by Udi Dekel
Israel
has been preparing for escalation in the northern theater for a long
time. In particular, it fears that the events in Syria will spill over
into Israel, creating an area along the Golan Heights border that is not
controlled by a central government and that will be used by rogue
terrorist and jihadi elements against Israel. Indeed, the three violent
incidents on Israel’s border with Syria and Lebanon since early March
2014 may signal that the long standing situation is changing: as these
events harbored greater potential for escalation, perhaps a lengthy
period of relative quiet in Israel’s northern theater (Syria and
Lebanon) may be ending, with the area in question becoming a site of
increasing activity. The challenge that can be expected in the northern
theater is complex, given the various actors with conflicting interests
and objectives. This could drag Israel, willingly or unwillingly, into a
series of border incidents, a prolonged conflict, or even rocket fire
or gunfire deep into Israeli territory and widespread escalation.
Israeli soldiers deployed on the border
with Syria March 19, 2014; AFP/Getty Images
However, the incident of March 18, in which an IDF
patrol on the Golan Heights was struck by a roadside bomb, is not at
the heart of these scenarios, because all signs point to the bomb’s
having been placed by Hizbollah-backed forces, apparently with the
knowledge and aid of Assad’s forces. Indeed, it is likely that all three
incidents in March -
two on the Syrian border, in territories controlled by the Assad regime
and Assad loyalists, and the third in the area of Mount Dov, a
Hizbollah stronghold - were Hizbollah attacks against Israel.
The apparent catalyst for the recent
wave of incidents is the February 24, 2014 attack on a weapons convoy
from Syria to Lebanon, attributed to the IAF. Unlike previous attacks
attributed to the IDF, this strike took place in Lebanese territory and
apparently resulted in more extensive damage than the destruction of
weapons. In turn, Hizbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah promised to respond
at the appropriate time and place. Nasrallah and his forces may believe
that the aerial attack in Lebanon indicates a change in the rules of the
game that were ostensibly in place until now, and that therefore
Hizbollah must signal that it will not accept continued air strikes in
Lebanon. More generally, it is obligated to respond, inter alia, in
order to maintain its image as Lebanon’s protector against Israel.
If the assessment is correct that
Assad (or his forces) were a party to the bombs in the Golan Heights, at
least in terms of knowledge thereof, the question is, what led to this
change in the previous policy, namely, not to respond to air strikes
attributed to Israel? There are a number of developments that may affect
Assad and Hizbollah’s cost-benefit assessment of the situation and the
expected harm they will suffer from testing the boundaries of the rules
of the game with Israel and risking escalation.
Hizbollah has regained some obvious
self-confidence after achieving military successes in Syria in the
Yabrud sector and driving rebel forces from the Syrian-Lebanese border.
Regarding internal Lebanese politics, the rival political forces have
reached an agreement on establishing a government, whose basic
guidelines refer to Hizbollah’s right to act against Israel, with a
focus on the Israeli “occupation” of Lebanese territories (Shab’a
Farms/Mount Dov). Nevertheless, the domestic processes in Lebanon are
not evolving in Hizbollah’s favor – evidenced by the series of car
bombings aimed at organization officials.
Assad is defying predictions and surviving the third year of the uprising. The story Assad wove when the violence began -
that this was not a popular uprising by the Syrian public, but an
attack by Salafist jihadi terrorist elements against the Syrian state
and government, whose objective was not the benefit of Syrian citizens -
is in fact proving true, and now appears to be a correct description of
the uprising, given the weakness of the moderate and secular
opposition. Assad is supported financially and militarily by Iran and
Russia, has even received international legitimacy following his
agreement to dismantle the chemical arsenal, and his participation in
implementation of the agreement. Russia has increased its assistance to
Assad, channeling more funding and sending more advisors to support the
regime. Furthermore, Putin has shown himself a tough leader who does not
recoil from conflicts with the West and from establishing facts on the
ground using aggressive measures (e.g., vis-à-vis Ukraine and Crimea).
