by Eli E. Hertz
Most Arabs living west of the Jordan River in Israel, the West Bank (Judea and Samaria) and Gaza are newcomers who came from surrounding Arab lands after the turn of the 20th century because they were attracted to the relative economic prosperity brought about by the Zionist Movement and the British in the 1920s and 1930s.
The Palestinians claim that they are an ancient and
indigenous people fails to stand up to historic scrutiny. Most
Palestinian Arabs were newcomers to British Mandate Palestine.
Until the 1967 Six-Day War made it expedient for Arabs to create a
Palestinian peoplehood, local Arabs simply considered themselves part of
the ‘great Arab nation’ or ‘southern Syrians.’
“Repeat a lie often enough and people will begin to believe it.”
Nazi propaganda master Joseph Goebbels
“All [that Palestinians] can agree on as a community is what they
want to destroy, not what they want to build.”
New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman
There is no age-old Palestinian people. Most so-called Palestinians are relative newcomers to the Land of Israel
Like a mantra, Arabs repeatedly claim that the
Palestinians are a native people. The concept of a ‘Stateless
Palestinian people’ is not based on fact. It is a fabrication.
Palestinian Arabs cast themselves as a native people in “Palestine” – like the Aborigines in Australia or Native Americans in America. They portray the Jews as European imperialists and colonizers. This is simply untrue.
Until the Jews began returning to the Land of Israel in increasing numbers from the late 19th century to the turn of the 20th, the area called Palestine was a God-forsaken backwash that belonged to the Ottoman Empire, based in Turkey.
The land’s fragile ecology had been laid waste in the
wake of the Arabs’ 7th-century conquest. In 1799, the population was at
it lowest and estimated to be no more than 250,000 to 300,000
inhabitants in all the land.
At the turn of the 20th century, the Arab population west of the Jordan River (today, Israel and the West Bank) was about half a million inhabitants and east of the Jordan River perhaps 200,000.
The collapse of the agricultural system with the
influx of nomadic tribes after the Arab conquest that created malarial
swamps and denuded the ancient terrace system eroding the soil, was
coupled by a tyrannous regime, a crippling tax system and absentee
landowners that further decimated the population. Much of the indigenous
population had long since migrated or disappeared. Very few Jews or Arabs
lived in the region before the arrival of the first Zionists in the
1880s and most of those that did lived in abject poverty.
Most Arabs living west of the Jordan River in Israel,
the West Bank (Judea and Samaria) and Gaza are newcomers who came from
surrounding Arab lands after the turn of the 20th century
because they were attracted to the relative economic prosperity brought
about by the Zionist Movement and the British in the 1920s and 1930s.
This is substantiated by eyewitness reports of a deserted country – including 18th-century reports from the British archaeologist Thomas Shaw, French author and historian Count Constantine Volney (Travels through Syria and Egypt, 1798); the mid-19th-century writings of Alphonse de Lamartine (Recollections of the East, 1835); Mark Twain (Innocents Abroad, 1867); and reports from the British Consul in Jerusalem (1857) that were sent back to London.
The Ottoman Turks’ census (1882) recorded only 141,000 Muslims in the Land of Israel.
The real number is probably closer to 350,000 to 425,000, since many
hid to avoid taxes. The British census in 1922 reported 650,000 Muslims.
Aerial photographs taken by German aviators during
World War I show an underdeveloped country composed mainly of primitive
hamlets. Ashdod, for instance, was a cluster of mud dwellings, Haifa
a fishing village. In 1934 alone, 30,000 Syrian Arabs from the Hauran
moved across the northern frontier into Mandate Palestine, attracted by
work in and around the newly built British port and the construction of other infrastructure projects. They even dubbed Haifa Um el-Amal (‘the city of work’).
The fallacy of Arab claims that most Palestinians were indigenous to Palestine – not newcomers - is also bolstered by a 1909 vintage photograph of Nablus, today an Arab city on the West Bank with over 121,000 residents. Based on the number of buildings in the photo taken from the base of Mount Gerizim, the population in 1909 – Muslim Arabs and Jewish Samaritans – could not have been greater than 2,000 residents.
Family names of many Palestinians attest to their non-Palestinian origins. Just as Jews bear names like Berliner, Warsaw
and Toledano, modern phone books in the Territories are filled with
families named Elmisri (Egyptian), Chalabi (Syrian), Mugrabi (North Africa). Even George Habash – the arch-terrorist and head of Black September – bears a name with origins in Abyssinia or Ethiopia, Habash in both Arabic and Hebrew.
Palestinian nationality is an entity defined by its opposition to Zionism, and not its national aspirations.
What unites Palestinians has been their opposition to Jewish nationalism and the desire to stamp it out, not aspirations for their own state. Local patriotic feelings are generated only when a non-Islamic entity takes charge – such as Israel did after the 1967 Six-Day War. It dissipates under Arab rule, no matter how distant or despotic.
A Palestinian identity did not exist until an
opposing force created it – primarily anti-Zionism. Opposition to a
non-Muslim nationalism on what local Arabs, and the entire Arab world,
view as their own turf, was the only expression of ‘Palestinian
peoplehood.’
