Israel-United States military relations.

 

Israel-United States military relations have been extremely close,  reflecting both shared security interests in the unstable Middle East and the influence of a strong pro-Israel lobby in the United States. A major purchaser and user of US military equipment, Israel is also involved in the joint development of military technology and regularly engages in joint military exercises involving United States and other friendly forces.

The relationship has deepened gradually over time, though, as Alan Dowty puts it, it was "not a simple linear process of growing cooperation, but rather a series of tendentious bargaining situations with different strategic and political components in each."

* * * * * * * *

During the first twenty years of Israel's existence, United States policy in the Middle East was driven by two major policy concerns: The prevention of an arms race in the Near East, and the prevention of the spread of Soviet influence. Israel's main military patron at the time was France, which supported Israel by providing it with advanced military equipment and technology, such as the Dassault Mystère fighter-bomber aircraft. Initially, the US government resisted pressure by Israel and Arab countries in the region to sell them advanced weapons. In response to the supply of advanced fighter aircraft by the USSR to Iraq and the United Arab Republic, the US government agreed to sell MIM-23 Hawk anti-aircraft missiles to Israel in 1962, as a "specific action designed to meet a specific situation" which "by no means constitutes change in US policy in area.". The Hawk system was approved on the grounds that it was a "purely defensive" weapon.. Later, when Jordan threatened to turn to the USSR for weapons, the US agreed to sell tanks and jet aircraft to Jordan in order to prevent the spread of Soviet influence, and in return, agreed to sell similar systems to Israel.

During the early 1960s, the US government sought to establish a regional arms limitation agreement in the Middle East. The initiative lost steam in early 1965 after it was disclosed that the US had been indirectly supplying weapons to Israel via West Germany since 1962, under the terms of a 1960 secret agreement to supply Israel with $80 million worth of armaments. The remainder of the agreement was fulfilled publicly, following its disclosure by the U.S., with Israel receiving shipments of M48 Patton tanks in 1965 and A-4E Skyhawk attack aircraft in 1968.

US policy changed markedly after the Six-Day War of 1967, in response to a perception that many Arab states (notably Egypt) had permanently drifted toward the Soviet Union. In 1968, with strong support from Congress, U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson approved the sale of F-4 Phantom II fighters to Israel, establishing the precedent for U.S. support for Israel's qualitative military edge over its neighbors. The U.S., however, would continue to supply arms to Israel's neighbors, particularly Lebanon, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, in order to counter Soviet arms sales and influence in the region.

 During the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the US mounted a major airlift codenamed Operation Nickel Grass to deliver weapons and supplies to Israel. Over 22,000 tons of tanks, artillery, ammunition, and other materiel were delivered to aid the Israeli military in response to a large-scale Soviet resupply effort of the Arab states. The operation was paralleled by a large-scale sealift of some 33,000 tons of materiel and the transfer of 40 F-4 Phantoms, 36 A-4 Skyhawks and twelve C-130 Hercules transport aircraft to replace Israeli war losses.

Bilateral military cooperation deepened under the Ronald Reagan administration in the 1980s. In 1981, US Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Israeli Minister of Defense Ariel Sharon signed the Strategic Cooperation Agreement, establishing a framework for continued consultation and cooperation to enhance the national security of both countries. In November 1983, the two sides formed a Joint Political Military Group, which still meets twice a year, to implement most provisions of the MOU.  Joint air and sea military exercises began in June 1984, and the United States has constructed facilities to stockpile military equipment in Israel.

In 1987, the United States granted Israel the status of major non-NATO ally, enabling it to compete equally with NATO and other US allies for contracts and purchase advanced US weapons systems. Israel became the largest recipient of U.S. military aid in the world. In 1988, Reagan and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir signed a memorandum of understanding to formalize and perpetuate the work of the bilateral US-Israel military, security and economic working groups.

In an effort to prevent Israel from retaliating against Iraqi SS-1 Scud missile attacks during the Persian Gulf war of 1991, and thereby breaking up the US-Arab coalition, the US dispatched MIM-104 Patriot surface-to-air missile batteries to Israel. The effort met with very limited success, with less than 10% and perhaps as few as none of the Scuds fired against Israel intercepted successfully.

Under the Bill Clinton administration in the 1990s, the US government made efforts to bolster the Israeli government's military edge by allowing it to purchase $700m of the latest U.S. military equipment, including advanced fighters, attack helicopters and the Joint Direct Attack Munition system. A series of major joint military technology development projects was also instituted.

Further extensive military cooperation took place under the George W. Bush administration, with Israel placing major orders for F-16I multirole fighters. During the 2006 Lebanon War, the United States provided a major resupply of jet fuel and precision-guided munition to replenish depleted Israeli stocks.

Joint military activity

Israeli soldiers and US Marines from the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit fast-rope from a CH-46E Sea Knight helicopter on the deck of the USS Kearsarge (LHD-3).

The United States and Israel cooperate closely in a number of areas of military activity. The U.S. underwrites Israel's research and development of weapons, contributing significant amounts of money to Israeli defense projects such as the Merkava main battle tank and the IAI Lavi ground-attack aircraft. Israel is a participant in the F-35 Lightning II fighter development program and was offered access to the F-22 Raptor program, though it turned this down due to the high costs.

