The "Middle East and Terrorism" Blog was created in order to supply information about the implication of Arab countries and Iran in terrorism all over the world. Most of the articles in the blog are the result of objective scientific research or articles written by senior journalists.
From the Ethics of the Fathers: "He [Rabbi Tarfon] used to say, it is not incumbent upon you to complete the task, but you are not exempt from undertaking it."
As we approach the 2024 U.S. presidential election, the Middle East will become more unstable, and Iran will get closer to having a nuclear weapon.
According to a new International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) report, Iran increased the rate of its production
of near weapons-grade uranium (60% uranium-235) in late November 2023.
This increase ended a slowdown of Iran’s 60% uranium enrichment that
began in mid-2023 and increased the number of nuclear weapons it could
theoretically make and the amount of time to construct them.
Iran’s recent ramp-up of uranium enrichment
followed warnings last year that the number of nuclear weapons Iran
could construct has become dangerously high.
A March 2023 assessment report by
the Institute for Science and International Security indicated
that Iran could enrich enough weapons-grade uranium (90% uranium-235)
for one nuclear weapon in 12 days. In mid-November, the Institute assessed Iran
was capable of making enough weapons-grade uranium “for six nuclear
weapons in one month, eight in two months, ten in three months, eleven
in four months, and twelve in five months.”
Iran enriching uranium beyond the 60% level is reportedly a red line for Israel and could trigger Israeli attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities.
Although it is not clear whether or when
Iran will make the jump to weapons-grade enrichment, alarms were raised
in mid-November that Iran has taken steps to prevent the IAEA from
detecting just such a move when it barred
the agency’s most experienced and expert inspectors from entering the
country. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi called this “a serious
blow” to his agency’s capability to conduct meaningful inspections of
Iranian nuclear facilities.
This means Iran could start enriching uranium to weapons-grade at any time without being detected.
If Iran took this step, any weapons-grade
uranium it enriched would be in the form of a gaseous uranium compound
that would need to be processed into uranium metal to fuel a nuclear
weapon. This would take about a year. Iran would probably conduct one or
two underground nuclear tests before adding a nuclear weapon to its
arsenal. Any one of these moves could trigger Israeli airstrikes.
An Enormous Biden National Security Failure
The most damning element of this story is
that Iran did not begin enriching uranium to near-weapons grade until
Joe Biden became president.
Biden entered office determined to restore
the deeply flawed Iran nuclear deal (the JCPOA) negotiated by the Obama
Administration, which President Trump withdrew from in 2018. Shortly
after the administration initiated multilateral nuclear talks in 2021 to
revive the JCPOA, Iran started enriching uranium to the 60% level,
probably to gain leverage in the talks.
Instead of halting the nuclear talks
because of this development, the U.S. and its European allies ignored it
and continued to offer Iran concessions. Despite the U.S. offering Iran
increasingly generous concessions, negotiations collapsed in June 2022.
The concessions offered by the U.S. to Iran were so extravagant that
three members of the Biden Administration’s negotiation team at the
nuclear talks resigned in late January 2022. Several attempts in the
second half of 2022 by the U.S. and European states to negotiate an
interim nuclear deal with Iran also failed.
This situation took a stunning turn for the worse in the spring of 2023 when the Biden Administration agreed to a secret deal with Iran that “froze” Iran’s uranium enrichment at 60%. By striking this agreement, the Biden Administration knowingly legitimized
Iran’s uranium enrichment at a near weapons-grade level. This also
means Iran’s recent increased 60% enrichment is consistent with its
commitment to the Biden Administration.
Acceleration of Iran’s Nuclear Program Likely to Continue in Run-Up to 2024 U.S. Election
Driven by a global perception of President
Biden’s weak leadership and incompetent foreign policy, provocations by
Iran and its proxy groups have grown in recent months. These include the
October 7 Hamas terrorist attack on Israel, a sharp increase in attacks
against U.S. troops in Iraq and Syria by Iranian proxy groups, and
attacks against Israel and Red Sea shipping by Yemen’s Houthi rebels,
another Iranian proxy.
A growing belief that President Biden could
lose the 2024 presidential election will probably cause Middle East
security to deteriorate further this year as America’s enemies in the
region attempt to exploit Biden’s weakness before he is replaced next
January by a more decisive president with a more effective foreign
policy.
Concerning Iran’s recent expanded
production of near weapons-grade uranium, this probably represented
Tehran exploiting American weakness under President Biden and was
intended to challenge the United States as well as advance its nuclear
weapons program. It was also likely an Iranian ploy to pressure the
Biden Administration to resume nuclear talks and offer more concessions.
With Iranian leaders believing that the
Biden Administration could end in early 2025, there likely will be more
significant advances in Iran’s nuclear program this year to take
advantage of the current administration’s weak foreign policy and to
pursue a possible last chance to revive the JCPOA on terms favorable to
Iran.
It is therefore crucial that Congress be on
the lookout in 2024 for any desperate last-minute attempt by the Biden
Administration to strike another dangerous nuclear deal with Iran and
demand the immediate halt of any such effort.
Because of the above factors, as we
approach the 2024 U.S. presidential election, the Middle East will
become more unstable, and Iran will get closer to having a nuclear
weapon. Although I believe this is unlikely, if Iran were to cross any
Israeli “red lines” on its nuclear program, this could trigger Israeli
airstrikes against Iran and result in a regional war.
This is another solemn reminder of why
competent leadership by U.S. presidents is critical for global security
and why U.S. presidential elections matter.
Fred Fleitz is vice-chair of the
America First Policy Institute Center for American Security. He
previously served as National Security Council chief of staff, CIA
analyst, and a House Intelligence Committee staff member.
