by Maurice Hirsch
One of the most prominent features of PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas’s legacy is the “Pay-for-Slay” policy, under which the PLO-PA has paid billions of dollars to terrorists and their families, to incentivize, promote and reward terror.
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| President Donald Trump and President of the Palestinian Authority Mahmoud Abbas shakes hands as they meet, Wednesday, May 3, 2017, in the Oval Office of the White House in Washington, D.C. (Official White House Photo by Shealah Craighead) |
Institute for Contemporary Affairs
Founded jointly with the Wechsler Family Foundation
- One of the most prominent features of PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas’s legacy is the “Pay-for-Slay” policy, under which the PLO-PA has paid billions of dollars to terrorists and their families, to incentivize, promote and reward terror.
- In order to force the PLO-PA to abolish the policy, both Israel and the U.S. have adopted legislation. While the U.S. legislation conditioned the bulk of U.S. direct aid to the PA on the abolition of the policy, the Israeli legislation imposed direct punitive financial sanctions. Additional legislation passed in Israel and the U.S. provides victims of terror with the ability to sue the PLO-PA and hold it liable for terror attacks, based on the “Pay-for-Slay” policy.
- The PA responded to both U.S. and Israeli laws by both doubling down on the commitment to continue paying salaries to terrorists and their families and by implementing a number of cosmetic changes in order to hide the payments.
- On February 10, 2025, multiple news agencies reported that the PA had decided to repeal its “Pay-for-Slay” legislation, but this is not truthful.
- The goals of the PLO-PA’s new move were to undermine the Israeli and U.S. legislation and potentially paved the way for renewed U.S. funding to the PA.
- Even if the PLO-PA did indeed abolish the policy, it will still be barred from receiving direct U.S. aid as a result of its activities in the International Criminal Court (ICC).
Executive Summary
For years, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Palestinian Authority (PA) attempted to deny the existence of its “Pay-for-Slay” terror rewarding policy. As part of the policy, the PLO and then the PLO together with the PA paid billions of dollars to imprisoned terrorists, released terrorist prisoners, injured terrorists and to the families of dead terrorists. The recipients of the payments included murderers, mass murderers and the families of suicide bombers. The payments were made to all terrorists from all of the Palestinian terror organizations, including, but not limited to, Fatah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and others. While the payments to the injured terrorists and the families of dead terrorists were implemented pursuant to PLO internal regulations, the payments to the terrorist prisoners and released terrorist prisoners were entrenched in Palestinian law.
Despite numerous attempts by the PLO-PA to conceal the payments, U.S. and Israeli legislation adopted since 2014 has continuously imposed increasing financial sanctions on the PA. On the one hand, the 2018 U.S. Taylor Force Act conditioned further direct U.S. aid to the PA on the abolition of the policy. On the other hand, the Israeli “Freeze Law” imposed direct financial sanctions on the PA.
Despite the cumulative legislation, the PLO-PA remained adamant to continue the policy, with PLO-PA leader Mahmoud Abbas declaring that even if the PA was left with only one penny in its coffers, that penny would be paid first to the terrorists. Consistent with this rejection, just during the period of 2018 through 2024, the PA paid the sundry terrorists at least NIS four billion in terror rewards. As a result, the PA forfeited an estimated USD 1.5 billion in U.S. aid and another NIS four billion deducted by Israel.
More recent legislation, adopted in both the U.S. and in Israel, has opened the door for victims of Palestinian terror to sue the PLO-PA for the acts of terror that caused the murder of their family members and receive substantial damages.
In an attempt to again mislead the international community and try to undermine the U.S. and Israeli legislation, the PLO-PA recently announced that it is ostensibly cancelling all the legislation, regulations, and orders upon which the policy rests.
While unsuspecting pundits and journalists initially swallowed the fraud, hook, line and sinker, the reality is that what the PLO-PA actually did was merely employ a new tactic to hide the payments, transferring them to a newly established and ostensibly legitimate body.
Quickly exposing the fraud, just ten days after the initial announcement and media frenzy, Abbas himself reiterated his commitment to the continued payment of the terror rewards. All other indicators on the ground, including the absence of any public outcry by the terrorists and their families who should have suddenly lost a substantial source of their income, also suggest that the initial euphoria in response to the PLO-PA declaration was misguided.
While the PLO-PA is trying to present a false reality of having abolished its “Pay-for-Slay” payments, the move, even if legitimate, will not enable the Trump administration to renew its aid to the PA. Other provisions in U.S. legislation, also adopted by the Obama administration, prevent the U.S. from providing the vast majority of the U.S. aid to the PA if it is engaged in and supports a judicially authorized investigation of Israel by the International Criminal Court (ICC). Since the PLO-PA did initiate and is supporting the ICC investigation of Israel, regardless of whether the PLO-PA has legitimately abandoned its “Pay-for-Slay” policy, it will still not be able to receive U.S. aid.