The U.S. and Israel also cooperate jointly on a number of technology development programs, notably the Arrow missile system and the Tactical High Energy Laser (also known as Nautilus). The two countries carry out regular exercises together, including carrying out biennial exercises codenamed JUNIPER COBRA intended to test interoperability between the two militaries. In addition, the Israeli port of Haifa is the main port of call in the eastern Mediterranean for the United States Sixth Fleet, and Israel provides other logistical and maintenance support for U.S. forces in the region. The two countries also share intelligence and maintain a joint anti-terrorist working group, and in April 2007 their air forces committed to share information about mutually relevant procurements.

Controversies

The close military relationship between the U.S. and Israel has engendered a number of controversies over the years. Operation Nickel Grass — the U.S. resupply effort during the Yom Kippur War — led to retaliation, as the Arab states declared a complete oil embargo on the United States, causing oil prices to skyrocket, fuel becoming scarce, and embroiling the United States in the 1973 oil crisis.

Israeli use of U.S.-provided military equipment in the 1982 Lebanon War resulted in controversy, exposing serious differences between Israeli and U.S. policies.^{[citation needed]} Similar controversies attended Israel's use of weapons supplied by the U.S. in the course of the Palestinian First Intifada and al-Aqsa Intifada as well as the 2006 Lebanon War.

Military aid

Israel has received more U.S. military assistance than any other country, both in terms of grant aid and military sales on a concessional basis. Since 1987, the U.S. has provided an average of $1.8 billion annually in the form of Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and funds to support research and development.

A bilateral memorandum of understanding was signed in January 2001, at the end of the Clinton administration, under which defense aid was increased to $2.4 billion annually from $1.8 billion, while the $1.2 billion of economic aid would be eliminated. This was predicated on the basis of the defense aid being increased by $60 million per year until the full amount was reached in 2008, while the economic aid is decreased by $120 million per year until eliminated.

In 2007, the United States increased its military aid to Israel by over 25%, to an average of $3 billion per year for the following ten year period (starting at $2.550 billion for 2008, growing by $150 million each year). The package is scheduled to start October 2008, when regular economic aid to Israel's economy is to end. Officials have insisted the aid is not tied, or meant to balance, simultaneous military aid packages totalling $20 billion to Arab countries including Saudi Arabia. U.S. President George W. Bush assured Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert that the U.S. would help keep a "qualitative advantage" to Israel over other nations in the region.

Significant major procurements

The United States is the largest single supplier of military equipment to Israel. According to the U.S. Congressional Research Service, between 1998-2005 the U.S. accounted for the vast majority of Israel's arms transfer agreements, accounting for $9.1 billion out of $9.5 billion worth of agreements.

Israel deals directly with U.S. companies for the vast majority of its military purchases from the United States, though it requires permission from the U.S. government for specific purchases. Permission is not always automatic; for instance, in March 2000 it became known that the Israeli government had been refused permission to purchase BGM-109 Tomahawk missiles.

Israel has the world's largest F-16 fleet outside the United States Air Force. With the delivery of 102 F-16Is, scheduled through 2008, the Israeli Air Force will have a total F-16 inventory of 362, in addition to 89 F-15s.

 

Putin Leads Russia's Return to the Middle East and the Arab Embrace.

 

By Michael Widlanski

 

1^st part of 2

 

*  Russian President Vladimir Putin promised to support Egypt's bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and insisted that his country sell advanced missiles to Syria, while continuing to aid the nuclear development of Iran, particularly the Russian-built, 1,000-megawatt, Bushehr nuclear reactor.

*  The real reason for Putin's visit and for Palestinian enthusiasm seems to be an attempt to restore previous Russian or Soviet policies. "The Soviets were always keen on the Middle East. The region was practically their backyard," said Reda Shehata, a former Egyptian ambassador to Russia.

*  With former Soviet Central Asia today dotted with American air force bases, Putin's best option is to skip over this tier of American influence and re-engage the Arab world. The Middle East is the natural area for Russia to be active, if Moscow is to regain some of the influence that the Soviet Union once enjoyed. However, past Russian diplomacy, aid, and weapons offers have sometimes spurred wars and arms races, not peace.

*  Abbas is not very different from the Ba'ath party officials in Syria who believe in a Russian counterweight to U.S. policies. Abbas did his advanced university training in Moscow, speaks fluent Russian, and once served as the PLO ambassador to the Soviet Union.

*  The chosen instrument that both Russia and the PA hope to employ to neutralize American power is the Quartet, where a united front of Russia, the EU, and the UN can be depended upon to offset the position of the U.S. After Putin met Abbas in Ramallah, he called for strengthening the role of the Quartet.

   *  The renewed Russian drive for influence in the Middle East raises serious questions about the entire idea of relying on a multilateral Quartet for peacemaking. Given Putin's harsh critique of U.S. support for Middle Eastern democracy, how can he be a partner for President Bush in the Middle East? Why empower those who oppose you?

 

Putin Visits Israel and the PA

When Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Israel and Egypt in April, he offered to host a Middle East peace conference in Moscow and, in return, he offered the Arab/Islamic world several things. Putin made his bold offer even as he promised to support Egypt's bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, and while insisting that his country sell advanced missiles to Syria - missiles which Israel fears will alter the power balance in the region.¹ He, in fact, came to Syria's defense, calling for conciliatory policies toward the regime in Damascus. Putin has also reasserted Russia's right to sell the Palestinians armored personnel carriers, while continuing to aid the nuclear development of Iran, particularly the Russian-built, 1,000-megawatt, Bushehr nuclear reactor - something which deeply concerns both the United States and Israel, which Iran has pledged to destroy.² At the end of his visit to Israel, Putin placed some minimal caveats on his support for the Iranian nuclear program, insisting that Russia's "Iranian partners" put all their nuclear programs "under complete international control." But no cutback in Russian involvement in Iran's nuclear infrastructure was proposed.

