by Barry Rubin
There  is no good policy for the United States regarding the uprising in Egypt  but the Obama Administration may be adopting something close to the  worst option. This is its first real international crisis. And it seems  to be adopting a policy that, while somewhat balanced, is pushing the  Egyptian regime out of power. The situation could not be more dangerous  and might be the biggest disaster for the region and Western interests  since the Iranian revolution three decades ago.
Experts and news  media seem to be overwhelmingly optimistic, just as they generally were  in Iran's case. Wishful thinking is to some extent replacing serious  analysis. Indeed, the alternative outcome is barely presented: This  could lead to an Islamist Egypt, if not now in several years.
What's  puzzling here is that a lot of the enthusiasm is based on points like  saying that the demonstrators are leaderless and spontaneous. But that's  precisely the situation where someone who does have leaders, is well  organized, and knows precisely what they want takes over.
Look at  Tunisia. The elite stepped in with the support of the army and put in a  coalition of leadership, including both old elements and  oppositionists. We don't know what will happen but there is a reasonable  hope of stability and democracy. This is not the situation in Egypt  where the elite seems to have lost confidence and the army seems  passive.
Can Omar Suleiman, long-time head of intelligence, as  vice-president  and former Air Force chief  (the job Mubarak himself  used to have) Ahmed Shafiq as prime minister stabilize the situation?  Perhaps. He is an able man. But to have the man who has organized  repression running the country is not exactly a step toward libertarian  democracy.
There are two basic possibilities: the regime will  stabilize (with or without Mubarak) or power will be up for grabs. Now,  here are the precedents for the latter situation:
Remember  the Iranian revolution when all sorts of people poured out into the  streets to demand freedom? Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is now president.
Remember the Beirut spring when people poured out into the streets to demand freedom? Hizballah is now running Lebanon.
Remember the democracy among the Palestinians and free elections? Hamas is now running the Gaza Strip.
Remember democracy in Algeria? Tens of thousands of people were killed in the ensuing civil war.
It doesn't have to be that way but the precedents are pretty daunting.
What  did Egyptian tell the Pew poll recently when asked whether they liked  "modernizers" or "Islamists"? Islamists: 59%; Modernizers: 27%. Now  maybe they will vote for a Westernized guy in a suit who promises a  liberal democracy but do you want to bet the Middle East on it?
Here's the problem.
On  one hand, everyone knows that President Husni Mubarak's government,  based on the regime that has been running Egypt since the morning of  July 23, 1952, is a dictatorship with a great deal of corruption and  repression.
This Egyptian government has generally been a good  ally of the United States yet has let Washington down at times. For  example, the Mubarak government has continued to purvey anti-American  propaganda to its people; held back on solving the Israel-Palestinian  conflict (it did not endorse the 2000 Clinton plan, though I have good  sources saying Mubarak said later he regretted that decision); has not  taken a strong public stance on pressuring Iran; and so on.
For a  long time it was said that Egypt was the most important U.S. ally in  the Arabic-speaking world. There is truth in this but it has been less  true lately, though due more to passivity in foreign policy than to  hostility.
Clearly, though, Egypt is an American ally generally  and its loss to an anti-American government would be a tremendous defeat  for the United States. Moreover, a populist and radical  nationalist-much less an Islamist-government could reignite the  Arab-Israel conflict and cost tens of thousands of lives.
So the  United States has a stake in the survival of the regime, if not so much  that of Mubarak personally or the succession of his son, Gamal. This  means that U.S. policy should put an emphasis on the regime's survival.  The regime might be better off without the Mubaraks since it can argue  it is making a fresh start and will gain political capital from getting  rid of the hated dictator. Given the weakness of designated successor,  Gamal Mubarak, who is probably too weak to deal with the situation the  regime might well be a lot better off.
On the other hand, the  United States wants to show that it supports reform and democracy,  believing that this will make it more popular among the masses in the  Arab world as well as being the "right" and "American" thing to do.  Also, if the revolution does win, the thought is, it is more likely to  be friendly to America if the United States shows in advance its support  for change.
Finally, the "pro-democracy" approach is based on  the belief that Egypt might well produce a moderate, democratic,  pro-Western state that will then be more able to resist an Islamist  challenge. Perhaps the Islamists can be incorporated into this system.  Perhaps, some say (and it is a very loud voice in the American mass  media) that the Muslim Brotherhood isn't really a threat at all.
So in this point of view, U.S. policy should favor the forces of change.
Of course, it is possible to mix these two positions and that is what President Obama is trying to do.
Thus, Obama said:
"I've  always said to [Mubarak] that making sure that they are moving forward  on reform -- political reform, economic reform -- is absolutely critical  to the long-term well-being of Egypt, and you can see these pent-up  frustrations that are being displayed on the streets....Violence is not  the answer in solving these problems in Egypt, so the government has to  be careful about not resorting to violence and the people on the streets  have to be careful about not resorting to violence. I think that it is  very important that people have mechanisms in order to express  legitimate grievances. As I said in my State of the Union speech,  there's certain core values that we believe in as Americans that we  believe are universal: freedom of speech, freedom of expression --  people being able to use social networking or any other mechanisms to  communicate with each other and express their concerns."