The Palestinian “Pay-for-Slay” Policy
In the hope to curry favor in the eyes of U.S. President Donald Trump and potentially pave the way for renewing U.S. funding to the Palestinian Authority (PA), PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas announced that he was ostensibly repealing the Palestinian terror-rewarding “Pay-for-Slay” policy. While Abbas’s declaration was received with a combination of both optimism and skepticism, what remains clear is that even if Abbas has repealed the policy, which he has not, the PA will still be ineligible to receive U.S. aid.
One of the most prominent features of Abbas’s legacy is the “Pay-for-Slay” terror reward policy.1 While the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) had been paying financial rewards to terrorists for decades, and the PA had been paying the rewards since its creation in 1994, the policy was predominantly informal and based on internal regulations.
In the twilight period between the death of Yasser Arafat (Nov. 2004) and the election of Abbas as head of the PLO and Chairman of the PA (Jan. 2005), the PA adopted the Law of Prisoners and Released Prisoners, Law No. 19 (2004). The law defined all Palestinian terrorists arrested by Israel as the “fighting sector and an integral part of the fabric of the Arab Palestinian society,” and guaranteed them substantial financial benefits, including a monthly “salary,” as if they were legitimate employees.
Soon after the passage of the new law, in 2006, Abbas approved the regulations that codified the monthly salary payments paid by the PA to Palestinian terrorists held in Israeli prisons. For the first time, these regulations entrenched the idea that the salary paid by the PA to the terrorist prisoners would increase with time spent in prison.
In 2010, Abbas approved new regulations with an updated pay scale. The new regulations were a substantial salary hike for the terrorist prisoners, including a 300% rise,2 from NIS 4,000 per month to NIS 12,000 per month, for prisoners who serve more than 30 years in prison, i.e., murderers. He also codified the practice of ensuring jobs to released terrorists in PA institutions. Shamelessly, some of the released terrorists were even recruited into the PA security forces.3
Alongside the PA payments to the terrorist prisoners and released prisoners, the PLO (also headed by Abbas) runs an additional program that pays allowances to wounded terrorists and the families of dead terrorists, including the families of suicide bombers and other terrorists killed, whether at the scene of the crime or in other circumstances.
While this program had also been running for decades, the payments remained somewhat modest. Under Abbas, these payments too rose in 2007, again in 2009, and again in 2013.4 As opposed to the payments to the terrorist prisoners and released prisoners that are codified in law, the payments to the injured terrorists and the families of the dead terrorists are mandated by internal PLO policies and regulations. Even though the program is run through the PLO, according to testimony in court and under oath of the CEO of the program, it is entirely funded by the PA.
By 2018, these two categories of payments – to the terrorist prisoners and released prisoners and to the wounded terrorists and the families of dead terrorists – that are cumulatively referred to as the PA’s “Pay-for-Slay” policy, had reached an estimated 7.47 percent of the PA’s entire operational budget.5
U.S. Anti-”Pay-for-Slay” Legislation
The first U.S. legislation to combat the “Pay-for-Slay” policy was passed in 2014, as part of the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015.6 The legislation provided that “The Secretary of State shall reduce the amount of assistance made available by this Act under the heading ‘Economic Support Fund’ for the Palestinian Authority by an amount the Secretary determines is equivalent to the amount expended by the Palestinian Authority as payments for acts of terrorism by individuals who are imprisoned after being fairly tried and convicted for acts of terrorism and by individuals who died committing acts of terrorism during the previous calendar year: Provided, That the Secretary shall report to the Committees on Appropriations on the amount reduced for fiscal year 2015 prior to the obligation of funds for the Palestinian Authority.”
While the Obama administration was willing to take declaratory steps to penalize the PA for its policy, there seems to be no record of the provision being implemented.
Thus, when U.S. veteran Captain Taylor Force was murdered in Israel and his family and friends realized that the PA was going to pay financial rewards to the family of Taylor’s murderer – the terrorist himself was killed at the scene before he could murder other innocent people – they initiated the Taylor Force Act (TFA).7
As opposed to the previous legislation, TFA conditioned the bulk8 of direct U.S. aid – the entire ‘‘Economic Support Fund’’ that amounted to approximately $250 million annually – to the PA on the PA and PLO fulfilling a number of cumulative conditions:
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That the PA and the PLO are “taking credible steps to end acts of violence against Israeli citizens and United States citizens that are perpetrated or materially assisted by individuals under their jurisdictional control.”
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That the PA and the PLO “have terminated payments for acts of terrorism against Israeli citizens and United States citizens to any individual, after being fairly tried, who has been imprisoned for such acts of terrorism and to any individual who died committing such acts of terrorism, including to a family member of such individuals.”