Israel and the United States both demurred on the Russian peace conference, while Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas and the PA media immediately welcomed the Russian initiative warmly. Why was Putin so eager to invite, and why were the Palestinians so overjoyed to come?

Palestinian Authority (PA) Chairman Abbas supplied a tentative answer in interviews with Palestinian radio and official PBC television, noting, first, that "this visit has great importance because it is the first time the president of the Russian republic has visited the region."³ Despite Abbas's initial analysis, however, this was not the real reason, although similar comments came from some Israeli officials who seemed overjoyed at the latest photo opportunity.⁴

The real reason for Putin's visit and for Palestinian enthusiasm seems to be an attempt to restore previous Russian or Soviet policies. "The Soviets were always keen on the Middle East. The region was practically their backyard. Today the Russians, under Putin, are trying to regain their presence, if not influence, in the Middle East," said Reda Shehata, a former Egyptian ambassador to Russia.⁵ As one life-long student of Middle East politics wrote 30 years ago, "what the tsars seized, the commissars never gave up."⁶ Putin's visit was viewed as significant, as an official Egyptian newspaper noted, because it was the first visit of a Russian/Soviet head of state to Egypt since Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev attended the funeral of Gamal Abdel-Nasser in 1970.

 

Russia Re-engages the Arab World

Foreshadowing the Russian reentry into the Middle East, two days earlier Putin gave a state-of-the-Russian Federation speech in Moscow in which he enunciated a theme that is popular both on the Russian Left and the Russian Right: The fall of the Soviet Union was, according to Putin, "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century."⁷ In his nationally televised speech, Putin unabashedly and nostalgically returned to the Great Power themes that dominated the Communist era. As one observer remarked: "Putin, who served as a colonel in the KGB, has resurrected some communist symbols during his presidency, bringing back the music of the old Soviet anthem and the Soviet-style red banner as the military's flag."⁸

With the extension of NATO to the Baltic states in the 1990s, the resurrection of Russia's Great Power status is not going to come through Eastern Europe. Even former Soviet Central Asia is today dotted with American air force bases. Like Khruschev in the late 1950s, Putin's best option is to skip over this tier of American influence and re-engage the Arab world. The Middle East is the natural area for Russia to be active, if Moscow is to regain some of the influence that the Soviet Union once enjoyed.

This hasn't been lost on the Palestinians. When Abbas explained to a Palestinian radio and television audience more fully the importance of the Putin trip and the Putin invitation, he said, "This is especially so because we have historical relations with the Soviet Union which has become Russia, and because it is one of the Committee of Four Nations (the Quartet)."⁹ Why would Abbas hint at any sentimentality toward the Soviet Union?

Arab diplomats with historically close ties to Moscow are hoping that Putin's entry into the Middle East can help offset what they view as American hegemony over the region. Tired of Washington's critique of their lack of democratic institutions and need for political reform, they have an interest in a counterweight to the U.S. that can help alleviate pressure to curtail corruption and open up their political systems. Putin picked up on this sensitivity during his Israel visit, declaring that it is the U.S. that is destabilizing the Middle East with its support for democratization of the Arab world: "with their policies the Americans are supporting the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt."¹⁰ Putin probably picked up this line of argument in Egypt, but it rang well with other Arabs including Palestinians.

Abbas is not very different from the Ba'ath party officials in Syria who believe in a Russian counterweight to U.S. policies. After all, Abbas did his advanced university training in Moscow. He is part of a generation of Fatah leaders who share strategic, historical, and personal links with the old Soviet elites and even shared their goals. Abbas speaks fluent Russian and once served as the PLO ambassador to the Soviet Union.

Michael Widlanski

 

Putin Leads Russia's Return to the Middle East and the Arab Embrace.

 

By Michael Widlanski

 

2^nd  part of 2

Russia and the PA: Shared Areas of Interest

With Putin, both the Russians and Abbas have a number of shared areas of interest. Putin and the Russian leadership are eager to regain political and economic influence in the Middle East region that is in Russia's backyard, while the Palestinians are eager to curtail the "pro-Israel" role of the United States in the Arab-Israeli arena. The Arab world gained global power by playing the superpowers against one another during the Cold War. Additionally, the "anti-American" side of Palestinian politics is frequently on display in mosque sermons and newspaper editorials and cartoons, all controlled by the PA.

The chosen instrument that both Russia and the PA hope to employ to neutralize American power is the Quartet, where a united front of Russia, the European Union, and the United Nations Secretariat can be depended upon to offset the position of the U.S. After Putin met Abbas in Ramallah, he called for strengthening the role of the Quartet in the future. Putin asserted: "There is no alternative but that the Quartet monitor the implementation of the Roadmap, the renewal of permanent status negotiations, and assisting the Palestinians in establishing institutions and a state." Abbas also looks for the Quartet to provide a "political horizon" and articulate positions calling for a full Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, contrary to the Bush commitments to Sharon.

