put
conditions that will make a gradual, responsible withdrawal of forces
from Syria [possible],” Valensi said.
What
are those conditions? A quiet border, the removal of extremist elements
from the area near the border, keeping the Iranians from reestablishing
a presence there, and addressing the unconventional weapons that remain
in Syria.
Valensi
said that Israel needs to put those conditions on the table, and then
“give an opportunity for positive scenarios to develop there.”
If they do, then perhaps Witkoff’s talk of Syria eventually joining the Abraham Accords may not be as fanciful as it now seems.
A Trump decision to designate the Muslim Brotherhood as a Foreign Terrorist Organization would go a long way toward making it difficult for its many offshoots to continue supporting it.
"[Iran's] Operation True
Promise 3 will be carried out at the right time, with precision, and in a
scale sufficient to destroy Israel and raze Tel Aviv and Haifa to the
ground." — Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Major General Ebrahim
Jabbari, February 2025.
A Trump decision to designate the Muslim Brotherhood as a Foreign
Terrorist Organization would go a long way toward making it difficult
for its many offshoots to continue supporting it.
Even more urgent is for the Trump administration to neutralize
Hamas, Qatar, Iran, Hezbollah and the Houthis -- to limit their ability
to keep on destabilizing the entire region, as well as to curtail the
Houthis' stranglehold on global shipping. The policy is certainly
congruent with the long-held American principle of maintaining the
international freedom of navigation.
The move would also send a warning to China not to continue its
aggressive effort to gain control of the world's critical sea lines near
Taiwan, Australia, the Philippines and Japan.
Iran, reportedly weeks away from a nuclear weapons breakout,
is still threatening the "total annihilation of Israel." Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Major General Ebrahim Jabbari this
month said: "Operation True Promise 3 will be carried out at the right
time, with precision, and in a scale sufficient to destroy Israel and
raze Tel Aviv and Haifa to the ground." Pictured: IRGC
commander-in-chief Major General Hossein Salami speaks during a memorial
service beneath portraits of slain Hezbollah leader Hasssan Nasrallah
(L) Iranian general Qassem Soleimani (C), and Nasrallah's successor
Hashem Safieddine at Tehran's Grand Mosque. (Photo by Atta Kenare/AFP
via Getty Images)
Iran, reportedly weeks away from a nuclear weapons breakout, is still threatening
the "total annihilation of Israel." To that end, the regime's Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has announced "Operation True Promise
3" – another rocket and ballistic missile air assault on Israel. IRGC Major General Ebrahim Jabbari this month said:
"Operation True Promise 3 will be carried out at the right time, with
precision, and in a scale sufficient to destroy Israel and raze Tel Aviv
and Haifa to the ground."
Meanwhile, Qatar, possibly capitalizing on the reluctance of Egypt
and Jordan to receive Gazans, seems to be trying to come up with its own
peace plan to derail President Donald Trump's. It most likely designed
to keep its client, beneficiary and Muslim Brotherhood cohort, Hamas, in
power in the Gaza Strip. The invaluable website MEMRI reports:
"After World War II, tens of millions of refugees and
displaced persons in Europe needed to be resettled, among them Jewish
survivors of the Holocaust. The UN and the international community
rushed to help them.
"In 1949, there was a new wave of refugees – the Arab Palestinians –
that resulted from their failed attempt, along with that of seven Arab
states, to destroy the newborn State of Israel. Over the years, there
were still more refugees from new regions of crisis – northern Cyprus
(1974), Yugoslavia (1990-1992).
"A single global policy for all refugees was set: resettlement in
their new locations. But for the Palestinians, another principle was
devised – the principle of return to their previous locations, in
complete disregard of the State of Israel.
"In order to implement the return of the Palestinians, a special UN
agency was created: the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees in the Near East – UNRWA.
"It is no wonder that over the years UNRWA's education system taught
children to fight Israel, to allow all Palestinians everywhere in the
world to return to it to completely destroy it, and to establish
Palestine 'from the river to the sea.' And it is no wonder that UNRWA
teachers participated in the October 7, 2023 massacre of Israeli
civilians – women, children, and the elderly.