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The PA and the PLO “have revoked any law, decree, regulation, or document authorizing or implementing a system of compensation for imprisoned individuals that uses the sentence or period of incarceration of an individual imprisoned for an act of terrorism to determine the level of compensation paid, or have taken comparable action that has the effect of invalidating any such law, decree, regulation, or document.”
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That the PA and the PLO “are publicly condemning such acts of violence and are taking steps to investigate or are cooperating in investigations of such acts to bring the perpetrators to justice.”
As the Secretary of State has been unable to certify that the PA and PLO were in compliance with the requirements of the TFA since its passage in March 2018, U.S. administrations have been prevented from providing the “Economic Support Fund” aid to the PA.
As a result, assuming no changes in the level of “Economic Support Fund” over the years, the PA has forfeited an estimated $1.5 billion in U.S. aid.
Israeli Anti-”Pay-for-Slay” Legislation
Soon after the passage of TFA, in July 2018 Israel also passed a law9 that imposes financial penalties on the PA for the policy. Pursuant to the Oslo Accords, Israel collects and transfers to the PA a number of different taxes.10 The law, commonly referred to as the “Freeze Law,” requires the Israeli Minister of Defense to submit an annual report to the Ministerial Committee for National Security quantifying the PA payments to terrorists in the passing year. Once the report is approved, the Minister of Finance is then required to deduct11 from the taxes Israel collects and transfers to the PA, a sum equivalent to the PA payments to terrorists. The deducted money is then set aside, literally “frozen,” until the Minister of Defense certifies, in his annual report, that in the previous year the PA did not make any payments to terrorists in connection with terrorism.
Based on the provisions of the freeze law, since 2019 Israel has frozen a cumulative sum of over NIS 3.6 billion.12 In its decision on February 17, 2025, the Ministerial Committee for National Security approved the report of the Minister of Defense regarding the PA payments to terrorists in 2024, setting the sum at NIS 470 million.13 Accordingly, once fully implemented, the PA will have forfeited an additional NIS 4 billion.
In other words, since 2018, the PA has “lost,” as a result of implementing TFA and the Freeze Law, over $3 billion, simply because it insisted on continuing the “Pay-for-Slay” terror reward payments.
In 2024, the Knesset passed an additional law14 to provide enlarged punitive damages to victims of terror. The law was predicated on the finding15 that the PLO-PA “Pay-for-Slay” policy, which rewards every Palestinian terrorist for his actions16 is an expression by the PLO-PA of ex post facto ratification of the act, and therefore gives rise to civil liability. The law provided that the PLO-PA is a “sponsor of terror,” and that if the plaintiffs sued the PLO-PA and the courts affirmed their liability for the terror attack as ex post facto ratification of the act, the estate of the victims murdered would be awarded NIS 10 million, and every person who suffered permanent disability would be awarded NIS five million. Finally, the law provided that damage awards given by the courts based on the new law could be collected from the frozen funds. Since the law came in to effect in June 2024, scores of lawsuits have been submitted against the PLO-PA, and the Israeli courts have issued liens in excess of NIS 2 billion against the frozen funds.
The PA Responds to TFA and the Freeze Law
The PA responded to both TFA and the Freeze law by doubling down on the commitment to continue paying the terror rewards. Abbas, who also heads the PLO, declared that even if the PA was left with just one penny in its coffers, that penny would be paid first to terrorists.17 Making good on his commitment, the PA did indeed prioritize the terror reward payments over welfare benefits to needy Palestinians,18 salaries to Palestinian doctors,19 salaries to Palestinian teachers,20 and even over paying for the cancer treatment of Palestinian children.21
Abbas’s decision followed the sentiment in Palestinian society. An opinion poll published by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in July 2017 showed22 that 91% of Palestinians oppose the suspension of the PA’s “Pay-for-Slay” payments.
Cautious optimism regarding a change in the PA’s approach arose when the New York Times reported23 in November 2020 that as part of the efforts to woo the incoming Biden administration and renew direct U.S. support, the PA-PLO had decided to completely overhaul the “Pay-for-Slay” policy.
Despite its grandiose commitments, in practice, the PLO-PA did not revise or change the policy, and they certainly did not meet any of the other requirements stipulated in the TFA.
The PA’s Latest Attempt to Fool the World
Over the years, the PLO-PA have tried a number of tricks to hide the “Pay-for-Slay” payments. These tricks included, but were not limited to, closing the PA Ministry of Prisoners, transferring the payments from the PA to the PLO, the PA hiding its financial reports, PA decisions allowing thousands of the released prisoners to take early retirement24 and thus hide their payments as pension payments, artificially recruiting thousands of others into the ranks of the PA to hide their payments as legitimate expenses of the relevant ministries, and many more.
The latest trick is potentially the most sophisticated of all.
