by Seth D. Kaplan
From Pressure to Transition: An Integrated Strategy for Political Change in Iran
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Eight months of war have weakened Iran’s military but not the regime itself. Political change depends on breaking apart the coalition that holds it together. |
Executive Summary
The military and economic campaign against the Islamic Republic has fundamentally altered the regional balance of power, but it has not yet altered the political foundations of the Iranian regime. Iran’s military capabilities have been significantly degraded, yet the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) continues to preserve the cohesion of the political system, suppress domestic opposition, and project sufficient power to sustain the regime. The central strategic challenge is therefore no longer how to weaken Iran militarily, but how to convert military advantage and economic coercion into durable political transition.
This paper argues that the decisive center of gravity is the IRGC-centered governing coalition rather than Iran’s remaining military capabilities. Authoritarian systems rarely collapse because populations become dissatisfied. They become vulnerable when elite confidence erodes, alternative political institutions emerge, and the regime can no longer convince its supporters that it represents the safest path to stability.
Accordingly, successful transition requires an integrated political strategy built around four mutually reinforcing objectives: strengthening a unified opposition capable of governing, fragmenting the regime’s governing coalition through differentiated engagement with elites, dominating the information environment, and competing with the regime economically through targeted pressure, support for civil resistance, and a compelling vision of post-transition prosperity. Military and economic pressure remains essential, but only insofar as it creates opportunities for these political dynamics to develop.
The report further argues that protected opposition enclaves inside Iran could provide secure political space from which opposition institutions can organize, govern, and demonstrate credible alternative authority. Over time, these enclaves should expand beyond peripheral minority regions into Iran’s Persian-majority heartland, increasing territorial denial, weakening elite confidence, and reinforcing national legitimacy.
Finally, the paper proposes complementary roles for the United States and Israel. The United States should lead political, economic, informational, and transition-planning efforts, while Israel continues degrading the regime’s coercive capabilities through persistent military and intelligence operations. All external assistance should remain discreet and support an unmistakably Iranian-led political transition. The objective is not simply to weaken the Islamic Republic, but to ensure that when the opportunity for change arrives, a credible alternative is prepared to replace it.
Introduction: The Regime Is Weaker, but Not Yet Vulnerable
The Middle East has entered a new strategic era. Since February 2026, the United States and Israel have conducted a prolonged military campaign against the Islamic Republic of Iran, transforming decades of proxy confrontation into direct interstate conflict. What began as an effort to degrade Iran’s nuclear program and military capabilities has evolved into a prolonged regional war extending across the Persian Gulf, Iraq, the Levant, and the Red Sea. Iran has suffered substantial losses: senior military leaders have been killed, elements of its nuclear infrastructure and missile enterprise have been damaged, and much of the regional deterrence architecture painstakingly built over four decades has been degraded. Yet eight months of war have also demonstrated an uncomfortable reality. Despite intense military pressure, the Islamic Republic remains in power, continues to fight, and retains the capacity to threaten regional stability on a scale few anticipated.
This paradox should define future policy toward Iran. The principal lesson of the war is not simply that Iran is weaker than before, but that military degradation alone has proven insufficient to produce political change. The United States and Israel have demonstrated that they can inflict severe damage on Iran’s military capabilities. They have not yet demonstrated how military success can be translated into the collapse of the political system that generated those capabilities in the first place.
Indeed, if the conflict has revealed one defining characteristic of the Islamic Republic, it is institutional resilience. The regime has adapted to repeated military setbacks by dispersing assets, decentralizing command structures, relying on redundant production networks, and shifting the conflict into domains where it retains important asymmetric advantages. Rather than accepting strategic defeat, Tehran has leveraged its remaining strengths—particularly missiles, drones, maritime coercion, cyber operations, and surviving regional partners—to impose continuing costs on its adversaries. In doing so, it has reminded policymakers that even a weakened Iran remains capable of shaping the regional security environment.
Perhaps nowhere has this adaptation been more evident than in the Persian Gulf. Throughout the conflict, Iran has repeatedly demonstrated an ability to threaten one of the world’s most important energy corridors. Using combinations of ballistic missiles, long-range drones, naval forces, proxy attacks, and coercive maritime tactics, Tehran has repeatedly targeted Gulf states hosting American forces, commercial shipping, and regional energy infrastructure. Although these operations have not permanently closed the Strait of Hormuz, they have repeatedly disrupted commercial traffic, increased global energy prices, forced major naval deployments, and reminded regional governments that Iran retains the capacity to hold Gulf commerce at risk despite months of intensive military operations. This ability to impose strategic costs while simultaneously absorbing military punishment represents one of the most important lessons of the current conflict.
