by Avner Golov
Avner Golov, a research associate at INSS, believes that although the Vienna agreement reduces the chances of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons within the coming decade, it actually increases the chances of this occurring during the second decade of the agreement
The
Vienna agreement between Iran and the world powers is intended to
prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. However, although the
agreement reduces the chances of this occurring within the coming
decade, it does not completely preclude the possibility that Iran will
acquire a bomb. In fact, the agreement actually provides Iran with an
alternative route for doing so, thereby increasing the chances of this
occurring during the second decade of the agreement. In this sense, the
title chosen by Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Yaalon for his book – The
Long Short Road – might aptly describe the nuclear strategy adopted by
Iran when it signed the agreement.
Until the signing of the agreement, Iran had two routes to
acquire nuclear weapons. The first route, a “breakout” to a bomb, refers
to Iran’s use of all its abilities to cross the nuclear threshold
quickly and openly. Since the beginning of the Iranian nuclear program,
the likelihood that such a scenario would be realized was extremely low.
Iranians learned from the experiences of Iraq and North Korea and
developed a strategy to progress by means of the safest – as opposed to
the shortest – route to a bomb. Over the past decade the Iranian nuclear
program advanced cautiously, maneuvering between internal and
international political constraints. Only in the event of an existential
threat against the regime, or an international crisis viewed by Iran as
a window of opportunity posing little risk, was Iran expected to
deviate from its cautious approach and “break out” to acquire nuclear
weapons.
The nuclear agreement, which extends the breakout time to a
bomb from a number of months to one year, increases the level of risk
to Iran posed by such a scenario. It does not, however, constitute an
appropriate response to the danger of an Iranian breakout. According to
the agreement, Iranian violations of the terms of the agreement will be
dealt with by a multilateral framework and result in the re-imposition
of sanctions. However, the feasibility of sanctions actually being
snapped back is highly questionable in light of Iran’s expected
determination to break out to a bomb. Economic sanctions, which by
nature require an extended period of time to wield a significant effect,
are a tool with limited effectiveness in this context, especially in
the event that the Iranian regime feels an imminent threat to its
survival. An international punitive mechanism may also prove to be
ineffective if at the time in question the international community is
engaged with another crisis. A danger likewise exists that the more Iran
continues to develop its nuclear research program and more advanced and
efficient centrifuges, the greater the danger that the Iranian regime
will choose to break out toward a bomb in the event that it feels
threatened or is presented with a relatively low risk opportunity.
The second route, a “sneak out,” refers to secret Iranian
nuclear activity conducted in parallel to declared activity that would
allow Iran to cross the nuclear threshold slowly and secretly, thereby
significantly minimizing the risks involved. In practice, over the years
Iran has pursued this route. Because it is a continuous and slower
strategy than the breakout scenario, the nuclear agreement addresses it
more effectively. Nonetheless, the measures it institutes are far from
ideal. Thus, in continuation of its longstanding strategy, Iran can be
expected to engage in gradual violations of the agreement aimed at
testing the awareness of the international community as well as its
response threshold and response time. The nuclear agreement does not set
an automatic response for “minor” violations, but rather stipulates the
visit of IAEA inspectors – with Iranian agreement – to undeclared sites
suspected of nuclear activity, and an enforcement mechanism that
requires at least one country to act to re-impose sanctions. Then will
the issue of American willingness to take action to enforce the
agreement emerge, and when it does, it can be expected to face the
opposition of Russia and China. During the negotiations with Iran, the
United States argued that re-imposing sanctions without consensus would
in practice result in their collapse. This assessment might be realized
if in the future Iran decides to sneak out to a bomb.
Therefore, the agreement provides only limited measures for
contending with these two potential routes to nuclearization. Perhaps
even more serious, however, is that it allows Iran to advance along a
third, combined route to acquire a bomb – a “step out.” If during the
first decade of the agreement the Iranian government decides that it
will not endanger itself by crossing the nuclear threshold, it can do so
during the second decade, exposing itself to only minimal risk, by
gradually expanding the scope of its nuclear program for five more
years, until most of the imposed restrictions are lifted. As noted by
President Obama, this will reduce the breakout time to near zero. In
this third situation, Iran could cross the nuclear threshold by means of
quick action (as in the breakout scenario) but do so without being
discovered (as in the scenario of sneaking out to a bomb). This scenario
presents decision makers in the United States with new challenges.
For example, in such a situation, the US willingness to
stop Iran will be critical – particularly the ability to implement a
military option in an extremely short period of time. President Obama
has stated that the achievements of the military option would be limited
and that its use would result in war in the Middle East. It is
questionable whether during the second decade of the agreement this
option – which may be the only way to try to prevent Iran from acquiring
nuclear weapons – will be any more attractive than it is today. An
attack on the Iranian nuclear program, which will develop in accordance
with the nuclear agreement on the basis of international legitimacy,
will demand unequivocal evidence of Iranian violations and broad
international legitimacy. Gathering the evidence and mobilizing the
required international support will require time that the US
administration will not have if it wants to stop Iran once Tehran
chooses to step out to a bomb.
Given this threat, the United States must develop an
appropriate response. First, it must rehabilitate the credibility of a
military option in the form of a surgical strike. Even if the
administration is guided by the assessment that employing this option
will lead to war, statements to that effect should be limited, as they
weaken the validity of the nuclear agreement, especially due to the fact
that Iran is also not interested in a direct nuclear confrontation with
the United States. In contrast to the lack of Iraqi and Syrian
responses to attacks on their nuclear facilities, Iran can be expected
to respond. However, its response – like in the nuclear realm – can be
expected to be measured and cautious.
Second, and supplementary to the nuclear deal with Iran,
determined efforts must now be made to stop the Iranian missile program
before it acquires the ability to arm ballistic missiles with nuclear
warheads. If Iran succeeds in developing a nuclear bomb despite the
stipulations of the nuclear agreement, the improvement of its missile
program will be the final obstacle preventing it from becoming a nuclear
power. The agreement signed between the world powers and Iran does not
provide a sufficient response to the threat posed by the Iranian missile
program, and stipulates that the related sanctions will be lifted in
eight years. Limiting Iran’s missile program may help to prevent an
Iranian decision to cross the nuclear threshold, as such action could
prevent it from translating its technological capacity in the nuclear
realm into an operational nuclear missile program.
Israel’s ability to take action against the three roads to
Iranian nuclearization is currently limited. Therefore, it must strive
to reach a side agreement with the United States focused on coordinating
plans of action in the event of Iranian violations of the agreement,
and on intensifying the intelligence cooperation between the two
countries in an effort to cover the remaining blind spots in the
supervision of Iran’s nuclear program. An important aspect of this
discussion should be planning a joint response to the challenge that the
Iranian nuclear program can be expected to pose during the second
decade of the agreement, once the primary limitations on its scope are
lifted. Moreover, the return of the Israeli military option, in addition
to the rehabilitation of the American military threat, will increase
the effectiveness of the nuclear agreement as a result of the element of
deterrence it carries with it, and will therefore reduce the chances of
actually needing to use it. In this way, the chances of blocking Iran’s
long road to a bomb can be enhanced.
Article originally published on the INSS website.
Avner Golov
Source: http://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/content/long-road-shortest-road-iran%E2%80%99s-possible-routes-bomb
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.
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