"The Trump plan has brought all actors back to the 1948 moment. No
principle of return. The rules for all other refugees in the world
should apply to the Palestinians of Gaza as well. The natural solution
for them should have been their rehabilitation in Gaza, not relocating
them into Israel. This could have been implemented had there been a
guarantee that Gaza attacks on Israel would cease.
"But the Palestinians want to eat their cake and have it too. They
want both rehabilitation in Gaza and the implementation of return into
Israel through violent means. This has been reiterated by Hamas leaders
throughout the war. For example, senior Hamas official Ghazi Hamad said
that the 'Al-Aqsa Flood' – the Hamas name for its October 7 massacre,
'was just the first time, and there will be a second, a third, a
fourth.' Adding 'Will we have to pay a price? Yes, and we are ready to
pay it. We are called a nation of martyrs, and we are proud to sacrifice
martyrs,' he concluded: 'On October 7, October 10, October 1,000,000 –
everything we do' to eliminate Israel 'is justified.'"
"Hamas cannot continue as a military or government force," US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on February 16.
"And frankly, as long as it stands as a force that can
govern or as a force that can administer or as a force that can threaten
by use of violence, peace becomes impossible. They must be eliminated.
It must be eradicated."
In addition, Houthi leader Abdel Malik pledged
in a television address on February 11 address that targets if Israel
resumes the war in Gaza, his Yemen-based group will resume attacks on
Israeli troops.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced if the promised
hostage release does not materialize as promised, he will order the IDF
to resume military operations against Hamas.
Trump explained on February 10 what should happen if Hamas does not free all the hostages:
"As far as I'm concerned, if all of the hostages aren't
returned by Saturday at 12 o'clock -- I think it's an appropriate time –
I would say, cancel it and all bets are off and let hell break out. I'd
say they ought to be returned by 12 o'clock on Saturday. And if they're
not returned – all of them, not in drips and drabs, not two and one and
three and four and two – by Saturday at 12 o'clock. And after that, I
would say, all hell is going to break out.
"Saturday at 12, we want them all back. I'm speaking for myself.
Israel can override it, but from myself, Saturday at 12 o'clock, and if
they're not, they're not here, all hell is going to break out."
Netanyahu, evidently eager to see as many of the approximately 59
remaining hostages --around half of whom are presumed dead -- released
as soon as possible before any more are murdered by their captors, did
not adopt Trump's position. He warned, however, that if all the hostages were not returned, "the gates of hell will be open."
If the Houthis resume their piratical assaults on international
shipping, it is surely an opportunity for the Trump administration to
reverse the Biden regime's failure to restrain the group, which Trump recently re-designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.
Hamas spokesmen have claimed,
incorrectly, that Israel has not lived up to its promises "to
facilitate the entry of humanitarian aid," when in fact the aid was
delivered to the border but the United Nations failed to distribute it.
The Houthi threat presumably includes the resumption of its attacks on shipping in the Suez Canal and Red Sea which serves about 12% of world trade and 30% of global container traffic. In November 2023, the Houthis attacked more than 100 vessels, as well as launching drones and missiles toward Israel. Houthi missiles have targeted Israeli cities, including Tel Aviv.
Ships forced to navigate around the southern tip of Africa to avoid Houthi attacks, rather than using the Suez Canal, require roughly an additional ten days, Meanwhile, fuel costs are growing at a prohibitive rate, and insurance companies and shipping businesses have also raised their rates.
Trump's addressing the Houthi threat, in addition to the Iranian one,
would be welcomed by the Free World as well as by Egypt, which has lost billions in revenues from the reduced traffic through the Suez Canal.
A Trump decision to designate the Muslim Brotherhood as a Foreign
Terrorist Organization would go a long way toward making it complicated
for its many offshoots to continue supporting it.