New FOIA production obtained by America First Legal shows Hunter Biden's efforts to secure benefits for a organization for which he was a board member.
New documents uncovered by as part
of a Freedom of Information lawsuit against the National Archives for
documents related to the Biden family’s dealings during the Obama
Administration reveal how Hunter Biden used his influence with his
father’s staff to provide benefits to an organization where he served as
a board member.
The documents were provided to America First Legal (AFL) after it sued the
National Archives and Records Administration in the District of
Columbia federal court for documents related to now-President Joe
Biden’s time as vice president during the Obama Administration.
The most recent document production shows that in 2015 Hunter Biden
lobbied for his father, the then-vice president, to be the featured
speaker at the Truman National Security Project’s
conference, while the younger Biden served as a board member at the
organization. Last year, the Truman Center's keynote speaker was
left-wing media personality Rachel Maddow. The Truman Project did not
immediately respond to a request for comment from Just the News.
President Biden's 2015 tax forms appear to show that he was not paid for
the speech while he was vice president.
Hunter Biden also appears to have used his foreign policy contacts
through the administration to help secure a donation for the Truman
Project and to attempt to further his own business interests.
“Our critical lawsuit has revealed evidence about the extent to which
Hunter Biden and his business associates used the Office of the Vice
President—with apparent full knowledge of Joe Biden himself—as leverage
for personal enrichment. This is particularly problematic because the
records establish that substantial portions of the enrichment at issue
were the result of favors for and connections made with foreign
nationals. Biden first, America last, apparently,” said Gene Hamilton,
AFL’s Vice President and General Counsel said in a statement.
Hunter Biden served on the board of the Truman Project’s Center for
National Policy alongside Blue Star Strategies principal Sally Painter,
with whom he would work to end Ukrainian Prosecutor General Viktor Shokin’s investigation into Burisma later the same year that he secured his father’s speaking role for the organization.
In March of 2015, the Truman National Security Project invited
then-Vice President Biden to be the keynote speaker at the annual
conference held by the organization in Washington, D.C. “On behalf of
the Truman National Security Project and the Center for National Policy,
I am writing to invite you to be a featured speaker at our annual
conference,” the letter sent to Vice President Biden by Truman Project
President Michael Breen reads.
At the time that the letter was sent, Hunter Biden served on the board of the Truman Project. He was appointed in 2011, not long after his father assumed the office of the vice presidency.
During its existence, the Truman Project has been stocked with board
members who are prominent Democratic national security figures,
including Jake Sullivan, a Clinton State Department official and current
Biden National Security Advisor; Matthew Spence, a senior aide to
Obama’s National Security Advisor; and Steve Israel, a former Democratic
elected official, according to the Washington Free Beacon. Biden served on the board until at least 2019, according to the Beacon.
Just two days after Breen wrote the letter inviting the then-vice
president to the conference, Hunter Biden emailed the letter to his
father’s scheduler. “For scheduler. Please let me know if it’s possible.
Thanks,” Hunter Biden wrote to the vice president’s office.
The day before that and shown earlier in the email chain, Breen had
emailed Hunter Biden asking for his assistance in securing his father’s
speaking role.
“I am hoping you can assist us in delivering the attached letter
inviting the Vice President to speak at our annual conference in June,”
Breen wrote. “If you have any questions, I would be happy to discuss
this request in greater detail next week,” he continued.
You can read the email thread, obtained by AFL, below:
After Hunter Biden’s email to the office, the vice president’s
scheduler Kathy Chung conferred with Joe Biden and the vice president
agreed to speak at the conference. AFL noted public reporting indicated Hunter Biden had helped Kathy Chung to secure her job in the administration prior to this interaction.
“Kathy spoke to the VP about this and he has agreed to do it,” EOP
staff member Anne Marie Person wrote. “Just wanted to circle back and
make sure we have gotten back to them if we have not already,” she
continued.
Hunter Biden also appeared to use official foreign diplomacy of the
Obama Administration to further the interests of the Truman Project and
his own personal business interests at the same time, documents from the
AFL FOIA production and evidence obtained from Hunter Biden’s abandoned
laptop indicate.
The year prior to the speaking invitation to Vice President Biden, in
2014, Scott Bates and Michael Been of the Truman Project Board asked
Hunter Biden to pitch a donation proposal to the Japanese ambassador on
behalf of the organization, according to an email obtained from Hunter
Biden’s laptop.
“Attached is a one page script for your pitch to the Japanese
Ambassador on behalf of CNP and the Truman Project,” Bates wrote to
Biden.
“This one pager sums up our engagement with the Japanese and provides
a dollar amount ask which is realistic based on their previous overture
and giving to other think tanks in DC,” he continued later. Time was of
the essence to the Truman Project team because of delegation of their
representatives was traveling to Tokyo shortly after the request,
according to the email.
“I wanted to let you know that I was unable to reach the Ambassador
this week due to conflicting schedules,” Hunter Biden responded.
"However, in the essence of time, I sent a letter to the Ambassador so
that he would make the connection between my role on the CNP Board and
the upcoming delegation to Japan,” he informed his fellow board members.
Later the same month, Hunter Biden was sent an official invitation to
attend a “BBQ dinner” at the Japanese Embassy by the social secretary
of the ambassador himself.
"Ambassador & Mrs. Sasae will be so delighted if you will be able
to join in the BBQ dinner. Could you or your office please let me
know if you could attend the BBQ dinner?” the social secretary wrote to
Hunter Biden and his then-wife, Kathleen.
A selling point that the secretary made sure to highlight: “It will
be a small gathering around 20 people!” an intimate setting with the
direct representative of the Japanese government in Washington, D.C.
Though the Truman Project did not secure funding from Japan that
year—2014—Hunter Biden appeared to be seeking business benefits from the
meetings in addition to his work for the group.
