The "Middle East and Terrorism" Blog was created in order to supply information about the implication of Arab countries and Iran in terrorism all over the world. Most of the articles in the blog are the result of objective scientific research or articles written by senior journalists.
From the Ethics of the Fathers: "He [Rabbi Tarfon] used to say, it is not incumbent upon you to complete the task, but you are not exempt from undertaking it."
There is little evidence that Syria's allies will step in to help al-Assad, CNN reported.
A rebel led by the Islamist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham
stands in the back of a vehicle in al-Rashideen, Aleppo province, Syria
November 29, 2024.(photo credit: REUTERS/Mahmoud Hasano)
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's fate is currently unknown, US officials told CNN.
The officials cautioned that there has been no formal assessment of Assad's status and that his death has not been ruled out.
“The emerging consensus is that is an increasingly plausible scenario,” one senior US official said to CNN.
The Syrian government has denied reports that al-Assad is not in Damascus, Syrian state news agency SANA reported.
Axios reported on Saturday night that three Israeli defense officials said that al-Assad was still in Damascus.
A view shows a damaged poster of Syria's President Bashar al-Assad in
Aleppo, after the Syrian army said that dozens of its soldiers had been
killed in a major attack by rebels who swept into the city, in Syria
November 30, 2024. (credit: REUTERS/MAHMOUD HASSANO/FILE PHOTO)
Conflicting reports
Bloomberg reported that Assad's whereabouts where unknown, but listed multiple possibilities of where he could be.
Assad
could be in Damascus, as Syrian officials have stated. He reportedly
also could be in his hometown of Al-Qardaha, which is close to a Russian
base, or in Tehran, a US policy source familiar with the matter told
Bloomberg.
Officials told CNN that they believe the al-Assad regime will lose power over the weekend.
US
National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said that the current fighting
in Syria is "a complicated situation. It’s one we’re monitoring closely,
and we’re staying in close touch with regional partners about it."
CNN further reported that there was little evidence that Syria' allies, Russia and Iran, would step in to help al-Assad.
Russian war bloggers have reported that Russian military staff have fled
bases in the region. Tehran began evacuating its Quds Force personnel
and diplomatic staff as early as Friday.
The agency experienced critical failures ahead of one of Israel's worst-ever security breaches.
At around 5 a.m. on Oct. 7, 2023, the
operational phone of Chief Inspector Arnon Zamora, rang. On the other
end was a senior officer from the Border Police’s Yamam
National Counter-Terrorism Unit. “The Shin Bet has detected something in
Gaza,” he said. “Get ready.”
Zamora, who was at the unit’s base not far
from Jerusalem, where he was commanding an alert team, wasn’t told to
hurry. The only information he received was to head to the Gaza
periphery and take up an alert position. “We’re going to the south for
the weekend,” he told his team. “Take sleeping bags with you.”
According to a testimony obtained by Israel Hayom, Zamora’s
team set out after 6 a.m. and headed to Kibbutz Yad Mordechai, where
they were supposed to meet representatives from the Shin Bet’s
operational unit. Such an alert, known as a “tequila,” is common between
the Shin Bet and Yamam and is used when intelligence is received about a
possible terrorist attack in the near future.
However, Zamora, experienced in such
missions, quickly understood that there was only a vague suspicion that
Hamas was planning a limited infiltration attack into Israel. The Shin
Bet had no further details.
Israel Border Police Chief Inspector Arnon Zmora. Credit: Courtesy.
The rocket barrage caught the Yamam team
on their way. Even when they arrived at Moshav Mavki’im, a five-minute
drive from Yad Mordechai, more precise intelligence failed to arrive. It
was only when a panicked civilian, driving a bullet-riddled car, passed
them and reported a confrontation near the city of Sderot, that Zamora
understood for the first time that terrorists had crossed the border.
The small and elite “tequila” team—about
15 fighters—began racing south on Route 4 toward Sderot. Zamora’s
vehicle, which was towing an equipment-laden trailer, was relatively
slow and brought up the rear of the convoy.
When they reached the Yad Mordechai
Junction, intending to turn left to Sderot, Zamora noticed several
motorcycles parked on the side of the road. He assumed they were Israeli
riders seeking shelter from the ongoing rocket fire. Only after a
rocket-propelled grenade hit his vehicle did he realize that these were
terrorists. It was 7:10 a.m.
