Saturday, March 21, 2015

Will Obama Unleash the UN on Israel? - Joseph Klein

by Joseph Klein

Turning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict over to the UN is akin to turning the fire truck over to the arsonist. The UN institution, all the way up to the top, is pro-Palestinian to the core. That apparently suits Obama just fine, since he sees Israel, particularly Prime Minister Netanyahu, as the main obstacle to peace, just as the UN establishment does.

Congressional Leaders Meet With Obama And Biden At White House Over BudgetIsraeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu won a resounding victory at the polls on March 17th.  His party Likud will have an expected 30 out of 120 seats in the Knesset, compared to 24 seats for its closest competitor, the Zionist Union. As a result, Mr. Netanyahu is in the strongest position to form a new right-of-center coalition government.

After seeing their hopes for regime change in Israel go up in smoke, Obama administration officials have been attacking what White House spokesman Josh Earnest called Mr. Netanyahu’s “divisive rhetoric” during the election campaign.  They did not like that the prime minister rejected a two-state solution as they envision it should be designed. They were unhappy with likely plans by a new Netanyahu government for more settlement construction. And they objected to the prime minister’s last minute efforts to rally his supporters to come to the polls by telling them, in a video posted on social media, that they could lose the election because “Arab voters are streaming in huge quantities to the polling stations.” Finally, Obama is still smarting from Mr. Netanyahu’s historic speech before a joint session of Congress warning about the perils of the bad nuclear deal with Iran that may be in the offing.

President Obama wants to have as little direct dealings with Prime Minister Netanyahu as possible. He is reportedly ready to outsource the management of the relationship to Secretary of State John Kerry. As one senior administration official was quoted by the New York Times as saying about his peevish boss engaging with the prime minister, “he’s not going to waste his time.” However, Obama did finally get around to calling the prime minister to congratulate him, while reiterating the U.S. commitment to a two-state solution “that results in a secure Israel alongside a sovereign and viable Palestine.”

For his part, Prime Minister Netanyahu has tried since the election to qualify what he had said during the campaign about rejecting a two-state solution outright. He told MSNBC that what he wants is “a sustainable, peaceful two-state solution” when the circumstances permit. He told Fox News’ Megyn Kelly that the right conditions for such a two-state solution are not achievable just now, citing as one reason security concerns arising from terrorists occupying territory that Israel gives up. He added: “I didn’t retract any of the things I said in my speech six years ago, calling for a solution in which a demilitarized Palestinian state recognizes a Jewish state.”

It may be too late for such qualifications and back-tracking as far as the Obama administration is concerned. It is reportedly leaving the door open to throwing Israel to the wolves in the United Nations.

Indeed, Obama may decide to go along with the Palestinians’ push for a UN Security Council resolution that would codify the Palestinians’ demands, or at least not veto such a resolution. Obama already agrees with much of the demands in substance. His willingness in the past, however reluctant, to block UN Security Council intervention into the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations may well have gone by the wayside, now that Prime Minister Netanyahu has been re-elected. The excuse would be that Mr. Netanyahu has reversed his prior declaration of support for a two-state solution, which leaves no option but to go to the UN Security Council to endorse the principles of a final peace agreement centered on a two-state solution. The problem is what a Security Council-endorsed two-state solution would look like.

The Palestinian resolution, if it is anything like the previous draft resolution that failed to pass the Security Council last December when the U.S. did vote against it, would define the border between Israel and an independent Palestinian state along the pre-June 1967 lines, with minor mutually agreed upon swaps of territory. It would designate “East Jerusalem” as the capital of the Palestinian state. While legitimizing the Palestinians’ demands, such a resolution would provide virtually nothing concrete regarding specific steps to ensure Israelis’ security. And it would still provide the Palestinians the leeway to continue demanding the so-called right of return of millions of so-called refugees to live within the pre-June 1967 Israeli borders.

Turning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict over to the UN is akin to turning the fire truck over to the arsonist. The UN institution, all the way up to the top, is pro-Palestinian to the core. That apparently suits Obama just fine, since he sees Israel, particularly Prime Minister Netanyahu, as the main obstacle to peace, just as the UN establishment does.

The UN’s institutional bias against Israel rears its ugly head so often that it is impossible to keep count. Asked for comment on Prime Minister Netanyahu’s election victory, for example, the deputy spokesperson for UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon read a statement on March 18th that put all the onus for reaching a peace agreement on the newly formed Israeli government.

“It’s incumbent on the new Israeli Government,” the statement said, “to create the conditions for a negotiated final peace agreement – with the active engagement of the international community – that will end the Israeli occupation and realize the creation of a viable Palestinian state, living in peace and security alongside Israel.” The statement insisted on the “cessation of illegal settlement building in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,” adding that the Secretary General “firmly believes this is also the best and only way forward for Israel to remain a democratic state.” Not a single concession was asked from the Palestinian side. Only lip service was given to Israel’s security concerns. And lecturing Israel on how to remain a democratic state was an insult to the Israeli voters – including Arab Israeli citizens – who freely elected their next leader. The Palestinian leadership, on the other hand, remains split between jihadist terrorists in Gaza and a president of the Palestinian Authority who remains in power long after his term expired.

Responding to this one-sided statement, Israel’s ambassador to the UN Ron Prosor said:
The United Nations may disagree with the policies of the Israeli government, but there is one fact that can’t be disputed – that Israel is the only democracy in the Middle East. Yesterday Israelis went to the polls and 72% of citizens voted – that’s one of the highest voter turnouts in the world. If the UN is so concerned about the future of the Palestinian people, it should be asking why President Abbas is in the tenth year of a five-year presidential term or why Hamas uses the Palestinian people as human shields.
If President Obama does decide to use the UN Security Council in a cynical effort to undermine Prime Minister Netanyahu, he will be handing the Palestinians a propaganda victory. He will enable the UN to become the instrument of international legitimization of their demands. No concessions would be required on the Palestinians’ part. Indeed, there will be little if anything left to negotiate except the timing of rocket attacks launched against Israeli civilians from the West Bank and how many millions of Palestinians will be permitted to flood pre-1967 Israel so that they can turn Israel into another Lebanon.