A few days before the BBQ dinner, one of Hunter Biden’s business
partners with Rosemont Seneca Technology Partners emailed Eric Schwerin
and Hunter Biden about securing business opportunities for the firm in
Japan. The firm, abbreviated RSTP, was formed as a branch off from Rosemont Seneca Partners, the more famous firm that Hunter Biden founded with longtime associate Devon Archer and John Kerry stepson Christopher Heinz.
“Eric, Were you able to connect with your contact in Japan re helping
us with RSTP in the region?” said John DeLoche, co-founder of the firm.
The BBQ at the ambassador’s residence was scheduled just two days
later, though it is unclear if Hunter Biden ever attended. It is also
not known if RSTP secured any business in the country.
Hunter Biden’s lawyer Abbe Lowell did not immediately respond to a request for comment from Just the News.
The Truman Project did eventually secure its desired donation from
the Japanese government. The following year, Bates emailed Hunter Biden
to notify him that he had secured a $100,000 commitment to the Truman
Center from the Japanese Foreign Ministry.
“I’m teaching American politics this week at the University of Tokyo.
Meeting Foreign Ministry official Tuesday..and word is we've secured
$100,000 for the Truman Center,” Bates wrote to Hunter Biden.
“Thanks for your supportive letter on this some time back. It's taken
a bit of patience but we've gotten there,” he continued, directly
thanking the younger Biden for his efforts to forward the letter to the
Japanese ambassador.
The White House did not respond to a request for comment from Just
the News about Hunter Biden’s contacts with official staff of Vice
President Biden on behalf of the Truman Project nor about Hunter Biden’s
apparent use of official diplomatic events in an attempt to advance the
interests of the project and his own businesses.
This latest FOIA release marks the latest in a series of documents
uncovered by America First Legal in its wide-ranging investigation into
the vice presidential records of Joe Biden that involved his son and his
foreign business dealings.
“The American people deserve answers about Joe Biden’s use of his
office while serving as Vice President to advance the financial and
other interests of his family. Since January 20, 2022, the records from
his service as Vice-President during the Obama Administration are now
subject to the Freedom of Information Act,” AFL Vice President Gene
Hamilton said when the investigation was launched.
AFL’s investigation closely mirrors an inquiry by House Oversight
Chairman James Comer into Joe Biden’s vice presidential records. Comer requested all
documents and communications where then-Vice President Biden used a
pseudonym and where Hunter Biden and his business partners are copied.
Shortly after the request, Comer accused the Biden Administration of stonewalling his requests for records.
Hunter Biden’s contacts with vice presidential staff will likely
remain a focus of the House Republicans' impeachment inquiry into
now-President Joe Biden in the new year. “[The President] must be held
accountable for this corruption & abuse of public office,” Comer
said on Thursday in a post to X.
Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh has said that Hamas “will never be defeated," after the assassination of its deputy leader Saleh al-Arouri in Lebanon by Israel.
Head of Hamas delegation Saleh al-Arouri and Fatah
leader Azzam Ahmad sign a reconciliation deal in Cairo, Egypt, October
12, 2017. (photo credit: REUTERS/AMR ABDALLUH DALSH/FILE PHOTO)
The killing of Hamas deputy leader Saleh al-Arouri in Beirut is a game changing event and represents the end of an era for his Hamas organization.
For decades Hamas has enjoyed growing impunity for its crimes.
For
instance, its leaders became increasingly active abroad, moving between
Doha, Beirut and Ankara. After October 7, Hamas was also successful in
getting many countries not to condemn their crimes against humanity. For
instance, Russia, China, Turkey and other key countries did not condemn
the Hamas attack.
Hamas
has also enjoyed impunity from international organizations. It was able
to built up a terror tunnel empire in Gaza in part because it got
funding from abroad and because a plethora of organizations were willing
to deal with health care and essential services.
The
Palestinian Authority even paid salaries in Gaza, despite the fact that
Hamas had forced it out of the Strip in 2007. The entire situation was
strange. Hamas,
a terrorist group, ran Gaza as if it was a government. Its leadership
was hosted in Doha, the capital of Qatar, which is a major non-NATO ally
of the US. By hosting Hamas, Doha actually got increased status as a
Western ally. Turkey, a member of NATO, has also hosted Hamas leaders
over the years for meetings.
But
now Arouri is gone. Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh has said that Hamas
“will never be defeated," after the assassination of its deputy leader
in Lebanon by Israel. "A movement whose leaders and founders fall as
martyrs for the dignity of our people and our nation will never be
defeated," Haniyeh said on Tuesday evening.
People stand at a damaged building following an explosion at the Beirut
suburb of Dahiyeh, Lebanon January 2, 2024. (credit: REUTERS/MOHAMED
AZAKIR)
Hamas also lost others in Beirut on
Tuesday. Samir Findi Abu Amer and Azzam Al-Aqraa Abu Ammar, were also
eliminated in the same blast in Dahiyeh that killed Arouri.
Hezbollah
is non-plussed. The fact that incident happened in an area it controls
and where it feels secure raises eyebrows for the Lebanese-based
terrorist group. Hezbollah has said the “assassination” will not go
“unanswered.”
Hezbollah views the killing as an assault on Lebanon
“We, Hezbollah,
affirm that this crime will not go unanswered or unpunished," it said.
"We consider the crime of assassinating Sheikh Saleh al-Arouri... in the
heart of the southern suburb of Beirut to be a serious assault on
Lebanon... and a dangerous development in the course of the war.” Ankara
has warned in the past against the killing of any Hamas members in
Turkey.