The explanation lies in the nature of the Iranian state itself. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is not merely another military organization protecting an otherwise conventional government. It has evolved into the institutional backbone of the Islamic Republic—a political, military, intelligence, economic, and ideological enterprise that links together the regime’s coercive institutions, provincial authorities, commercial networks, religious foundations, and strategic industries. It finances itself through extensive commercial holdings, directs internal repression through overlapping security organizations, and projects power abroad through missile forces, drones, maritime assets, and regional partners. So long as this institutional architecture remains intact, the regime retains an extraordinary capacity to absorb external shocks while preserving internal control.
This resilience also explains why successive waves of domestic unrest have failed to produce political transition despite widespread public opposition. Over the past two decades, millions of Iranians have repeatedly demonstrated their rejection of the Islamic Republic through nationwide protests, labor strikes, women’s rights campaigns, student activism, and civil resistance. Yet every movement has ultimately confronted the same structural imbalance: a cohesive security apparatus confronting an opposition that remains politically fragmented, organizationally underdeveloped, and unable to present a unified governing alternative. Legitimacy alone does not produce regime change. Organization does.
Legitimacy alone does not produce regime change. Organization does.
Comparative experience reinforces this conclusion. Durable authoritarian systems rarely collapse because populations become dissatisfied; they collapse when elite confidence begins to fracture. Political leaders, security officials, economic actors, and bureaucratic managers reconsider their loyalty when they conclude that the regime can no longer protect their interests, when the costs of continued allegiance rise, when credible information reveals the true balance of political forces, and when a viable alternative government appears capable of maintaining order. In short, authoritarian breakdown depends less on mass persuasion than on elite uncertainty.
This insight carries profound implications for American and Israeli strategy. The challenge is no longer simply to weaken the Islamic Republic, but to translate ongoing military and economic pressure into conditions that enable an Iranian-led political transition. External actors can help create those conditions by increasing uncertainty within the regime while quietly strengthening the organizational capacity, resilience, and credibility of an indigenous alternative. Because the legitimacy of any future government will depend upon its independence, outside support should remain as discreet as possible, expanding opportunities for Iranian political organization without becoming its public face.
This paper argues that political transition requires an integrated strategy built around four mutually reinforcing objectives: strengthening a unified opposition, fragmenting the regime’s governing coalition, dominating the information environment, and competing with the regime economically while offering a realistic vision of national recovery. It further argues that establishing protected opposition enclaves inside Iran can provide the organizational foundation from which opposition institutions can survive, expand, and prepare to govern. The role of external actors is not to direct this process, but to create the conditions under which it can succeed. The decisive contest is therefore no longer whether the Islamic Republic can be militarily weakened, but whether its remaining political foundations can be systematically displaced by a credible Iranian alternative.
Part I: The IRGC as the Center of Gravity
The decisive center of gravity of the Islamic Republic is not its remaining military capability but the cohesion of the IRGC-centered political-security system. The Guard is more than a military organization. It links the regime’s coercive institutions, intelligence services, economic networks, provincial authorities, and political leadership into a mutually reinforcing governing coalition that has repeatedly demonstrated an extraordinary capacity to absorb external shocks. The central strategic question is therefore not simply how to degrade Iran’s military capabilities, but how to fracture the institutional relationships that enable the regime to survive.
The succession has transformed the Islamic Republic from a clerically led revolutionary state supported by the IRGC into an IRGC-dominated security state that retains clerical legitimacy as one of its governing instruments. Although the Supreme Leader remains constitutionally paramount, practical authority has shifted decisively toward the institutions that exercise coercive power, control economic resources, and maintain elite discipline. The regime’s center of gravity therefore lies not in an individual leader but in the cohesion of the IRGC itself.
The regime’s center of gravity therefore lies not in an individual leader but in the cohesion of the IRGC itself.