On the other hand, unless Israel goes along with the will of the so-called “international community,” as expressed by the Security Council, more European countries and other democratic nations will be persuaded to formally recognize the Palestinian state, perhaps including the Obama administration itself. And the insidious Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions Movement will pick up steam in a worldwide effort to cast Israel in the image of a pariah apartheid state.

If President Obama decides to use the UN to help enable the isolation or surrender of Israel, he will have sabotaged the only democratic, pluralistic state in the Middle East while continuing to coddle the repressive Iranian theocratic regime determined to annihilate the Jewish state. Sadly, that may well be exactly where Obama is headed.

Joseph Klein is a Harvard-trained lawyer and the author of Global Deception: The UN’s Stealth Assault on America’s Freedom and Lethal Engagement: Barack Hussein Obama, the United Nations & Radical Islam.


Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

The Urgent Business of the Next Government - Caroline Glick

by Caroline Glick

The Nation-State bill was controversial not because the Left supports changing the national anthem from “Hatikva” to the PLO’s anthem “Baladi, Baladi.” The Left opposed the legislation because its leaders feared the law would weaken the Supreme Court.

Originally published by the Jerusalem Post

On Tuesday, the people of Israel spoke. They gave a clear mandate to the nationalist camp, led by the Likud and Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, to lead the country.

Now that the people have spoken, our leaders must consider the steps they must take, immediately upon entering office, that will enable them to advance their agenda and so meet the public’s expectations.

To understand why this is necessary, we need to recall why Netanyahu decided to dismantle his last coalition government and opt for an early election. What made Netanyahu decide that he would be better off going to an election and risk losing power rather than maintaining his existing government intact? There were two developments that caused Netanyahu to break up his coalition government by firing then-justice minister Tzipi Livni and then-finance minister Yair Lapid. First, they voted in favor of the so-called “Israel Hayom” bill, legislation that would have forced the closure of the mass circulation free daily “Israel Hayom.”

Second, they opposed draft legislation for a basic law that would give a new quasi-constitutional anchor to Israel’s Jewish identity – the so-called Nation-State bill.

The “Israel Hayom” bill was a raw act of aggression against Israel’s democratic system. The legislation was an attempt by the political Left, together with media moguls, to censor and silence the only mass circulation Hebrew daily with an editorial line significantly different from the rest of the mass media in the country.

Whether you love or hate the paper owned by Netanyahu’s supporter, billionaire Sheldon Adelson, if you care about Israel’s democratic system, the notion that lawmakers would act in collusion with media moguls – or even on the own – to pass a censorship law with the goal of forcing the closure of a newspaper should disturb you deeply.

Consequently, one of the most urgent orders of business on the next government’s agenda must be to contend with the forces in our society that support censorship of ideas and the ideological uniformity of our mass media.

The proper response to this attempt to silence different voices and prevent an open discourse in this country is not simply to tear up the draft legislation.

The proper response is to open up the media market to competition. To this end, the government must direct its attention to the one remaining media market that remains closed to competition: the electronic media.

The government should act as quickly as possible to open the television and radio waves to market forces. Everyone with the financial wherewithal should have the right to buy and operate a radio or television station. To achieve this, the government needs to take two steps.

First, it needs to end all restrictions on content in television and radio broadcasting aside from provisions barring the airing of pornography and other social ills. Second, it needs to make media licensing conditional on the licensee’s prior agreement to broadcast IDF messages during states of emergency. Under the new system, state owned media outlets, including Army Radio, will be privatized.

The second step the government must take to ensure free competition in the mass media is to sell operating licenses to operate television and radio stations. The licenses should be restricted only by the constraints of the electromagnetic spectrum. The right to decide if a media outlet succeeds or fails ought to belong to the public, not to a group of unelected “media professionals” sitting on a content committee.

The “Israel Hayom” draft law was a threat to Israeli democracy. And the threat would have been carried out if the election results had been different. To ensure that we don’t face a similar threat in the future, we need a media market full of different voices saying different things, competing for our attention. As long as Israel Hayom remains the only mass media organ with a unique voice, it will remain under threat from the forces that prefer unanimity to variety in our public discourse.

Although the next Knesset will have the votes to pass the Nation-State bill, there is no pressing need to do so, although it wouldn’t be a bad thing if the legislation did become law. The reason it doesn’t matter one way or another is because the legislation is redundant. Its central components, those that define Israel as the Jewish state, are already anchored in standing law, including basic laws with quasi-constitutional standing.

The Nation-State bill was controversial not because the Left supports changing the national anthem from “Hatikva” to the PLO’s anthem “Baladi, Baladi.” The Left opposed the legislation because its leaders feared the law would weaken the Supreme Court.

And that was indeed the declared purpose of the measure’s proponents. After the bill received the cabinet’s approval last November, Economy Minister Naftali Bennett said that by giving constitutional weight to Israel’s Jewish identity, the law would force the Supreme Court to take the necessity of protecting Israel’s Jewish character into consideration in its rulings.

The problem with this view – again, shared by the bill’s right-wing proponents and its left-wing opponents – is that it ignores the Supreme Court’s record. As we saw as recently as last month, Supreme Court justices have no compunction about ignoring the explicit language of standing laws, including Basic Laws with quasi- constitutional weight.

Basic Law: The Knesset prohibits anti-Zionist parties and candidates who reject Israel’s right to exist from running for the Knesset. And yet, just as they did in previous elections, last month the Supreme Court allowed MK Haneen Zoabi to run for Knesset despite the fact that she rejects Israel’s right to exist.

It is impossible to reform the legal system by passing laws that justices and governmental legal advisers will ignore. The only way to reform the legal system and so strengthen Israeli democracy is to take direct steps to curb the anti-democratic powers that the legal fraternity, led by the court, has arrogated. To this end, the incoming government and Knesset must take four actions, and the quicker they move, the more likely they will be successful.

First, the Knesset must amend standing law in a manner that prohibits justices from legislating from the bench and overturning laws passed by the Knesset. The Knesset must reassert its sole authority to pass laws.

Second, the Knesset must change the way that judges are selected. The authority to appoint judges must be transferred to the justice minister.

Their appointments should be conditional on the approval of the cabinet. Supreme Court nominees should similarly be appointed by the justice minister, but after their appointments are approved by the cabinet, they must also receive Knesset approval.

