by Caroline Glick
The US’s new war against Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi is the latest sign of  its steady regional decline. In media interviews over the weekend, US military  chief Adm. Michael Mullen was hard-pressed to explain either the goal of the  military strikes in Libya or their strategic rationale.
Mullen’s  difficulty explaining the purpose of this new war was indicative of the  increasing irrationality of US foreign policy.
Traditionally, states have  crafted their foreign policy to expand their wealth and bolster their national  security. In this context, US foreign policy in the Middle East has  traditionally been directed towards advancing three goals: Guaranteeing the free  flow of inexpensive petroleum products from the Middle East to global market;  strengthening regimes and governments that are in a position to advance this  core US goal at the expense of US enemies; and fighting against regional forces  like the pan-Arabists and the jihadists that advance a political program  inherently hostile to US power.
Other competing interests have  periodically interfered with US Middle East policy. And these have to greater or  lesser degrees impaired the US’s ability to formulate and implement rational  policies in the region.
These competing interests have included the  desire to placate somewhat friendly Arab regimes that are stressed by or  dominated by anti-US forces; a desire to foster good relations with Europe; and  a desire to win the support of the US media.
Under the Obama  administration, these competing interests have not merely influenced US policy  in the Middle East. They have dominated it. Core American interests have been  thrown to the wayside.
BEFORE CONSIDERING the deleterious impact this  descent into strategic dementia has had on US interests, it is necessary to  consider the motivations of the various sides to the foreign policy debate in  the US today.
All of the sides have contributed to the fact that US  Middle East policy is now firmly submerged in a morass of strategic  insanity.
The first side in the debate is the anti-imperialist camp,  represented by President Barack Obama himself. Since taking office, Obama has  made clear that he views the US as an imperialist power on the world stage. As a  result, the overarching goal of Obama’s foreign policy has been to end US global  hegemony.
Obama looks to the UN as a vehicle for tethering the US  superpower. He views US allies in the Middle East and around the world with  suspicion because he feels that as US allies, they are complicit with US  imperialism.
Given his view, Obama’s instincts dictate that he do nothing  to advance the US’s core interests in the Middle East. Consider his policies  towards Iran. The Iranian regime threatens all of the US’s core regional  interests.
And yet, Obama has refused to lift a finger against the  mullahs.
Operating under the assumption that US enemies are right to hate  America due to its global hegemony, when the mullahs stole the 2009 presidential  elections for Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and then violently repressed the pro-Western  opposition Green Movement, Obama sided with the mullahs.
Aside from its  imperative to lash out at Israel, Obama’s ideological predisposition would  permit him to happily sit on the sidelines and do nothing against US foe or  friend alike. But given Obama’s basic suspicion of US allies, to the extent he  has bowed to pressure to take action in the Middle East, he has always done so  to the detriment of US allies.
Obama’s treatment of ousted Egyptian  president Hosni Mubarak is case in point.
When the Muslim  Brotherhood-backed opposition protests began in late January, Obama was  perfectly happy to do nothing despite the US’s overwhelming national interest in  preserving Mubarak in power. But when faced with domestic pressure to intervene  against Mubarak, he did so with a vengeance.
Not only did Obama force  Mubarak to resign. He prevented Mubarak from resigning in September and so  ensured that the Brotherhood would dominate the transition period to the new  regime.
Obama’s most outspoken opponents in the US foreign policy debate  are the neoconservatives.
Like Obama, the neoconservatives are not  motivated to act by concern for the US’s core regional interests. What motivates  them is their belief that the US must always oppose tyranny.
In some  cases, like Iran and Iraq, the neoconservatives’ view was in consonance with US  strategic interests and so their policy recommendation of siding with regime  opponents against the regimes was rational.
The problem with the  neoconservative position is that it makes no distinction between liberal regime  opponents and illiberal regime opponents. It can see no difference between  pro-US despots and anti-US despots.
If there is noticeable opposition to  tyrants, then the US must support that opposition.
This view is what  informed the neoconservative bid to oust Mubarak last month and Gaddafi this  month.
The fracture between the Obama camp and the neoconservative camp  came to a head with Libya. Obama wished to sit on the sidelines and the  neoconservatives pushed for intervention.
To an even greater degree than  in Egypt, the debate was settled by the third US foreign policy camp – the  opportunists. Led today by Clinton, the opportunist camp supports whoever they  believe is going to make them most popular with the media and Europe.
In  the case of Libya, the opportunist interests dictated military intervention  against Gaddafi. Europe opposes Gaddafi because the French and the British bet  early on that his opponents were winning. France recognized the opposition as  the legitimate government two weeks ago.
Once Gaddafi’s counteroffensive  began, France and Britain realized they would be harmed politically and  economically if Gaddafi maintained power so they began calling for military  strikes to overthrow him.
As for the media, they were quick to  romanticize the amorphous “opposition” as freedom fighters.
