by Julio Rivera
A policy’s intentions do not guarantee its results, and the question is whether Washington’s approach has strengthened America’s position over time.
Joe Biden’s Washington set out to slow China’s march toward technological dominance. Instead, it may have handed Beijing one of the best incentives imaginable to build its own semiconductor industry. Now, as President Donald Trump pursues a different approach to win the AI race, a Congress controlled by his own party is considering provisions that could lock America into a more rigid export-control regime just when strategic flexibility matters most.
The irony is hard to miss. Huawei chairman Xu Zhijun reportedly credited American pressure with helping China’s semiconductor industry grow. Washington wanted to make it harder for Chinese companies to obtain advanced chips and the equipment needed to manufacture them. Beijing’s response was to double down on domestic alternatives. When the world’s second-largest economy decides that it can no longer depend on American technology, it has every incentive to throw money, talent, and political muscle at building its own.
That is the danger of confusing economic pressure with a strategy for winning a technological competition. Restrictions can deny an adversary access to specific capabilities in the short term. But when they also persuade that adversary to replace American suppliers, develop rival technologies, and cultivate its own international customers, the long-term consequences can be considerably less comfortable.
The Biden administration’s October 2022 controls targeted China’s access to advanced computing chips, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and certain technical capabilities. The stated national security rationale was serious: powerful chips can support military modernization, surveillance, and advanced weapons development.
No sensible American president should ignore those risks. But a policy’s intentions do not guarantee its results, and the question is whether Washington’s approach has strengthened America’s position over time.
Examine the case of Huawei. The Chinese telecommunications giant has been at the center of American concerns about technology and national security. Yet Huawei’s research and development spending rose from roughly 102 billion yuan in 2018 to nearly 180 billion yuan in 2024, illustrating the scale of resources China’s leading technology firms have committed to developing capabilities at home.
Huawei is hardly alone. Chinese chipmakers and memory manufacturers are working to expand domestic production, while Chinese AI companies compete to build models and hardware that can reduce their reliance on American suppliers. The objective is not simply to survive Washington’s restrictions. It is to create an ecosystem that can eventually compete with American companies in China and beyond. That should concern anyone who believes American technological leadership is a strategic asset.
The United States does not win merely by making it harder for China to buy something. It wins when American companies remain the world’s preferred suppliers, when our technologies set global standards, and when foreign businesses have strong commercial reasons to build on American platforms rather than Chinese alternatives. This is where Trump’s approach deserves a fair hearing.
Not every chip presents the same risk, not every customer poses the same threat, and not every commercial transaction should be treated as though it were a transfer of weapons technology. The Trump administration has made it a point to distinguish between genuinely sensitive capabilities and products whose sale can reinforce American commercial leadership.
Exports are not automatically concessions. In the right circumstances, they can help American companies sustain revenue, finance research and development, establish industry standards, and keep customers invested in American technology. When Washington abandons markets altogether, it creates openings for competitors. Chinese companies will not politely wait for America to reconsider; they will try to fill the vacuum.
That is why Congress should think carefully before adding new statutory constraints through the National Defense Authorization Act. Three provisions deserve particular scrutiny: the AI OVERWATCH Act, the MATCH Act, and the Chip Security Act.
Supporters argue that these measures would strengthen national security and prevent sensitive technology from reaching China. Those are legitimate objectives. But legislation can also constrain executive discretion, create compliance burdens, and make it harder to adjust policy as technology, markets, and geopolitical circumstances change.
The details matter, and Congress should not treat every new restriction as automatically beneficial simply because it is described as a security measure.
The central question is whether these provisions would give Trump better tools to protect America or tie his hands as he tries to balance security with commercial competitiveness. If the administration is pursuing a deliberate strategy of controlled exports and targeted restrictions, lawmakers should not casually write new statutory barriers that undermine its ability to adapt. Congress, therefore, should pass a clean NDAA that is stripped of these provisions.
This is not an argument for handing Beijing the keys to America’s most sensitive technology. It is an argument for distinguishing between protecting national security and pursuing restrictions for their own sake. America needs firm guardrails against the transfer of genuinely dangerous capabilities. It also needs a strategy that recognizes the value of markets, customers, research investment, and global dependence on American innovation.
China is not going to abandon its technological ambitions because Washington wishes it would. If anything, the experience of recent years suggests that pressure can intensify Beijing’s determination to build alternatives. American policymakers should learn from that reality rather than repeat the same mistake under a different legislative label.
Trump should have the flexibility to make those judgments, and Congress should demand evidence that its proposed restrictions will actually work. The goal is not to make China like us. It is to make sure China needs what we build. That is how private-sector America funds its victory in the AI race.
Julio Rivera is a business and political strategist, cybersecurity researcher, founder of ItFunk.org and ReactionaryTimes.com, and a political commentator and columnist. His writing, focused on cybersecurity and politics, has appeared in major publications around the world.
Source: https://amgreatness.com/2026/11/04/bidens-gift-to-china-how-washington-helped-build-beijings-ai-chip-industry/
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