It's
worth remembering a few details about Arouri. Born in the village of
‘Arura near Ramallah in 1966, he became involved in terrorist activity
and was sentenced to five years in prison in 1992. This was during the
Oslo era when Hamas was trying to sabotage the peace deal with Israel.
Arouri
was released from prison in 2010 and moved to Jordan, then on to Syria
and then to Turkey, according to the Meir Amit Intelligence Information
Center. He then moved to Qatar briefly and then to Beirut, where he
basically moved in with Hezbollah and began plotting crimes from Lebanon.
In
2015, he was designated a terrorist by the US, which put a $5 million
reward out for him. Arouri played a role in the Shalit deal in 2011 in
which more than 1,000 terrorists, including Yahya Sinwar, were released
for the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit. He was elected deputy head of
Hamas in 2017, Al-Mayadeen media notes.
Arouri
has been involved in supporting and planning terrorist attacks in the
past. He was linked to the kidnapping and murder of three Israeli teens
in 2014. He warned in September 2023 that a war was coming to the Middle
East, and blamed Israel for such a scenario. That month he also took
part in meetings in Lebanon with Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Iranian
officials and Hezbollah, and then called for escalating attacks on
Israel.
He is
sometimes described as an “architect” of the October 7 attack. He
praised the massacre and claimed it was a response “to the crimes of the
occupation."
The end of an era
Now
it appears the Arouri era may be ending. He was a living embodiment of
Hamas terrorist privilege. His ability to move around the region with
ease was an example of how the genocidal terrorist group operated
openly. Hamas exploited the region. With Iran’s backing and cash
support, it was able to manipulate the region and also build up its
massive terrorist infrastructure in Gaza.
Arouri
was a key part of that machine. He was also able to network in Turkey,
and most recently in Beirut to increase threats to Israel. Many media
outlets in the region are now reflecting on the life of Arouri. Al-Ain
media in the Gulf and Arab News both have put up articles discussing his
life and his operations over the years.
The
Arouri era is also marked by a period in which Hamas built up its
capacity in Gaza. It came to rule the coastal enclave in 2007 and its
leaders now relax abroad while they have helped Hamas in the Strip
leverage its rule to become a regional terrorist threat. The October 7
attacks illustrated this. Although Hamas was much less influential in
the 1990s, it was able to galvanize support even then.
For
instance, Khaled Mashal was able to travel to Jordan during those
years. Hamas leaders who were briefly exiled to Lebanon in the '90s by
Israel received international support. However, the group was more
isolated in the early 2000s during the Intifada.
Arouri’s
role in the region was key to the group's expansion over the last
decade, even though it was contained in Gaza. Hamas expanded in the
region, and it got more legitimacy, which it has exploited after October
7. Arouri was a symbol of this attempt by Hamas to grow its influence,
networking from Qatar to Turkey to Lebanon.
The ship sent a message on the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations portal saying five to six unknown armed personnel had boarded on the evening of January 4, the Indian navy statement said.
The domes of the Taj Mahal hotel are seen in front of the Arabian Sea in Mumbai December 22, 2008.(photo credit: REUTERS/Arko Datta)
An Indian Navy warship was moving towards a hijacked Liberian-flagged vessel in the Arabian Sea, and aircraft were closely monitoring the situation, the Indian Navy said on Friday.
At
least 15 Indian crew members were on board the MV Lila Norfolk, which
was hijacked near Somalia's coast and the navy received information
about it on Thursday evening, Indian news agency ANI, in which Reuters
has a minority stake, reported earlier, citing military officials.
The
ship sent a message on the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations
(UKMTO) portal saying five to six unknown armed personnel had boarded on
the evening of Jan. 4, the Indian navy statement said.
The ship was 460 nautical miles east of the Somalian coast when it sent the message, the UKMTO noted.
An
Indian warship, the INS Chennai, was diverted and deployed to assist
the vessel, the statement said, adding that a naval aircraft overflew
the hijacked vessel on Friday and had established contact with it.
The Indian navy has increased its surveillance of the Arabian Sea after a recent spate of attacks in the region.
The Indian Navy's warships take part in a fleet review at sea in
Visakhapatnam February 12, 2006. (credit: REUTERS/Kamal Kishore)
India: we protect maritime trade in the Indian Ocean
The
hijacking of commercial ships and attempted hijackings by suspected
pirates near the Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea regions resumed in
December after a six-year lull. Experts believe this is because naval
forces led by the US have diverted their attention to the Red Sea to
thwart Houthi attacks.
Data
from the Indian Navy's Information Fusion Centre - Indian Ocean Region
shows at least three hijackings in December. The previous such incident
was reported in 2017.
"The
sudden revival in ship hijacking and attacks can only be attributed to
the pirates' willingness to take advantage of the fact that the focus of
anti-piracy maritime forces has largely shifted from the Gulf of Eden
to the Red Sea," Abhijit Singh, head of the Maritime Policy Initiative
at the Observer Research Foundation think tank in New Delhi said.
Earlier
this week, the navy said it had investigated a large number of fishing
vessels and boarded vessels of interest in the North and Central Arabian
Sea.
"India plays the role
of a net security provider in the entire Indian Ocean region. We will
ensure that maritime trade in this region rises from the sea to the
heights of the sky," Defence Minister Rajnath Singh said last month of
the increased surveillance in the region.
India is not part of the US-led Red Sea task force.
Hezbollah has dictated the tempo. It has been used to doing what it wants, creating provocations and escalation, and pushing again and again to see what is effective.
Smoke rises during an exchange of fire between the IDF and terrorists from the Hezbollah organization on December 16, 2023(photo credit: AYAL MARGOLIN/FLASH90)
For the past 90 days of the war, Hezbollah got used to playing
fiddle. After Hamas attacked Israel on October 7, Hezbollah began to
carry out attacks on Israel, and while there were initial concerns in
the region and Washington that this could escalate, Hezbollah appeared
to prefer daily small attacks to a larger war; a US aircraft carrier
parked in the Mediterranean may have made it think twice.