The third step the government should take is to introduce uniformity to the process of appointing senior government officials – including the attorney- general and the IDF chief of staff.

The relevant minister should be given the power to appoint subordinate officials. Like judges, their appointments should be subject to government approval.

The prevailing system for senior appointments empowers a group of unelected officials and former officials, generally appointed by the president of the Supreme Court, to nominate or screen candidates for senior positions and then force the government to rubber-stamp its decisions. The system was developed to prevent a certain type of abuse of power. But it has created an even greater abuse of power.

By marginalizing the role of elected officials in the appointments process, unelected clerks, appointed by an unelected justice, have affected a sort of bureaucratic coup that denies the public’s representatives the ability to perform their basic function of carrying out the people’s will.

The final step the government must take to ensure it is able to conduct the business of leading the country in accordance with the public’s wishes is to end the current practice of elevating the unelected attorney-general and his colleagues, the legal advisers in the various government ministries and in the Knesset, above the country’s elected leaders. It is an affront to the norms of democracy and good governance, not to mention public hygiene that under the current system the attorney- general can and often does refuse to defend government decisions when they are challenged in the Supreme Court.

If Netanyahu’s next government takes the steps outlined above, not only will it strengthen Israeli democracy. It will make it far easier for the government to meet Israel’s manifold challenges – from expanding housing construction to improving the education system, to saving the bankrupt medical system to developing policies for dealing with the kangaroo courts abroad seeking to delegitimize Israel’s right to exist.

Steps must also be taken to correct the pathologies we discovered during the latest election. Over the past three months, we learned that our election finance laws are a disaster.

Under the current legal regime, political parties receive public financing. Their ability to receive private donations is harshly restricted. On the other hand, soft money, even funds from foreign governments and foreign donors, is completely unrestricted.

As a consequence, foreign governments and non-citizens can buy themselves more powerful microphones than the political parties running for election. This is true even in the case of organizations like V15, A Million Hands and the 200 retired commanders who hate Bibi, whose expressed goal of defeating Netanyahu and the Likud was explicitly partisan.

In theory, there are two ways of correcting the system’s glaring inequity. Either soft money can be as heavily regulated as state election funding; or restrictions on direct donations to political parties can be removed. In practice, there is no way to effectively restrict the operation of non-partisan political operatives during an election. The only way to level the playing field that is enforceable is to allow unrestricted donations to political parties.

The caveat to unrestricted contributions is that they must be transparent for political parties and private organizations alike. Parties and political groups like V15 must be required to submit a full accounting of their contributors to the Central Elections Committee. The submissions must include information on any conditions placed on the contributions that relate to the current or future positions of the political parties and groups.

Failure to provide a complete and accurate accounting of these issues should be defined as a felony offense, and offenders should be subject to mandatory imprisonment.

The last government collapsed due to the weakness of Israel’s democratic institutions. The most acute expressions of that weakness are the closed electronic media market and the tyranny of our unelected legal fraternity. Most recently, the deficiencies of our election finance laws was also exposed as a threat to our system, easily exploited by foreign influence peddlers.

From the moment it takes office, the next government is going to be faced with massive challenges on every front. To surmount them, and so ensure it can fulfill the mandate it received from the public, our elected leaders must take immediate steps to strengthen our democracy.

Caroline Glick is the Director of the David Horowitz Freedom Center's Israel Security Project and the Senior Contributing Editor of The Jerusalem Post. For more information on Ms. Glick's work, visit


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Will a deal with Iran be struck this weekend? - Rick Moran

by Rick Moran

The administration and Kerry have been moving the goal posts for months.  The only progress has come when the West has acceded to the Iranian position.

Both Secretary of State John Kerry and Iranian president Hassan Rouhani are saying that a deal on Iran's nuclear deal is within reach, leading to speculation that an agreement may be imminent.
The United States and Iran reported significant progress Saturday toward a nuclear agreement, with the Iranian president declaring a deal within reach. America's top diplomat was more reserved, leaving open whether world powers and Tehran would meet a March 31 deadline.
Speaking after a week of nuclear negotiations in Switzerland, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry challenged Iran to make "fundamental decisions" that prove to the world it has no interest in atomic weapons. Amid conflicting statement by officials about how close the sides were, Kerry said, "We have an opportunity to try to get this right."
The talks "have made substantial progress," Kerry told reporters, "though important gaps remain." Talks with Iran resume next week.
In Tehran, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani was more optimistic. "Achieving a deal is possible," he said. "There is nothing that can't be resolved."
Other negotiators offered both positive and negative assessments. Top Russian negotiator Sergey Ryabkov and Iran's atomic energy chief Ali Akbar Salehi said in recent days that technical work was nearly done. But French officials said the opposite, declaring the sides far from any agreement.
France is sounding the alarm about the potential deal:
French diplomats have been publicly pressing the U.S. and other world powers not to give ground on key elements—particularly the speed of lifting U.N. sanctions and the pledge to constrain Iran’s nuclear research work—ahead of the March 31 target.
Paris also appears to be operating on a different diplomatic clock than Washington, arguing that the date is an “artificial” deadline and that global powers should be willing to wait Tehran out for a better deal if necessary.
Obama administration officials have said that expected moves by the U.S. Congress to put new sanctions on Iran as soon as April limit their ability to extend the diplomacy.
But French officials took exception.
“Making the end of March an absolute deadline is counterproductive and dangerous,” France’s ambassador to the U.S., Gérard Araud, said via Twitter after the latest round of negotiations in Switzerland concluded Friday.
“No agreement without concrete decisions on issues beyond the enrichment capability question,” he said a day earlier, specifically mentioning the need for extensive monitoring and clarity on Iran’s past research work. Western officials believe they included the pursuit of nuclear-weapon capabilities.
There's one of two explanations for the seemingly rapid progress over the last few hours: either Iran has substantially altered its position and is making concessions, or the U.S. and the West are caving in to Iranian demands.

Which do you think is more likely?

The French government won't blow up the talks by claiming a Western surrender.  They don't want to go to war over Iran's nuclear program any more than Obama does.  Nor do they want to be blamed if the talks collapse.  All they can do is point out the obvious and keep their mouths shut otherwise.