In the battle that ensued at the Yad
Mordechai Junction, Zamora’s team killed more than 10 Hamas terrorists.
They then proceeded south toward the Erez Crossing to the northern Gaza
Strip, where they encountered two trucks full of terrorists, whom they
also neutralized.
In hindsight, it became clear that Hamas
had planned to seize the Yad Mordechai Junction, and from there, move
forces north toward the cities of Ashkelon and Kiryat Malakhi. The
defense mounted by Zamora’s team completely disrupted this plan.
From Yad Mordechai, the team continued in a
jeep riding on its rims because of flat tires to the IDF’s Nahal Oz
outpost, where they participated in its clearing. The team kept moving
south, still on the rims, and was among the first to enter the
terrorist-occupied Kibbutz Be’eri. During the long day of combat,
several of the team members were wounded.
Zamora would be killed seven months later in an operation to rescue four Israelis taken hostage into Gaza.
The story of Zamora’s team’s battle on
Oct. 7, 2023, is not only a testament to extraordinary bravery but also
to the complete intelligence failure of the Shin Bet that day. It turns
out that even after the surprise attack began, the Shin Bet had no clue
what Hamas was planning or what was happening on the ground. The
intelligence body responsible for preventing terrorism from Gaza
(alongside the Military Intelligence Directorate), which has been in a
fierce struggle with Hamas for nearly 40 years, suffered a crushing
defeat.
“We failed to provide sufficient warning
to prevent the attack,” Shin Bet director Ronen Bar wrote in a letter to
service personnel and their families shortly after the failure. Several
months later, A., the Shin Bet’s southern district head, resigned from
his position.
Firefight with Hamas. Photo by Oren Ben Hakoon.
‘How could he not see what was happening?’
Currently, the Shin Bet is conducting
internal investigations to determine the causes behind the success of
the Oct. 7 terrorist attacks and the difficulty in detecting them in
advance. This comprehensive investigation is in the process of examining
all relevant units and includes a review of long-standing operations
against terrorists in Gaza, research approaches, and decision-making
processes in the days and nights leading up to the massacre.
The investigations point to several key
issues. For example, Hamas’s “Al-Aqsa Flood” plan, which was well-known
within the Shin Bet, did not receive proper attention. Additionally,
agents working for the agency in the Strip communicated with their
handlers during the night of Oct. 7 but either misled them or simply did
not know about Hamas’s attack plans. Investigations also reveal that
the Shin Bet’s Southern District was unaware of the Supernova music
festival, which took place right along the Gaza border.
Another interesting finding in the
investigations concerns the timing of Hamas’s decision to launch the
surprise attack. It is believed that Yahya Sinwar and a small circle of
associates made the fateful decision in the days leading up to the
attack. This alone made it especially difficult for the Shin Bet to
detect Hamas’s plans early.
More than a year after the war began, the
Shin Bet’s investigations—while the agency works tirelessly in Gaza,
Judea and Samara, and other theaters, this time with impressive
success—are still ongoing. Even now, the agency does not fully
understand what went wrong, and it is not alone.
“I can’t understand why Ronen Bar decided
what he decided that night. I just don’t get it!” said a very senior
former Shin Bet official angrily. “I just can’t wrap my head around it;
how could he not see what was happening right in front of him?”
In recent months, this writer has spoken
with current and former Shin Bet officials and intelligence community
sources in an attempt to answer this very question. This investigation
reveals the Shin Bet’s long-standing difficulty in gathering
intelligence from Gaza, the dynamics of the months leading up to the
surprise attack that left the agency in the dark, and the chronology of
that fateful night, when the agency faced an adversary who outwitted it
and left it exposed.
“The Shin Bet bears significant
responsibility for the failure,” said a former agency official with
sorrow. “I don’t know how they manage to sleep at night.”
Parallel tracks
In September 2023, the tango between the
Shin Bet and Hamas reached a boiling point. During this period, the two
organizations operated against each other on parallel tracks that were
clearly never meant to meet.
Since the beginning of 2023, the Shin Bet
and Hamas have engaged in persistent negotiations. Hamas, which had
restrained itself for two years in the face of Israeli military
operations in the Gaza Strip, seemed at that time to be making genuine
efforts to reach agreements with Israel regarding the release of two
soldiers’ bodies and two Israeli civilians held captive.