This aircraft carrier is now heading away, allowing Hezbollah to feel more empowered
in its decisions; it has to fish or cut bait. The problem with
Hezbollah is that it has become too big in recent years. Not only does
it occupy a swath of Lebanon and hold Lebanese politics hostage, but it
is so powerful that Iran fears “losing” it in a war, like an advanced
piece on a chess board, where you keep sending more pieces to protect
it, lest that piece end up being lost in some complex sacrifice. Iran
doesn’t want to sacrifice Hezbollah, yet it also wants Hezbollah to be a
threat to Israel.
So
far, Hezbollah has succeeded in driving some 80,000 Israelis from their
homes on the northern border; this is unprecedented – never in history
did Israel evacuate the whole border. Hezbollah can pretend it has won,
but it has also lost around 140 or more of its fighters. Hezbollah
terrorists are not a rabble. It’s not like the poor Iranian recruits
from Afghanistan – the Fetimiyoun – whom Iran sent as cannon fodder to
Syria. Hezbollah, rather, is used to being the senior partner among all
of Iran’s proxies.
The 'small work' of firing rockets
Hamas
upstaged it on October 7, so it has been doing the “small work” of
firing rockets and ATGMs at Israel, small work that causes damage but
doesn’t win the war. Hezbollah uses drones as well, but those don’t win
wars either.
So
what is at its disposal now? It now faces a serious problem. Defense
Minister Yoav Gallant joined IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Herzi Halevi
this week, as well as other officials, to discuss the northern border,
including the “defense establishment’s requirement to facilitate the
secure return of Israel’s northern communities to their homes in the
region.”
IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi gives a statement to the media at an
army base in southern Israel, December 26, 2023. (credit: FLASH90)
Hezbollah
knows that the tempo of the war is shifting. Israel is transitioning
operations in Gaza to a more low-intensity conflict, which means that
Israeli air power is not as active over Gaza. It also means that
reservists are leaving Gaza and that, this last week, there were more
comments by Israeli officials about the North. Hezbollah must wonder
then, if the tempo is shifting, what does that mean for Hezbollah? It
has been used to carry out attacks at a time and place of its choosing,
to a proportionate response.
Over
the last two decades, Hezbollah has gained a lot of power and was able
to put its foot into Syria and expand its work with Iran’s proxies to threaten Israel from Syria.
Iran even moved drones to Syria in 2018 and also tried to move air
defenses. Hezbollah sought to improve its precision-guided munitions and
had gotten used to testing Israel. For instance, after the maritime
deal last year, brokered by the US, Israel and Lebanon were supposed to
benefit from gas reserves off the coast. Hezbollah threatened Israel
over that and also sought to create tension along the border last
spring.
Hezbollah
has dictated the tempo. It has been used to doing what it wants,
creating provocations and escalation, and pushing again and again to see
what is effective.
But
a terrorist army like Hezbollah can only push so far. It has a lot to
lose in Lebanon and it has become so large that it also has a lot of
assets that are not easy to simply fold up and move.
On
the other hand, it may try to feed stories to the media about being
willing to withdraw from the border or pretend its elite units have
withdrawn. For instance, the Radwan units may become a talking point.
Making its own decisions
But
it will also have to make its own decisions. It has constantly put up
its redlines and made demands and threats. Is it concerned that its
threats will not be taken seriously? Or has Hassan Nasrallah become so
used to making speeches that he feels the speeches are enough?
Iran must also be wondering, after reports of US airstrikes in Iraq on Thursday
and the US mobilizing to stop the Houthis, whether it is now facing a
multi-front conflict of its own making. In short, Iran sought to expand
the number of “arenas” threatening Israel. But the more arenas it
exploits, the more places it leaves open to setbacks.
In
a sense, the more pawns it moves forward on the board, the more it has
to defend those same pawns. And what happens when the “threat” of the
pawns, becomes a series of losing gambits? Moreover, what happens when
all that Iran has invested in Hezbollah becomes questionable as to how
powerful an asset it is?
Earlier this month, Jordanian airstrikes reportedly targeted arms and narcotic smugglers in southern Syria.
Royal Jordanian Air Force F-16 Fighting Falcon aircraft
fighter pilots fly alongside a US Air Force KC-135 Stratotanker aircraft
while waiting to connect for fuel over Jordan. October 19, 2009.(photo credit: Caycee Cook/US Air Force)
Jordanian airstrikes targeted several sites near the Jordanian-Syrian border on Thursday night, according to the local news site Suwayda24.
One
of the sites targeted was located in the town of Al Ghariyah, while
another strike targeted the home of a man named Ahed al-Ramthan in the
town of Al-Shaab, both south of As-Suwayda.
Local
and regional intelligence sources told Reuters that the airstrikes
targeted suspected warehouses and hideouts of Iranian-backed drug smugglers.
Jordan ups crackdown on drug, weapons smugglers
Earlier this month, Jordanian airstrikes reportedly targeted arms and narcotic smugglers in southern Syria.
Jordanian F-16 fighter jets escorting the plane carrying Bahrain's King
Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa (not pictured) are seen at Amman airport
February 9, 2015. (credit: MUHAMMAD HAMED/REUTERS)
Suspected
Jordanian airstrikes in May targeted sites in the same area, killing a
drug smuggler named Marie al-Ramthan in his home in Shaab. According to
opposition-affiliated media outlets in Syria, Ramthan had ties with the
Syrian military and Hezbollah and used those ties to expand his drug
smuggling. It is unclear as of yet if Ramthan is tied to the Ramthan
targeted in the latest reported strike.