Add to this the failure of the second Geneva conference. This has made
it clear that there is no viable alternative to the Assad government,
which is prepared to position itself for reelection by Syria’s citizens.
The question, then, is whether and to
what extent the parties are interested in changing the rules of the game
that have been in place until now.
While Assad recently may have felt
strengthened, he likely understands that if Israel has to intervene in
the conflict in Syria, there would be a dramatic change in the balance
of forces arrayed against him, to the point that his regime could be
jeopardized. However, he has also received enough messages making it
clear to him that Israel prefers not to intervene in Syria’s domestic
conflict and be drawn into the Syrian swamp.
Hizbollah has paid for its active
support of Assad in the erosion of its status and legitimacy within
Lebanon. Therefore, if it has to clash with Israel, it prefers to
transfer the battlefield to the Golan Heights and not position it in
Lebanon. Nasrallah apparently fears that Israel will attempt to take
advantage of his distress and introduce new rules of the game. Hence, on
the one hand Nasrallah has made a commitment to respond to the recent
attack attributed to the IAF in Lebanon: he fears that if Israel is
moving toward new rules of the game, he must signal to Israel that he
too can change the rules (by choosing to operate in the Golan Heights).
On the other hand, Hizbollah is committed to Assad, and therefore, it
must carefully consider its moves and avoid actions that could
jeopardize the future of the Assad regime.
Israel’s offensive response against
the Syrian army and security positions on the Golan Heights indicates
its assessment that Hizbollah is responsible for the IEDs (improvised
explosive devices) and that the attack was carried out with at least the
knowledge of Assad’s forces. At this point, Israel has no intention of,
or interest in, intervening in events in Syria because there is no
guarantee that the situation after Israeli intervention would be better
from Israel's point of view. All signs indicate that there is no real
moderate alternative to Assad, and that the regime’s ouster could thrust
Syria into the hands of Salafist jihadi elements.
The uncertainty concerning Syria’s
future has created a tripartite deterrence of sorts among Israel, Syria,
and Hizbollah, with each side having the power to damage the others,
which could lead to an uncontrolled deterioration of the situation.
Therefore, only the non-state actors - the anti-Assad jihadi elements -
are likely to try to exploit the situation by sparking incidents and
masking them as Hizbollah or Syrian provocations in order to drag Israel
into escalation and thereby lead to deterioration of the situation and
the fall of the Bashar Assad regime.
Indeed, it appears that all sides are
attempting to delicately shape the rules of the game, without breaching
the overall framework in existence. Nevertheless, in terms of the
boundaries of each side, there is the potential for escalation because
Syria and Lebanon have unstable, shaky systems and every action can
easily lead to a chain of unintended and unanticipated consequences.
Accordingly, there is the potential for uncontrolled deterioration in
which each party reacts to the response of the other, prompting a
process of escalation.
Thus while Israel has been preparing
for the changing situation in Syria and on the Golan Heights front, the
Israeli response was directed at Assad’s Syria as the responsible state
actor that must prevent any operations against Israel from Syrian
territory. This response was chosen even though Assad controls only
one-fifth of the country and his forces do not control the situation;
the assessment that Hizbollah was acting with Assad’s knowledge also
requires proof.
The IDF must adjust its actions to the
developing hybrid situation. It must be prepared for a series of
provocations directed at Israel, refrain from uncontrolled operant
responses directed at irrelevant actors, and not fall into the traps
that Syria, Hizbollah, and rogue actors try to set for it. Only in
incidents when it is clear that Hizbollah, Syria, and Iran are behind
the anti-Israel operations is it important for Israel to direct its
response to pro-Assad forces, and in the event of escalation, to signal
and threaten the Assad regime, because it is its interest in survival
that drives it, along with Iran and Hizbollah.
Udi Dekel
Source: http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=6781
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.
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