On  paper, this is an ideal policy: Mubarak should reform; the opposition  should not use violence; and everything will turn out all right. Again,  this is the perfect policy in theory, and I'm not being sarcastic at all  here.
Unfortunately, it has little to do with reality. For if  the regime does what Obama wants it to do, it will fall. And what is  going to replace it? And by his lack of support--his language goes  further than it might have done--the president is demoralizing an ally.
And  it is all very well to believe idealistically that even if  Egyptians are longing to be free, one has to define what "free" means to  them. Also, the ruler who emerges is likely to be from the best  organized, disciplined group. People in Russia in 1917 were yearning to  be free also and they got the Bolsheviks. In Iran where people are  yearning to be free, the Obama Administration did nothing.
No  matter what the United States says or does at this point, it is not  going to reap the gratitude of millions of Egyptians as a liberator. For  the new anti-regime leaders will blame America for its past support of  Mubarak, opposition to Islamism, backing of Israel, cultural influence,  incidents of alleged imperialism, and for not being Muslim. If anyone  thinks the only problem is Israel they understand nothing.
This  is not the first time this kind of problem has come up and it is  revealing and amazing that the precedents are not being fully explained.  The most obvious is Iran in 1978-1979. At that time, as I wrote in my  book Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran, the  U.S. strategy was to do precisely what Obama is doing now: announce  support for the government but press it to make reforms. The shah did  not go to repression partly because he didn't have U.S. support. The  revolution built up and the regime fell. The result wasn't too good.
There  is a second part of this story also. Experts on television and  consulting with the government assured everyone that the revolution  would be moderate, the Islamists couldn't win, and even if they did this  new leadership could be dealt with. So either Ayatollah Ruhollah  Khomeini couldn't triumph-Islamists running a country, what a laugh!-or  he couldn't really mean what he said. That didn't turn out too well  either.
Even more forgotten is that, regarding Egypt, that's how  the whole thing started! Back in 1952, as I wrote in my book, The Arab  States and the Palestine Conflict, U.S. policymakers supported-don't  exaggerate this, it was not a U.S. engineered coup but they were  favorable-to an army takeover. The idea was that the officers would be  friendly to the United States, hostile to the USSR and Communism, and  more likely to enjoy mass support.
In other words, policymakers  and experts are endorsing a strategy today that has led to two of the  biggest disasters in the history of U.S. Middle East policy. And now it  is even worse, since we have these precedents and particularly the point  about what happens when Islamists take power.
There is no  organized moderate group in Egypt. Even the most important past such  organization, the Kifaya movement, has already been taken over by the  Muslim Brotherhood. Since 2007 its leader has been Abdel Wahhab  al-Messiri, a former member of the Muslim Brotherhood and a virulent  antisemite.
Muhammad el-Baradei, leader of the reformist movement, makes the following argument against my analysis:
"Mubarak  has convinced the United States and Europe that they only have a choice  between two options -- either they accept this authoritarian regime, or  Egypt will fall into the hands of the likes of bin Laden's al-Qaida. Of  course that is not exactly true. Mubarak uses the specter of Islamist  terror to prevent a third way: the country's democratization. But  Washington needs to know that the support of a repressive leadership  only creates the appearance of stability. In truth, it promotes the  radicalization of the people."
This is a reasonable formulation.  But one might also say that nothing would promote the radicalization of  the people more than having a radical regime. Even el-Baradei says that if he were to be president he would recognize Hamas as ruler of the Gaza Strip and end all sanctions against it.
That  is not to say that there aren't good, moderate, pro-democratic people  in Egypt but they have little power, money, or organization. Indeed,  Egypt is the only Arab country where many of the reformers went over to  the Islamists believing-I think quite wrongly-that they could control  the Islamists and dominate them once the alliance got into power.
Nothing  would make me happier than to say that the United States should give  full support for reform, to cheer on the insurgents without reservation.  But unfortunately that is neither the most honest analysis nor the one  required by U.S. interests. In my book, The Long War for Freedom, I  expressed my strong sympathy for the liberal reformers but also the many  reasons why they are unlikely to win and cannot compete very well with  the Islamists.
Ihave pointed out that the Brotherhood's new leader sounds quite like al-Qaida and has called for war on both Israel and America.
And  here is Rajab Hilal Hamida, a member of the Brotherhood in Egypt's  parliament, who proves that you don't have to be moderate to run in  elections:
"From my point of view, bin Ladin, al-Zawahiri and  al-Zarqawi are not terrorists in the sense accepted by some. I support  all their activities, since they are a thorn in the side of the  Americans and the Zionists....[On the other hand,] he who kills Muslim  citizens is neither a jihad fighter nor a terrorist, but a criminal  murderer. We must call things by their proper names!"