On February 10, 2025, multiple news agencies reported that the PA had decided to repeal its “Pay-for-Slay” legislation. One of the first to swallow the bait was Israeli journalist Barak Ravid, who wrote25 on his X account:
BREAKING: Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas has issued a decree on Monday revoking the payment system to families of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli prison or to families of Palestinian terrorists (AKA “Pay for Slay”)
The false claim then spread like wildfire across the media.
The PA announcement on the subject,26 published on Wafa, the official mouthpiece of the PA, was more restrained. In the announcement, the PA claimed that Abbas had issued a “decree-law restructuring the social welfare system.”27
Written in a cunningly manipulative manner and framed intentionally to fool the willingly blind with short attention spans, the Wafa announcement said:
President Mahmoud Abbas, President of the State of Palestine and Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, issued a decree law revoking the articles contained in the laws and regulations related to the system of paying financial allowances to the families of prisoners, martyrs, and the wounded, in the Prisoners’ Law and the regulations issued by the Council of Ministers and the Palestine Liberation Organizations.
While this declaration would seem positive, the devil, as is often the case with the PA, is in the details. The Wafa announcement then continued to describe, in general terms, what Abbas was actually going to do. According to the details, the entire mechanism28 was merely to be transferred from the “Ministry of Social Development to the Palestinian National Foundation for Economic Empowerment.”
According to the PLO-PA announcement, the “Palestinian National Foundation for Economic Empowerment” is “an independent legal personality managed by a Board of Trustees” appointed by none other than Abbas himself.
The announcement added that:
All families that benefited from previous laws, legislation, and regulations are subject to the same standards applied without discrimination to all families benefiting from protection and social welfare programs, in accordance with the standards of comprehensiveness and justice, the conditions of which apply to all families in need of assistance in Palestinian society.
What is a “Law by Decree”/”Decree Law”?
The Oslo Accords that gave birth to the PA envisaged a functioning liberal democracy in which the PA would be governed by a democratically elected parliament, called the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC).
The PA law29 which partially implemented the Accords, then empowered the PLC and gave it legislative authority. In exceptional cases, article 43 of the law empowered the head of the PA “to issue decrees that have the power of law.”:
The President of the National Authority shall have the right, in cases of necessity that cannot be delayed, and when the Legislative Council is not in session, to issue decrees that have the power of law. These decrees shall be presented to the Legislative Council in the first session convened after their issuance; otherwise, they will cease to have the power of law. If these decrees are presented to the Legislative Council, as mentioned above, but are not approved by the latter, then they shall cease to have the power of law.
As the provision clearly states, while these decrees do have the force of law, they do not enjoy full legislative status, but rather require the approval of the PLC.
Despite making provision for an exceptional circumstance in which necessity required the issuance of an immediate decree in an interim period pending the first session of the convening of the PLC, in practice, the PLC has not functioned since 2006 and was even disbanded by Abbas in 2018.30 Filling this vacuum, since 2007, Abbas has effectively ruled the PA as a dictatorship, issuing hundreds of Laws by Decree that will one day need to be brought before the PLC if it ever returns to function.
A Performance Worthy of an Oscar
Abbas’s new Law by Decree31 presents an almost utopian picture tailored like a glove to fit the provisions not only of TFA but also the Israeli laws. The decree itself is actually an amendment to a previous Law by Decree from 2019, which established the Palestinian National Foundation for Economic Empowerment, referred to by Wafa (or as it is referred to in other PA documents, the “Palestinian National Economic Empowerment Institution”/PNEEI).
The PNEEI is a seemingly innocent body whose function is to empower different sections of the Palestinian population by different means that include, among others, providing “grants,”32 “loans,”33 and “cooperation with the private sector and civil society.”34
The target groups of this “empowerment” were defined in paragraph 4 of the law: “(1) Poor families; (2) Unemployed youngsters and university graduates; (3) Poor and weakened women; (4) Families headed by women; (5) Palestinian who work in the factories in the settlements; (6) Poor farmers and fishermen; (7) People with disabilities; (8) Entrepreneurs, inventors and outstanding professionals.”
Abbas’s new decree partially amended the list of the target groups, such that in place of the “Unemployed youngsters and university graduates” and the “Poor and weakened women,” the “President of the State can add any other category that he deems necessary of empowerment according to the recommendation of the board [of trustees of the institute].”35
The decree then critically added36 that “Criteria and mechanisms” would be set regarding the “Poor families” that would “take into account the rights of the families or rehabilitated individuals that were previously supported by different programs that have ended or have been cancelled pursuant to paragraph 8 of the decision.”
Section 5 of Abbas’s decree then added the financial assistance provided by PNEEI would be set in a “payment guide” set by the board of trustees of the institution, and that the process for providing the “financial assistance would be just and fair.”
