by Maj. Gen. (ret.) Yaakov Amidror
It appears that in Iraq and Syria -- but more importantly, in the U.S. -- it is understood that the counterattack stage could turn out to be critical. If the group overcomes these strikes, it is hard to imagine what might stop it in the future, barring full-scale involvement by the U.S. military that would include heavy ground forces.
Lately it looks as
though the Islamic State group has managed to rack up highly significant
geographic achievements. These coups will lead to the group controlling
the enormous expanse of territory west of Baghdad to the Syrian border
beyond Palmyra by establishing rule in the north and east of the
crumbling Syrian state.
The occupation of
Ramadi, one end of an arch that bridges between the Iraqi capital and
Palmyra in the heart of northern Syria, serves as a base for future
gambits of even greater importance. We shouldn't wonder if the group
needs a little time to "digest" the new areas it has conquered, to take
care of any local population that might resist, if any such remains, and
to settle its rule on the rest of the residents and prepare for
retaliatory attacks by the Syrian and Iraqi armies and their auxiliary
militia forces.
It appears that in Iraq
and Syria -- but more importantly, in the U.S. -- it is understood that
the counterattack stage could turn out to be critical. If the group
overcomes these strikes, it is hard to imagine what might stop it in the
future, barring full-scale involvement by the U.S. military that would
include heavy ground forces.
After the
counter-strikes, the moment the organization feels secure in its new
area, and we cannot know how long that will take, it will face the
standard dilemma presented by such situations: What next? By nature, a
group like this cannot refrain from action for long. It needs constant
movement; it is thirsty for new gains and fears the "stagnation" that
could affect it after a period of calm. The group is still in its
dynamic stage, continuing to rise. It has four options for action, and
no one knows which one its leaders will choose. It is possible that they
themselves have not made up their minds and are still not ready to
decide, at least until the results of any possible counterattack become
clear.
Islamic State's next
"natural" effort could be toward Baghdad, to strengthen its rule of
everything west of the Iraqi capital. The goal would be to strike a
fatal blow to the Shiite government's operational ability in the Sunni
regions the group has taken thus far, and maybe even to bring down the
present Iraqi regime.
Such a move would
doubtless put pressure on the ruling Shiites and their Iranian allies,
because when an organization like this approaches areas with a dense
Shiite population, as well as the cities most holy to Shiites, the
latter envision a mass slaughter. So there is no question that a move
like that, if successful, would force the Iranians to make some tough
decisions, mainly about whether to opt for direct military intervention.
The group has another
option in Iraq: to the north, beyond Kurdistan. If it managed to take
control of the areas where the Kurds are currently extracting oil, it
would enjoy maximal success, running nearly an entire country and
putting heavy pressure on Turkey. That looks tempting, because the West
hasn't taken care to adequately arm the Kurds, the only ones so far who
have fought the group successfully.
It is also possible
that after its great success in Iraq, the group will prefer to entrench
its rule over northern Syria -- in other words, seize control of Aleppo
and Homs. That would be an ambitious plan given the size of the
geographic area, but it appears any resistance there would be weaker
than it would be in a metropolis like Baghdad or from the fierce Kurds.
If Islamic State took Aleppo and Homs, it would improve its chances of
eventually taking action against the Kurds, particularly their Syrian
wing.
In Syria, the main ones
opposing the group would be President Bashar Assad's exhausted army. In
that area, other Sunni groups from what is known as the army of
insurgents might join Islamic State, granting it legitimacy in the eyes
of the locals. A move like that could lead to a dramatic change in
Assad's position and force Hezbollah to spread its forces even thinner. A
loss of Hezbollah's strategic homefront and the presence of its Sunni
haters breathing down the neck of the Alawite minority, on the coast of
Latakia, means a threat to a region that is vital to Hezbollah and to
the Iranians' position in Syria, and eventually in Lebanon. The Iranians
and Hezbollah would do almost anything to protect these, because any
threat to them is an existential one. If the Islamic State group
acquires control of Alawite or Shiite areas, it will exterminate
everyone there. This is a life or death struggle. That's clear to
everyone.
The ambitious option
And there is a fourth
option, which for now seems less appealing and therefore less likely,
although not impossible. It's possible that to avoid clashing with
Shiite strength around Baghdad or with Alawite and Hezbollah desperation
en route to Damascus, the group will turn its attention to Amman.
All the residents of
Jordan are Sunni, and some of them could begin to identify with a
serious, successful Sunni group that purports to act on behalf of
Sunnis, who are in distress because of the Shiite dynamic in the Middle
East. The group could asses that it would be easier for it to operate
against Jordan, and if it does so successfully it would have more
convenient access to Saudi Arabia -- the crown jewel of the Muslim
world.
Saudi Arabia is the
target that anyone who talks about an "Islamic caliphate" dreams of,
because it is home to Mecca and Medina, the two holiest cities for any
Muslim. In acting against Jordan, the group could combine a military
maneuver with an attempt to influence the kingdom from inside by
exploiting the social and economic problems in Jordan that have worsened
because of the mass influx of refugees from Syria.
Today, the chances of
the organization succeeding in Jordan appear very slim. The Jordanian
army, unlike the armies of Iraq and Syria, is both serious and
professional and among many Jordanians, the king is popular as well as
legitimate. Jordan is no easy prey, and it would certainly have the help
of everyone for whom the kingdom's stability is important.
In any case, it is
obvious that the American intervention thus far has not brought the U.S.
any closer to the goal defined by President Barack Obama of "destroying
the organization." The opposite -- it has grown stronger and expanded
its area of control since the U.S. declared war on it. The last chance
the U.S. has to continue its current policy, avoiding the deployment of
massive American ground forces, is conditional upon its ability to give
the Iraqi army the assistance it needs in the attack it is promising to
execute, and possibly on helping the Syrian army indirectly.
The Americans will take
a look at themselves after these battles, when it becomes clearer
whether the group's recent successes are the regular ups and downs seen
in conflicts like these, or whether they have altered its standing, and
Islamic State will now take advantage of the momentum to move on more
ambitious targets.
Maj. Gen. (ret.) Yaakov Amidror
Source: http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_opinion.php?id=12729
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.
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