The Jordanian Army has thwarted several drug and weapons smuggling attempts from Syria
throughout the past year, including in recent weeks. Armed clashes have
repeatedly erupted between Jordanian forces and the smugglers, with one
Jordanian soldier and several smugglers killed.
Chairman
of Jordan's Joint Chiefs of Staff, Maj. Gen. Yousef Huneiti, pushed for
the improvement of the country's border guard units on Thursday, saying
that all the latest and most sophisticated equipment was being provided
to the units to combat infiltrations and smuggling attempts, according
to Jordan's state news agency.
Huneiti also instructed the army to start plans to build an electronic fence along the border to deter smuggling.
Jordanian officials say pro-Iranian terrorists behind smuggling
Jordanian
officials, like their Western allies, say that Lebanon's Iran-backed
Hezbollah group and other pro-Iranian terror groups who control much of
southern Syria were behind a surge in drug and weapons smuggling.
Iran
and Hezbollah say the allegations are part of Western plots against the
country. Syria denies complicity with Iranian-backed terrorists linked
to its army and security forces.
Jordan
has been promised more US military aid to improve security on the
border, where Washington has given around $1 billion to establish border
posts since the Syrian conflict began in 2011, Jordanian officials say.
UN
experts and US and European officials say the illicit drug trade
finances a proliferation of pro-Iranian terrorists and pro-government
paramilitary forces created by more than a decade of conflict in Syria.
War-torn
Syria has become the region's main site for a multi-billion-dollar drug
trade, with Jordan being a key transit route to the oil-rich Gulf
states for a Syrian-made amphetamine known as captagon, Western
anti-narcotics officials and Washington say.
The USS Dwight Eisenhower aircraft carrier and its strike group were dispatched to the Middle East. (US Navy)
Institute for Contemporary Affairs
Founded jointly with the Wechsler Family Foundation
Vol. 24, No. 2
Iran derives its power in the Middle East from devising conflicts
that put Israel in an ongoing war against Iran’s proxies along its
borders.
Hence, the importance of dismantling Hamas’ military capability in
Gaza demonstrates that Israel is serious in its intentions to destroy
the proxy organizations or distance them from its borders. It is also
the first signal of a change in its approach to Hizbullah.
Because of Iran’s economic plight, limited military capability, and
domestic tensions, it recognizes its difficult position for engaging in
an all-out war against the United States and Israel.
Israel must ramp up its efforts to convince the U.S. administration
of the necessity to stop Iran’s nuclear program and to bear down on the
sanctions. Failing to act on those issues will carry grave implications.
Soon after Hamas’ October 7, 2023, attack on Israel, the Iranian
regime emphatically denied its involvement. It similarly denied any
involvement in the Houthis’ attacks on shipping in the Bab el-Mandeb
Strait—and even in the attack, attributed to Iran itself, on an
Israel-related ship, the MV Sai Baba, off the coast of India.
Notwithstanding Iran’s denials, which are part of its proxy strategy,
the Pentagon said Iran was “deeply involved” in the Houthis’ activity
and directly involved in the attack on the abovementioned ship.
Can the Ayatollah regime avoid being drawn into an all-out war? Is it ready for war? How should Israel respond to these threats?
Threats and Denial: Iran’s Rhetoric since October 7
In the months since the 10/7 attack, we are witness to the familiar
Iranian rhetoric of sweeping denial of its involvement alongside
baseless threats.
In his speech on October 10, Khamenei staunchly denied1
that Iran was behind Hamas’ murderous attack on October 7 and claimed
that Hamas had not even informed the Iranian regime of its intention to
carry out a terror onslaught.2
Beyond Iran’s empty threats,3
the regime has offered many excuses for its failure to intervene in the
Gaza war —from lack of prior notice of the Hamas attack to the claim
that Iranian involvement would be in Israeli, not Palestinian, interest
and would likely salvage the Zionist entity.4
A Houthi hijacker stands on the Galaxy Leader cargo ship in the Red Sea. (Houthi Military Media/Handout)
On November 19, 2023, the Houthis of Yemen seized the ship Galaxy Leader, which Israeli businessman Rami Ungar partly owns.5 The Iranians denied involvement in this act.6
After the American declaration on efforts to form a maritime
coalition in response to the Houthis’ naval attacks in the Bab el-Mandeb
region, the U.S. defense secretary threatened that the emerging
maritime coalition would take extraordinary measures.7
A week earlier, the Iranian representative to the United Nations sent
a letter to the Security Council in which he denied the U.S.
representative’s claim that Iran was responsible for the Houthis’
actions and claimed that Iran had not taken part in any action or attack
against U.S. forces.8
According to a December 22, 2023, Wall Street Journal report
based on Western intelligence sources, an Iranian spy ship was guiding
the Houthis’ attacks since they themselves have no such guiding
technology. The Journal quoted the White House as saying Iran was deeply involved in the attacks on the vessels.9
A denial by Iran’s deputy foreign minister was not long in coming.10
On December 23, 2023, the Pentagon reported11, 12
that the drone that had attacked the “Israel-related” ship off the
coast of India had been launched by Iran. Israel gave the same
assessment, while the spokesman of the Iranian Foreign Ministry
vehemently denied13 Iran’s involvement and those assessments.
These denials were an integral, ongoing part of the Iranian proxy
strategy of denying its involvement. Iran is trying to balance the
multi-arena strategy of its warfare against Israel and the fear that it
will be dragged into war.
The escalation to a direct attack on an Israel-related vessel stemmed
from the fact that Iran is under pressure from Israel’s progress in
Gaza toward toppling Hamas and is trying to generate pressure that will
cause an end of the fighting, though not at the price of an all-out war.