Even more urgent is for the Trump administration to neutralize Hamas,
Qatar, Iran, Hezbollah and the Houthis -- to limit their ability to
keep on destabilizing the entire region, as well as to curtail the
Houthis' stranglehold on global shipping. The policy is certainly
congruent with the long-held American principle of maintaining the international freedom of navigation.
The move would also send a warning to China not to continue its
aggressive effort to gain control of the world's critical sea lines near
Taiwan, Australia, the Philippines and Japan.
Dr. Lawrence A. Franklin was the Iran Desk Officer for
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld. He also served on active duty with the
U.S. Army and as a Colonel in the Air Force Reserve.
“The polite lie that we tell ourselves over and over again is that Hamas does not represent the Palestinians,” Rabbi Ammiel Hirsch said. “It is simply not true.”
Rabbi Ammiel Hirsch of the Stephen Wise Free Synagogue in Manhattan. Photo by Edgar De La Vega.
The murder of Shiri Bibas and her two
children at the hands of Palestinian terrorists has ended the
possibility of a two-state solution, a prominent Reform rabbi declared
on Friday.
Rabbi Ammiel Hirsch, senior rabbi at New York City’s Stephen Wise Free Synagogue, told congregants in an explosive Shabbat sermon that he had “snapped” over the killings.
“This was the week that finally ended the
hope–at least in my lifetime–for a Palestinian state and a Jewish state
existing side-by-side,” Hirsch said. “The Palestinians themselves
strangled this fragile hope in its crib.”
“Until such time as the Palestinians
themselves say they want peaceful coexistence–two states living
side-by-side–we must cease deluding ourselves that a two-state solution
is available now,” he added.
Gazan terrorists abducted Shiri Bibas, 32,
and her two sons Ariel, 4, and Kfir, 9-months-old, from Kibbutz Nir Oz
in the Hamas-led terrorist attacks in southern Israel on Oct. 7, 2023.
Based on forensic evidence, their captors murdered the two children
“with their bare hands” within weeks of the attacks, according to the
Israel Defense Forces.
The funeral
for the three victims was held on Wednesday after their bodies were
returned to Israel as part of Phase 1 of the ceasefire-for-hostages deal
between Hamas and Israel.
According to Hirsch, the murders and
Hamas’s staging of parade-like ceremonies to crowds of cheering Gazans
during the release of emaciated Israeli hostages is an indictment of
Palestinian society, which suffers from a “moral miasma and social
collapse” and whose national movement fuels “an endless cycle of violent
depravity.”
“The polite lie that we tell ourselves
over and over again is that Hamas does not represent the Palestinians.
It is simply not true,” Hirsch said. “We recite this like a mantra so
that we do not have to face the terrible truth that Hamas is the
Palestinians. That Palestinianism is more about destroying the Jewish
state than creating a state of their own.”
“On Oct. 7, there were only wild
celebrations on the streets of Gaza as hostages were enslaved and
corpses defiled,” he said. “Many of the hostages were held in apartment
complexes of ordinary civilians. Thousands were in on the secret. No one
objected. No one helped the hostages escape.”
Hirsch, who is president of the New York
Board of Rabbis and is frequently cited as one of the most influential
leaders of Reform Judaism, has previously described himself as
“committed to the two-state solution” and said Friday that he had been a
lifelong supporter of coexistence between Israelis and Palestinians.
While a path to a two-state solution is listed
by the Union for Reform Judaism as an “essential” part of its
longstanding positions on Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,
Hirsch said he no longer believed that was possible.
“How do you make peace with such
neighbors?” he asked. “Never is a long time, but how do you make peace
with such neighbors now?”
The government should create an independent, nonpartisan investigative body with the authority to thoroughly examine the failures that occurred on October 7.
An Israeli flag flutters in front of the remains of a
building, following a deadly infiltration by Hamas gunmen from the Gaza
Strip, in Kibbutz Beeri in southern Israel October 22, 2023(photo credit: AMIR COHEN/REUTERS)
The IDF’s internal investigations into the October 7 Hamas attacks
revealed widespread failures at multiple levels, including intelligence
oversight, delayed military response, and lack of coordination between
security agencies. Military sources described the situation as one where
they “had no legs or eyes and were just trying to figure out where to
run.”
