 Following
9/11, Americans demanded to know "why they hate us." Academic experts
were swamped with invites from media and senior officials. Their answer?
America is to blame. |
In 2001, my book Ivory Towers on Sand: The Failure of Middle Eastern Studies in America
became a part of a much bigger and heated discussion over what made the
United States vulnerable on 9/11. The main argument in the book was
that Middle Eastern studies in America had consistently missed the most
important developments in the region. One of them was the rise of very
radical forms of Islamist extremism. That claim is why the book took
off.
The book does not argue that academics or anyone else could or should
have predicted 9/11. Even the greatest experts cannot predict such
things. Winston Churchill once said, "It is not given to human beings
... to foresee or to predict to any large extent the unfolding course of
events." In fact, nearly all the events that have transformed the
Middle East since I started to study it, were surprises: the 1973 Yom
Kippur War, Anwar Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, the Iranian revolution,
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, 9/11,
and the "Arab Spring."
However, the book does show that when events failed to conform to
academic models, the academics disregarded or distorted the evidence.
Still worse, they poured scorn on anyone who dared to propose another
way forward. Every intellectual endeavor, to stay credible, has to
correct itself. This was the problem: not that Middle Eastern studies
got some big things wrong, but that they would not acknowledge it and
then revisit their assumptions. This was the greater sin.
New Experts for Old
So much for what preceded 9/11. What has happened since, and what is happening now?
The market share of academics in interpreting the Middle East for
Americans is now much smaller than it was right after 9/11. Up until
then, studying the Middle East and writing about it were very much a
niche industry. The lead producers were university-based academics and a
few specialized think tanks. If you were smart and ambitious and did
not have a stake in some Middle Eastern fight, you usually specialized
in something else. Sure, the Middle East erupted every so often, but it
did not stay on the front burner or the front pages for long.
Following 9/11, Americans demanded to know "why they hate us," and
"how do we change them." At the time, the academic experts were swamped
with invites from television producers, newspaper editors, and senior
officials. They performed unevenly, to say the least. That was because
the academics tended to sound one repetitive note: America is to blame.
This was not so much an analysis as an ideological profession of faith.
But very quickly, the whole ecosystem changed. The main effect of
9/11 was to make the Middle East a matter of very wide concern. That
meant that smart people who had not given the Middle East much thought
made themselves into experts—some, quite credibly.
Not only did the region-specific think tanks grow large. The
all-purpose, general think tanks built out large shops to deal with the
Middle East. These alternative experts drove the academics out of the
limelight. Generally, the non-academic voices ignored the "blame
America" narrative and searched for deeper causes. And they discovered a
whole world of rage and grievance that the academics had overlooked.
Especially impressive was the way top journalists rode 9/11 to become
some of America's leading interpreters of the Middle East. There is,
today, a large shelf of books about al-Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden,
Afghanistan and Iraq, Islamism and the "Arab Spring," written by
journalists. Many made the best-seller lists and won prizes.
A high proportion of people now summoned to comment on the region have had boots on the ground.
|
Then there were the military commanders, diplomats, and intelligence
officers who served on front lines from Afghanistan to Iraq to Syria.
Before 9/11, few of them had much on-the-ground experience in the
region. They took an over-the-horizon view. But the wars cycled several
million Americans through the Middle East, and many of them developed a
high-resolution knowledge of politics, society, and culture. If one
looks today at the people summoned to comment on the region, the
proportion who had their boots on the ground is very high, and it is
likely to stay that way for years to come.
In sum, very little of what the public reads or hears about the
Middle East today comes from academics. This is evident in the 9/11
documentaries that have been broadcast in the general media on this
twentieth anniversary. Among the quotable talking heads, academics are
almost entirely absent. They mostly write for and speak to each other in
a narrow circle, or for the slightly wider circle of the farther left.
If one wants more proof, ask this: Does anyone in the field, any
credentialed professor of Middle Eastern studies, enjoy any broad name
recognition in America? The answer is an obvious "no." The last one was
the late Bernard Lewis. Lewis had two New York Times bestsellers right after 9/11: What Went Wrong and The Crisis of Islam. They were quick, readable syntheses that filled an immediate void and that flew off the shelves.
But Lewis, and to some extent also Fouad Ajami, were the exceptions
that proved the rule: The academic study of the Middle East does not
produce high-profile public intellectuals.
America has not looked to academics for its ideas about the region in a long while.
A Classroom Monopoly
And yet, Middle Eastern studies still matter, not because of what the academics say or write but because of what they teach.
