by Yoram Schweitzer, David Siman-Tov, Kobi Michael
Over the 11 days of the recent military campaign in Gaza there was a second and no less important struggle – the cognitive battle. If at the outset of the campaign it seemed that Hamas had the upper hand in this battle, by the end it was clear that the terror organization’s cognitive achievement had dissipated. How can the message be conveyed repeatedly that a military venture against the IDF is not recommended, and what else can be done in this regard?
Operation Guardian of the Walls saw Hamas's most intense use of military power since Operation Protective Edge. Heavy rocket barrages toward the Israeli civilian home front focused on massive “routine” rocket fire at the Gaza envelope communities and at cities in the south and center of the country, all introduced by the rocket fire toward Jerusalem on the opening day. In the most recent campaign, the severe damage to Hamas’s military infrastructure and rocket production industry, in addition to the damage to significant parts of the underground infrastructure in the Gaza Strip, was accompanied by targeted and widespread damage to the commanders' offices and houses and the commanders themselves. It included the demolition of high-rise buildings used by Hamas in addition to the military infrastructure, to convey a deterrent message of exacting a personal and economic price from the organization's leadership.
Hamas's Goals in the Cognitive Campaign
It
is important to understand Hamas’s goals in this campaign in the
internal Palestinian context – which, in Hamas's view, is related to the
political and propaganda contexts vis-à-vis Israel and other target
audiences and arenas relevant to the organization.
In
the tensions that developed in Jerusalem during Ramadan, Hamas
identified an opportunity to create a significant cognitive effect and
to ignite several fronts simultaneously in order to position itself as
the leader of the Palestinian national struggle and restore it to the
regional and international agenda. Exacerbating the cracks between Jews
and Arabs in Israel, both at the social level and at the political
level, is seen as a very important achievement – an achievement that was
then leveraged to magnify the organization's influence capability and
extend it to the regional level. These achievements are intended to
shape cognition regarding inter-Arab unity and puncture Israel's
strengthening regional status.
Hamas tried to position itself in a
confrontation as the one that widened the deterrence equation with
Israel by connecting Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip, as the one that dared
to issue an ultimatum to Israel and make good on its threats, as the
one that managed to crack the fabric of Arab-Jewish relations in Israel
and set off a wave of violence that significantly undermined the sense
of security of the citizens of Israel, as the one that did not succumb
to Israeli military power and rained rockets on population centers in
Israel, which Israel was unable to prevent, and as the one that managed
to stir up and agitate parts of the Arab world.
Had
the campaign ceased in the first days, it is possible that Hamas's
cognitive achievements would have carried weight. However, as the
operation continued, and as the severe Israeli losses to the
organization's military infrastructure and commanders increased and much
infrastructure in the Gaza Strip was heavily damaged, the validity of
Hamas's claim to military achievement was undermined. Diminishing
Hamas's achievements of recent years in reconstruction and improved
civilian life in Gaza may erode its domestic legitimacy and the
international legitimacy it sought to establish as a responsible
sovereign, and instead, strengthen its image (at least to several
audiences, mainly in the West) as an unbridled terrorist organization
that holds civilians hostage to its wild policies.
Israel's Goals in the Cognitive Campaign
In
order to undermine the rationale behind Hamas's belligerent rounds of
escalation that have characterized relations between Israel, Hamas, and
the Gaza Strip over the past decade, Israel sought to exact a physical
toll from Hamas and its supporters that would also be deeply etched in
their minds and weaken their readiness to pay such a heavy price in the
future. In addition, Israel sought to send a message to Hamas that
despite the barrages of rockets launched at Israeli cities, its military
campaign did not achieve its purpose, and furthermore, its strategy of
an underground secured safe heaven was badly crippled. Another message
is the futility of developing resource-intensive projects that are
destroyed in every round of fighting that Hamas launches in the face of
Israel’s clear military and technological superiority, which readily
exacts a heavy toll in the face of indiscriminate attacks on its
civilians.
Beyond that, the
massive destruction throughout the Gaza Strip during the conflict with
Israel underscored to Gazans that Hamas has caused the area to regress
significantly. To the Palestinians in the West Bank living under the
Palestinian Authority, it should be clear that Hamas has sustained a
severe blow to its military capabilities and thus to its political
stance, and that the challenge it poses to the PA's dominance in the
territories and Jerusalem has been weakened in the wake of the recent
campaign.
The attack on the "metro" – the system of
underground tunnels – appears to be one of the most important cognitive
moves in the operation, both in disrupting the organization's strategic
infrastructure, damaging its immunity, and creating a sense of
infiltration among its operatives, and in conveying a message to other
terrorist organizations that use the underground space that it is not
immune to attack. The destruction highlights the futility of the
enormous force buildup efforts invested by the organization (at the
expense of Gaza’s civilians) and at the same time its inability to
defend itself against Israel.