Putin and the Palestinian leadership are both suffering from serious domestic problems and disappointments, according to public opinion polls. Russia is suffering a huge public health crisis that includes spiraling AIDS deaths and infant mortality.¹¹ The average young Russian male is nearly ten times likelier to die a violent death than the average Israeli.¹² High-powered summitry is especially attractive to Putin because it meets the Russian populist desire to reassert Great Power status. For Abbas, it distracts from his relative inability to improve the Palestinian quality of life or to make any major inroads in reducing corruption or internal Palestinian violence. Abbas can also present an advantage over Hamas to the Palestinian public, showing that he is capable of mobilizing international support on behalf of the Palestinian cause.

Both Putin and Abbas, each of whom were trained and/or employed by the Soviet KGB for significant periods in their lives, are both past masters at the KGB tactics of disinformation and "peace offensives." During the 1980s and early 1990s, after his return from doctoral studies in Moscow, Abbas was in charge of PLO contacts with the Israeli "peace camp."

While both Abbas and Putin have talked about peace and democracy, their records are somewhat more modest. Putin has used the Russian legal system to rein in press critics, while Abbas's election victory in January was attained during a two-week election campaign in which none of the other candidates were interviewed or covered significantly in the Palestinian broadcast media, and when gunmen from Abbas's Fatah faction intimidated election officials into opening polls so that Abbas backers could "vote" repeatedly.¹³

Both men have promised to curb incitement against Israel and against Jews, but anti-Semitism is rife in both regimes. Anti-Semitic laws are regularly offered in the Russian national assembly, while Abbas's radio, television, and school textbooks deny the existence of several major Jewish holy places such as Solomon's Temple and Rachel's Tomb, with mosque sermons still full of anti-Semitic references.

Both men have also had difficulty in curbing domestic terrorism and internal violence. In theory, Putin should have serious reservations about Abbas's willingness to embrace Hamas and Islamic Jihad, since Russia is at the forefront of the war against jihadi movements in Chechnya. Moscow's concern with militant Islamic terrorism should equally draw it closer to Israel. But if Putin is seeking to restore the old Soviet position of strength in the Middle East, he will take a less critical stand toward Arab or Iranian leaders harboring terrorist groups, just like his Soviet predecessors. Indeed, Putin's defense of Syria and Iran is really a throwback to Soviet-era diplomacy.

Confronting Terrorism

Is there an alternative course for Russian diplomacy? The post-9/11 world, in fact, has created new joint Russian interests with the West. Russia was a primary target of al-Qaeda long before the U.S.; indeed, al-Qaeda was born in the wake of the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan in 1989. Today, Putin views the regional threat to Russia across the Caucuses as part of the threat of international terrorism. Furthermore, if the energy factor is taken into account, new Russian interests become evident. With the massive increase in the energy needs of China and India, Russia has a strategic interest in meeting this demand. This puts it in competition with Middle Eastern states like Iran and Saudi Arabia. Russia is already using Israeli pipelines to transport its oil from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean, thereby bypassing the Suez Canal, in order to reach these new Asian markets. Putin must be torn between adopting policies toward the Middle East that were fashioned by the Soviet bureaucracy fifty years ago, and fashioning an entirely new Middle East approach based on cooperation with the U.S. and Israel. Putin's recent visit indicates that he still prefers Soviet "old-think."

Putin and Abbas seem to share an ambivalence about confronting terrorism, except if it is directed at them. For his part, Abbas has promised Israel and the United States to curb Palestinian terrorists, but he has not arrested any gunmen, preferring to spend his first 100 days in office demanding increased American and Israeli financial support as well as Israel's release of all convicted Palestinian terrorists and arms merchants.¹⁴ It is ironic that Putin can embrace Abbas, who is a self-declared ally of the Chechen mujahidin, while Abbas has chosen a path of legitimizing an armed Hamas and making it a part of the Palestinian political system.¹⁵

Abbas has also talked to his own people about ending "the militarization of the intifada" and the "anarchy of weapons." In real terms, this means putting an end to internal Palestinian violence which has increased along with Palestinian-Israeli violence. "People are being killed every day in the street," observed Bassem Eid, director of the Palestinian Human Rights Group. "Mostly it's not collaborators [people accused of cooperating with Israel]," declared Eid, explaining, "Many Palestinians are killed, and our people don't even know why."¹⁶

The renewed Russian drive for influence in the Middle East raises serious questions about the entire idea of relying on a multilateral Quartet for peacemaking of any sort. The idea of an international conference touching on permanent status issues is a vehicle for skipping over the first stage of the Roadmap - that calls on the Palestinians to dismantle the terrorist infrastructure - and moving already into establishing a Palestinian state. Given Putin's harsh critique of U.S. support for Middle Eastern democracy, how can he be a partner for President Bush in the Middle East? Why empower those who oppose you? The Quartet was conceived as a way of obtaining international support for the U.S. prior to the Iraq War. Clearly, participation in the Quartet didn't alter Russia's position on raq in any way. It may be that this entire approach needs serious reexamination.

Dr. Michael Widlanski teaches political communication and comparative politics at the Rothberg School of Hebrew University.