The durability of this coalition depends less on ideological unity than on shared expectations about the future. Many Iranian business leaders, provincial officials, technocrats, bureaucrats, and even members of the security services may privately question the country’s trajectory. Yet dissatisfaction rarely produces defection because authoritarian systems create a collective action problem: few elites will break ranks until they believe others are prepared to do the same. Political transitions become possible only when those expectations reverse—when influential insiders conclude that the regime can no longer protect their interests and that a credible alternative government provides a focal point for coordinated disengagement.
Nor is this coalition monolithic. The interests of senior IRGC commanders differ fundamentally from those of technocrats, provincial administrators, state-owned enterprise managers, judges, business leaders, career civil servants, and regular military officers. These groups face different incentives, possess different vulnerabilities, and will respond differently as uncertainty grows. Effective transition strategy therefore depends upon differentiating among them rather than applying uniform pressure. Accountability should remain focused on those responsible for repression and corruption, while clear opportunities should be created for others to disengage without fearing institutional collapse or indiscriminate retribution. Such differentiation weakens the incentives for collective resistance while preserving the institutional capacity needed for post-transition governance.
The central implication is straightforward. The objective is not simply to weaken the IRGC’s military capabilities, but to erode the political coalition that the IRGC organizes, protects, and ultimately depends upon for regime survival. Every subsequent element of strategy should therefore be evaluated according to a single question: does it increase uncertainty within the regime’s governing coalition while strengthening confidence in a credible Iranian alternative?
Part II: A Framework for Political Transition
If the Islamic Republic’s resilience rests on the cohesion of the IRGC-centered governing coalition, then a successful transition strategy must alter the political equation that has repeatedly favored the regime. Neither economic pressure, military operations, nor public protest alone is likely to produce political change. Rather, transition depends upon simultaneously strengthening the opposition while systematically weakening the regime’s ability to govern. Four mutually reinforcing lines of effort are essential: building opposition capacity, fracturing regime cohesion, dominating the information environment, and competing with the regime economically through targeted pressure, support for civil resistance, and credible preparation for post-transition recovery. Together, these efforts increase the probability that future political shocks—whether generated by military pressure, economic crisis, or domestic unrest—produce political transition rather than another cycle of repression.
The first requirement is building opposition capacity. The greatest weakness of Iran’s opposition has never been public support but political organization. Despite widespread dissatisfaction, opposition movements remain fragmented across ideological, ethnic, geographic, and generational lines. A successful transition requires a unified political vehicle capable of coordinating disparate constituencies while engaging both domestic actors and the international community. Such a vehicle must provide effective leadership, articulate a broadly inclusive political platform, maintain secure communications with internal networks, and develop the organizational capacity necessary to coordinate protests, strikes, diplomacy, humanitarian assistance, and eventual governance. The objective is not ideological uniformity but institutional coherence: a recognized center capable of transforming popular dissatisfaction into sustained political action and ultimately into legitimate governing authority.
The second line of effort is fracturing the regime’s governing coalition. Because authoritarian systems depend upon elite cooperation, transition strategies must reshape the incentives facing those who sustain the existing order. Research consistently demonstrates that undifferentiated pressure often strengthens regime cohesion, while differentiated approaches widen internal divisions. Senior officials responsible for repression and corruption should expect accountability, but technocrats, civil servants, business leaders, provincial administrators, and lower-level security personnel should be offered a credible future within a lawful post-transition state. Such differentiation reduces fear of change, increases uncertainty within the ruling coalition, and encourages gradual disengagement from the regime. Political transitions are rarely triggered by a single dramatic defection; they emerge through the cumulative erosion of elite confidence across institutions that gradually lose the will to defend the status quo.
The third requirement is winning the information environment. Every authoritarian system depends upon controlling perceptions as much as controlling territory. The Islamic Republic has long relied on censorship, surveillance, internet shutdowns, and state-controlled media to conceal internal divisions, discourage collective action, and reinforce the perception that organized resistance is futile. A successful transition therefore requires resilient communications networks capable of surviving government disruption, systematic documentation of regime abuses, and consistent strategic messaging that exposes corruption while demonstrating the growing strength and unity of the opposition. Equally important, information campaigns must communicate not only why the current system should end, but what will replace it. Demonstrating that a credible political alternative exists—and that change can occur without national collapse—is essential both for mobilizing society and reassuring regime insiders contemplating disengagement.