Section 8 of Abbas’s decree then “cancelled…all the provisions of the laws, orders, regulations and programs connected to financial assistance of the official institutions, including and for example only the Ministry of Finance, the Institute for Prisoners and Released [prisoners], the Institute for dealing with the Families of the Martyrs and Injured, the Palestinian National Fund, the Palestinian National Union for the Families of the Martyrs…including cancelling all the provisions linked to financial support or employment detailed in the Law for Supporting Prisoners in the Israeli Prisons, No. (14) of 2004, and the Law of Prisoners and Released Prisoners, No. (19) of 2004 and its amendments, and cancelling all the laws, regulations, policy orders and programs linked to payments to martyrs and the injured, including provisions that provide for payments based on prison terms or their death.”
What the New Decree or the Ensuing Media Frenzy Did Not Include
As noted, Abbas’s new decree did not repeal the Law of Prisoners and Released Prisoners, No. (19) of 2004 in its entirety, but rather only financial payments linked to the law. Thus, for example, paragraph 2 of the law, which defines the terrorist prisoners as the “fighting sector and an integral part of the fabric of the Arab Palestinian society” remains in force. So, too, paragraph 4, which prohibits the PLO-PA “from signing or participating in the signing of a peace agreement to resolve the Palestinian problem without releasing all the prisoners,” similarly remains in force. Paragraph 5, which guarantees preferential treatment for released prisoners, and paragraph 8, which recognizes years spent in prison by the terrorists as part of their “tenure,” also remain in force.
In other words, the principled approach of the PLO-PA towards the terrorists remains intact, and all that is required is to invent a new, less transparent, payment system, preferably one which conceals the payments by merging them with other potentially legitimate expenses and goals, and hides them from public scrutiny.
Alongside the provisions of the Law of Prisoners and Released Prisoners that remain intact, the decree also did nothing to satisfy the additional demands of TFA, such as that the PLO-PA are “taking credible steps to end acts of violence against Israeli citizens and United States citizens that are perpetrated or materially assisted by individuals under their jurisdictional control,” and that the PLO-PA “are publicly condemning such acts of violence and are taking steps to investigate or are cooperating in investigations of such acts to bring the perpetrators to justice.”
Despite the Promises, Abbas Quickly Exposed the Fraud
Given the opaque nature of the fraud, it is not surprising that it quickly unraveled. While the widely hailed Law by Decree was issued on February 10, 2025, just ten days later, in the aftermath of the Palestinian public backlash, Abbas addressed the Fatah Revolutionary Council and reiterated his, the PA’s, and the PLO’s unwavering commitment to continue the “Pay-for-Slay” payments:37 “If we had one penny left, it will go to the martyrs and prisoners. They will receive their full payments as in the past. We are proud of their sacrifices.”
Recognizing the potential damage of Abbas’s speech, the PA later tried to expunge the statement from the record with the assumption that the willfully blind would continue to play along with the fraud.
Further undermining the bona fides of the Law by Decree, Palestinian Media Watch exposed38 that at the beginning of March 2025, the PA continued to pay salaries through the PA Postal Service, a practice adopted by the PA to specifically serve the “Pay-for-Slay” payments.
Further evidence of the absence of any real implementation of the Law by Decree is evident from the absence of any public outcry from the terrorist prisoners, released terrorists, injured terrorists, or the families of the dead terrorists, all of whom should have ostensibly suffered a sudden and substantial reduction in their income from the PA/PLO.
In fact, the only evidence of implementation of the Law by Decree was the decision of Abbas, prior to his speech before the Fatah Revolutionary Council, to fire Qadura Fares, the head of the PLO Commission of Prisoners, a ministerial position in the PA, for criticizing Abbas and the decree.
Referring to the decree, Fares said,39 “The attempt to silence the national voices and punish those who stand with the detainees, martyrs, and their rights reflects the repressive and exclusionary approach of the Authority. It marks a dangerous deviation from national principles and submission to the Zionist and American dictates.”
While the firing of Fares may have potentially indicated the genuine intention of the PA to implement change, it is no less likely that Abbas used the opportunity to dispose of Fares, a long-time loyalist of Abbas’s political rival, convicted terrorist Marwan Barghouti.
What Suddenly Pushed Abbas and the PLO-PA to Action – the Determined Legacy of Ari Fuld?
Although there could potentially be a number of justifications for the timing of Abbas’s new decree, it is more than possible that the specific timing was a result of actions taken by the estate of Ari Fuld. In his lifetime, Fuld, who held dual U.S. and Israeli citizenship, was an unwavering defender of the Jewish people and their right to settle in their ancestral homeland. On September 16, 2018, Fuld was murdered by a sixteen-year-old Palestinian terrorist who fatality stabbed him in the back. Despite being convicted and sentenced to life in prison for the murder, Fuld’s murderer was recently released as part of the deal to secure the release of some of the hostages captured by Hamas in the October 7, 2023, massacre.