After Yaron Blum, the government’s
coordinator for the talks, finished his term in October 2022, the Shin
Bet took control of the negotiations with Hamas, which were conducted
well under the public radar. The agency even compiled a list of Hamas
prisoners who could be released as part of a prisoner exchange deal that
seemed within reach.
However, at the same time, the Shin Bet
and Hamas were also operating against each other in more familiar
areas—terrorist attacks and their prevention. In the two years leading
up to the surprise invasion, and in parallel with the talks, Hamas’s
“West Bank headquarters,” which operated out of the Gaza Strip and was
made up of former prisoners released in the 2011 Shalit deal, managed to
carry out an increasing number of deadly terrorist attacks.
These attacks, though directed from Gaza,
struck at the soft underbelly of Israel. In June 2023, the “West Bank
headquarters” carried out a shooting attack at the gas station in
Be’eri, where four Israelis were murdered. Shortly thereafter, another
shooting attack took place, in which kindergarten teacher Batsheva Nigri was
killed. Other attacks directed by the “West Bank headquarters” also
claimed Israeli lives. Bar was determined to put an end to this.
Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip. Credit: IDF Spokesperson’s Unit.
In early October 2023, during a security
meeting attended by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Bar presented a
detailed plan for a preemptive strike in Gaza, aimed at the leaders of
the “West Bank headquarters.” The goal was not only to disrupt the
capabilities of the group but also to send a message to Hamas that
Israel’s restraint regarding terrorist attacks in Judea and Samaria had
ended. Bar also presented the Shin Bet’s operational readiness for
targeted killings of “the ace and the king,” code names for Sinwar
and Mohammed Deif.
Netanyahu listened attentively but did not approve the strikes. Less than a week later, the heavens fell.
Deceptive calm
The Shin Bet’s insistence on initiating
action against Hamas in Gaza did not originate in that meeting. Already
during Nadav Argaman’s tenure (2016–2021) as head of the agency, he
repeatedly raised in Cabinet discussions his desire to strike Hamas in
Gaza with a preemptive blow. Argaman even prepared an operational plan
aimed at killing Hamas leaders in Gaza and replacing the rule in the
Strip with the Palestinian Authority.
Argaman’s plan received backing from
several Cabinet ministers, including Ze’ev Elkin and Avigdor Liberman,
but it apparently did not fit Netanyahu’s agenda. Argaman concluded that
the prime minister preferred to weaken the Palestinian Authority for
political reasons while buying time in the face of Hamas’s growing power
in Gaza through Qatari money and endless discussions on a ceasefire.
Netanyahu’s successor as premier, Naftali
Bennett, also disagreed with Argaman and continued down the path of
de-escalation. Bennett even increased the quota of workers allowed to
enter Israel from Gaza, contrary to the Shin Bet’s strong stance.
Argaman’s plan for an early strike in Gaza
was also rejected by the then-IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Aviv Kochavi,
who preferred to maintain relative calm in the Strip and focus on other
fronts.
Meanwhile, according to Shin Bet sources,
the IDF drastically reduced intelligence gathering in Gaza and
redirected its collection means, mainly drones, to the northern front.
Hamas managed to create a deceptive calm in Gaza, which suited the
interests of the Israeli political leadership and all security bodies,
except for the Shin Bet.
The Shin Bet’s offensive approach towards
Gaza did not change during Bar’s tenure. In a strategic assessment Bar
conducted upon taking office in October 2021, he wrote, “Israel cannot
afford to live with an enemy like Hamas near its border with military
capabilities.”
But Bar had to yield to Israel’s policy of
maintaining quiet and containing the threat. During his tenure, he
presented several plans for killing Hamas leaders in Gaza, all of which
were rejected by Netanyahu and Bennett. “Your ability to preemptively
thwart the threat in Gaza was very limited because it was subject to
approval, which never came,” said a security source. “Once you can’t
preemptively thwart, you wait for the terrorists at the fence and lose
all your advantage.”