In
the international arena, Israel conveyed that Hamas is the aggressor
that planned and launched this campaign and that it acts as a terrorist
organization in every way and blindly directs its weapons at the
civilian population. Moreover, Israel emphasized that since its
withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in the summer of 2005, Hamas has
preferred military armament and harm to Israel over civilian welfare and
development. Israel also clarified that rocket fire or terrorism
against its citizens is unacceptable, just as it is unacceptable in any
country in the world.
Beyond the
direct cognitive discourse with Hamas, the campaign in Gaza sent a
deterrent message to Hezbollah, demonstrating IDF capabilities (emphasis
on intelligence and precision fire, willingness to use destructive
force that is far greater than what the opponent possesses, including in
the underground space). Another message was conveyed to Arabs in Israel
and to Palestinians in the West Bank, some of whom may have pinned
their hopes on Hamas as the leader of the Palestinian national struggle.
Hamas's failure in the military campaign may undermine the hopes of
that extremist minority that was enticed by the organization.
Conclusions and Recommendations
Hamas's
cognitive achievements in the early days of the campaign were
significant, but their weight over time is in question. For example,
despite Hamas's initial success in linking rocket fire toward Jerusalem
and the flare-up between Jews and Arabs in East Jerusalem, shifting the
focus of the campaign to the Gaza Strip overshadowed the linkage it
sought to create between the two arenas.
The
outbreak of violence between Jews and Arabs in Israel was influenced by
the escalation initiated by Hamas, but it is likely also the outgrowth
of deep currents in Arab society, fueled by a combination of issues of
identity, frustration, crime, incitement, and lack of leadership. In
Israel, much effort has been channeled to locate those who incited the
violence, including among the extreme Jewish minority, as part of the
main effort to alleviate the tension between the two populations and to
sever the connection that Hamas sought to establish with the outbreak of
the war in Gaza. The tactical achievements of Hamas's “surprise attack”
were also reversed, once it was surprised by the demonstration of
Israeli power and Israel's willingness to launch a large-scale campaign
against everything perceived by Hamas as an asset, including high-rises,
luxury houses in the Rimal neighborhood, and financial institutions,
along with the razing of the organization's military infrastructure.
Hamas's
attempt to portray the campaign in Gaza as an element that engulfed the
Lebanese and Syrian arenas was neutralized by Hezbollah's careful and
meticulous behavior, which avoided direct involvement in the fighting
and contented itself with statements encouraging the “Palestinian
struggle against the predatory occupier” from Iran and the
Shiite-affiliated militias in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, while allowing
sporadic rocket fire from Lebanon and Syria and the UAV infiltration
attempt. Moreover, Hezbollah and Iran have closely watched Israel's
kinetic ability, determination, and intensity, which relayed a clear
cognitive message as to Israel's willingness to pursue an extremely
high-intensity aggressive policy in response to rocket fire into its
territory.In the long term, the following lessons should be emphasized:
- Attack on the media building in Gaza: During the campaign, the al-Jalaa building was demolished – a site that in part was used by international media (AP and al-Jazeera). The attack on the building evoked media shockwaves and sharp international criticism. Israel's statement that the attack was essential due to intelligence that Hamas had used the building remained vague (at least in the media). Therefore, if possible, it is essential to reveal intelligence about Hamas's use of the building, and in the future, to manage events that have the potential to provoke international resentment in similar fashion.
- Preventing
the entry of foreign journalists into the Gaza Strip as a lesson from
previous operations in the Gaza Strip (Cast Lead) subjects Israel to
sharp criticism by the world media, and is interpreted as an attempt at
concealment. Foreign media should be allowed, while taking care to
protect the lives of the journalists, because the images of destruction
and killing in the Gaza Strip are published anyway and override Israel’s
public diplomacy.
- Need for a "national spokesperson": Although there has been an improvement in the work of the Foreign Ministry and the IDF Spokesperson’s Unit vis-à-vis the international arena (briefings, articles, and activities on social media), as well as coordination between the relevant parties, the lack of a "national spokesperson” for both the Israeli target audience and the global target audience is noticeable. As a lesson for the future, a national information and cognition apparatus must be established.
- Strengthening Israeli presence on social networks: The moves in the diplomatic arena led by the Foreign Ministry afforded Israel some success. However, it seems that the digital realm, in which Israel's rivals in the world have an apparent advantage, requires special organization and encourages the harnessing of civil society in Israel and around the world as a force multiplier.
Yoram Schweitzer, David Siman-Tov, Kobi Michael
Source: https://www.inss.org.il/publication/guardian-of-the-walls-narrative/
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