While U.S. victims of terror have often tried to sue the PLO-PA in U.S. courts, those efforts were mostly stymied by the decision of the Second U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Manhattan and the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court to reject an appeal in the Sokolow case.40
In 1992, Congress amended the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA),41 as a response, albeit belated, to the 1985 murder of Leon Klinghoffer, a wheelchair-bound Jewish man, who was murdered and thrown off a ship by Palestinian terrorists. The law was explicitly designed to allow American citizens who are victims of terrorist attacks abroad to sue the perpetrators in U.S. courts.
In the Sokolow case – a civil suit submitted by U.S.-Israeli citizens against the PLO, on behalf of terror victims murdered by Palestinian terrorists in the course of the PA-initiated terror war that started in September 2000 – a Manhattan jury found the PLO liable for terror and awarded the plaintiffs damages in the sum of $655 million.42 The PLO appealed the decision, not denying its responsibility for the terror and the murders, but rather by questioning the jurisdiction of the U.S. courts to adjudicate claims based on acts of terror carried out outside of the U.S.
Despite the explicit language of the Anti-Terrorism Act, the Second U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Manhattan accepted the appeal of the PLO and found that the district court lacked general personal jurisdiction over the PLO.
Since the decision was clearly at odds with both the language and the spirit of the law, Congress initially responded by passing the Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act (ATCA).43 The new legislation was very simple: Any recipient of U.S. aid inherently agrees to the jurisdiction of the U.S. court system. After the PLO-PA understood the potential ramifications of ATCA, PA Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah wrote44 to then U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo, saying that “In light of these developments, the Government of Palestine respectfully informs the United States Government that, as of January 31st, 2019, it fully disclaims and no longer wishes to accept any form of assistance referenced in ATCA.”
Soon after, for different reasons, ATCA was repealed and replaced, in 2019, with the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act (PSJVTA).45 Designated, inter alia, to specifically address the PLO-PA’s “Pay-for-Slay” policy and grant jurisdiction to the U.S. courts for victims of terror to sue the PLO-PA, PSJVTA provides, inter alia, that a defendant is seen to have agreed to personal jurisdiction if he “makes any payment, directly or indirectly – “(i) to any payee designated by any individual who, after being fairly tried or pleading guilty, has been imprisoned for committing any act of terrorism that injured or killed a national of the United States, if such payment is made by reason of such imprisonment;” or “(ii) to any family member of any individual, following such individual’s death while committing an act of terrorism that injured or killed a national of the United States, if such payment is made by reason of the death of such individual.”
After the passing of PSJVTA, Fuld’s estate, together with others, filed civil suits in the U.S. courts against the PLO-PA. While a Second Circuit Court initially found46 that the new legislation violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, in December 2024, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear an appeal.47 Just days before Abbas issued the new decree, the court received all the relevant submissions. Critically, the comprehensive brief submitted by the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ),48 threw its full weight behind the law and asked the Supreme Court to overturn the decision of the lower court.
While the new Israeli law provides the Israeli victims of terror with increased damages, those sums pale in comparison to the damages awards provided by the U.S. courts. If the Supreme Court does indeed affirm the constitutionality of PSJVTA, the financial repercussions for the PLO-PA would be extremely harsh. But as the DoJ wrote in its brief, the PLO-PA was put on notice regarding the legislation and its implications, and “that making payments for terrorists who injured or killed Americans would provide a basis for U.S. courts to exercise jurisdiction over respondents in cases alleging their more direct involvement in acts of terror that injured or killed Americans. And respondents chose to prioritize their policy of continuing to make payments to terrorists and their families or designees over avoiding federal-court jurisdiction in ATA cases.”
In the same way TFA honors the memory of Captain Taylor Force, PSJVTA and the Fuld case, which severely punishes the PLO-PA for its “Pay-for-Slay” policy, or even potentially caused the PLO-PA to abandon its pugnacious policy, would be a fitting legacy for Ari Fuld.
The Obstacle to Receiving U.S. Aid that the PA Seems to Have Forgotten About
While Abbas decided to launch his latest fraudulent endeavor in the hope of restoring U.S. funding to the PA, his efforts will soon prove to be fruitless.
In January 2014, under former President Barack Obama’s administration, Congress incorporated an important amendment into the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014. According to the amendment, all “Economic Support Fund” aid to the PA would be blocked if the Palestinians “initiate an International Criminal Court (ICC) judicially authorized investigation, or actively support such an investigation, that subjects Israeli nationals to an investigation for alleged crimes against Palestinians.” The amendment has been incorporated into every Appropriations Act passed since 2014.