Finally, political transition requires economic competition. The Islamic Republic sustains loyalty not only through ideology and coercion but also through patronage. Any alternative political movement must therefore compete economically as well as politically. This begins with practical measures that enable sustained civil resistance, including financial support for striking workers and vulnerable families. It also requires optimizing sanctions to maximize pressure on institutions responsible for repression while minimizing unnecessary hardship for ordinary Iranians. Beyond immediate pressure, opposition leaders must present detailed plans for economic stabilization, reconstruction, restoration of market confidence, and the continuity of essential public services. Clear guarantees regarding lawful property rights, functioning state institutions, and future investment are particularly important for business leaders, technocrats, and economic managers whose cooperation will be indispensable during any transition. A believable economic future reduces uncertainty, weakens dependence on regime patronage, and strengthens confidence that political change will produce stability rather than chaos.
None of these four lines of effort is sufficient independently. Opposition organization without elite disengagement is unlikely to overcome the regime’s coercive apparatus. Elite uncertainty without a credible political alternative is more likely to produce paralysis than transition. Information campaigns unsupported by organization lack durability, while economic pressure without a vision for recovery reinforces fear rather than hope. Only by advancing all four simultaneously can the balance of political power gradually shift away from the IRGC-centered governing coalition.
Part III: Conditions for Regime Fracture
Political transitions rarely result from a single decisive event. Authoritarian regimes typically unravel when multiple pressures reinforce one another, gradually altering how political actors perceive the balance of risk. Military setbacks, economic disruption, public protest, information failures, and institutional fragmentation matter less as independent causes of collapse than because together they convince growing numbers of insiders that the existing order can no longer guarantee security, stability, or personal survival. Political transitions are therefore cumulative rather than catalytic.
Public mobilization often provides the visible manifestation of this process, but it is seldom sufficient on its own. Sustained protests increase the political costs of repression, demonstrate declining legitimacy, and reveal the breadth of public dissatisfaction. Their greatest strategic value, however, lies in influencing the calculations of elites rather than directly overthrowing the regime. Iran’s repeated protest movements since 2009 illustrate this dynamic: despite widespread participation, none generated the organizational capacity or elite disengagement necessary to produce political transition.
The decisive shift occurs when uncertainty spreads through the governing coalition. Political leaders, technocrats, business figures, provincial officials, and members of the security apparatus begin hedging against an increasingly uncertain future. Some quietly reduce cooperation. Others refuse politically risky decisions. Still others establish discreet relationships with emerging opposition institutions. These actions rarely appear dramatic individually, but collectively they weaken the regime’s capacity to govern while strengthening confidence that alternatives are becoming viable. Defections should therefore be understood not as the final stage of regime collapse but as one of its principal causes.
Defections should therefore be understood not as the final stage of regime collapse but as one of its principal causes.
Military and economic pressures accelerate this process by reshaping expectations rather than determining outcomes directly. Continued battlefield losses, declining territorial control, disruption of logistics, and mounting constraints on patronage all increase doubts about the regime’s long-term viability. As the costs of preserving the existing system rise, so too does the attractiveness of disengagement for actors whose loyalty has always depended more on stability than ideology.
Information is the mechanism through which these changing realities become politically meaningful. As censorship weakens, corruption is exposed, internal divisions become visible, and citizens observe growing participation by others, the perceived risks of resistance decline. Equally important, regime insiders gain a more accurate understanding of the government’s weakening position and of the emergence of credible alternatives. Information therefore accelerates the spread of uncertainty throughout the governing coalition.
Finally, successful transitions require somewhere for elite confidence to migrate. As trust in the incumbent government erodes, confidence in an alternative political authority must grow simultaneously. Opposition institutions capable of coordinating political action, sustaining communications, preparing for governance, and maintaining essential public services reduce fears of instability among both citizens and regime insiders. Without such an alternative, even severe crises are more likely to reinforce repression than produce lasting political change.
The central implication is that regime fracture is a process rather than an event. Political change occurs when multiple reinforcing pressures steadily increase uncertainty within the governing coalition while simultaneously increasing confidence in a credible alternative. The objective is therefore not simply to weaken the Islamic Republic, but to shift the balance of political risk until preserving the existing order appears more dangerous than supporting its replacement.
