by Zhou Xin
This is the third in a series of five stories exploring the global backlash that China may face as a result of its actions and rhetoric during the coronavirus pandemic.
Chinese
policymakers are increasingly worried that the country may be
internationally isolated over its handling of the pandemic.
Illustration: Lau Ka-kuen
This
is the third in a series of five stories exploring the global backlash
that China may face as a result of its actions and rhetoric during the
coronavirus pandemic. This story examines the outlook for China’s
economy as it recovers from the outbreak, including the risk that its
place in the global value chain may be fundamentally altered as a result
of the pandemic.
Consensus
is growing in Beijing that the coronavirus pandemic is set to make the
world more hostile towards China, undermining the accommodating
international environment that underpinned the country’s spectacular
rise from a closed communist backwater into a global economic
powerhouse.
The
global health crisis, which has killed more than 200,000 people and
infected more than 3 million worldwide, has many in China wondering how
the nation can continue to thrive amid an international backlash over its handling of the virus, which first appeared in the central city of Wuhan.
One
of the most pressing challenges facing the central government will be
the acceleration of a global value chain realignment, which may hit
China’s job market in the short term and marginalise the country’s
long-term role in the global economy, according to Chinese researchers
and analysts.
While
Beijing is politically and ideologically at odds with Western liberal
democracies, it is determined to stay embedded within the global market.
Whether
China can maintain its position in the global economy or ends up
isolated after the pandemic is brought under control, will be one the
most important questions post-crisis.
Huang Qifan, the former mayor of Chongqing,
who oversaw an economic boom in the city, said in a speech earlier this
month that the traditional “horizontal” distribution of the global
value chain was facing an overhaul, as the coronavirus had exposed its
weakness. It could be replaced by “vertical” integration in specific
regions, Huang said.
The
future production landscape would be dotted with “production bases” –
areas with a radius of 50km to 200km (31 miles to 124 miles) where 70
per cent of a value chain's core parts and semi-finished products would
be concentrated, he said. These areas, with easy access to global
transport networks and located in favourable business environments, will
be the future, the former mayor said.
“The
pandemic has exposed weak links in the old globalisation model … China
and other countries must rethink and readjust global industrial layout,”
Huang said.
“However,
the adjustment is not total negation of globalisation … such a move
would be shooting one’s own foot,” he said. “The right approach is to
open further, instead of taking a 180-degree turn.”
Huang’s
view is in line with Beijing’s pledge that China will remain
investor-friendly and open its market further to foreign businesses.
Samsung, for instance, has received special approval to send 200 workers
to Xi’an, the capital of Shaanxi province, to complete the expansion of
its chip manufacturing plant there.
While
threats about decoupling and isolating China are grabbing headlines,
the nation remains the world’s biggest manufacturer and the world’s
largest consumer market – something that is not lost on multinationals.
Tesla
had its best month ever in China last month, selling more than 12,000
cars — up 450 per cent from a year earlier and bucking a 40 per cent plunge in China’s overall car sales.
“Elon
Musk danced in public when the first Model 3 was delivered this year –
you can see how happy he was,” said Chen Fengying, the former director
of the World Economy Institute at the China Institutes of Contemporary
International Relations.
“China remains a market that can’t be neglected.”
Chen
said the coronavirus could speed up formation of regional economic
blocs, with three likely to emerge in North America, Europe and East
Asia.
“China
will be the centre of gravity in the East Asia bloc … that has been
decided by China’s industrial system and the vast market size,” he said.
China has the ability to link Japan and South Korea in the north and Southeast Asia in the south, he added.
The
shift was already being reflected in China’s trade relationships. In
the first quarter of this year, the Asean bloc replaced the European
Union as China’s biggest trade partner.
Ding
Yifan, a researcher affiliated with the Development Research Centre
under the State Council, said China’s industrial power was too big to
fail.
China
has proved its international competitiveness in “almost every
industrial sector”, from telecoms equipment to high-speed railways, he
said, and that competence remained amid the pandemic.
“China’s
early days of economic development did rely a lot on foreign investors …
and every time Western countries talk about leaving China, China gets
really anxious,” Ding said. “But in fact, it doesn’t matter any more.
China has built up its own industrial system.”
President
Xi Jinping has made “protecting a stable supply chain and a value
chain” one of six priorities amid the coronavirus fallout, reflecting
the president’s determination to maintain China’s role in the world
economy.
Beijing is simultaneously strengthening its commitment to its political model.
Xi
said at the last meeting of the Politburo, the centre of power within
the Communist Party, that China must make “ideological and work
preparations” to respond to changes in the outside world that could last
for a long time to come.
The
comments were a marked shift from the central leadership’s previous
view that China was in a historic “period of strategic opportunity”, a
line of thinking that has been fading from official statements since
last year.
Beijing’s war of words with Washington has added to the perception of growing global hostility towards China and further fanned nationalist sentiment at home.
One
populist theory circulating on Chinese social media, dubbed “the
Manchus breaking into the Great Wall”, compares China’s role in the
world today to that of the Manchu people, who in the 17th century
conquered China.
China’s
governance, institutions and culture are looked down upon by the US-led
liberal democracies just as the Manchu, a nomadic group outside the
Great Wall, were seen as barbarians by the Ming dynasty of 1368-1644.
The
right option for the Manchu people was not to accept the Ming system,
but to develop their own military power to conquer the ruling dynasty.
Once the Manchu broke through the Great Wall, their institutions and
culture became the standard.
The
theory follows that China should use its economic and mercantile might
to dominate the world and fight for its own moment of “breaking into the
Great Wall”, snatching centre stage and proving the superiority of
Chinese governance and institutions over the West.
In
a recent article circulated widely on Chinese social media app WeChat,
the author Lu Shihan asked: “Why is China always put at a disadvantaged
position in global public discourse, why do so many people believe
China-bashing information from Western countries and why is no one
giving us fair recognition, even [after] we have achieved so much? Why
can't we win other people’s recognition of our culture, even when we are
already the No 2 economy?”
Lu said the answer lay in that China was culturally different from the US and Europe.
“China
is seen as a barbarian country just like the Ming saw the Manchu as
barbarians – whatever we do will be seen as wrong,” Lu said.
China's
best chance of prospering was by growing its economic might and helping
Chinese companies conquer the world market with Chinese products — just
as the Manchu conquered China with their warhorses, the author said.
Source: https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3081778/coronavirus-how-will-chinas-role-global-economy-change-when
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