by Dr. James M. Dorsey
Gulf states are taking contradictory approaches to the problem of ensuring that entrenched conflicts do not spiral out of control as they battle the pandemic and struggle to cope with the economic fallout.

Iranian Shiite Mosque, Dubai, UAE, photo via Wikimedia Commons
BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 1,549, May 4, 2020
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: It is  early days, but first indications are that the global coronavirus  pandemic is entrenching long-drawn Middle Eastern geopolitical,  political, ethnic, and sectarian battle lines rather than serving as a  vehicle to build bridges and boost confidence. Gulf states are taking  contradictory approaches to the problem of ensuring that entrenched  conflicts do not spiral out of control as they battle the pandemic and  struggle to cope with the economic fallout.
The coronavirus crisis is changing the political  landscape of the Middle East as non-governmental organizations and  militants in countries like Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon fill gaps where  governments have failed to cater to populations’ social and health  needs.
The empowerment of NGOs and militant groups,  particularly in cases where they act without coordinating with a  government, raises potential security issues as militants capitalize on  their ability to show up states’ lack of capability at a time of crisis.
The expanded role of militants takes on added  significance as states like Saudi Arabia and the UAE use the pandemic to  entrench many of the Middle East’s fault lines, if not widen them to  their advantage.
The pandemic has also not stopped the region’s  foremost external power, the US, from taking Iran’s bait in an  escalating tit-for-tat that risks a larger military conflagration.
The UAE has used the pandemic to solidify its  limited outreach to Iran, which is designed to shield the Gulf state  from becoming a battlefield in any US-Iranian military confrontation.
When the US reportedly blocked an Iranian request for $5 billion from the IMF to fight the virus, the UAE was among the first nations to deliver medical aid to Iran and facilitate shipments by the WHO.
The shipments led to a rare March 15 phone call  between UAE foreign minister Abdullah bin Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan and  his Iranian counterpart, Muhammad Javid Zarif.
The UAE began reaching out to Iran last year when  it sent a Coast Guard delegation to Tehran to discuss maritime security  in the wake of alleged Iranian attacks on oil tankers off the coast of  the Emirates.
The Trump administration remained silent when the UAE last October released $700 million in frozen Iranian assets, a move that ran counter to US efforts to strangle Iran economically with harsh sanctions.
The UAE’s moves amount to a lowering of the  temperature. Officials insist there will be no real breakthrough in  Emirati-Iranian relations as long as Iran supports proxies like  Hezbollah in Lebanon, pro-Iranian militias in Iraq, and Houthi rebels in  Yemen.
UAE Crown Prince Muhammad bin Zayed made that  clear when he phoned Syrian president Bashar Assad in a bid to drive a  wedge between Syria and Iran and complicate Turkish military  interventions in Syria as well as Libya.
UAE support for Syria and Libyan rebel forces led  by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar spotlight the contradictions in the  Emirates’ projection of itself as a humanitarian actor. Neither Assad or  Haftar has shied away from targeting hospitals and medical facilities  at a time when functioning health infrastructure is a priority.
In cozying up to Syria and reaching out to Iran,  the UAE and Saudi Arabia may have common goals even if they pursue them  in different ways that are dictated by the degree of risk they are  willing to shoulder.
As a result, Saudi Arabia, in contrast to the UAE,  has maintained a hard line toward Iran, casting aside opportunities to  build bridges by, for example, offering Iran medical aid.
Instead, Saudi Arabia appeared to reinforce the divide by accusing  Iran of “direct responsibility” for the spread of the virus.  Government-controlled media charged that Iran’s allies, Qatar and  Turkey, had deliberately mismanaged the crisis.
Moreover, the kingdom, backing a US refusal to  ease sanctioning of Iran, prevented the Non-Aligned Movement from  condemning the Trump administration’s hard line during the pandemic.
Saudi Arabia’s failure to follow in the UAE’s footsteps could prove costlier than meets the eye.
The coronavirus coupled with the global economic  breakdown and the collapse of the oil market has somewhat levelled the  playing field with Iran by undermining the kingdom’s ability to  manipulate oil prices and diminishing its financial muscle.
Add to that the weakening of Saudi Arabia’s claim  to leadership of the Islamic world as the custodian of Mecca and Medina,  Islam’s two holiest cities, as a result of its efforts to combat the  pandemic.
One has to go far back in history to find a precedent for the kingdom’s banning of the umra, Islam’s minor pilgrimage to Mecca; the likely cancelling of the haj,  Islam’s major  pilgrimage, which constitutes one of the faith’s five  pillars; and the closing down of mosques to avoid congregational prayer.
To make matters worse, Saudi Arabia has  jeopardized its close ties to the US with an oil price war against  Russia that collapsed oil markets, drove oil prices to rock bottom, and  significantly undermined the US shale industry and its ten million jobs.
Nonetheless, Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad bin  Salman, in a twist of irony given his record on human rights and rule of  law, has emerged as a model in some Muslim countries like Pakistan that  have been less forceful in imposing physical distancing and lockdowns  on ultra-conservative religious communities.
“What if this year’s haj was under Imran Khan rather than Muhammad bin Salman? Would he have waffled there as indeed he has in Pakistan?” asked  Pakistani nuclear scientist, political analyst, and human rights  activist Pervez Hoodbhoy, referring to the Pakistan prime minister.
Saudi Arabia has so far carried the brunt of US  criticism despite the fact that it remains more closely aligned with US  policies than the UAE, which has succeeded in flying under the radar to  date.
That is a remarkable achievement given that the  Emirates backed Saudi Arabia in its debilitating price war by announcing  that it too would raise oil production.
The strategy has since been put on hold with an  agreement to radically reduce production among members of OPEC; non-OPEC  producers, including Russia; and the Group of Twenty, which brings  together the world’s largest economies.
In the same vein, the UAE’s outreach to Syria and Iran runs counter to US policy.
The policy contradictions stem from Gulf efforts  to ensure that entrenched conflicts do not spiral out of control,  particularly as they battle a pandemic and struggle to cope with the  economic fallout.
That is also their core message to President  Donald Trump amid heightening tensions with Iran: “Don’t let this get  out of hand. You live thousands of miles away. It will be us, not you,  who pays the price, and you won’t be there to rush to our defense,” said  a prominent Saudi.
Source: https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/coronavirus-us-gulf-relations/
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