Part IV: A Comprehensive Strategy for Political Transition
The preceding sections have argued that the Islamic Republic’s survival rests not simply on its military capabilities or coercive apparatus, but on the continued cohesion of an IRGC-centered political system. Political transition therefore requires more than weakening the regime; it requires strengthening a credible alternative while systematically reshaping the incentives of those who sustain the existing order. No single instrument—military pressure, sanctions, protests, diplomacy, or information operations—is likely to achieve this independently. Instead, success depends on integrating political, informational, economic, institutional, and diplomatic efforts into a mutually reinforcing campaign that gradually shifts the balance of power away from the regime and toward a viable alternative.
The first priority is building a credible political alternative capable of governing during and after a transition. The greatest weakness of Iran’s opposition has not been a lack of public support but the absence of a unified political vehicle capable of coordinating diverse constituencies. Such a body should unite domestic and diaspora actors around an inclusive political platform, prepare for interim governance, develop political and economic roadmaps, and engage labor organizations, women’s groups, students, ethnic minorities, technocrats, business leaders, and reform-minded religious figures. It should focus less on resolving every ideological dispute than on establishing broad agreement regarding the principles of a democratic transition, constitutional governance, territorial integrity, and the peaceful transfer of political power. Above all, it must demonstrate that an organized and competent alternative to the current regime exists. Existing initiatives—including the Iran Freedom Congress and the efforts of nationally recognized figures such as Reza Pahlavi—illustrate both the progress that has been made and the continuing need for a unified institutional framework capable of coordinating the broader democratic opposition.
Political organization must be matched by an effective information strategy. The regime’s ability to suppress dissent depends heavily upon controlling information, fragmenting opposition networks, and convincing both citizens and insiders that resistance is futile. A comprehensive communications effort should therefore strengthen secure communications, circumvent censorship, document human rights abuses, expose corruption, and amplify credible voices inside Iran. Just as importantly, it should consistently communicate a positive vision for the country’s future. Demonstrating that political change is both achievable and compatible with stability is essential for mobilizing society while simultaneously reassuring regime insiders that transition need not produce chaos or revenge.
Economic strategy should similarly focus on shaping political incentives rather than simply imposing costs. Financial assistance for striking workers and vulnerable communities can sustain civil resistance during periods of confrontation, while sanctions should increasingly target institutions and individuals directly responsible for repression and corruption rather than broadly increasing hardship for the Iranian population. At the same time, opposition leaders and international partners should prepare credible plans for macroeconomic stabilization, reconstruction, restoration of investment, protection of lawful property rights, continuity of pensions and essential services, and reintegration into international markets. Providing confidence that economic life can improve after transition reduces dependence on regime patronage while encouraging business leaders, technocrats, and private-sector actors to view political change as an opportunity rather than a threat.
Perhaps the most important line of effort involves reshaping elite incentives. Because authoritarian regimes depend upon elite cooperation, transition strategies should distinguish carefully among different categories of regime insiders. Senior officials responsible for severe repression and corruption should expect accountability under the rule of law. At the same time, lower-level civil servants, technocrats, economic managers, provincial officials, and many security personnel should receive clear assurances that they have a future within a post-transition Iran, provided they are not implicated in serious abuses. Individualized accountability, institutional continuity, professional protections, and clearly defined transition frameworks reduce fears associated with political change while encouraging gradual disengagement from the existing system. Such differentiation weakens regime cohesion, preserves state capacity, and increases the likelihood that defections occur before—not after—the regime begins to collapse.
Security-sector engagement represents a complementary line of effort. Historical experience suggests that authoritarian regimes become particularly vulnerable when portions of the security apparatus refuse orders to repress the population or choose to remain neutral during periods of political crisis. Transition strategies should therefore distinguish between ideologically committed elements responsible for repression and the broader population of regular military personnel, lower-ranking security officers, and conscripts whose primary loyalty may be to the nation rather than the regime. Carefully targeted information campaigns, credible assurances regarding lawful treatment and continued professional service where appropriate, and consistent appeals to constitutional duty can increase the likelihood that elements of the security sector either defect or stand aside during a transition. Even limited neutrality within key security institutions can significantly reduce the regime’s capacity to sustain repression while preserving the institutional continuity necessary for post-transition stability.