However, Bar, according to sources
familiar with the details, did not confront the IDF and the political
echelon as forcefully as his predecessor Argaman. For example, Bar
supported increasing the number of permits for Gazan workers, a position
he expressed in the political and security discussions leading up to
Oct. 7, which aligned with the positions of the Military Intelligence
Directorate and the Defense Ministry’s Coordinator of Government
Activities in the Territories unit. “Ronen preferred to align with the
IDF,” claimed a former senior Shin Bet official.
‘Sinwar decided on a change’
Despite the policy of containment, the
political and intelligence communities were fully aware that Hamas was
building its strength for a comprehensive attack on Israel, to be
carried out by its elite Nukhba Force.
The plan for “Al-Aqsa Flood,” uncovered by
the Israeli Intelligence Corps’ Unit 8200 and referred to by Military
Intelligence as “Walls of Jericho,” was first shared with the Shin Bet
in 2018 and again, in greater detail, in 2022. In hindsight, the Shin
Bet now acknowledges that the plan was not properly internalized or
integrated into its thinking. The prevailing assessment was that the
plan would only materialize sometime around 2025 and that until then,
the likelihood of it being implemented was low.
“The narrative was that Hamas was acting
based on considerations of feasibility and that for now, the calm served
its interest, as it wanted to continue building its strength and save
the attack for the future,” explained a security source.
Current Shin Bet investigations suggest
that even within the Hamas organization, the “Al-Aqsa Flood” was not
initially considered a feasible plan. Documents seized during the war
support the assumption that Sinwar was genuinely advancing negotiations
with Israel and that his main focus was releasing hundreds of his
operatives from Israeli prisons through an agreement rather than a
military operation.
“The intelligence picture we had indicated
that Hamas was not gearing up for war,” said a military source. “But at
some point, Sinwar decided on a change.”
The Shin Bet believes this happened at the
very last moment. Progress in normalization talks with Saudi Arabia,
advancements in Israel’s laser missile defense system, and actions by
National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir to harden the conditions of
Hamas prisoners in Israeli prisons and disrupt the status quo on the
Temple Mount—all led the Hamas leader in Gaza to consider a grand move
that could fundamentally alter the balance with Israel. Sinwar, with his
sharp instincts, also sensed that Israel was preparing for a preemptive
strike in Gaza, an attack the Shin Bet had indeed been advocating for
in early October. He chose to strike first.
Another factor that significantly
influenced Sinwar’s decision-making, according to updated Shin Bet
assessments, was the political and social upheaval in Israel surrounding
the judicial reform effort. Sinwar, a deeply religious man, genuinely
believed that God was sending him messages through the crisis unfolding
in Israel. Israel’s internal weakness, which reached the point
of threatening the readiness of the Middle East’s most formidable air
force, was interpreted by Sinwar not just as an opportunity, but as a
divine decree.
According to one Shin Bet assessment,
Sinwar made the final decision to abandon the talks and proceed with the
mass attack just a week before Oct. 7, in consultation with a small
group of close associates.
‘Just a drill’
To the Shin Bet’s credit, it was the first
agency to pick up on the preparations for the attack and alerted the
entire security establishment. “Without the Shin Bet, the system would
have woken up to sirens at 6:30 a.m. The Shin Bet saw the intelligence
as a real threat,” said a security source.
The intelligence that alerted the Shin
Bet, which brought Bar to the organization’s headquarters in Tel Aviv,
were Israeli SIM cards, linked to Hamas’s Nukhba Force, which began to
activate one by one on Oct. 6. The tracking of these SIM cards was
possible thanks to an outstanding intelligence operation, entirely under
the responsibility and initiative of the Shin Bet. Unfortunately, this
was not enough.
Until recently, according to senior former
officials in the Shin Bet’s Southern Division, the activation of the
SIM cards was “a clear sign of war, even without any additional
suspicious signs.” One of them explained, “The reason for this, as
Nukhba members told us during their interrogations, is that when there’s
a drill that includes the activation of SIM cards, they receive
instructions to go to a mosque. They go to the mosque without their
personal phones, then descend into the tunnel to stock up, so they have
no signal for several hours or even days. From that moment, they can’t
report what’s happening—whether it’s a drill or a real attack—and
therefore, our working assumption was that once the SIM cards are
activated, we must be on high alert.”
As for the SIM cards, this was not the
first time they had been activated. In previous instances, it had been
for drills. This was also the main assumption in the Shin Bet that
night—a Hamas drill, nothing more.
