Hamas invested heavily in propaganda - will the death of Abu Obeida be a game changer? - analysis - Seth J. Frantzman

 

by Seth J. Frantzman

An estimate says that 200 Hamas operatives in the terror group's propaganda arm have been eliminated; however, 1,000 may still remain.

 

Hamas spokesman Abu Obeida delivers a speech following a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, January 19, 2025

(photo credit: Hamas Armed Wing Media/Handout via REUTERS)

 

Israel's elimination of Hamas propaganda chief Abu Obeida on Saturday could be a game-changer. A recent report by Doron Kadosh, the military correspondent for Army Radio, provides details on the extent of Hamas’s investment in its military propaganda arm. However, there is one troubling problem. Many of the hundreds of Hamas propagandists are still active in the field in Gaza.

What Kadosh wrote, in a long post on social media X/Twitter, was that Hamas had 1,000 operatives involved in spreading propaganda. It had rooms devoted to this throughout Gaza among its remaining units. It had even devised a plan to stop Israel’s invasion of Gaza City.

First of all, it is now clear that Obeida was not just one of the last well-known Hamas commanders, but he was incredibly important.

Palestinian-American humanitarian activist and blogger Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib wrote on Facebook that Obeida’s death was the “end of an era.” He noted, “I don’t think most Western audiences and policy commentators are aware of the blow that Hamas just experienced with the elimination of its most public figurehead.”

The military said on Sunday that the IDF and Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) had “eliminated Hudahaifa Kahlout, ‘Abu Obeida,’ who headed Hamas’s propaganda apparatus and psychological terror operations and was the spokesman of Hamas’s military wing.”

An illustrative photo of Hamas terrorists with hostage demonstrations in the background. (credit: Miriam Alster/Flash90, Reuters/Ibraheem Abu Mustafa)

Kadosh’s report said that “Obeida was one of the last remaining senior terrorists of Hamas’s military wing from before October 7, 2023. Over the past decade, Kahlout was responsible for Hamas’s military wing’s propaganda apparatus. In this role, he oversaw spokesmanship across Hamas’s brigades and battalions, coordinated between the terror organization’s political spokespeople and its military wing, and was a senior figure in determining propaganda policy.”

 

The report, combined with Kadosh’s post about Obeida, makes it increasingly clear that this could be a major blow.Hamas has recovered from other blows in the past, though, so it’s worth considering the ramifications. First of all, what does Kadosh’s post reveal about the size of the Hamas propaganda arm?

 

It consisted of around 1,500 operatives who were working to spread propaganda for Hamas. This was an increase from only 400 back in 2014. Clearly, Hamas believed that it should invest more in this arm of its operations than in its foot soldiers.

 

Of the 1,500 people involved in the propaganda arm, around 1,000 were deployed to the field, attached to battalions and brigades. We know that the IDF has said throughout the 22 months of war that most Hamas company, battalion, and brigade commanders have been eliminated. However, the apparent destruction of many of these units has not led to the deaths of most of the propagandists attached to the units.

 

“Every battalion and brigade in the military wing has a deputy commander for propaganda, a senior representative on behalf of Abu Obeida who manages efforts, and under him, terrorists who are ‘operational documenters’ trained in field filming,” Kadosh wrote.

 

What’s interesting here is that he writes that the IDF has eliminated around 200 of the Hamas propaganda field operatives. However, more than 1,000 remain.

The state of Hamas's battalions

What does this tell us about the state of the Hamas battalions?

 

Hamas was assessed to have some 24 battalions at the beginning of the war. It may have had some 150 companies and five or six brigades.

 

Hamas’s brigade in Rafah was apparently destroyed in the summer of 2024 and then beaten again in April 2025. The northern Gaza Brigade was also destroyed several times. The Khan Yunis Brigade is also believed to have been mostly destroyed. This leaves the Gaza City Brigade and the Central Camps Brigade.

 

The question is, if these brigades had some 25,000-30,000 fighters, and around 1,000 of them were these propagandists, is it reasonable to conclude that the propaganda arm took fewer losses than the rest? What if the reality is that in many Hamas brigades, the losses were also fewer, meaning Hamas hasn’t lost 20,000 fighters but fewer than that?

 

It’s not clear, but what is clear is that Hamas’s propaganda arm apparently remains active. Also, the terrorist organization seems to have invested more in this arm.

 

Hamas knows it can survive in Gaza with fewer gunmen, hiding in the background. However, it needs propaganda to continue the war, as it puts pressure on Israel abroad.

 

Hamas produces videos in the field. It has access to multimedia and has sought to operationalize people who work with various media outlets. This means co-opting some local journalists or using them.

 

Kadosh noted that Hamas films in the field and moves these videos back to a “war room.” This means that, even if the men in the field are killed, the propaganda survives.

The IDF has attacked these operatives’ “war rooms” many times during the war, but Hamas moves them from place to place – to schools and hospitals – and “all that’s needed is basically a laptop with Internet communication,” Kadosh wrote.

 

Hundreds of Hamas members sit in these war rooms, ready to push out the propaganda. Obeida was personally involved in this, Kadosh said. “No military move by Hamas in recent years – in Operation Protective Edge (2014), in the Great March of Return demonstrations at the Gaza fence (2018-2019), in Guardian of the Walls (2021), and of course on October 7, 2023 – would have been carried out without being accompanied by a standard combat procedure and approval of propaganda plans by Abu Obeida.”

 

This has created an asymmetry within the asymmetry of this war. Not only is Israel fighting Hamas members who wear civilian clothes, but it also has to fight the propaganda army. This kind of war within a war has long been a feature of modern conflicts. However, Hamas has invested in this even more than others, such as the Soviets, the Viet Cong, or other groups.

According to the Kadosh report, Obeida had been focused on preventing Israel’s operations in Gaza City.

 

“He dealt with the question of how to block the IDF tanks and APCs [armored personnel carriers] using consciousness and influence moves that would affect the Israeli government and cabinet. He planned to do this through psychological terror moves that would make use of the hostages.”

 

The report added that Hamas is seeking to replace its chief propagandist. He had deputies. “As far as is known, he didn’t have a dominant deputy under him who is the natural replacement.” However, Hamas will try to put on a brave face and assert that it lost many commanders in the past and has replaced them.

Seth J. Frantzman

Source: https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/defense-news/article-866122

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