*     *     *

Notes

1. Putin told Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon that the missiles were only defensive, that they would be used to "guard Syrian President Assad's palace," according to several Israeli press reports. However, some Western analysts suspect that Putin has basically agreed to sell Syria two weapons systems: SS-26 and SA-18 missiles. The SS-26, also known as the "Iskander," is a highly mobile ground-to-ground missile that uses satellite guidance systems and can be re-targeted in-flight. With a range of 180 miles, it can carry a 1,000-pound warhead to most targets inside Israel. The SA-18 shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missile, known also as the "Igla," uses its enhanced seeker to hit aerial targets, such as jet fighters, head-on. Israeli press reports have claimed that Putin, under Israeli pressure, offered to sell a vehicle-based version of the SA-18, but the Israeli army says it would be easy to re-convert back to a mobile version with parts available on the open market. Such a missile could then find its way to Hizballah, the Lebanon-based and Iranian-supported terror group that has assumed a great share in the planning and financing of Palestinian terror in the West Bank and Gaza. The Israeli defense establishment is especially worried that such missiles could be used to attack Israeli military helicopters and civilian aircraft. See Claremont Institute reports on missile threats at http://www.missilethreat.com/missiles/ss-26_russia.html, and http://www.missilethreat.com/threat/syria.html, as well as an October 2004 report from Janes Missiles and Rockets. See also Michael Mainville, "Crisis Is Brewing Over Russ Missiles," New York Sun, January 13, 2005, http://www.nysun.com/article/7612.   2. Israel's Channel 10 television reported on April 28, 2005, that Putin indicated he might cancel a deal to provide the PA with armored personnel carriers, which Israel has opposed as being counter to the terms of the Israel-PA accords.
3. Voice of Palestine radio in Arabic (Sawt Felasteen) from Ramallah (hereafter VOP), as well as Palestinian Television from Gaza (hereafter PBC), April 28, 2005. All Arabic and Hebrew translations are by author unless otherwise indicated.
4. Israel's Deputy Prime Minister Ehud Olmert made almost identical remarks in an interview with the Voice of Israel, April 28, 2005, and similar remarks were made by Israeli President Moshe Katsav. Israel's Vice Prime Minister Shimon Peres once again saw visions of a new Russia and a new Middle East: "This is a sign of the changes that have occurred in Russia itself, in Israel-Russia relations, and in Russian policy in the Middle East."
5. Al-Ahram, April 28-May 4, 2005.
6. J.C. Hurewitz, Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension (New York: Octagon Books, 1974).
7. See Alex Nicholson, "Russia's Putin: Soviet Collapse a Tragedy," AP/Washington Post, April 25, 2005; http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/04/25/AR2005042500537_pf.html.
8. Ibid.
9. This was a reference to the "Quartet" or the informal American-Russian-European-UN oversight of the Arab-Israeli peace process.
10. Yediot Ahronot, April 29, 2005.
11. Cesar Chelala, "Russia wastes time as AIDS crisis builds," Japan Times, April 5, 2005. See http://www.japantimes.com/cgi-bin/geted.pl5?eo20050405a2.htm.
12. David Brooks, "Mourning Mother Russia," New York Times, April 28, 2005. See http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/28/opinion/28brooks.html.
13. Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, who served as an international observer, and the PA's own election commission made these charges.
14. Abbas promised to release Fouad Shoubaki from British custody in Jericho, the man behind the "Karinne A" arms transport from Iran to the Palestinians, as well as the men who planned and carried out the assassination of Israeli Tourism Minister Rehav'am Ze'evi in Jerusalem in 2001.
15. Maj.-Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror and David Keyes, "Will a Gaza 'Hamas-stan' Become a Future Al-Qaeda Sanctuary?" Jerusalem Issue Brief 4- 7, November 8, 2004, http://jcpa.org/brief/brief004-7.htm; Lt. Col. Jonathan D. Halevi, "Undermining Mahmud Abbas: The 'Green Revolution' and the Hamas Strategy to Take Over the Palestinian Authority," Jerusalem Issue Brief 4-21, April 14, 2005, http://jcpa.org/brief/brief004-21.htm.
16. Interviews by Michael Widlanski with Bassem Eid, April 2005.

 

Hitler's “Grossmufti von Jerusalem”

 

Icon of Evil: Hitler's Mufti and the Rise of Radical Islam
By David G. Dalin and John F. Rothmann

Reviewed by Jonathan Schanzer
Jerusalem Post
September 5, 2008

For the better part of a century, violence against Jews has arguably been the top export of the Palestinian people. True, they have olives and citrus, but ask any man on the street what the Palestinians are best known for, and you are likely to hear "suicide bombings" or "rockets." While most Palestinians would claim that the violence is simply a means to "liberate" their homeland, another plausible explanation may lie in the fact that early Palestinian nationalism was influenced heavily by Nazism. While other nations have disavowed fascism (Germany and Italy, for example) and have since developed into thriving democracies, the Palestinians have never reconciled with their past.

The most influential leader of the Palestinians during the British mandate, the grand mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husseini, was a Nazi collaborator. Husseini's relationship with the Nazis is incontrovertible. He worked closely with Hitler's top men in an attempt to achieve the "final solution." Yet, in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Husseini is considered a founding father of Palestinian nationalism.

Should there be any question about Husseini's involvement with Hitler and his executioners, readers are advised to read Icon of Evil, by David G. Dalin and John F. Rothmann. Their short history of the mufti is an exceptional one. With the help of photos and original documents, the book paints a stark picture of Husseini's ties to the Nazis and his dangerous role in the Third Reich.

Husseini, appointed the grand mufti of Jerusalem in 1921, is perhaps best known as the provocateur who exhorted Palestinian Arabs to carry out anti-Jewish violence in British-controlled Palestine in 1920, as well as the architect of the 1936-1939 Arab Revolt, which resulted in hundreds of Jewish and British casualties. For this, he was hailed as a hero and a staunch enemy of Zionism.

