by Dr. Max Singer
Israel’s objective in Syria is to prevent Iran from building military facilities there that increase its ability to attack Israel.
Iranian drone over Israeli territory, screenshot from video via Israel Defense Forces
BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 825, May 8, 2018
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: Israel
has neither the power nor the motivation to significantly influence the
outcome of the war for control of all the pieces of Syria. Israel’s
objective in Syria is to prevent Iran from building military facilities
there that increase its ability to attack Israel. The only way Israel
can achieve this is by destroying any such facilities that Iran builds,
or by convincing Iran not to build any threatening facility out of fear
that Israel will destroy it.
There is little Israel could do to affect the
outcome of the struggle for control of Syria and its component parts.
Jerusalem does not have any strong preferences among the likely
alternative outcomes, all of which are bad for Israel. (For humanitarian
reasons Israel would like the bloody attacks on civilians to stop, but
Israel’s security benefits so long as its enemies are fighting with each
other.[1])
Jerusalem’s main practical interests in Syria are
to prevent construction of military facilities there that would increase
Iran’s ability to attack Israel, and to prevent Iran from controlling
territory near the Golan Heights.
Israel has made political efforts to protect its
interests in Syria, but there is not much possibility that such efforts
can succeed. Even if for some reason an outside party such as Russia
induced Iran to agree not to build a base that threatened Israel, Iran
cannot be counted on to keep such an agreement, and no one else would
feel strongly enough to insist that Iran live up to it. Iran cares more
about this issue than anyone else except Israel.
So Israel itself has to try to prevent Iran from
gaining new abilities to threaten it from Syria. It can’t do this
through diplomatic demands or other forms of negotiation with Iran. But
Israel can prevent Iran from having new military facilities in Syria –
such as bases or factories – by bombing any such facilities that Iran
builds so they become unusable.
This strategic “game” is understood by both Israel
and Iran. For now, neither side wants a war, but each is willing to
take action that might risk war. They will both be careful, but neither
is likely to be passive. The “game” has more complexities and nuances
than presented here.
The first level of complexity is that both sides
make threats that are broader than what they are willing to carry out.
Tehran threatens to attack Israel if it bombs Iranian bases in Syria,
while Jerusalem says it will not “accept” Iranian assets that threaten
Israel anywhere in Syria. Each side tries to get other parties to step
in to stop its enemy in order to prevent a new war.
Each side understands that its enemy’s threats are
exaggerated, but neither is certain what the other will actually do.
Iran started already by building a small base in southern Syria from
which it launched a drone to deliver a small bomb to northern Israel. By
destroying the Iranian facilities at that base, Israel demonstrated the
will and ability to prevent Iran from basing forces so close to Israel.
Iran learned it would have to keep a bigger distance or risk a
humiliating military blow.
Both sides had to pay a price for this
teaching/learning experience. Iran lost whatever it had invested in
building the base. More importantly, it suffered the embarrassment of
being attacked without the ability to make a sufficient response – that
is, some of its threats were exposed as empty. While Israel achieved its
immediate goal, it too had prices to pay. Any military attack involves
costs and risks, even if the dangers that are risked don’t happen. And
while there are there political benefits to using military power
successfully, there are also political costs.
Iran now needs to know if it can safely build a
facility further from the border with Israel. How much further? Israel
won’t draw a precise line because a degree of uncertainty can work in
its favor. Just exactly how far Israel will go in excluding Iranian
facilities depends on all kinds of details and political considerations.
The only way Iran can determine Jerusalem’s limits is to build
something and see whether Israel destroys it. But if it does cross an
Israeli red line, Iran will suffer losses like those from the Israeli
destruction of their drone-launching base last month.
Iranian leaders care much more about who controls
Syria than about building bases in Syria that threaten Israel, and they
don’t seem to want to have a war with Israel at this time. So for now,
Israel can probably prevent Iran from building military facilities in
Syria that it finds unacceptably threatening, contributing to the peace
and security of the region. This capability hinges on Tehran’s
continuing to believe that Jerusalem can and will use military strikes
to prevent Syria from becoming a base for Iranian attacks against
Israel.
When the question of control over all the pieces
of what was Syria is finally settled – which will probably take at least
another several years – Iran may give more emphasis to their goal of
being able to use Syria as another base for attacking Israel. It may be
less concerned at that point with avoiding war with Israel, especially
if it has nuclear weapons by then. If that happens, Israel will have
less ability to limit Tehran’s building of military facilities in Syria,
though that will also depend to an extent on the nature of the new
regime or regimes in Syria.
It is also entirely possible that by the time the
war in Syria is settled, there will be a new regime ruling Iran. That
would end the “game” described here and greatly reduce many other
problems now troubling the region.
BESA Center Perspectives Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family
[1]
Any democracy’s ability to influence the outcome is limited by what
could be called “the Sabra and Shatilla problem”; that is, a lack of
local allies who can be trusted to refrain from massacres and ethnic
cleansing.
Source: https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/israel-iran-in-syria/
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Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.
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