While these probes shed light on critical errors within the military, they are not enough.
The government must establish a state commission of inquiry to thoroughly investigate not only the IDF’s
failures but also those of the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency),
Israel Police, and the country’s political leadership, including the
Prime Minister’s Office and the Defense Ministry.
The
military’s readiness to examine its shortcomings is admirable but has
its limitations. A military conducting its investigation will always
face challenges due to institutional biases, the need to safeguard
reputations, and internal hierarchies.
Suppose
Israel aims to ensure accountability and avoid similar disasters in the
future. In that case, it must create an independent, state-sanctioned
commission with comprehensive investigatory powers, including the
ability to issue subpoenas.
Palestinians
take control of an Israeli tank after crossing the border fence with
Israel from Khan Yunis in the southern Gaza Strip, October 7, 2023.
(credit: ABED RAHIM KHATIB/FLASH90)
This commission should evaluate the IDF, the Shin Bet, the police, and, importantly, the political leadership.
Failures on October 7 run deep
The
failures of October 7 were not merely due to errors on the battlefield;
they stemmed from years of flawed policies, misinterpretations of
intelligence, and a paralysis in leadership. To restore public trust,
Israel’s top civilian and military decision-makers must be held
accountable.
A comprehensive inquiry must answer fundamental questions beyond the IDF’s actions.
What
role did the Shin Bet play in assessing the Hamas threat? Why were
early warnings ignored? What about the Israel Police and their lack of
preparedness? Why did government officials, including the Prime
Minister’s Office and the Defense Ministry, fail to foresee or respond
swiftly to the crisis?
These are critical questions that only an external commission can truly address.
The investigation should also examine the worldviews that influenced
the choices that led to this failure. For decades, Israel’s leaders
viewed Hamas as a manageable threat instead of a serious one.
The belief that Hamas was deterred – despite several close calls before October 7 – was a risky misunderstanding.
Intelligence
that should have raised alarms was dismissed. Internal military and
political fiefdoms prevented a coordinated response.
Thursday probes show investigation one is only tip of the iceberg
Thursday’s probes
showed that IDF intelligence “failed to notice or detect three near
mass invasions by Hamas before October 7,” in April 2022, October 2022,
and April 2023.
This suggests a systemic failure beyond just military shortcomings and extends into national security policy at large.
Late
prime minister Golda Meir once said, “When peace comes, we will perhaps
in time be able to forgive the Arabs for killing our sons, but it will
be harder for us to forgive them for having forced us to kill their
sons. Peace will come when the Arabs will love their children more than
they hate us.”
This
sobering reminder emphasizes the tragic reality of conflict. If Israel
is to ensure lasting security, it must not only defend itself against
future threats but also critically examine how its own leadership failed
its citizens on October 7.
History
has shown that independent commissions have been instrumental in
reforming Israel’s security apparatus. The Agranat Commission after the
Yom Kippur War led to significant military restructuring. The Winograd
Commission, after the First Lebanon War, exposed deep flaws in
political-military decision-making.
What must Israel do now?
What
is required now is a commission that will guarantee that the nation is
never caught off guard like this again. Some may contend that an
investigation during wartime could undermine morale or divert attention
from the current conflict.
However,
Israel has encountered similar situations in the past and has learned
that transparency is not a liability; rather, it is essential, both to
protect against future attacks and to restore public trust.
Soldiers, intelligence officers, and commanders must be assured that their leaders are held accountable.
The families of the victims and hostages deserve clear answers.
The
government should create an independent, nonpartisan investigative body
with the authority to thoroughly examine the security, intelligence,
and political failures that occurred on October 7.
This
commission must include credible legal, military, and intelligence
experts who are not influenced by political agendas. Their mission
should be to uncover the truth, determine accountability, and suggest
practical reforms.