Supporting these political efforts requires strengthening civil resistance and cyber resilience. Independent communications infrastructure, secure digital tools, resilient documentation networks, and decentralized organizational capacity enable activists to coordinate despite censorship and surveillance. At the same time, labor organizations, professional associations, universities, economic networks, and other components of civil society should be supported in ways that improve their ability to organize, sustain collective action, and maintain communication during periods of disruption. These networks provide the organizational foundation upon which successful transitions ultimately depend.
A successful transition also requires close international coordination. Democratic governments should align sanctions policy, diplomatic messaging, humanitarian assistance, support for civil resistance, and transition planning while avoiding approaches that reinforce regime narratives of foreign control. Support should prioritize strengthening Iranian-led political institutions, independent media, civil society, documentation efforts, and an integrated economic strategy that combines targeted pressure on the regime with practical support for opposition resilience and credible planning for post-transition recovery. Regional partners, Europe, and the United States each possess distinct capabilities, but their efforts are most effective when coordinated around the shared objective of enabling an Iranian-led transition rather than attempting to direct it from outside.
Finally, planning for the day after is as important as planning for the transition itself. One of the greatest risks following authoritarian collapse is institutional breakdown. Preserving the functioning of ministries, courts, public utilities, local administration, and essential government services should therefore be treated as a strategic priority. Transitional justice should balance accountability with stability through a layered approach that prosecutes those responsible for the gravest abuses while protecting ordinary civil servants and professionals who can contribute to rebuilding the state. Security-sector reform, negotiated transition mechanisms where appropriate, truth-seeking processes, and institutional continuity together reduce fears of chaos while increasing confidence that political change will strengthen rather than dismantle the Iranian state.
Taken together, these lines of effort constitute a single integrated strategy rather than a collection of independent initiatives. Political organization, information operations, economic competition, elite engagement, civil resistance, international coordination, and post-transition planning reinforce one another by simultaneously increasing uncertainty within the regime while reducing uncertainty about the future beyond it. The objective is not simply to hasten the end of the Islamic Republic, but to ensure that when the conditions for political transition emerge, a credible alternative is prepared to replace it with a stable, and internationally recognized Iranian state.
Part V: Establishing Protected Opposition Enclaves
Historical experience suggests that durable authoritarian systems become substantially more vulnerable when organized opposition acquires the ability to establish and sustain protected enclaves within the country. Such enclaves deny the regime uncontested control over portions of national territory while providing secure space in which opposition organizations can coordinate, deliver humanitarian assistance, and develop the institutions of an alternative government. Syria provides a recent example. Opposition-held territory in Idlib—protected in part by external military deterrence and sustained through cross-border logistical support—preserved opposition political and administrative institutions long after they had been eliminated elsewhere in the country, enabling them to participate in Syria’s subsequent political transition.
Protected enclaves derive their strategic value less from the territory they encompass than from the political institutions they enable. Secure space allows opposition organizations to coordinate leadership, maintain communications, administer humanitarian assistance, resolve local disputes, and demonstrate the capacity to govern. In Iran, such enclaves would most plausibly emerge first in border regions—including parts of Kurdistan and Baluchistan—where geography and existing political networks may offer greater opportunities for sustained organization. However, enclaves confined to minority regions alone are unlikely to achieve the national legitimacy necessary for political transition and may reinforce regime narratives of separatism. Their purpose should therefore be to serve as the foundation for a broader national movement that progressively expands political influence into Iran’s Persian-majority heartland.
Protected enclaves derive their strategic value less from the territory they encompass than from the political institutions they enable.
Sustaining these enclaves would require resilient logistical and institutional support. Border access, secure communications, humanitarian assistance, financial resources, medical care, independent media, legal expertise, and administrative capacity would enable opposition institutions to survive prolonged confrontation while preserving organizational continuity and preparing for eventual national governance. As the regime’s capacity to project force declines, expanding protected political space into Iran’s principal population centers would further undermine perceptions of regime permanence and increase confidence in an emerging alternative political authority.
The strategic significance of protected enclaves ultimately extends beyond the territory itself. Once the regime can no longer exercise uncontested authority over parts of the country, perceptions of its permanence begin to erode among bureaucrats, business leaders, provincial officials, and members of the security services. Territorial denial therefore functions primarily as a political and psychological mechanism that weakens elite confidence, accelerates defections, and increases uncertainty throughout the governing coalition. Protected enclaves are valuable only insofar as they strengthen a unified national opposition capable of preserving leadership, coordinating political action, and demonstrating that a credible alternative government is prepared to govern a stable and territorially unified Iran.
Part VI: Implementing the Strategy: Policy Options for the United States and Israel
The United States and Israel possess complementary capabilities for advancing political transition in Iran. The United States is best positioned to shape the political, economic, diplomatic, and informational environment surrounding a future transition, while Israel provides the sustained military and intelligence pressure necessary to weaken the regime’s coercive apparatus. Success depends upon integrating these complementary capabilities into a coordinated strategy that strengthens an Iranian-led opposition while steadily eroding the cohesion of the Islamic Republic’s governing coalition.
A central principle should guide every element of this strategy: political transition in Iran must remain unmistakably Iranian-led. External support is most effective when it strengthens indigenous political organization without becoming its public face. Visible American or Israeli sponsorship of opposition activities would reinforce longstanding regime narratives of foreign manipulation, undermine the domestic legitimacy of opposition leaders, complicate efforts to broaden support among the Iranian population, and discourage potential elite defections. Wherever possible, assistance should therefore be provided discreetly, through indirect and deniable channels that maximize the opposition’s operational capabilities while minimizing the visibility of external involvement. The objective is not to create a foreign-backed movement, but to enable an independent Iranian opposition to organize, communicate, and ultimately govern on its own legitimacy.
The United States
The United States should assume primary responsibility for building the political conditions necessary for transition. The first priority should be facilitating the emergence of a unified and representative opposition capable of governing during and after political change. American policy should encourage coordination among domestic activists, diaspora organizations, technocrats, labor groups, women’s organizations, ethnic minorities, and business leaders while avoiding efforts to dictate political outcomes or select individual leaders. Where opportunities arise, discreet support should also strengthen the organizational capacity of protected political spaces and internal opposition networks capable of sustaining governance under conditions of continued regime pressure. The objective is to strengthen Iranian-led institutions rather than create dependence on external sponsors.
Economic policy should shift from maximizing pressure alone toward long-term economic competition with the regime. Targeted sanctions should concentrate on institutions, companies, and individuals responsible for repression, corruption, and IRGC financing while minimizing unnecessary hardship for ordinary Iranians. At the same time, international partners should support civil resistance by expanding practical assistance for workers, vulnerable communities, and independent civil society while presenting a credible vision of post-transition recovery—including sanctions relief, reconstruction, renewed investment, and restoration of normal economic life. Together, these measures reduce dependence on regime patronage while strengthening confidence that political change will produce greater prosperity rather than instability.
Information should become a central line of effort rather than a supporting activity. The United States should expand support for independent Persian-language media, secure communications platforms, anti-censorship technologies, satellite internet capabilities where feasible, and systematic documentation of regime corruption and human rights abuses. Strategic communications should emphasize not only the failures of the Islamic Republic but also the existence of a credible alternative capable of maintaining national unity, preserving state institutions, and restoring economic opportunity. Demonstrating that transition is both possible and manageable is essential for mobilizing public support while encouraging elite disengagement.
A central principle should guide every element of this strategy: political transition in Iran must remain unmistakably Iranian-led.
Cyber capabilities should reinforce these information efforts by improving the resilience of opposition communications and reducing the regime’s ability to suppress independent information. Assistance should focus on secure communications, digital security training, protection of civil society networks, and resilience against censorship and cyber disruption. These capabilities increase the organizational durability upon which successful political transitions depend while strengthening the resilience of protected political spaces and internal opposition networks.
American policy should also directly address the regime’s governing coalition. Transition strategies should distinguish between senior officials responsible for repression and the broader population of technocrats, civil servants, provincial administrators, business leaders, and security personnel whose continued cooperation is often driven more by uncertainty than ideology. Clear assurances regarding institutional continuity, lawful accountability, and future professional opportunities can encourage gradual disengagement while reducing incentives for collective resistance. At the same time, Washington and its allies should quietly prepare contingency plans for humanitarian assistance, security-sector reform, preservation of government ministries, continuity of essential public services, and rapid economic recovery, including pathways to sanctions relief, renewed investment, and reintegration into global markets. Such preparation reduces uncertainty among regime insiders while demonstrating that a stable and prosperous future exists beyond the Islamic Republic
Israel
Israel’s principal contribution will remain sustained military and intelligence pressure against the institutions that preserve the Islamic Republic’s coercive power. Continued operations against IRGC leadership, missile forces, drone infrastructure, command-and-control systems, and military production facilities increase the long-term costs of regime survival while reducing Tehran’s ability to project force domestically and throughout the region. Military operations should therefore be evaluated not solely by tactical damage but by their cumulative contribution to weakening the cohesion and confidence of the regime’s governing coalition.