After the British ousted him from Mandatory Palestine, however, Husseini became an enemy of humanity. The "Grossmufti von Jerusalem", as the Nazis called him, should today be recognized as a war criminal.

Husseini left incontrovertible evidence of his Nazi collaboration in writing. In one journal entry, he admits that the basis for his cooperation with Germany was the fact that he was given "a free hand to eradicate every last Jew from Palestine and the Arab world," and Hitler's "explicit undertaking to allow us to solve the Jewish problem... according to the scientific methods innovated by Germany in the handling of its Jews."

Husseini also left behind letters that prove his collaboration with the Nazis. In a January 1941 letter that he wrote to Hitler, he pledged to the "great Führer" that Arabs everywhere were "prepared to act as is proper against the common enemy and to take their stand with enthusiasm on the side of the Axis and to do their part in the well-deserved defeat of the Anglo-Jewish coalition."

Later that year, the mufti was welcomed as an honored guest by the leaders of the Third Reich. After meeting personally with Hitler, he established close working relationships with high-profile Nazi war criminals including Joseph Goebbels, Heinrich Himmler and Adolf Eichmann. In fact, according to testimony at the Nuremberg trials, Husseini was "one of Eichmann's best friends," and that "accompanied by Eichmann, he had visited incognito the gas chamber of Auschwitz."

In 1943, Himmler placed Husseini in charge of recruiting as many as 100,000 Muslim fighters to join units serving in the Balkans, North Africa and the Middle East. As the authors note, "Two of the best known and most infamous Waffen-SS Nazi-Muslim divisions were established in Nazi-occupied Bosnia and Croatia."

As the mufti became part of the Nazi war machine, he did his part to help Goebbels with propaganda. On March 1, 1944, he urged in a radio broadcast to the Arab world to "kill the Jews wherever you find them. This pleases God, history and religion." His efforts to murder Jews did not end with propaganda, however. As Dalin and Rothmann note, "At one point, he lobbied Hitler personally to block a plan to allow Jews to leave Hungary... claiming that they would settle in Palestine and reinforce a new center of world Jewish power."

On another occasion, he implored Himmler and other Nazi leaders to bomb Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. Finally, according to British documents, Husseini in 1944 dispatched a group of paratroopers to poison Tel Aviv's water system, but they were apprehended before reaching their objective. Had the attack been successful, it might have killed more than 200,000 people.

Throughout Icon of Evil are numerous parallels between the murderous Nazi ideology of the 1940s and the murderous jihadist ideology that dominates headlines today. Both seek to kill Jews and somehow view the West as puppets in a Jewish plot of world domination. It seems only fitting, then, that Mein Kampf is translated as My Jihad in Arabic.

Perhaps the only part of this book that might have been reconsidered was Chapter 4, which asks, "What if Germany had conquered Palestine and Britain?" This chapter amounts to 12 pages of conjecture in what was otherwise an historical narrative. This section does not detract from the book, but was an unnecessary tangent. Indeed, the history speaks for itself.

Husseini died in 1974, but the history recounted in Icon of Evil is more important than ever. The rhetoric and violence of Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Aksa Martyrs Brigades and other terrorist groups bear a sickening resemblance to the rhetoric and violence of Hitler's mufti.

 

 

 

 

A New Strategy for the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict .

 

By Lt.-Gen. (ret.) Moshe Yaalon

Former Chief of Staff, Israel Defense Forces

1^st part of 2

 

· Solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, says mainstream public opinion, and the rest will follow. But the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is only one of many afflicting the Middle East, and it is by no means the dominant one.

· The Palestinian leadership continues to evade accountability. Today the watchword is "weakness." The image of political impotence has become a precious asset in the Palestinian strategy. The problem is not Abbas' actual capabilities. The problem is his unwillingness and lack of determination to create and govern a viable and accountable state.

· Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair and others have called for more foreign assistance for the Palestinians. This strategy has no chance of success if it is not linked to reforms. Unless the Palestinians are first convinced through education to give up the extremism which informs their national and religious aspirations, they cannot be expected to be full partners in building a vibrant Palestinian economy.

· The central conflict of the Middle East is not territorial but ideological; not about borders but about Islamic Jihadism and Western liberty. No ideology, least of all radical Islam, can be defeated by concessions, which encourage, energize, and inspire Jihadists. Those who wish for peace must face and assimilate this fact, and realize that territorial concessions, or any concessions in any realm in the struggle against militant Islam, have been consistently counterproductive.

· From Oslo to Annapolis , we have engaged in a top-down strategy. We aimed to reach a political horizon or a final settlement agreement with the Palestinian leadership, hoping that political reform among Palestinians would follow. I propose we replace this approach with a bottom-up strategy in which the PA first proves its willingness and ability to govern.

Current efforts to achieve a final settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are based on a number of deeply flawed assumptions. These have in turn produced an erroneous paradigm and a manifestly failed strategy for seeking peace and security which is preventing us from moving forward.

The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Is One of Many in the Middle East
Solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, says mainstream public opinion, and the rest will follow. Since the November 2007 meeting at Annapolis , this has become the U.S. administration's policy.

I have a great personal desire to see the Israeli-Palestinian conflict solved, for the benefit of Israelis and Palestinians, and for the benefit of all the region's peoples. Nevertheless, it is clear to me that it is not the epicenter of the region's many ills. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is only one of many afflicting the Middle East , and it is by no means the dominant one.