The administration and Kerry have been moving the goal posts for months.  The only progress has come when the West has acceded to the Iranian position.  We have gone from a ten-year deal, with sanctions being gradually lifted over that time, to a deal of unspecified length with the major sanctions lifted in weeks.  When you consider that the Iranians will interpret this deal any way they see fit and the administration won't dare call them out for violating it, Iran is sitting pretty at the moment.

Yes, but at least Obama will make "history" by enabling the Iranian nuclear bomb program.

Rick Moran


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France: Nuclear deal must guarantee Iran can’t get bomb - Times of Israel Staff

by Times of Israel Staff

French FM unhappy with emerging accord, says it must be sufficiently ‘robust’ to win approval of regional countries, prevent arms race

France’s Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius said Saturday that Paris is pushing for a nuclear deal with Iran that would ensure Tehran would not be able to build an atomic weapon in the future.

“France wants an agreement, but a robust one that really guarantees that Iran can have access to civilian nuclear power, but not the atomic bomb,” Fabius told Europe 1 radio on Saturday. 

The French FM added that “if the accord is not sufficiently solid then regional countries would say it’s not serious enough, so we are also going to get the nuclear weapon, and that would lead to an extremely dangerous nuclear proliferation.”

France has taken a tougher line on an Iran deal almost from the beginning, insisting on significant concessions from Tehran in the framework of an agreement.

In the recent round of talks in Switzerland this weekend, cut short Friday because of the death of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani’s mother, Fabius reportedly called the French delegation to make sure no more concessions were made, Reuters reported.

French diplomats have been pressing their counterparts not to give in on key elements, such as the easing of sanctions before serious progress is made, and arguing that an upcoming deadline was an “artificial” date, the Wall Street Journal reported. The P5+1, France argues, should be willing to press Tehran for a better deal and wait, if necessary.

US Secretary of State John Kerry was headed to London Saturday to meet with his Europeans counterparts for a briefing on Iran nuclear negotiations

The US’s top diplomat was expected to discuss France’s strong reservations. Paris would like to see only a symbolic easing of punitive measures until an agreement is inked, according to reports.

US President Barack Obama called French President Francois Hollande on Friday to discuss the disagreement between the two allies.

The presidents reaffirmed their commitment to a deal “while noting that Iran must take steps to resolve several remaining issues,” the White House said in a statement.

Talks are set to resume next week, according to Iranian officials, only five days before a March 31 target date for a political framework.

On Friday, Iran and the six world powers met to attempt to iron out their remaining differences over the outline of a deal on Iran’s nuclear program.

The mooted agreement, due to be finalized by July, is aimed at convincing the world after a standoff now in its 13th year that Iran won’t build nuclear weapons under the guise of its civilian program.

The highly complex deal would likely involve Iran reducing in scope its nuclear activities, allowing ultra-tight inspections, exporting nuclear material and limiting development of new nuclear machinery.

In exchange, Iran, which denies wanting nuclear weapons, would be granted staggered relief from the mountain of painful sanctions that have strangled its oil exports and hammered its economy.

Negotiators missed two deadlines last July and November for a deal but the pressures in Washington — where Republicans are teeing up new sanctions legislation — all but rule out a new extension, experts say.

Both Kerry and Zarif on Thursday spoke of “progress” in the talks, but both sides have said that there remain considerable gaps still to bridge.

In earlier indications of a building deal, officials told the AP Thursday that the United States and Iran were drafting elements of a deal that commits Tehran to a 40-percent cut in the number of machines it could use to make an atomic bomb. In return, the Iranians would get quick relief from some crippling economic sanctions and a partial lift of a UN embargo on conventional arms.

Agreement on those details of Iran’s uranium-enrichment program could signal a breakthrough for a larger deal aimed at containing the Islamic Republic’s nuclear activities.

Obama appealed to Tehran Friday to seize a “historic” opportunity and begin a “brighter future”.

In a Nowruz (Persian New Year) video address, Obama said that a “reasonable nuclear deal… can help open the door to a brighter future for you, the Iranian people.”

“I believe that our nations have a historic opportunity to resolve this issue peacefully — an opportunity we should not miss,” added Obama.

In an apparent response, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif said it was the other side that had to make a decision.

“Iranians have already made their choice: engage with dignity. It’s high time for the US and its allies to chose: pressure or agreement,” Zarif wrote in a message posted on his official Twitter account.

AP and AFP contributed to this report.

Times of Israel Staff


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Did Israel Weaken Hamas? The 2014 Gaza War - Efraim Inbar

by Efraim Inbar

Despite sweeping support in Israel for the military action against Hamas, the results left Israelis troubled. It is no small matter to accept that the conflict cannot be resolved and that another round of fighting is just around the corner. Nevertheless, surveys show that Israelis have internalized this reality and, during the war, displayed extraordinary fortitude and solidarity. Turning the protracted conflict into a tolerable routine constitutes a major challenge for Israeli society.

Following the abduction and murder of three Israeli teenagers in the West Bank and a continuous barrage of Hamas rockets on Israeli towns and villages, the government of Israel launched Operation Protective Edge on July 8, 2014, mostly in the form of air strikes on Hamas targets. On July 17, a limited ground incursion commenced to locate and destroy tunnels into Israel, coming to a close on August 5. Having either rejected or violated numerous ceasefires, on August 26, Hamas finally accepted an Egyptian ceasefire proposal (originally made on July 15). The operation lasted fifty days and was longer than all previous rounds of violence in Gaza.

What were the operation's strategic rationale and goals? How has it affected Israel's international standing, its negotiations with the Palestinians, and regional deterrent posture? Above all, who actually won the war?

In July 2014, three Israeli teenagers were found shot to death in the
West Bank, shortly after their abduction by Hamas terrorists. These
murders, and the ensuing rocket attacks on Israeli population centers,
have reinforced Israeli awareness of the inability to affect the motivation
of non-state actors such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah to fight
the Jewish state.

What were the operation's strategic rationale and goals? How has it affected Israel's international standing, its negotiations with the Palestinians, and regional deterrent posture? Above all, who actually won the war?