Seeing the  direction of the wind, Clinton jumped on the European-media bandwagon and forced  Obama to agree to a military operation whose goal no one can define.
WHAT  THE US foreign policy fights regarding Egypt and Libya indicate is that  currently, a discussion about how events impact core US regional interests is  completely absent from the discussion. Consequently, it should surprise no one  that none of the policies the US is implementing in the region advance those  core interests in any way. Indeed, they are being severely damaged.
Under  Mubarak, Egypt advanced US interests in two main ways. First, by waging war  against the Muslim Brotherhood and opposing the rise of Iranian power in the  region, Mubarak weakened the regional forces that most threatened US interests.  Second, by managing the Suez Canal in conformance with international maritime  law, Egypt facilitated the smooth transport of petroleum products to global  markets and prevented Iran from operating in the Mediterranean Sea.
Since  Mubarak was ousted, the ruling military junta has taken actions that signal that  Egypt is no longer interested in behaving in a manner that advances US  interests.
Domestically, the junta has embarked on a course that all but  guarantees the Muslim Brotherhood’s rise to power in the fall.
Saturday’s  referendum on constitutional amendments was a huge victory for the Brotherhood  on two counts. First, it cemented Islamic law as the primary source of  legislation and so paved the way for the Brotherhood’s transformation of Egypt  into an Islamic state. Under Mubarak, that constitutional article meant nothing.  Under the Brotherhood, it means everything.
Second, it set the date for  parliamentary elections for September. Only the Brotherhood, and remnants of  Mubarak’s National Democratic Party will be ready to stand for election so soon.  The liberals have no chance of mounting a coherent campaign in just six  months.
In anticipation of the Brotherhood’s rise to power, the military  has begun realigning Egypt into the Iranian camp. This realignment is seen most  openly in Egypt’s new support for Hamas. Mubarak opposed Hamas because it is  part of the Brotherhood.
The junta supports it for the same reason. Newly  appointed Foreign Minister Nabil el-Araby has already called for the opening of  Egypt’s border with Hamasruled Gaza.
There can be little doubt Hamas’s  massive rocket barrage against Israel on Saturday was the product of its sense  that Egypt is now on its side.
As for the Suez Canal, the junta’s  behavior so far is a cause for alarm. Binding UN Security Council Resolution  1747 from 2007 bars Iran from shipping arms. Yet last month the junta thumbed  its nose at international law and permitted two Iranian naval ships to traverse  the canal without being inspected.
According to military sources, one of  the ships carried advanced armaments. These were illicitly transferred to the  German merchant ship Victoria at Syria’s Latakia port. Last week, IDF naval  commandos interdicted the Victoria with its Iranian weaponry en route to Gaza  via Alexandria.
Add to that Egypt’s decision to abrogate its contractual  obligation to supply Israel with natural gas and we see that the junta is  willing to suspend its commitment to international law in order to realign its  foreign policy with Iran.
ON EVERY level, a post-Mubarak Egypt threatens  the US core interests that Mubarak advanced.
Then there is Libya. One of  the most astounding aspects of the US debate on Libya in recent weeks has been  the scant attention paid to the nature of the rebels.
The rebels are  reportedly represented by the so-called National Transitional Council led by  several of Gaddafi’s former ministers.
But while these men – who are  themselves competing for the leadership mantle – are the face of the NTC, it is  unclear who stands behind them. Only nine of the NTC’s 31 members have been  identified.
Unfortunately, available data suggest that the rebels  championed as freedom fighters by the neoconservatives, the opportunists, the  Europeans and the Western media alike are not exactly liberal democrats. Indeed,  the data indicate that Gaddafi’s opponents are more aligned with al-Qaida than  with the US.
Under jihadist commander Abu Yahya Al- Libi, Libyan  jihadists staged anti-regime uprisings in the mid-1990s. Like today, those  uprisings’ central hubs were Benghazi and Darnah.
In 2007 Al-Libi merged  his forces into al- Qaida. On March 18, while denouncing the US, France and  Britain, Al-Libi called on his forces to overthrow Gaddafi.
A 2007 US  Military Academy study of information on al-Qaida forces in Iraq indicate that  by far, Eastern Libya made the largest per capita contribution to al-Qaida  forces in Iraq.
None of this proves that the US is now assisting an  al-Qaida takeover of Libya. But it certainly indicates that the forces being  assisted by the US in Libya are probably no more sympathetic to US interests  than Gaddafi is. At a minimum, the data indicate the US has no compelling  national interest in helping the rebels in overthrow Gaddafi.
The  significance of the US’s descent into strategic irrationality bodes ill not just  for US allies, but for America itself. Until the US foreign policy community is  again able to recognize and work to advance the US’s core interests in the  Middle East, America’s policies will threaten both its allies and  itself.
Caroline Glick
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