The most important fault-lines of the strife in today's Middle East are found rather in non-localized conflicts such as pan-national Islamic Jihadism against the West, the Shia-Sunni divide, and the Persian-Arab contest for power and influence. Within Muslim societies, across the region and beyond, there is a struggle between nationalists and Jihadists. Many, if not most, Muslim nations in the Middle East are torn internally between groups that believe happiness is achievable in this world, and groups who preach martyrdom (istish'had), the killing of infidels, and happiness in "the next world."

There are indeed more than a few struggles in the Middle East in addition to the Israeli-Palestinian one. None of them emerged from it, and none are dependent on it. Admittedly, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been exploited by those seeking to inflame passions in other arenas, often cynically and with a view to influence the prevailing wisdom in the West. It is essential for our own well-being that we maintain our clarity of vision in the face of misinformation and false optimism.

Implacable Palestinian Rejection of Israel
Another myth is that at the core of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the "occupation." This term refers to the territories conquered by Israel in the Six-Day War of 1967. Among Palestinians from all sectors and factions (Fatah, Hamas, PIJ, PFLP, DFLP, etc.) there are those that use the term "'occupation" simply as a euphemism for Israel ("from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River"). This view has proponents even among Israeli Arabs. They consider Israelis to be foreign colonialists and the entire land mass of Israel including its cities, towns, villages, and kibbutz farms as "occupied" territory.

The Palestinians have maintained a posture of implacable hostility to Israel's most fundamental and inalienable rights. The PLO, for example, existed and launched terror attacks against Israelis before 1967 when the West Bank and Gaza were not yet occupied by Israel . The PLO's pre-1967 raison d'etre has not magically disappeared in the meantime. Both Fatah and Hamas continue to maintain charters denying Israel's right to exist as an independent Jewish state. We find the rejection of Israel forms an integral part of the Palestinian ethos, and is expressed in no less than the founding documents and actions of the largest and most important Palestinian factions.

Rejectionism, far from being a "mere" matter of official policy or posturing, reaches the rhetoric of the Palestinian national leadership (including Mahmoud Abbas), the educational curriculum, and the Palestinian media. It deeply informs Palestinian strategy and policy. During the preparations for the Annapolis conference, it was demonstrated in the Palestinian refusal to make a basic declaration of their belief in "two states for two peoples." Instead they spoke only of "two states," avoiding explicit recognition of the Jewish people's right to an independent state. This quibbling over words is only the tip of an iceberg.

If the solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were a territorial compromise within Mandatory Palestine, I have no doubt we would have reached this long ago. Instead, from the dawn of Zionism to the present day, the Palestinian leadership has rejected every partition plan proposed, and has reacted violently to all political initiatives seeking a settlement along those lines. This occurred in 1937 in response to the Peel Commission, in 1947 as a reaction to the UN partition plan, and in 2000 when the Palestinians rejected former Prime Minister Barak's proposal at Camp David .

Attempts by Israel at peace through territorial concession have been met, again and again, with violence by Palestinians. The core of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not the "occupation" according to its meaning in Western discourse. Rather it is the "occupation" in the Palestinian sense: The relentless refusal of the Palestinian leadership to recognize Israel's right to exist as an independent Jewish state. Professor Bernard Lewis put it succinctly in the Wall Street Journal on November 28, 2007 , a day before the Annapolis Conference: "'What is the conflict about?' There are basically two possibilities: that it is about the size of Israel , or about its existence..If.the issue is the existence of Israel , then clearly it is insoluble by negotiation. There is no compromise between existing or not existing, and no conceivable government of Israel is going to negotiate on whether that country should or should not exist."

Do the Palestinians Want a State?
It is often said that the Palestinians desire and are capable of establishing a state that will live in peace alongside Israel . Those who believe this is so must explain why the Palestinian leadership, from the implementation of the Oslo Agreement in May 1994 through to the present, have failed to take even the first baby steps toward establishing a state - this in spite of overwhelming and unprecedented international support.

The facts suggest that the Palestinian leadership has been motivated by something other than a desire to create a thriving state. Although the Palestinian national movement stands out in recent history as the cause celebre of the international community, and despite massive political and economic support, the Palestinians have failed to create and nurture stable, efficient, and accountable political institutions. They have also crushed what little civil society they had. I do not think this failure was inevitable; I believe it is directly due to Yasser Arafat's conscious decision to create a society based on "gang logic."

Arafat and his cronies brazenly violated every agreement they signed with Israel . By eschewing the principle of "one authority, one law and one gun," Arafat was able, with craftiness, to evade responsibility for what was occurring. He used Hamas, PIJ, and other terror organizations as proxies, though he had the power and legitimacy needed to confront and disarm them. While his proxies were fighting Israel, Arafat could remain aloof and appear innocent. Moreover, to bolster his influence over the chaos he had created, Arafat established his own direct terror proxy, Fatah Tanzim, or the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade as it became known after September 2000. Arafat's war by proxy required a certain level of permanent instability in Palestinian institutions, and it was this that led to the "gang logic" which we now see mostly strikingly in inter-Palestinian violence.

Arafat has since been replaced by Mahmoud Abbas, yet the Palestinian leadership continues to evade accountability, according to a modified version of Arafat's strategy. Today, the watchword is "weakness." The image of political impotence has become a precious asset in the Palestinian strategy. Western politicians, as well as many Israelis, believe that Mahmoud Abbas is the only alternative to a far more extreme Hamas. They believe, therefore, that he should be strengthened economically, and equipped with additional weapons and ammunition. This approach has not and will not pay dividends because the problem is not Abbas' actual capabilities. The problem is his unwillingness and lack of determination to create and govern a viable and accountable state.