The provision had two focuses for deterrent. The first element focused on the Palestinians and was meant to serve as a financial deterrent to prevent the Palestinians from initiating an investigation and proceedings against Israel in the ICC. The second focus, requiring that the investigation be “judicially authorized,” was the ICC.
The assumption of the amendment was that the Palestinians would most probably flout the warning and engage with the ICC, but that the ICC would serve as the responsible elder.
Indeed, the PA-PLO and the Palestinian leadership did engage heavily with the ICC, and even boasted about holding more than 80 meetings with the Prosecution.49
The PA-PLO complaints, among other political factors, prompted the ICC prosecutor in 2019 to approach the court and request instruction regarding the “territorial scope” of the court’s jurisdiction – i.e., the prosecutor asked the court to set the borders of the non-existent “State of Palestine.” Instead of rejecting the request, the court decided, early in 2021, to act ultra vires and define all of Gaza, Judea, Samaria, and East Jerusalem as part of the “State of Palestine.”
Shortly afterward, the ICC prosecutor announced50 the opening of a full-blown investigation against Israel.
Three years later, in a morally distorted response to the October 7, 2023, massacre perpetrated by Hamas and other Gazan terrorists, the ICC prosecutor even asked51 the court to issue arrest warrants against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and then-Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant. Once again, the court rejected substantive arguments against its jurisdiction and issued the arrest warrants52 as requested.
Since there is no doubt that the PA-PLO did initiate what is now a judicially authorized investigation in the ICC against Israel and is actively supporting that investigation, even if the PA-PLO were to legitimately and sincerely repeal its “Pay-for-Slay” policy, the U.S. would still be prevented from renewing the “Economic Support Fund” aid to the PA.
Conclusion: What Does All That Mean?
Contrary to the media spin, Abbas’s new decree does not end the PLO-PA “Pay-for-Slay” policy. Rather, true to form, Abbas’s new decree simply laid the foundation for the PLO-PA’s continued payments, by creatively inventing a sub-category of “Poor families” that would cover all of the “Pay-for-Slay” recipients – the terrorist prisoners, the released terrorist prisoners, the injured terrorists, and the families of the dead terrorists.
Instead of receiving the support directly from the PLO-PA institutions that are dedicated to supporting the terrorists and their families, the new support would be provided by the PNEEI, a less known institution. In place of the regular terrorist pay-scale charts that had previously been included in open documents, the new “payment guides” will be set by the PNEEI, without public scrutiny.
Thus, without seeing the new payment criteria, it is, as yet, premature to conclude that the PLO-PA has indeed abandoned its “Pay-for-Slay” policy.
Moreover, all indicators, including express statements by Abbas after issuing the new decree, indicate that what we are seeing is nothing more than another convoluted, albeit well-designed and skillfully-worded, fraud accompanied by an extensive media campaign.
The PLO-PA fraud has many goals. First and foremost, it is designed to mislead the naïve observer and buy the PLO-PA some extra grace, as if the leopard has changed its spots. Thereafter, it is designed to mislead Trump administration officials into believing that the PLO-PA has finally met the requirements of TFA, and direct U.S. aid to the PA can be restored. No less importantly, the decree is designed to undermine the U.S. legislation that provides U.S. victims the ability to sue the PLO-PA in the U.S. courts and receive damages. Similarly, the decree is designed to undermine the Israeli legislation that punishes the PLO-PA for the “Pay-for-Slay” policy, whether through the Freeze Law or the latest legislation that could potentially see the PLO-PA lose billions of shekels as a result of civil suits in the Israeli courts.
While the potential ability of the PLO-PA to achieve these goals remains in question, what is clear is that even after allegedly abolishing the “Pay-for-Slay” policy, the PLO-PA will still be barred from receiving direct U.S. aid as a result of its activities in the ICC.
* * *
Notes
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https://jcpa.org/paying-salaries-terrorists-contradicts-palestinian-vows-peaceful-intentions/↩︎
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https://www.congress.gov/113/plaws/publ235/PLAW-113publ235.pdf↩︎
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https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/1625/text↩︎
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U.S. direct aid to the PA was divided into four main sections. The largest aid was provided under the “Economic Support Fund” title.↩︎
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Law to freeze money that the Palestinian Authority has paid in connection with terror from the money transferred to it by the Government of Israel – https://www.nevo.co.il/law_html/law01/501_888.htm↩︎
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https://jcpa.org/article/palestinian-misrepresentation-and-falsification-of-the-oslo-accords-tax-provisions/↩︎
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The deduction is made In twelve equal parts.↩︎
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2018 – 651,602,507 NIS https://nbctf.mod.gov.il/he/Announcements/Documents/%d7%91%d7%9c%d7%9e%d7%a1%20%d7%9c%d7%94%d7%a4%d7%a6%d7%94%20-%20%d7%93%d7%95%d7%97%20%d7%9c%d7%a4%d7%99%20%d7%97%d7%95%d7%a7%20%d7%94%d7%94%d7%a7%d7%a4%d7%90%d7%94%20%d7%9c%d7%a9%d7%a0%d7%aa%20%202018_2.6.21.pdf; https://nbctf.mod.gov.il/he/Announcements/Documents/%d7%91%d7%9c%d7%9e%d7%a1%20%d7%9c%d7%94%d7%a4%d7%a6%d7%94%20-%20%d7%aa%d7%95%d7%a1%d7%a4%d7%aa%20%d7%9c%d7%93%d7%95%d7%97%20%d7%9c%d7%a4%d7%99%20%d7%97%d7%95%d7%a7%20%d7%94%d7%94%d7%a7%d7%a4%d7%90%d7%94%20%d7%9c%d7%a9%d7%a0%d7%aa%202018_3.6.21.pdf
2020 – 597,709,868 NIS https://nbctf.mod.gov.il/he/PropertyPerceptions/Documents/%d7%93%d7%95%d7%97%20%d7%9c%d7%97%d7%95%d7%a7%20%d7%94%d7%94%d7%a7%d7%a4%d7%90%d7%94%202020_20.70.21.pdf
2023 – 630,795,561 NIS https://nbctf.mod.gov.il/he/Announcements/Documents/%d7%93%d7%95%d7%97%20%d7%91%d7%9c%d7%9e%d7%a1%20%d7%9c%d7%a4%d7%a8%d7%a1%d7%95%d7%9d%20-%20%d7%97%d7%95%d7%a7%20%d7%94%d7%94%d7%a7%d7%a4%d7%90%d7%94%202023.pdf↩︎
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At the time of publication of this paper, the report for 2024 has not yet been published.↩︎
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The finding was made by Israel’s Supreme Court in CA 2362/19 – John Does v The Palestinian Authority and the Palestine Liberation Organization – in which victims of terror sued the PLO-PA for damages resulting from terror attacks. See https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=HebrewVerdicts\19/620/023/E22&fileName=19023620.E22&type=4 (Hebrew)↩︎
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The PA law provided that all terrorist arrested by Israel, irrespective of their terror group affiliation, would be paid a salary. The PLO policy similarly provided that all injured terrorists, and the families of all dead terrorists would receive payments from the organization, similarly irrespective of their terror group affiliation.↩︎
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https://www.pcpsr.org/sites/default/files/poll%2064%20%20full%20text%20June%202017_%20English_0.pdf↩︎
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https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/19/world/middleeast/biden-palestinian-prisoner-payments.html↩︎
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As defined by the announcement: “the computerized cash assistance program, its database, and its financial, local, and international allocations.”↩︎
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The Amended Basic Law (Promulgated March 18, 2003) – https://www.elections.ps/Portals/0/pdf/The_Amended_Basic_Law_2003_EN.pdf↩︎
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https://jcpa.org/understanding-abbass-decision-to-appoint-rawhi-fattouh-as-his-successor/↩︎
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Officially known as: “Law by Decree No. (4) of 2025, to Amend Law by Decree No. (1) of 2019 regarding the Palestinian National Economic Empowerment Institution” – see: https://maqam.najah.edu/media/uploads/offizial_gazette/222%D8%AC%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9.pdf, pages 25 -28↩︎
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Para. 6(1) of the law.↩︎
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Para. 6(1) and (2) of the law.↩︎
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Para. 6(3) of the law.↩︎
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Para. 2 of Abbas’ new Law by Decree.↩︎
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ibid↩︎
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https://www.alestiklal.net/en/article/palestinian-authority-fires-official-for-defending-detainees-and-martyrs-or-infographic↩︎
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Sokolow v. PLO and PA US Supreme Court No. 16-1071 April 2, 2018. For more details see: https://web.archive.org/web/20160914154700/https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_Sokolow_v_Palestine_Liberation_Organization.pdf↩︎
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The original award was tripled in accordance with the provisions of ATA.↩︎
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https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/2946/text↩︎
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https://www.congress.gov/116/plaws/publ94/PLAW-116publ94.pdf, Section 903↩︎
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https://www.asil.org/ILIB/second-circuit-declares-consent-based-jurisdiction-under-promoting-security-and-justice-victims↩︎
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On file at the JCFA↩︎
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https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/statement-icc-prosecutor-fatou-bensouda-respecting-investigation-situation-palestine↩︎
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https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/statement-icc-prosecutor-karim-aa-khan-kc-applications-arrest-warrants-situation-state↩︎
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https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-state-palestine-icc-pre-trial-chamber-i-rejects-state-israels-challenges↩︎
Lt. Col. (res) Maurice Hirsch
Source: https://jcpa.org/article/will-the-pas-restructured-pay-for-slay-policy-lead-to-renewed-u-s-funding/
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