The most prestigious universities are no longer the beacons on a hill
they once were, but their degrees are still coveted. One still gets
mileage from a Princeton degree, or one from Harvard. These are the most
durable brands in America, some predating American independence. So it
is not surprising that young people still compete ferociously to get
into these schools. And from there, they will go on to make policy, form
opinion, and command U.S. power in the world.
The best guess is that the indoctrination in these places is as bad
as ever. It is a "guess" because the classroom is not public domain. But
if academics teach in the classroom what they say and write in the
public domain, then it is still a closed circle. Back around 9/11, there
were maybe half a dozen universities where a student could find enough
balance to get a credential worth having. Today, one would not need all
the fingers of one hand.
Previously, the government might have been able to balance things in
institutions subsidized by the taxpayer, such as university Middle East
centers. Now, that is doubtful. Higher education has an effective lobby
in Washington, and the White House and Congress do not care much
because, in relative terms, the money is quite small. So yes, by all
means, let us have accountability for biased outreach programs. And let
us have universities disclose foreign funding as required by law. But
let us not delude ourselves because this will not make much of a dent.
What does seem to work, at least in certain cases, is shaming. Of
course, much of academe is shameless, and in those places, the game is
long lost. But even in this era of rampant "wokeness," there are
university administrations that care about quality. Calling out error
and bias in these settings—as Middle East Forum's Campus Watch does—has
some value. It is not going to reverse the trend. It is not going to
stop it. But it might slow it down.
Taking the Initiative
But criticism can only do so much. Just as important is creating
alternatives. For example, on the disciplinary level, there is the
alternative to the Middle East Studies Association, named the
Association for the Study of the Middle East and Africa, or ASMEA. The Middle East Quarterly
also makes room for dissenting views. In the field of international
relations, including the Middle East, there is the Alexander Hamilton
Society. And there are some initiatives at individual universities and
colleges.
Creating alternatives is labor-intensive because it involves swimming
against the prevailing currents in academe. Success requires cunning,
tact, and money. And there is no packaged formula: Every campus is a
planet unto itself. What flies on one will crash on another.
But this is the only way left open. We are not going to witness a
revolution in Middle Eastern studies. A generation or more will have to
die out before that has a chance of happening. The objective must be
more modest: to create some space for alternative views and free debate
on the Middle East. To some extent, that has been achieved over the past
twenty years. The challenge of the next twenty years is to enlarge that
space and fill it.
Discussion
Editor's note: The following is excerpted from a Campus Watch webinar interview by Winfield Myers, September 10, 2021.
Campus Watch: You mentioned the disappearance of star
professors of the caliber of Bernard Lewis. With all due respect to
journalists and other non-academic commentators, has anyone really
filled those shoes? Has the quality of information that is available to
the public today regarding the Middle East, regardless of its source,
increased or decreased over the past twenty years?
Kramer: My overall impression is that it has probably
increased in terms of firsthand familiarity with the situation on the
ground. Hundreds of people were sent out to "cover" the region, and they
accessed information that even people like Bernard Lewis couldn't
access.
For example, prior to 9/11, the bookshelf on Saudi Arabia was
virtually empty. Academics didn't work on it, either because they
couldn't get access, or they were afraid that if they wrote something
uncomplimentary about Saudi Arabia, it would forever block their
universities from ever getting any Saudi funding. After 9/11,
journalists began to pick up the story, and now we have a very
impressive accounting of Islamic extremism in Saudi Arabia, the leading
actors in the Saudi royal house, and so on.
So yes, there's more out there, in absolute terms of quantity. What
we don't have is what the likes of Bernard Lewis and Fouad Ajami
provided: the longer historical perspective. That was something that
could only be done by academic scholars. No one is doing it for a wider
public today. So we get a lot of reportage of a very high quality. But
we haven't had a major book or even a major article in a mass
circulation outlet like The Atlantic or The New Yorker putting things in the broader historical perspective.
 Some
American universities have created satellite campuses in Persian Gulf
states and are creating dependent relationships on certain governments. |
CW: To what practical extent does foreign funding,
particularly but not exclusively from Saudi Arabia, impact the agenda of
Middle Eastern studies? Does this funding play the same role that it
did twenty or twenty-five years ago?
Kramer: There is still some money coming in. But I think the
more interesting development isn't so much the funding of Middle Eastern
studies, but the satellite campuses that have been created by American
universities in some of the Persian Gulf states. These universities are
internationalizing and creating dependent relationships on certain
governments.
I think that many gulf states play a positive role overall in Middle
Eastern politics. The Abraham Accords represent a signal breakthrough.
But I'm always wary of partnerships between institutions that pride
themselves on promoting the pursuit of truth and the free and open
exchange of ideas, and governments for which these things are anathema,
or at least not priorities.