Mahmoud Abbas is not weak. He possessed more than sufficient power to institute reforms when he was elected on January 9, 2005 . He has chosen to avoid the attempt to govern his people effectively, or to create a political culture based on "state logic." He chose "weakness" instead as his method of preserving and partially controlling the many heads of the Palestinian Authority that he inherited from Arafat. There is little difference between Arafat's "gang logic" and Abbas' "weakness" - both are designed to avoid the daunting task of Palestinian nation-building, while permitting the continuation of a bloody struggle against Israel.

The Key to the Conflict Is Not Economic
A third prevailing misconception in the Western understanding of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict relates to the economy. This misconception holds that the key to the conflict is economic. Those who hold this view believe, just as the architects of "Oslo" believed, that a prosperous Palestinian economy would neutralize extreme nationalism and religious fanaticism, leading to peace and an improved security situation for Israel . While the improvement of the Palestinian economy should be part of any strategy for attaining peace, I do not think that the Palestinians can be forced to enjoy an improved economy and the fruits of prosperity while their own priorities remain entirely elsewhere.

Although the PA has received no less than $7 billion from donors in recent years, neither Arafat nor Abbas has managed to improve the basic living conditions of the Palestinian people in any significant way. On the contrary, the Palestinian economic situation began to deteriorate precipitously from the moment Arafat rose to power in 1994, and continues to do so under the regime of cronyism he instituted. Examples of wasted economic opportunity abound on all levels, and Palestinian terror groups have directly devastated economic resources. They engineered the closure of the Erez industrial zone which employed 4,500 Palestinians and provided for their families. After the disengagement from Gaza in 2005. the Palestinians wantonly destroyed the greenhouses left behind by the evacuees which were purchased by former WorId Bank President James Wolfenson and others for their benefit.

There is no doubt that the Palestinian economy is in dire need of assistance. Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair and other prominent figures have called for more foreign aid to be directed for this purpose to the Palestinians. However, unless further foreign aid is directly connected to reforms within Palestinian civil society, there is no chance of success. Unless the Palestinians are first convinced through education to give up the extremism which informs their national and religious aspirations, they cannot be expected to cooperate in the creation of their own prosperity. They can do neither of these things before first imposing law, order, and security in the territories under their control. No law can be imposed while the Palestinian leadership continues to reject all responsibility, whether under the guise of "weakness" or otherwise. Responsibility will never be assumed as long as the Palestinian people continue to nurse the dream of the disappearance of Israel as the Jewish homeland.

In light of historical experience, there are some fundamental questions we have to ask ourselves. Can we trust that a future Palestinian entity in the West Bank will not become Hamastan, as occurred in Gaza ? Could such an entity, even according to the 1967 borders, be economically viable? Would the Palestinians be satisfied with those borders as a final settlement? Would it bring stability, peace, and tranquility to the region? Are these borders defensible for the State of Israel?

A Palestinian Entity in the 1967 Borders Threatens Both Israel and Jordan
I believe, in light of the Palestinian leadership's behavior since its inception, and especially since Oslo , that the answer is an unequivocal "no." As things stand today, a Palestinian entity according to the 1967 borders would present an existential threat to Israel , to the stability of the region, to Western interests, and to Jordan .

The paradigm of the "two-state solution" within the boundaries of former Mandatory Palestine under the present status quo is both irrelevant and dangerous. It is irrelevant because today there is no Palestinian partner willing to accept it as a final settlement. It is dangerous because it fosters illusions which undermine our resolve and embolden our enemies. Ultimately, the "two-state solution" paradigm, at this juncture, threatens the security and stability of the region.

The paradigm of the "two-state solution" is based on Israeli territorial concessions. It rests on the same idea which stands behind the "land for peace" principle which has dominated Israeli politics since 1967, and which bore fruit when peace was made with Egypt in 1979. The principle then enjoyed the support of the vast majority of Israelis. A slim majority of Israelis likewise supported unilateral withdrawals from Lebanon and Gaza in 2000 and 2005, respectively. These Israelis, like many in the West, believed that peace and tranquility could be reached by addressing Hizbullah's and Hamas' talk of "occupation" as a simple territorial grievance. We now know the results. Both from Hizbullah and the Palestinians, the reaction came in the form of concerted terror wars, rockets fired at Israeli cities, and kidnapped soldiers. There is no clearer proof needed that the central conflict of the Middle East is not territorial but ideological; not about borders but about Islamic Jihadism and Western liberty.

No ideology, least of all radical Islam, can be defeated by concessions. Concessions encourage, energize, and inspire Jihadists. Those who wish for peace must face and assimilate this fact, and realize that territorial concessions in the struggle against militant Islam have only been counterproductive. As Bernard Lewis has said, this conflict is not about the size of Israel , but about its very existence.

What is worse, the mistaken paradigm and conceptions regarding Jihadism and the Middle East prevent the emergence of a new strategy. While the pundits and the public continue to debate "the solution," the problem has slipped from their view. The problem is Islamic Jihadism and Palestinian rejectionism towards Israel's most basic rights. Whoever realizes this, realizes also that what is needed is not a solution based on failed paradigms and wishful thinking. What is needed is a long-term strategy based on realistic assumptions culled from experience.