In the hours that followed, the Shin Bet
tried to decipher the intelligence picture. One possibility that arose
was that the activation of the cards meant Hamas was preparing for
defense, not for an attack, fearing that Israel was preparing for a
preemptive strike in Gaza. That this was preparation for an invasion
across the entire front was not considered by the Shin Bet. The more
cautious figures in the agency claimed at the time that, at most, this
was preparation for a limited infiltration attack. No one, throughout
the entire night, talked about “Al-Aqsa Flood.”
Following the activation of the SIM cards,
the Shin Bet held discussions with its counterparts in the IDF. Among
them, the head of the IDF Southern Command, Maj. Gen. Yaron Finkelman,
conducted a joint situation assessment with the Shin Bet during the
night. “The discussions with the IDF were continuous, and the picture
was presented clearly,” said a security source. However, Bar and IDF
Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi did not speak to each other that
night.
At 2:58 a.m., the Shin Bet sent an alert
to the Military Intelligence Directorate, the Mossad and the police,
noting the activation of the Nukhba SIM cards, which could suggest
offensive intentions. However, this message was not framed as a war
warning. Far from it. “So far, we have no information on the nature of
the activity,” the Shin Bet reported. “However, it should be noted that
these are unusual activities, and given other suspicious signs, it could
indicate an offensive action by Hamas.”
Yet, such suspicious signs did not come to
the Shin Bet in any significant manner. Throughout the night, Shin Bet
field officers in Gaza spoke with their agents in the Strip, but these
agents did not provide any intelligence about an impending attack, and
in fact, they reassured the system. The agency is now investigating
whether these agents lied or if they genuinely were unaware of the
attack.
According to Shin Bet officials, “On Oct.
7, we had human sources, some within Hamas. Against the small group of
people planning the attack, we were looking for a human intelligence
network that could provide early warning signs. That asset was supposed
to give us much more than we got. This issue is at the heart of the
investigation, and there’s no doubt we should have done better. Although
we did receive human intelligence reports, for every suspicious sign,
we received a contradictory one.”
At 4:30 a.m., Bar held a situation
assessment at the Shin Bet’s headquarters in Tel Aviv, attended by the
heads of the various divisions. At this stage, the assumption was that
Hamas’s activities in Gaza could indicate coordination with other
parties outside the Strip, with an operation expected to take place in
the near future, but not in the coming hours.
One of the decisions made at the end of
the discussion was to declare “tequila” orders. “The assumption was that
if we were wrong in our assessment, they would provide an initial
response,” said a security source. There are no words to describe the
gap between the Shin Bet’s intelligence assessment during the discussion
at 4:30 a.m. and the reality that came crashing into their lives two
hours later.
‘The grocer in the grocery store’
To fully understand the gap and the
challenges faced by the Shin Bet in its intelligence work against Hamas
in Gaza, it’s necessary to look at history. “The failure didn’t begin
and end on Oct. 7,” said a former Shin Bet officer who spent many years
in the Gaza Strip. “It’s an ongoing failure.”
The primary strength of the Shin Bet as a
counterterrorism agency has always been its reliance on human
intelligence, a resource operated by its regional counter-terrorism
divisions. Officers in these divisions were assigned responsibility for
specific areas, and through human sources they recruited and operated,
they could know exactly what was happening within those areas. “The Shin
Bet’s approach has always been geographical,” explains a former
officer. “The officer knows the area like the back of their hand—who
lives where, the history of families, dominant families, problematic
figures to keep an eye on, etc.”
“Traditionally, the Shin Bet’s HUMINT
relied on what we called ‘basic cover,'” said a former regional officer
in Gaza. “Basic cover sources were the barber in the salon, the grocer
in the store, and the street cleaner, who would tell you what was
happening in their neighborhood. Of course, there was always the goal of
recruiting sources directly from the target groups, i.e., within
terrorist organizations, but the prevailing philosophy of the Shin Bet
was based on basic cover, especially when dealing with fundamentalist
Islamic groups, which are very hard to infiltrate.”
However, since the Gaza disengagement in
the summer of 2005, and especially after Hamas took control of the Gaza
Strip in late 2006, the Shin Bet has had to fundamentally change its
methods of operation in Gaza. “Until 2005, the Shin Bet operated in Gaza
as it was accustomed to, with the ability to meet sources and
communicate with them,” said a Shin Bet HUMINT officer. “After the
disengagement, that was a completely different ballgame.”