A study of  the Brotherhood members of Egypt's parliament shows how radical they  have been in their speeches and proposals. They want an Islamist radical  state, ruled by Sharia and at war with Israel and the United States.
Then  it is also being said that the Brotherhood is not so popular in Egypt.  Then why did they get 20 percent of the vote in an election when they  were repressed and cheated? This was not just some protest vote because  voters had the option of voting for secular reformers and very few of  them did.
The mass media is full of "experts" who also argue  that the Brotherhood is not involved in terrorism. Well, partly true. It  supports terrorism against Americans in Iraq and against Israelis,  especially backing Hamas. In major cases of terrorism in Egypt-for  example the assassination of Farag Fouda and the attempting killing of  Naguib Mahfouz-Brotherhood clerics were involved in inciting the  violence beforehand and applauding it afterward.
The deeper  question is: why does the Brotherhood not engage in violence in Egypt?  The answer is not that it is moderate but that it has felt the time was  not ripe. Knowing that it would be crushed by the government, and its  leaders sent to concentration camps and tortured or even executed, as  happened under Gamal Abdel Nasser in the 1950s and 1960s, is a  deterrent. It is no accident that Hamas and Hizballah-unrestrained by  weak governments-engaged in violent terrorism while the Muslim  Brotherhood facing strong and determined regimes in Egypt and Jordan did  not.
Having said all of this, U.S. influence on these events,  already rejected by Egypt's government, is minimal. It is morally good  to speak about freedom and seem to support the protestors but also quite  dangerous and will not reap the gratitude of the Egyptian masses in the  future. After all, aside from the likely radicalism of their leaders, a  revolutionary regime would be hostile toward the United States since  America would be blamed for supporting the Egyptian dictatorship for  decades. President Obama will not charm them into moderation.
The  Egyptian elite wants to save itself and if they have to dump Mubarak to  do so-as we saw in Tunisia-the armed forces and the rest will do so.  But if the regime itself falls creating a vacuum, that is going to be a  very bad outcome. If I believed that something better could emerge that  would be stable and greatly benefit Egyptians, I'd be for that. Yet is  that really the case?
Consider this point. Egypt's resources and  capital are limited. There aren't enough jobs or land or wealth. How  would a new regime deal with these problems and mobilize popular  support? One route would be to embark on a decades-long development  program to make the desert green, etc. Yet with so much competition  where would the money come from? How could Egypt try to gain markets  already held by China, for example?
More likely is that a  government would win support through demagoguery: blame America, blame  the West, blame Israel, and proclaim that Islam is the answer. That's  how it has been in the Middle East in too many places. In two  cases-Lebanon and the Gaza Strip-democracy (though other factors were  also involved) has produced anti-democratic Islamist regimes that  endorse terrorism and are allied to Iran and Syria.
Is America ready to bet that Egypt will be different? And on what evidentiary basis would that be done?
The  emphasis for U.S. policy, then, should be put on supporting the  Egyptian regime generally, whatever rhetoric is made about reforms. The  rulers in Cairo should have no doubt that the United States is behind  them. If it is necessary to change leadership or make concessions that  is something the U.S. government can encourage behind the scenes.
But  Obama's rhetoric-the exact opposite of what it was during the upheavals  in Iran which he should have supported-seems dangerously reminiscent of  President Jimmy Carter in 1978 regarding Iran. He has made it sound-by  wording and nuance if not by intention-that Washington no longer backs  the Egyptian government. And that government has even said so publicly.
Without  the confidence to resist this upheaval, the Egyptian system could  collapse, leaving a vacuum that is not going to be filled by friendly  leaders.
That is potentially disastrous for the United States  and the Middle East. There will be many who will say that an  anti-American Islamist government allied with Iran and ready to restart  war with Israel "cannot" emerge. That's a pretty big risk to take on the  word of those who have been so often wrong in the past.
Suggested Readings
Barry Rubin, Islamic Fundamentalism in Egyptian Politics, Second Revised Edition Palgrave Press (2002, 2008).
Barry Rubin, The Muslim Brotherhood: A Global Islamist Movement (Palgrave-Macmillan, 2010)
For the Brotherhood's political views on supporting Hamas "by any means necessary"
MERIA Articles
Barry Rubin, COMPARING THREE MUSLIMS BROTHERHOODS: SYRIA,JORDAN,EGYPT", Vol. 11, No. 2 (June 2007) 
Adel Guindy, "THE ISLAMIZATION OF EGYPT", Vol. 10, No. 3 (September 2006)
Magdi Khalil, " EGYPT'S MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AND POLITICAL POWER: WOULD DEMOCRACY SURVIVE?" Vol. 10, No. 1 (March 2006)
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal.
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.
 
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