The December 25, 2023, killing of the IRGC commander in Syria, Reza
Mousavi, attributed to Israel, can be seen as Israel’s response to
Iran’s escalation or as an escalation intended to warn what Israel sees
as the head of the octopus while dealing with one of its tentacles.
Despite the threats by Iranian senior officials of an imminent response to the assassination14, 15, 16 an informational film issued by the IRGC’s news agency Tasnim17
bears out the assessment that Iran is afraid of all-out war and will
not act directly in a way that would pull it into one. Hence, they claim
that the assassination was carried out to drag Iran into a direct
conflict with Israel, whereby Israel would gain U.S. support and draw
the United States itself into the war. Instead, they say, Iran will
respond with the continued backing for the resistance in such a way that
Israel will regret the assassination. In other words, it is not a
full-scale war.
Does Iran Fear an All-Out War?
Iran is in the midst of a severe economic crisis, as evidenced, among
other things, by poverty and shortages in most strata of the society.
The crisis stems, first, from a foreign policy that invests funds in the
proxy armies instead of using these monies to enable an economic
recovery from the sanctions, and second, from the corrosive corruption
of the regime’s leadership. Indeed, on December 1, 2023, the worst case
of corruption in Iranian history was revealed, involving the theft of
$3.7 billion from the state treasury.18
Iran is beset with problems of both domestic and foreign migration.
It is trying to cope, on the one hand, with an unprecedented brain drain
of intellectuals and professionals to foreign countries and, on the
other, with a massive immigration wave of Afghani refugees who,
according to Iran’s foreign minister, number at least five million.19
They are changing the fabric of the population and fostering a rise in crime.
Another problem is failing municipal management. For example, at
present, schools in many provinces have had to close because of extreme
air pollution,20 with the government helpless to address the matter and simply waiting for the rains to come.21
This situation produces instability, as evidenced by demonstrations
against the economic hardship. Demonstrators are again denouncing the
investment of state funds in Gaza, Syria, and Lebanon, and surveys
indicate that in the upcoming March 2024 elections, only 15 percent of
the population will participate.22
Foreign and Security Policy
On the military level, Iran understands that it does not have the
upper hand at this stage in many military sectors; any technological
advantage over Israel or the United States is not decisive at the
moment. (Hadi Kasimi of the Iranian Basij claimed regarding Lebanon, for
example, that the war is not a classic war because Israel is a
technological superpower and is exploiting its superiority in this
arena.)23
The manpower of Iran’s conventional army does not ensure victory,24 certainly not in light of its varied ethnic composition.25
Notwithstanding the acceleration of Iran’s nuclear program, it does not yet have nuclear weapons.
As an Iranian proxy in the current war, Hamas is not achieving its
objectives, and it is clear to all that the military stranglehold that
helped Hamas build in Gaza will be dismantled. Iran was surprised by the
intensity of Israel’s reaction, and particularly by the cohesion of its
army. Iran had viewed unity as a weak point for Israel in light of the
rift that had formed in Israeli society in the months before October 7,
as Iran closely followed the demonstrations and covered them extensively
in its regime-affiliated media. This could explain why the Iranians
have supported a ceasefire or any measure that would leave Hamas, even
battered, with a possibility of rehabilitation.
So far, the activity against Israel by the armed Shiite organizations
in Iraq has not been significant, nor that of the pro-Iranian
organizations in Syria. Attempts to open a West Bank front have failed.26
Hizbullah, which is undoubtedly the superior force among the Iranian
proxy organizations and constitutes the most substantial threat among
the terror groups on Israel’s borders, has launched attacks against
Israel. Lebanon as a country, however, is sunk in a severe economic
crisis. Its citizens and non-Hizbullah representatives oppose a war with
Israel,27
thereby restricting Hizbullah to limited responses—something the
Iranians also understand. As former Lebanese foreign minister Kamal
Hirazi remarked on December 4, 2023, Hizbullah shows great wisdom in
limiting its attacks on Israel because its main task is the defense of
Lebanon.”28
As for the Houthis, Yemen is ranked almost at the bottom of the world’s poverty-stricken countries,29 and its GDP has kept declining in 2023.30
The Houthis are very dependent on economic growth for civilian infrastructure, particularly the Al-Hudaydah port,31 and they understand that a maritime conflict in which it is damaged or destroyed would be a significant blow to their economy.
The intensity of the U.S. involvement on Israel’s side was a surprise
to the Ayatollah regime, especially the deployment of two aircraft
carrier strike forces to the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf, its
ongoing weapons supply to Israel, and formation of a maritime coalition
on December 1832
against the Houthi naval aggression. The Biden administration’s actions
did not align with the Iranian leadership’s view of a feckless U.S.
leadership.
From the Octopus’s Arms to Its Head
Like a pyromaniac, Iran derives its power in the Middle East from
lighting fires that put Israel in a constant state of war. In activating
Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hizbullah, and others, the “arms of the octopus,”
Iran maintains a condition of military conflict – and not to benefit
the Palestinian or Lebanese people.
Hence, the dismantling of Hamas’ military capability in the Gaza
Strip, to which the Israeli government has committed itself, signals to
Iran—beyond the necessary objective of achieving security for the
residents of both the Gaza belt and the interior—that Hamas’ attack on
October 7 changed Israel’s approach to security. The concept of
“relative quiet” no longer exists, and Israel is serious in its
intention to destroy the proxy organizations or distance them from its
borders. The disarming of Hamas points to a change of approach toward
Hizbullah.
Israel needs to take a proactive, not just reactive, posture toward
Hizbullah. (Of course, the preferred timing is after finishing the work
in Gaza, but it depends on the intensity of Hizbullah’s aggression.) It
is doubtful that any diplomatic process can push Hizbullah’s forces
beyond the Litani River, 30 km from Israel’s northern border, a mission
of which the UNIFIL force was never capable.