Speaking of Tehran
In the early years, Shin Bet officers
still managed to sneak some of their sources into and out of Gaza, but
over time this became increasingly difficult, nearly impossible. A
senior former Shin Bet officer said that in 2019, Hamas completed the
establishment of a surveillance network that completely surrounded
Gaza’s borders, both by land and sea. “From that moment, there is almost
no way to infiltrate Gaza without being seen,” he said. “That’s why
it’s so difficult to recruit and operate agents there.”
Moreover, Hamas became highly skilled in
detecting Israeli intelligence sources and capturing them. In many
cases, they also executed them. The Shin Bet is now investigating
whether some of the sources it operated in Gaza were actually agents
captured by Hamas and turned against the agency.
As a result, the Shin Bet began to devote
more and more technological resources to Gaza, some of which were used
to communicate with its agents in the Strip. But Hamas didn’t stand
still either. Iranian knowledge and funding, which began flowing into
Gaza in recent years, significantly boosted Hamas’s ability to detect
sources using technological means, said a former senior officer in the
Shin Bet.
“Hamas did a good job: It both sealed off
the border and located our HUMINT sources, struck them, and created
deterrence for others. Essentially, Gaza became a closed area—there is
no entry or exit—a very small, intimate place where everyone knows
everyone. This created a huge challenge for Israel in dealing with
terrorism. Hamas is very insular and knows how to keep secrets, unlike
Hezbollah, which we saw was deeply infiltrated. In recent years, there
is no place on the globe where it’s harder for Israel to carry out
operational and intelligence activities than the Gaza Strip. This
includes Tehran.”
‘They fired everyone’
The Shin Bet’s attempts to bridge the
“HUMINT gap” in Gaza through technological means significantly increased
under the leadership of Argaman and Bar, both operational officers who
did not come from HUMINT backgrounds. “The service began to look more
and more like Military Intelligence,” said a former Shin Bet officer.
In 2018, the number of Shin Bet
geographical divisions in Gaza was reduced to only two—South and North.
In place of the canceled divisions, “dedicated” divisions were
established, meaning those based on a specific issue (e.g., armament,
rocket systems), not geographic division. For former field officers,
this change was catastrophic.
“By reducing the divisions to two, you
overload each officer so that they cannot learn the area,” said a former
officer in the Gaza Division. “When you take the officers out of the
field itself and leave them with only two divisions, it’s like playing
soccer with five basketball players. Don’t expect to get the
intelligence you need.”
A senior former officer added, “The moment the assumption was that we could ease off on HUMINT, I think we lost.”
One of the areas neglected due to the
reduction of divisions, according to former Shin Bet officers, was the
Gaza-Israel barrier. “We had many basic cover sources there,” said a
former officer who served in the Gaza Division until about six years
ago. “We called them ‘ground drones’ because they covered the entire
border line. They were like a human fence, alerting us to any unusual
activity before the IDF’s observers could spot it. They could detect
preparations or gatherings of operatives beyond the first line of homes,
which was covered by IDF observers. Their role was to alert us to any
unusual movement or event.”
Q: What happened to the Shin Bet sources?
“To the best of my knowledge, they fired
everyone. They shifted toward more complex recruitment operations, from
which you get a source maybe once a year. That’s not something that
works with the masses and the constant friction of Gaza.”
A coordinator who served in the Gaza
Division and returned to reserve service in the Shin Bet during the war
said, “In my time, we defined the border as a recruitment target. There
was an understanding that this is an area that needs to be not just
covered but covered excellently. Now I was surprised to discover that
this doesn’t exist anymore.”
According to that coordinator, between
2012 and 2023, the number of Shin Bet sources—not only in the border
region but in Gaza in general—was reduced by about 50%.
The Shin Bet, however, counters this by
claiming that during the terms of Argaman and Bar, the counter-terrorism
divisions in Gaza were strengthened and received significant budgets,
especially in the human intelligence field. Bar set goals for recruiting
agents in Gaza, and since 2021, the Shin Bet has recruited many agents
there. As for the reduction of operations, after the war and the IDF
ground operation began, the number of operations returned to its
previous level.