The Grand Mufti Hajj Amin al-Husseini, a charismatic
religious leader and radical anti-Zionist was the moving force behind
opposition to Jewish immigration in the 1920s and 1930s. The
two-pronged approach of the “Diplomacy of Rejection” (of Zionism) and
the violence the Mufti incited occurred at the same time Lebanon, Syria,
Transjordan and Iraq became countries in the post-Ottoman reshuffling
of territories established by the British and the French under the
League of Nation’s mandate system.
The tiny educated class among the Arabs of Palestine
was more politically aware than the rest of Arab society, with the
inklings of a separate national identity. However, for decades, the
primary frame of reference for most local Arabs was the clan or tribe, religion and sect, and village of origin. If Arabs in Palestine defined themselves politically, it was as “southern Syrians.” Under Ottoman rule, Syria referred to a region much larger than the Syrian Arab Republic of today, with borders established by France and England in 1920.
In his book Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition, Daniel Pipes explains:
“Syria was a region that stretched from the borders of Anatolia to those of Egypt, from the edge of Iraq to the Mediterranean Sea. In terms of today’s states, the Syria of old comprised Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan, plus the Gaza Strip and Alexandria.”
Syrian maps in the 21st century still co-opt most of Greater Syria, including Israel.
The Grand Mufti Al-Husseini’s aspirations slowly
shifted from pan-Arabism – the dream of uniting all Arabs into one
polity, whereby Arabs in Palestine would unite with their brethren in Syria
- to winning a separate Palestinian entity, with himself at the helm.
Al-Husseini was the moving force behind the 1929 riots against the Jews
and the 1936-1939 Arab Revolt against two non-Muslim entities in Palestine – the British and the Jews. He gathered a large following by playing on fears that the Jews had come to dispossess, or at least dominate the Arabs.
Much like Yasser Arafat, the Grand Mufti’s ingrained
all-or-nothing extremism, fanaticism and even an inability to cooperate
with his own compatriots made him totally ineffective. He led the
Palestinian Arabs nowhere.
The ‘Palestinian’ cause became a key rallying point
for Arab nationalism throughout the Middle East, according to Oxford
historian Avi Shlaim. The countries the British and French created in
1918-1922 were based largely on meridians on the map, as is evident in
the borders that delineate the Arab states today. Because these states
lack ethnic logic or a sense of community, their opposition to the
national aspirations of the Jews has come to fuel that fires Arab
nationalism as the ‘glue’ of national identity. (see details on the
ramifications of British and French policy, which plague the Middle East
to this day in the chapter “The European Union.”)
From the 1920s, rejection of Jewish nationalism,
attempts to prevent the establishment of a Jewish homeland by violence,
and rejection of any form of Jewish political power, including any plans
to share stewardship with Arabs, crystallized into the expression of
Palestinianism. No other positive definition of an Arab-Palestinian
people has surfaced. This point is admirably illustrated in the
following historic incident:
“In 1926, Lord Plumer was
appointed as the second High Commissioner of Palestine. The Arabs within
the Mandate were infuriated when Plumer stood up for the Zionists’
national anthem Hatikva during ceremonies held in his honor when Plumer
first visited Tel Aviv. When a delegation of Palestinian Arabs protested
Plumer’s ‘Zionist bias,’ the High Commissioner asked the Arabs if he
remained seated when their national anthem was played, ‘wouldn’t you
regard my behavior as most unmannerly?’ Met by silence, Plumer asked:
‘By the way, have you got a national anthem?’ When the delegation
replied with chagrin that they did not, he snapped back, “I think you
had better get one as soon as possible.”
But it took the Palestinians more than 60 years to heed Plumer’s advice, adopting Anthem of the Intifada two decades after Israel took over the West Bank and Gaza in 1967 – at the beginning of the 1987 Intifada.
Under the Mandate, local Arabs also refused to
establish an ‘Arab Agency’ to develop the Arab sector, parallel to the
Jewish Agency that directed development of the Jewish sector (see the
Chapter “Rejectionism”).
In fact, the so-called patriotism of indigenous
Muslims has flourished only when non-Muslim entities (the Crusaders, the
British, the Jews) have taken charge of the Holy Land. When political
control returns to Muslim hands, the ardent patriotism of the Arabs of
Palestine magically wanes, no matter how distant or how despotic the
government. One Turkish pasha who ruled Acco (Acre) between 1775 and
1804 was labeled Al Jazzar, The Butcher, by locals.
Why hasn’t Arab representative government ever been
established in Palestine, either in 1948 or during the next 19 years of
Arab rule? Because other Arabs co-opted the Palestinian cause as a
rallying point that would advance the concept that the territory was up
for grabs. “The Arab invasion of Palestine was not a means for achieving
an independent Palestine, but rather the result of a lack of consensus
on the part of the Arab states regarding such independence,” summed up
one historian. Adherents to a separate Palestinian identity were a mute
minority on the West Bank and Gaza during the 19 years of Jordanian and
Egyptian rule - until Israel took control from the Jordanians and the
Egyptians in 1967. Suddenly a separate Palestinian peoplehood appeared and claimed it deserved nationhood - and 21 other Arab states went along with it.
Palestinianism in and of itself lacks any substance
of its own. Arab society on the West Bank and Gaza suffers from deep
social cleavages created by a host of rivalries based on divergent
geographic, historical, geographical, sociological and familial
allegiances. What glues Palestinians together is a carefully nurtured
hatred of Israel and the rejection of Jewish nationhood.
Eli E. Hertz
Source: http://www.mythsandfacts.org/article_view.asp?articleID=53&order_id=1
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