In this context, while UN Security Council Resolution 1701 (in 2006)
has not been upheld for a long time, it can serve to a certain extent as
a basis of legitimacy for Israel in the international arena.
Hizbullah is a well-trained force equipped with quality weapons, and a
war against it would be more difficult than one against Hamas.
Hizbullah’s weak point is its servitude to Iran’s command. In light of
Lebanon’s economic plight, such a war would be devastating to Lebanese
interests and is opposed by its residents and by non-Hizbullah elements
of the government.
Before a military offensive that proves Israel’s intentions, Israel
needs to convey the message to Lebanon, through all the diplomatic and
other channels, that a withdrawal of Hizbullah’s forces north of the
Litani River will save Lebanon’s civilian infrastructure from the wrath
of Israel’s air force. (Messages with images of the bombed-out Dahiya
quarter of Beirut in the Second Lebanon War would warn of the
consequences of Hizbullah’s aggression and rejectionism.)
Indeed, the assassination of Hamas official Salah al-Arouri33
in the Dahiya quarter sends a dual message to both Hamas and Hizbullah.
Firstly, Israel is fulfilling its commitments to eliminate senior Hamas
figures implicated in the events of October 7th. Secondly, Israel can
eliminate high-ranking Hamas operatives in the heart of the Dahiya
region in Lebanon or others designated for elimination; it’s simply a
matter of decision regarding any response beyond the anticipated
reaction from Hizbullah.
In this context, when the proposals are made for assembling a
multinational force, including contingents from moderate Arab countries,
for serving as a buffer between Israel and Gaza on “the day after,”
Israel should add the issue of a force on the Lebanese border since
UNIFIL is incapable of fulfilling that role.
As for the Houthis, Israel has succeeded in making clear that they
constitute an international problem. The American formation of the
maritime coalition may have surprised the Iranians. Beyond the threats
of the regime officials, would Iran directly join in the Houthis’ fray?
It is likely that Iran is aware of the implications of an all-out war
and will do everything possible to avoid one.
The attack on the “Israel-related” vessel off the coast of India with
a drone launched from Iran, according to both the Pentagon and Israel,
alongside the Iranians’ denial,34, 35
may reflect the pressures Iranians are feeling by Israel’s progress
toward toppling Hamas. While the ship that was attacked was Israeli and
not American, Israel should make use of the Americans’ awareness of
Iran’s involvement.
Iran’s many threats against the Americans36, 37, 38
should serve Israel’s diplomatic efforts to convince the Americans to
put a halt to Iran’s nuclear program and upgrade the surveillance of the
sanctions (conveying the message that a nuclear Iran would be less
anxious about an all-out conflict and the IAEA report that Iran has
“increased its production of highly enriched uranium, reversing a
previous output reduction from mid-202339).
The issue of the Houthis (including their reported alliances with the Al-Shabab in Somalia and the Dhulbahante militia in Somaliland40)
constitutes a window of opportunity for Israeli diplomatic efforts (if
they do not already exist) toward countries like Eritrea, Somaliland,
Somalia, and the anti-Houthi bloc in Yemen, in the vein of “the enemy of
my enemy is my friend.”
The Iranian frustration, in the context of the Iranian response to
the assassination of Gen. Razi Musawi in an Israeli airstrike in Syria,
along with the concern that it could lead to war, is evident in the
statement of the Revolutionary Guard spokesman. He asserted that the
operation on October 7 against Israel was a response to Qassem
Soleimani’s assassination four years ago, a statement met with
categorical denial by Hamas41 and by the IRGC commander.42
Further to the Iranian frustration, which is recognizable in the
official Iranian responses accusing Israel regarding the January 3,
2024, explosion in Kerman and the death of more than 200 Iranians on the
memorial day for Qassem Soleimani, the Iranians know that this was not
an Israeli operation. It was not consistent with
the typical Israeli modus operandi and the fact that civilians, not
military targets, were affected. The actual list of suspects in the
bombing involves numerous opposition groups, such as the Baluchis,
Kurds, Afghans, and others.
Without a doubt, Iranians aim to convey a threat. However, it can be
argued that Khamenei’s statements were nuanced and did not explicitly
point to the guilty party, possibly to prevent an all-encompassing war
or a potential Israeli attack.
In this regard, Nasrallah’s January 3, 2024, speech can be linked to
the same rhetoric of threats and warnings. In practice, he enumerated
all the reasons why there is no intention to initiate an
all-encompassing war (blaming Israel for its own self-destruction). So,
Hizbullah’s response will continue along a line that does not create a
new threshold leading to war.
Considering the intricate nature of Iranian sentiments, balancing
honor, religious extremism, and the fear of direct war, the
Revolutionary Guard is unlikely to desire war, especially since they
have not yet secured a nuclear weapon (while increasing the production
of highly enriched uranium).43
Therefore, it is time to separate the octopus from its arms. Israel
should undermine and disarm Hamas while taking action against Hizbullah.
* * *
Notes
* Theauthor would like to thank Avraham M. of the Iranian Desk for his assistance in preparing this document.
https://www.bbc.com/persian/afghanistan-60937341
His words were spoken on March 31, 2022, and since then Afghani
immigration has increased. For example, on August 24, 2023, Hashmatollah
Falah Tifisha, former chair of the Foreign Affairs and Defense
Committee of the Majlis, said in an interview to the website Khabar
Online that “up to 10 thousand Afghanis are entering Iran per day.” The
regime is carrying out an ethnic transformation in Iran to facilitate
the repression of Iranian citizens as well as its objectives throughout
the Middle East. See:
