by Shay Katiri
If Arab and Afghan Proxies Act with the Brutality They Showed in 2019, Iranian Security Forces Will Further Turn on the Regime
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A squad of Iraqi militia in a 2019 file photo. Shutterstock |
On January 2, 2026, Persian social media exploded with rumors that the Islamic Republic was bringing Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (Hashd al-Sha’abi) into Iran to crack down on protests. There are also rumors of Afghan forces attacking demonstrators inside Iran. Where there is smoke, there is likely fire. The Iranian regime resorted to using its foreign proxies in the past and likely does so now. At best, however, it might be a short-term patch but in the longer term, it will worsen the situation for the regime.
Many photos and videos show the [Iranian] security personnel taking a soft approach and even encouraging people to join the movement.
In 2019, the government ended protests in ten days, killing 1,500 in that short period. However, the regime had to rely heavily on its foreign proxies. Things were different in 2022. The protests lasted for months because, by the regime’s standards, the crackdown was diluted. The regime killed approximately 500 over two months, a much slower rate than in 2019, although the regime subsequently increased its numbers by executing prisoners it accused of participation. In 2022, most officers in Zahedan reportedly refused to deploy to Tehran to suppress the protests, and a small number agreed only on the condition that they would not need to use force. A leaked government memorandum showed that many Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps commanders were sympathetic to the people and also warned Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei that some of their junior officers were among the demonstrators.
On paper, the Islamic Republic retains the manpower to clear the streets easily. But many photos and videos show the security personnel taking a soft approach and even encouraging people to join the movement. Outside observers have confirmed the deaths of eight protesters after five days, a much slower rate than in the past. The regime’s pleas for a “dialogue” with the protesters also suggest a lack of confidence in its suppression forces.
The Islamic Republic used Popular Mobilization Forces and other foreign mercenaries in the past.
So, too, does the regime’s choice to employ foreign proxies. The Islamic Republic used Popular Mobilization Forces and other foreign mercenaries in the past. In 2019, their brutality caused criticism, even within the government. First, mercenary cruelty exceeded the tolerance of regime personnel. A perverted sense of nationalism also dictates that nobody gets to kill their compatriots but they themselves. Finally, regardless of their views on regime change, the security forces shared many of the protesters’ grievances.
Today, Khamenei’s inner circle faces a conundrum. If Arab and Afghan proxies act with the same brutality as they did in 2019, then Iranian security forces will further turn on the regime. Many, though not all, within the armed forces deploy just to create an environment of fear, using their uniforms and gear to deter protests without extreme violence. Others are bystanders, at the scene to follow orders, but unwilling to do more than observe. If they see Arab and Afghan forces use lethal and gratuitous violence on their compatriots, some may use their arms to protect fellow Iranians. This might happen during this wave of protests or the next. Either way, use of excessive violence by foreign proxies will transform this possibility into an inevitability.
The regime’s decision-makers are aware of this problem. That they accept its risk exposes their desperation.
Shay Katiri
Source: https://www.meforum.org/mef-observer/what-does-irans-use-of-iraqis-and-afghans-to-suppress-protests-mean
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