The Strategic Rationale

By the twenty-first century, Israel's leaders had reached the conclusion that the country was involved in an intractable conflict with part of the Arab world, particularly with non-state organizations driven by religious extremism. Most Israelis
are keenly aware of their inability to affect the motivation of the non-state actors such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah to fight the Jewish state; they understand full well the impracticality of attempting to defeat extreme ideologies by force of arms. The non-state organizations are a persevering and uncompromising enemy, bent on destroying the Jewish state, and there is nothing Jerusalem can do to lessen this motivation. Thus, Israeli leaders refrain from using military strength to strive for "victory" or for an end to the conflict. Jerusalem does not expect peace or integration with its neighbors. It merely wants to be left alone.
The patient approach of "mowing the grass" is a mirror image of the Arabs' persevering "resistance" strategy.
Although Israelis understand that there is no simple way to deter highly motivated organizations like Hezbollah and Hamas, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), nevertheless, use force to degrade their enemies' military capabilities and thus diminish the damage they can inflict. In Israel's military parlance, this is "mowing the grass" of its enemies' abilities, without any pretensions to solving the conflict.[1] Moreover, Jerusalem is trying to gain a modicum of deterrence in order to extend the quiet between rounds of violence. Periods of calm are important for Israel; its very existence portrays a victory to extremist, non-state enemies and constantly reminds them that their destruction plans are unattainable. Extending the periods of calm along the borders will lessen the cost of this protracted conflict for Israel. Ironically, the patient, attritional approach of Israeli military action is a mirror image of the Arabs' persevering "resistance" (muqawama) strategy. Israel's large-scale operations in Gaza of December 2008-January 2009 (Cast Lead) and November 2012 (Pillar of Defense) were conducted with this strategic rationale.

The Operation's Objectives

During the summer of 2014, Hamas found itself in a difficult position, primarily due to the fall of President Muhammad Morsi in Egypt in July 2013 and his replacement by Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, elected president in May 2014. Viewing Hamas as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood and hence an arch enemy, the new regime joined Israel in cutting its supply routes to Gaza.[2] As a result, Hamas chose to rock the boat by attacking Israel in the hope of breaking Gaza's isolation. Specifically, it demanded reconstruction of the Rafah airport, construction of a seaport, and unrestricted traffic between Gaza and the West Bank.

Jerusalem reacted with Operation Protective Edge to force Hamas to stop the rocket and missile attacks and to thwart its political goals in accordance with a strategy of attrition and limited political objectives: "gaining quiet on Israel's border with Gaza" and "quiet will be met with quiet."[3] The government did not speak in terms of toppling Hamas or returning Gaza to Israel's control, despite some proponents within the cabinet of this course of action. These voices became more prominent as Hamas refused to cease its bombardment. Yet, while the IDF is perfectly capable of these alternatives, toppling Hamas and reoccupying Gaza could easily incur a prohibitive human cost. In addition, it was not likely that Jerusalem would garner support from the international community, especially the United States, for a lengthy operation of this kind. Nevertheless, if Hamas renews its fire against Israel, there may be no other recourse but to recapture the entire Gaza Strip so as to destroy its military potential and to gain a long period of calm.
The government of Israel desired a weakened Hamas to rule over Gaza.
Hamas is deeply entrenched in Palestinian society and draws considerable support from the Palestinian public. Surveys conducted among Palestinians prior to Operation Protective Edge showed 35 percent support in both the West Bank and Gaza with even greater support in the Strip alone. Hamas's civilian arm provides many services for the Gaza population, and Gazans feel gratitude toward the organization. Noteworthy as well, Hamas won both the 2005 municipal elections and the 2006 parliamentary elections. All this indicates widespread support for Hamas on the Palestinian street. Moreover, the military arm's violent struggle against Israel is highly popular, despite its heavy cost for the Gaza population. In December 2014, an overwhelming majority of 77 percent supported rocket and missile attacks on Israel if the siege and blockade was not ended.[4] Public opinion surveys conducted in the wake of the operation showed support for Hamas among the Palestinians at a higher level than ever.[5] Unfortunately, many Palestinians are not encouraged to strive for peace but rather to sacrifice their lives and become martyrs in a holy war against the Jewish state.

An Israeli soldier inspects a Hamas tunnel. Hamas had planned to use
 this and other tunnels to launch an attack timed for the Rosh Hashanah
 holiday on kibbutzim and other Israeli communities, killing and
kidnapping as many Israeli civilians as possible. The recent Gaza
operation thwarted these plans.

Despite Hamas's uncompromising nature, the Israeli government desired a weakened regime to rule over Gaza. The separation of Gaza from the West Bank serves Israeli interests by weakening the national Palestinian movement, which remains a bitter enemy of Israel into the foreseeable future. Mahmoud Abbas' September 2014 address to the U.N. General Assembly is clear proof of that.[6] Even as the Palestinian Authority (PA) asks the United Nations to recognize Palestinian independence, it continues to teach hatred for Israel and to make demands that jeopardize its own existence.
Criticism of the operation's aims was also voiced by the Israeli Left and the international community. Some called for the ending of Hamas rule and the return of Gaza to the PA with IDF assistance. This could seemingly revive the two-state solution paradigm. But it is unclear whether Abbas is willing or capable of taking control of Gaza even if the IDF cleared the way. Indeed, apart from the nominal so-called unity government of June 2014, the PA has shown no interest in such a scenario. Neither the PA nor the government of Israel appears to want any part in running Gaza.

The proposal to hand Gaza to the PA also demonstrates forgetfulness of the failed Israeli attempts to determine the leadership of its Arab neighbors, such as the 1982 Lebanon war and the "village associations" with the West Bank Palestinians. Influencing political dynamics in the surrounding Arab states is simply beyond Jerusalem's abilities. Even the powerful United States has repeatedly failed to do this. Moreover, favoring particular candidates for power in an Arab entity will always have a boomerang effect since Israel's support erodes their legitimacy. Pragmatic cooperation with Israel is not the way to popularity in the Arab world.

The International Arena

Garnering international support for an operation against Hamas in Gaza was high on the Israeli list of priorities. The conduct of the Israeli government reflected this priority with its forbearing attitude and willingness to accept all proposed ceasefires. Political coordination with Egypt also served this aim, especially vis-à-vis the Arab states.

The majority of the international community supported Israel's right to self-defense. Part of the international credit was thanks to Jerusalem's readiness to accept every ceasefire and partly due to the somewhat reserved U.S. support. Despite international criticism of the supposed use of disproportionate force, generated by images of destruction from Gaza, Israel was able to operate militarily for fifty days. This is a considerable feat.