Sustained military pressure also creates opportunities for protected political enclaves to emerge by progressively reducing the regime’s ability to project coercive power into contested areas. Israeli operations should therefore be evaluated not only for their immediate military effects but also for whether they expand the political opportunities available to an organized Iranian opposition.
Intelligence operations will remain equally important. Continued intelligence collection on the IRGC, political leadership, security institutions, economic networks, and internal elite dynamics can improve understanding of emerging fractures within the regime while supporting efforts to identify opportunities for political engagement and elite defections. It can also improve understanding of local conditions that may permit the emergence or expansion of protected political enclaves, enabling policymakers to better synchronize political, military, humanitarian, and diplomatic efforts with changing realities on the ground. Intelligence cooperation with the United States and regional partners also strengthens the common understanding necessary for coordinated transition planning.
Israel should simultaneously continue disrupting Iran’s regional proxy architecture. Hezbollah, Iraqi militias, the Houthis, and other Iranian partners provide strategic depth that enables the regime to externalize conflict and preserve domestic legitimacy despite internal weakness. Sustained counter-proxy operations reduce Tehran’s regional influence, constrain its capacity for retaliation, and further increase the costs of maintaining the existing system.
Israel can also contribute indirectly to political transition by supporting secure communications and resilient information networks that enable opposition organizations and protected political enclaves to coordinate despite government censorship and surveillance. These efforts should complement broader American initiatives while remaining focused on improving organizational resilience rather than directing political activity.
Finally, neither the United States nor Israel can achieve these objectives independently. Establishing a regional coalition involving the United States, Gulf states, and other threatened governments remains essential. Its purpose should extend beyond military containment to coordinating humanitarian assistance, support for protected opposition enclaves where it emerges, refugee planning, maritime security, nuclear contingencies, economic stabilization, and post-transition reconstruction.
Conclusion
The Islamic Republic is weaker today than at any point in its modern history, but weakness alone does not produce political transition. Authoritarian systems survive not because they are invulnerable, but because they adapt. The central lesson of recent events is therefore that military success, economic pressure, and popular dissatisfaction will remain strategically incomplete unless they are translated into political change.
Authoritarian systems survive not because they are invulnerable, but because they adapt.
That requires shifting the focus of strategy from degrading the regime to building its successor. A unified opposition, growing elite uncertainty, resilient information networks, protected political space, economic competition that combines targeted pressure with a credible vision for national recovery, and institutional continuity are not separate initiatives; together they create the conditions under which the IRGC-centered governing coalition fragments. The decisive contest is therefore political rather than military.
The United States and Israel can help create these conditions, but they cannot manufacture legitimacy or determine Iran’s future. Political transition must remain Iranian-led. External actors should seek to expand political opportunities, reduce the costs of transition, and strengthen indigenous institutions while avoiding actions that reinforce regime narratives of foreign control. Their success should be measured not simply by the damage inflicted on the Islamic Republic, but by the emergence of a credible alternative capable of governing a stable and unified Iran.
Strategic opportunities of this magnitude are uncommon. If sustained military pressure is not matched by coherent political organization, the regime may once again adapt, consolidate its remaining strengths, and survive. If, however, military pressure is integrated with a comprehensive strategy for political transition, the current conflict may represent the greatest opportunity in decades to replace the Islamic Republic with a stable, democratic, and internationally integrated Iranian state.
Seth D. Kaplan is an expert on fragile states and political transitions. He teaches at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University, is senior adviser for the Institute for Integrated Transitions (IFIT), and consults for the World Bank, the U.S. State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the OECD. He wrote the State Department’s Political Transitions Analysis Framework (2020) and co-wrote the United Nations–World Bank report Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict. His books include Fixing Fragile States, Betrayed, Human Rights in Thick and Thin Societies, and Fragile Neighborhoods.
Source: https://www.meforum.org/mef-reports/fracturing-the-iranian-regime
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