by Clifford May
Israel's military is 
unusual in many ways, but start with this: A patch on Capt. Omri Levy's 
sleeve alludes to a Mel Brooks joke. The patch reads: "It's good to B200
 King." 
The B200 King is a 
Beechcraft used by the Israelis for reconnaissance. "It's good to be the
 king" was a line delivered by Mel Brooks in his 1981 film "History of 
the World Part I." The phrase entered American pop culture, where it has
 remained ever since. In just one example: Jeffrey Goldberg used it as 
the lead for his recent Atlantic profile of Jordan's King Abdullah II.
Capt. Levy, however, 
born in 1986, is not familiar with the comedy of Mel Brooks. So I ask 
about another patch on his uniform, one showing a camel sprouting wings.
 This story he knows well: Back in 1947, Egyptians, Syrians and other 
Arabs planning to go to war to prevent the partition of Palestine into 
Jewish and Arab nations -- the original two-state solution -- scoffed at
 the prospect of a Jewish air force, saying that would come about "when 
camels learn to fly." And so, the following year, the first squadron of 
the Israeli Air Force took the winged camel as its symbol.
I'm at a military base 
in north Tel Aviv, among a group of American journalists being briefed 
on Israel's use of air power. The Israelis use both drones and piloted 
aircraft to gather "visint," visual intelligence. But their mission is 
not just to identify targets. They also do everything they can to avoid 
collateral damage. 
"We make sure there are
 no civilians around the targets," the briefer tells us. "We want to 
destroy Hamas' ability to shoot rockets at us -- but we're not trying to
 kill people."
We're shown a film, 
taken from a B200 King, of two shadowy figures apparently preparing to 
launch a rocket from Gaza into Israel. As soon as the figures move away,
 the rocket is destroyed from the air. I ask whether those seen in the 
film were targeted later. No, the briefer says, they were allowed to get
 away because there was a chance -- however remote -- that they were not
 terrorists, that they stumbled upon the rocket and were examining it 
out of curiosity.
He notes that Israelis 
now have weapons so precise they can target a single room in a building,
 doing no harm to those in adjoining rooms. During last year's conflict 
in Gaza, Israelis also would phone people to warn them to leave 
buildings that contained ordnance, weapons caches or command-and-control
 facilities. Sometimes, too, the Israelis would "knock": Very small, 
relatively harmless bombs would be dropped on the roofs of buildings to 
further encourage people to leave.
I point out how unusual
 such practices are. Throughout history, military strategists have 
sought to demoralize their enemies, to defeat them conclusively or at 
least lead them to the conclusion that the cost of continuing the 
conflict would be unacceptably high. I ask if Israelis may instead be 
teaching Gazans that a long war, with Israel's extermination as the 
goal, is tolerable. He says he's not sure but he does know this: 
Israelis believe it is important to distinguish between Hamas and the 
people of Gaza. 
Is that distinction valid? Gazans voted for Hamas in 2006, but there have been no elections since. A poll taken in March shows
 support for Hamas in Gaza down to about 20 percent. And, in the 
aftermath of the last year's fighting, a clear majority of Gazans, 60 
percent, believe that waging war against Israel does them more harm than
 good. 
It is against this 
backdrop that Secretary of State John Kerry is attempting to restart 
negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians. Among the hurdles he 
faces: Hamas has no intention of giving up power in Gaza, nor does 
Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas speak for Hamas or the 
people of Gaza. In 2005, Abbas also was elected to a four-year term, and
 he, too, has not faced voters a second time. His popularity in the West
 Bank is far from solid. An Israeli analyst, who also identifies himself
 as a Palestinian and a Muslim, suggests what this means: "Abbas has no 
mandate to make peace with Israel."
What's more, any 
concessions Abbas might make would be seen by Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran's 
rulers and other Islamists in the region as a betrayal. Could this 
explain, at least in part, why Abbas has refused to negotiate with 
Israelis for more than four years? Does it really make sense for him to 
sit down for talks if (1) he knows he can't deliver a deal, and (2) 
he'll be painting a bull's-eye on his back if he makes a serious 
attempt?
I never fail to be 
astonished by how many "experts" refuse to grapple with such questions 
in their rush to propose the most banal and facile solutions. One 
example: Dov Waxman, an associate professor at the Graduate Center of 
the City University of New York, argues that the
 key to peace is "applying pressure on Israel." Waxman goes on to lament
 that "American Jews are not likely to exercise the same kind of 
pressure on Israel that Irish-Americans applied on Sinn Fein-IRA, which 
led it to renounce violence and disarm."
Does the professor 
really believe that Israelis -- who confront terrorism every day and, as
 noted above, go to extraordinary lengths to avoid harming Palestinian 
civilians -- are themselves akin to terrorists? Is he seriously 
suggesting that Israelis "disarm"? Is he unable to imagine the 
consequences were such advice to be followed? 
New York Times columnist Roger Cohen also promotes the dubious notion that
 just as "Irish-Americans played a significant role in the Northern 
Ireland peace" so too "American Jews can have similar influence on 
Israel-Palestine." 
But Cohen at least 
acknowledges that many Palestinians "still dream of all the land, the 
destruction of Israel" and that "nothing would advance the just cause of
 Palestinian statehood faster than the irrevocable renunciation of 
violence by all factions and reconciliation between them on the basis of
 territorial compromise with Israel."
I envision Palestinian 
leaders taking such steps when camels learn to fly. But as Israelis have
 demonstrated time and again, anything can happen.
Clifford D. May is president of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a policy institute focusing on national security.
                    Source: http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_opinion.php?id=4859
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.
 
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