The regional political alignment was also convenient for Israel. There was conspicuous restraint among conservative Arab states such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the Persian Gulf monarchies (excluding Qatar), all of which were keen to see Hamas hit hard. It was also clear that these states shared common strategic interests with Israel as was the case during the 2008-09 fighting in Gaza (Operation Cast Lead). Like Israel, these states also consider Iran a major threat, especially its nuclear aspirations. The phenomenon of the so-called Islamic State, the extremist Islamist organization that has conquered parts of Syria and Iraq and proclaimed a caliphate, has brought the moderate states even closer together. The strategic partnership between Israel and these Arab states is a bright point among the regional shambles left by the Arab uprisings.

Washington failed to grasp the seminal significance of Egypt in the Gaza equation.
Israel considered Egypt's involvement of paramount importance in arranging a settlement that would bring the Gaza campaign to an end and in goading Hamas into a ceasefire that basically ignored most of the terrorist organization's demands. This insistence strengthened the ties between Israel and Egypt—the most important Arab state.

Unfortunately, the Obama administration did not appear to have a real grasp of the Middle East reality. Before the war, Washington had expressed support for the Hamas-PA national unity government. This lent additional legitimacy to Hamas, strengthening the widespread impression that the Obama administration favored the Muslim Brotherhood (Hamas's parent organization) and further alienating key Arab states, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia. These two and the smaller Persian Gulf states were already suspicious of U.S. policy following years of unsuccessful negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program, the misplaced U.S. trust in Turkey's Islamist regime, and the inexplicable support for Egypt's short-lived Muslim Brotherhood regime. As such, Washington's approach toward Hamas became yet another component in the Obama administration's failed Middle East policy.[7]
The strains between Washington and Cairo following the ousting of the Muslim Brotherhood were in stark contrast to the close cooperation between Israel and Egypt regarding Hamas.[8] Washington failed to grasp the seminal significance of Egypt in the Gaza equation and, for a time, ignored its proposed ceasefire and endeavored to promote the mediation initiative of Qatar and Turkey, both Hamas supporters. The U.S. administration believed that these two states could influence Hamas, neglecting the fact that Cairo had historically been a rival of Ankara in regional affairs and had a particularly tense relationship with Turkey's controlling Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP).

During the Gaza war, disagreements arose between Jerusalem and Washington, underscoring the complexity of the bilateral relationship during the Obama administration. U.S. officials expressed concern about the effects of Israel's use of force while the Israelis resisted the U.S. intention to make Turkey and Qatar sponsors of a ceasefire. Highlighting the strains, a Wall Street Journal story about delays in transferring helicopter Hellfire missiles[9] referred to a scheduled delivery of missiles that Israel merely wished to expedite. With the delay, Washington signaled its disapproval of Israeli actions, but the operational implications were marginal. It is also important to note that the delayed arms shipment consisted of arms other than the Hellfire missiles. Unfortunately, the negative publicity surrounding the strains in U.S.-Israeli relations has had a detrimental effect on Israel's international reputation and, particularly, on its regional status.

Still, the U.S. unwillingness to transfer ammunition during the fighting sent a shock wave through the Israeli defense establishment. In the wake of this incident, the defense establishment is reconsidering joint U.S.-Israeli projects in which weapons are manufactured in the United States with U.S. aid funding. It is expected that in the future, Israel will increase its local production of sensitive arms to prevent a repeat of the summer's events. Another consequence of the delays is Israeli reexamination of its domestically manufactured ammunition supplies.[10]

Nevertheless, defense relations of the closest kind continue between Israel and the United States. Washington swiftly approved further funding for another Iron Dome missile defense battery and even opened its war reserve stockpile in Israel to assist the IDF with its ammunition shortage. And yet, publicity surrounding the strain harmed Israel and motivated Hamas to persist in its rejection of a ceasefire. Some friction with Washington on the Palestinian issue is inevitable due to differences over its importance and how it should be managed. In the Israeli view, Washington tends to exaggerate both the regional implications of Palestinian-Israeli peace and the chances for its achievement.[11]
It is noteworthy that great powers such as China, India, and Russia showed understanding toward Israel's situation while many other states were relieved to see the fighting draw to a close so that they could continue their "business as usual" with Israel. Despite exaggerated fears of international isolation among certain circles in Israel following the fighting in Gaza, Jerusalem's international status has remained strong, and its economic ties with the world are unaffected by the conflict with the Palestinians.[12]

Discontent with Israel's actions in Gaza was voiced by the usual suspects: human rights organizations, U.N. institutions, and some third world countries. Several West European countries hosted anti-Israel marches, and anti-Semitic sentiments surfaced in an unprecedented manner.[13] A number of Latin American states, including Brazil, recalled their ambassadors.[14] The U.N. Human Rights Council's decision to appoint a commission of inquiry on war crimes will likely lead to a "Goldstone II" report, which could inflict political damage on Israel.

War coverage by the international media was biased in favor of the Palestinians. Media reports on the alleged disproportionate use of force are the result of Hamas's manipulation and demonstrate a poor understanding of what happens during war. It should be noted, however, that both the BBC and The New York Times ran articles that questioned the data supplied by Hamas on the number and identity of their fatalities.[15] Among the slightly more than 2,000 fatalities, half were identified by Israel as Hamas operatives, which amounted to a ratio of one to one collateral damage—much better than the U.S. record in Iraq or Afghanistan.

Hamas will balk at any attempt to force it to part with its
weapons. Historically, full demilitarization was always applied
to the defeated side. But while Hamas has been considerably
weakened by Israel, it was by no means defeated. Thus, the
demand for Hamas's peaceful disarmament is unrealistic. Still,
the agreement on the demilitarization of Gaza in the Oslo
accords serves to erode the legitimacy of Hamas's use of force
against Israel.
On the other hand, one positive outcome of the war was the idea of "demilitarization in exchange for reconstruction," accepted by such international actors as the United States, the European Union, and even the U.N. The main motive for introducing demilitarization is to pave the way for the return of Gaza to the PA and, perhaps, the internationalization of the conflict that will give the Europeans a say in the Israeli-Palestinian arena. Yet, Hamas will balk at any attempt to force it to part with its weapons. Historically, full demilitarization was always applied to the defeated side. But while Hamas has been considerably weakened by Israel, it was by no means defeated. Thus, the demand for Hamas's peaceful disarmament is unrealistic. Nevertheless, the international agreement on the demilitarization of Gaza—a key element in the 1990s Oslo accords—erodes Hamas's legitimacy to use force against Israel. Moreover, this idea legitimizes efforts by Israel to monitor supplies entering Gaza and to use force for defense purposes.