 (Left
to right) Benjamin Netanyahu (Israel), Abdullah bin Zayed al-Nahyan
(UAE), and Abdullatif al-Zayani (Bahrain), at the signing of the Abraham
Accords, White House, September 15, 2020. Many gulf states play a
positive role overall in Middle Eastern politics. |
If you're in the Middle Eastern studies department in a university
that is avidly pursuing a relationship with a moneyed Middle Eastern
state, you're likely to pull your punches. The effect is not so much to
generate scholarship that is sympathetic to these countries but to take
unbiased study of those countries off the agenda. No one who wants to
advance a career is going to focus on these countries if that's going to
alienate their dean or provost.
So you get black holes of research, which no one ventures to fill.
It's the non-academics who have managed to keep up our understanding of
what goes on in these black holes. I don't think that's going to change
anytime soon. We're just going to have to live with the fact that the
flow of foreign money is a force that constricts the range of study of
the Middle East in the American academy.
CW: Does anything remain of the role of the liberal Arabists
of old? Is that still a viable school of thought within Middle Eastern
studies? If so, how does it affect views about Israel's existence?
The flow of foreign money constricts the range of study of the Middle East in the American academy.
|
Kramer: The liberal Arabists were pushed out of Middle Eastern
studies a while ago. One of the last of them was Malcolm Kerr from
UCLA, later president of the American University of Beirut, where he was
assassinated. He wrote a very sharp critique of Edward Said's Orientalism.
There was some degree of fair-mindedness about the liberal Arabists.
They had their biases and prejudices, and they certainly regretted the
creation of Israel. But they understood that Israel had to be
accommodated, provided it made far-reaching concessions to the Arabs and
the Palestinians.
The people who determine the pace of Middle Eastern studies today seek to delegitimize Israel completely.
|
But these liberals were pushed aside long ago. The people who
determine the pace of Middle Eastern studies today tend to be radical
leftists. And they aren't focused on the terms of accommodation with
Israel. They seek to delegitimize it completely; they lend their support
to BDS [Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement], and they champion
the "one-state solution" in a form that would end Israel. If only there
were still some liberal Arabists around, we could have a meaningful
dialogue with them. But instead, we're stuck with radicals, many of whom
come from radical political traditions within the Middle East. The
Middle East Studies Association resembles nothing so much as a
semi-official union of academics in some benighted dictatorship in the
Middle East.
CW: Just to segue into that, you have over the years noted the
increase in the share of those professors whose origins are in the
Middle East—not simply by ancestry, but who were themselves born there,
and who have come to the United States to work. Do you see that trend
continuing? Are we going to continue to import faculty at the rate we
have over the past twenty or thirty years?
Kramer: I don't know. I don't have the statistical basis on which to answer that.
As a general matter of principle, people coming from the Middle East
to teach in American universities could be a huge asset. Fouad Ajami, an
immigrant from Lebanon, was one of my undergraduate teachers, and later
my close friend. He made a major contribution to America's
understanding of the Middle East.
There is potentially huge value here. The problem is when people
bring along, in their baggage, the very same ideas in which they were
indoctrinated in their countries of origin. Ajami was a good example. As
a young man, he was indoctrinated as a Nasserist. But through his long
engagement with American values, American mores, American politics, and
Americans, he had a change of heart.
And so it's really a question of acculturation. We want an amalgam of
people with regional knowledge. Sometimes the knowledge of individuals
who come from the region can't be surpassed. But are they acculturated
to the values that America generally shares, such as openness,
tolerance, and the free exchange of ideas? That's a problem for those
who remain embedded in another culture and have not adapted to the norms
that make intellectual life in America tolerable.
CW: You have written that when you received your PhD in 1981,
so grim was the situation that you didn't bother applying for jobs in
the United States. That was forty years ago. It doesn't seem to be
getting any better in hiring. The gates are still controlled by the
people who are as hostile to someone with your viewpoint as they were
when you came out of Princeton. Do you agree with that? Can anything be
done about such ideological homogeneity?
Kramer: I hate to end on a pessimistic note. But I have a hard time even getting invited to speak on American campuses today.
I come back to the point I made in my remarks, about creating
alternatives. I see shoots coming up from the ground that have the
potential to create alternatives even within an academic setting. And
remember, while the top tier institutions are the same as when I was a
graduate student, once you get down to second and third tier, there's a
lot of room for entrepreneurs to try new approaches.
I said earlier that no one can make predictions about the Middle
East. I don't think anyone can make predictions about Middle Eastern
studies and be sure that they'll come to pass. So, I'll just end on an
optimistic note and say that, hopefully, in another twenty years on the
fortieth anniversary of Ivory Towers on Sand, I'll be able to report on more progress.