Several suggestions are being raised for the involvement of international actors and U.N. forces in advancing demilitarization, but Israel has had a dismal experience with such experiments. All the international peacekeeping mechanisms and forces in the Arab-Israeli arena have invariably proven ineffective. For example, there is the failure since 2006 of the U.N. force in South Lebanon (UNIFIL) to prevent rockets from reaching Hezbollah. In Gaza, after only one year at the Rafah crossing, European observers took to their heels at the first sign of danger. U.N. units in the Golan Heights (UNDOF) have now also retreated when faced with hostile activity. The international force in Sinai, which monitors the demilitarization clauses of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, has no mandate to fight Islamist terrorists in the peninsula. This force became largely superfluous when Israel agreed to the upgrading of Egyptian forces in Sinai to enhance counterterrorist capabilities. Israel simply cannot count on others to ensure its safety.

Israeli Deterrence

The government of Israel demonstrated caution in avoiding the use of massive force, which is commendable in a democracy that cares for the wellbeing of its citizens and soldiers. Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu was correct in predicting that such restraint would gain Israel international legitimacy as well as contribute to domestic national consensus. However, it remains to be seen whether such conduct eroded Israeli deterrence by delivering a message of weakness and hesitancy as the readiness to fight, determination, and uncompromising courage are the building stones of deterrence.

Restrictions placed on the IDF for fear of international reaction may be read as weakness and impair deterrence.
The image of Israel merely reacting to Hamas's moves, waiting each time until the last minute to see whether the terror group would oblige and extend the ceasefire, is not conducive to Israeli deterrence. Likewise, Hamas's lengthy refusal to accept a ceasefire shows that the 2014 Gaza operation did not exact a sufficiently painful cost to expedite an agreement. Nor does Hamas's claim that it withstood the Israeli military might for fifty days serve Israeli deterrence. Indeed, the fighting was much longer than the IDF had anticipated.[16] Maj. Gen. Sami Turgeman, who served as southern command chief in the Gaza war, said earlier in 2011, "We will do everything to shorten the duration of the campaign and will conduct a fast, lethal ground maneuver."[17]

It is important to remember that deterrence depends on military might but also on the willingness to employ force. Restrictions placed on the IDF for fear of international public reaction, such as avoidance of extensive targeting of multi-story buildings and mosques that served as Hamas strategic facilities and launching pads, may be read as weakness and impair deterrence. Perhaps escalation should have begun earlier in the war. On the other hand, Israel's ability to target the heads of Hamas's military branch, the severe level of destruction in parts of Gaza, and the IDF's capacity to collect real-time intelligence and attack swiftly, may contribute to deterrence. But leaving Hamas in control of Gaza conflicts with the aim of creating long-term deterrence. In light of all this, the contribution of the 2014 offensive to Israeli deterrence is inconclusive and will have to be examined over time.

The War's Effect on Negotiations

There is no sign of Hamas moderating its position toward Israel. Hamas's positions, and even that of the Palestine Liberation Organization, do not show any inclination to make a historical compromise with Jerusalem. The government of Israel still stands behind its statement that the Palestinian unity government is not a worthy partner for peace talks. Thus, the war did not directly affect the slim chances for advancing negotiations.

This realization has not permeated sufficiently into the Israeli political leadership since part of the political echelon is still caught up with the concept of a "two-state solution." Another part of society pays lip service to this formula despite understanding that it is impractical so long as the Palestinians reject Israel's right to exist; nevertheless, this group thinks that it is worth pursuing in order to manage the conflict rationally. Only the political extremes from Right and Left prefer other formulae and are ready to declare the "two-state solution" defunct. Yet, it is possible that the Gaza operation will constitute a stage in a long educational process by the Palestinians that Israel's existence is a fact and cannot be eradicated and that a high cost will be exacted for engaging the country in a protracted, violent conflict.

By contrast, the international community still cleaves rather obsessively to the "two-state solution" as panacea. The Pavlovian response to war is that increased efforts are necessary to solve the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. And yet, the difficulties in moving the "peace process" forward and crises in other places around the world may divert attention from this conflict and leave Israelis and Palestinians to continue spilling each other's blood. The Gaza war certainly clarifies that the two societies have reserves of energy and have not yet tired of fighting. At the end of the day, ethno-religious conflicts of the sort Israel is involved in usually are concluded once the societies involved reach a point of fatigue. That has not yet occurred.

The Domestic Arena

Operation Protective Edge was perceived by Israelis as both necessary and justifiable. The sense that there is no choice is an important condition in preserving national fortitude in an intractable, protracted conflict. The unprecedented efforts by the IDF to maintain its "purity of arms" or morality in warfare code also neutralized to a great extent criticism of the Israeli use of force from abroad and in extreme circles in Israel.

Israelis demonstrate in Tel Aviv in support of Operation
Protective Edge; the majority perceived it as necessary and
justifiable. The sense that there is no choice is an important
condition in preserving national fortitude in an intractable,
protracted conflict while the effectiveness of the Iron Dome
system contributed significantly to the ability of the home front
to function almost normally.

The achievements of the Iron Dome system contributed significantly to the ability of the home front to function almost normally—except for the Gaza-border residents, who were also exposed to mortar fire for which no appropriate defensive response was found. Moreover, for these residents, the failure to address Hamas's tunnels effectively severely detracted from their sense of security and trust in the government. It could be that preparing differently for the tunnel challenge might have entirely prevented the need for a ground campaign or at least would have required a less complicated operation.

Despite sweeping support in Israel for the military action against Hamas, the results left Israelis troubled. It is no small matter to accept that the conflict cannot be resolved and that another round of fighting is just around the corner. Nevertheless, surveys show that Israelis have internalized this reality and, during the war, displayed extraordinary fortitude and solidarity. Turning the protracted conflict into a tolerable routine constitutes a major challenge for Israeli society.

The domestic, political impact of the Gaza war will depend on the duration of the calm attained in its aftermath.
The domestic, political impact of the Gaza war will depend predominantly on the duration of the period of calm attained in its aftermath. The longer it lasts, the better it will be for Israel. If deterrence does not work and Hamas decides to challenge the government by firing into Israel, it may very well be that Jerusalem may be forced to "mow the grass" once again and all the more forcefully. This option is likely to gain much support from the Israeli public.


As long as the Palestinians do not transform their goals, the conflict will not be resolved, only managed. Israel will continue to live by the sword and to "mow the grass" as needed. In Operation Protective Edge, Jerusalem set out once again to destroy Hamas's military capabilities with the understanding that it is engaged in an intractable, protracted conflict requiring a strategy of attrition.
Ultimately, this objective was achieved. One third of Hamas's rocket and missile stockpile and most of its rocket-manufacturing infrastructure were destroyed. Most of its thirty-two attack tunnels were likely destroyed,[18] and about 1,000 Hamas combatants, including some high-level leaders, were killed.[19] It could be that more targeted killings and an earlier relaxing of the restraints on airpower could have expedited the acceptance of the ceasefire by Hamas and thus avoided much of the destruction in the Strip.

A major achievement by Hamas was the closure of the Ben-Gurion airport for a short time (due to a human error by Iron Dome operators). Moreover, the civilian population within the range of mortars and near the attack tunnels was shaken, and its resilience was questioned as some residents left the region.

Nevertheless, it is clear that Hamas lost this campaign. The unlimited ceasefire, as demanded by Israel and Egypt, constitutes a precondition to future negotiations and was formulated without the involvement of Qatar and Turkey. All the crossings into the Gaza Strip will continue to be under Israeli and Egyptian control, which will constrain Hamas's ability to rearm. Egypt even forced Hamas to agree to a PA presence at the Rafah crossing. All of Hamas's "victory speeches" cannot change the fact that, ultimately, it succumbed unconditionally to Egyptian-Israeli pressure.[20]

Any evaluation of Protective Edge must consider the cost for Israel. The Iron Dome system neutralized practically all rockets and missiles fired at Israeli population centers. The majority of the country suffered only marginally although the alarm sirens did have a negative psychological effect. The public's display of self-discipline reduced loss of life, but, nevertheless, there were seventy-two fatalities (including more than sixty soldiers) and hundreds of wounded. Limited damage was incurred, mostly to property in the Gaza envelope. The direct and indirect costs of the war, amounting to several billion dollars, are tolerable for the strong Israeli economy.

Israel's public diplomacy must adopt the concept of demilitarization and prepare a plan for promoting the idea. The goal is to make it as difficult as possible for Hamas (without toppling the organization) to acquire weaponry. Israeli diplomats must also contemplate how to check the onslaught against Israel in the field of international law.

Following the Gaza war, the IDF must rethink its operational mode. There are many areas of operation to be commended, such as technological superiority and fighting spirit among soldiers and commanders on the ground. Investigation of all these issues is underway in all corners of the Middle East, not just in Israel and the Gaza Strip.

The 2012 Pillar of Defense and 2009 Cast Lead operations in Gaza, as well as the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war, were launched to regain deterrence. All of them restored calm, marked by a continuing low level of attacks, but also engendered legal and political attacks in the international arena. So far, the 2014 military operation has achieved the same results, but no one can predict for how long the calm will last.
Efraim Inbar, director of the Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies, is professor of political studies at Bar-Ilan University and a Shilman-Ginsburg Writing Fellow at the Middle East Forum.

[1] Efraim Inbar and Eitan Shamir, "Mowing the Grass: Israel's Strategy for Protracted Intractable Conflict," Journal of Strategic Studies, Feb. 2014, pp. 65-90
[2] Yoni Ben-Menachem, "Egyptian President al-Sisi vs. Hamas," Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, Dec. 17, 2014.
[3] The Jerusalem Post, July 8, 2014.
[4] Palestinian Public Opinion Poll, no. 54, Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, Ramallah, Dec. 3-6, 2014.
[5] Special Gaza War Poll, Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, Ramallah, Aug. 26-30, 2014
[6] Mahmoud Abbas, speech to United Nations General Assembly, Palestine News and Information Agency, Ramallah, Sept. 26, 2014.
[7] Eytan Gilboa, "The United States and the Arab Spring," in Efraim Inbar, ed., The Arab Spring, Democracy and Security: Domestic and International Ramifications (London: Routledge, 2014), pp. 51-74.
[8] Daniel C. Kurtzer, "Can the Egyptian-American Relationship Be 'Reinvented?'" The American Interest, Apr. 8, 2014.
[9] The Wall Street Journal, Aug. 14, 2014.
[10] Author interview with senior Israeli official, Tel Aviv, Sept. 7, 2014.
[11] Jonathan Rynhold, The Arab-Israeli Conflict in American Political Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), chaps. 2-3; Dan Kurtzer and Scott Lasensky, Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace: American Leadership in the Middle East (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2008).
[12] Eugene Kontorovich, "Isolation and the Elections," Israel Hayom (Tel Aviv), Dec. 11, 2014; The Jerusalem Post, Dec. 18, 2014, Jan. 7, 2015.
[13] See, for example, The Telegraph (London), July 26, 2014.
[14] Haaretz (Tel Aviv), July 29, 2014.
[15] See, for example, The New York Times, Aug. 5, 2014.
[16] Moshe Yaalon, lecture, Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Ramat Gan, Sept. 29, 2014.
[17] Israel Defense (Kfar Saba), Sept. 18, 2014.
[18] "Operation 'Protective Edge': A Detailed Summary of Events," International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, Herzliya, July 12, 2014;The Jerusalem Post, July 16, 2014.
[19] "Operation 'Protective Edge.'"
[20] Ehud Yaari, "Hamas Searches for a New Strategy," Policy Notes, no. 19, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Oct. 2014; Yoni Ben-Menachem, "Internal Hamas Debate about Rethinking Policies," Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, Nov. 30, 2014.

Efraim Inbar, director of the Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies, is professor of political studies at Bar-Ilan University and a Shilman-Ginsburg Writing Fellow at the Middle East Forum.


Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.