A former senior official in the Shin Bet
claims that even during Argaman’s tenure, “we invested in technology
designed to serve HUMINT, not replace it, to bridge the gaps created in
Gaza. The interest of the Shin Bet director is maximum intelligence. The
tools through which you extract this intelligence are the tools you
invest in. The Shin Bet never harmed HUMINT in any way, only added
technology to it.”
Not everyone is convinced. A former member
of the IDF Southern Command Intelligence said, “For many years, the
backbone of the Shin Bet was the operation of HUMINT sources. That was
its tremendous relative advantage. The constant message was ‘leave
HUMINT to us.’ But what happened to the Shin Bet is similar to what
happened to the Military Intelligence Directorate. The management of the
Shin Bet became much more dominated by operational officers, like
Argaman and Bar, rather than HUMINT officers. I think the Shin Bet raced
into an era where operations and cyber became much more dominant
compared to the outdated profession of HUMINT operations. Don’t get me
wrong—the Shin Bet did some great things in Gaza, but the question is
what was the price.”
Further breakdown of the geographic structure
The geographical breakdown in the Shin Bet
was also evident in Bar’s decision to transfer full responsibility for
Hamas operations, not only in Gaza but also in Lebanon and other
countries, to the Southern Region, contrary to past divisions.
A former senior Shin Bet official
explained: “The advantage of the Shin Bet is that it works
geographically. Abolishing the geographic division and shifting to a
thematic division is essentially eliminating the Shin Bet’s relative
advantage as a counterterrorism organization. When you take a
geographical unit and sever it from its region, you create failures.”
The Shin Bet counters this by claiming
that the transfer of full responsibility for Hamas to the Southern
Region proved itself in the organization’s successful operations in
Lebanon during the war.
The Shin Bet also deserves credit for its
rapid recovery, which began on the morning of Oct. 7, when dozens of its
agents went to fight in dozens of areas, suffering painful losses: Ten
Shin Bet operatives were killed that day. Afterward, the Shin Bet went
into war mode across all areas: Gaza, Judea and Samaria, Green Line
Israel, Lebanon and foreign security.
Many fingers are pointed in the direction of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. But the evidence—and blame—says otherwise.
Israel Defense Forces Chief of Staff Herzi Halevy, Ronen Bar, head of
the Shin Bet security and Mossad chief David Barnea attend a ceremony of
laying of the Israeli flags on each fallen soldier's grave at Mount
Herzl military cemetery in Jerusalem, on May 8, 2024. Photo by Chaim
Goldberg/Flash 90.
A total of 364 people were brutally
murdered at the Nova music festival and along avenues of escape.
Thirty-nine were taken hostage. The rave opened on Oct. 5 with 3,800
revelers.
According to earlier investigative
reports, the IDF intercepted Hamas’s invasion plans a year before Oct.
7. They received multiple, rapidly escalating warnings of the impending
invasion from a variety of sources in the Southern Command in the
months, weeks and days prior to that day. Intelligence head Maj. Gen.
Aharon Haliva, IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi and Shin Bet
director Ronen Bar did not share the warnings or Hamas’s intercepted
invasion plans with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Instead, they
repeatedly briefed him that Hamas was deterred, and Israel simply needed
to provide it with more cash from Qatar and more work permits for
Gazans in Israel to keep the terrorist regime fat, happy and deterred.
On Oct. 10, we learned that on the night
between Oct. 6 and Oct. 7, Halevi, Bar, Southern Command Chief Maj.
General Yaron Finkleman, Operations Directorate Chief Maj. Gen. Oded
Basiuk and Haliva’s assistant (Haliva was on vacation and not answering
his phone), held two telephone consultations, at midnight and 4 a.m.,
when they discussed multiplying indications that Hamas was about to
carry out its invasion, slaughter and kidnapping plan. They chose to do
nothing, told no one and agreed to meet again at 8 a.m. Hamas invaded at
6:30.
Hasson’s reported excerpts from
two-and-a-half hours of recordings of a conversation between Halevi’s
representative Brig. Gen. Ido Mizrahi and police commanders in the
Southern District. Halevi appointed Mizrahi to conduct the IDF’s inquiry
into the slaughter at Nova.
The police were the heroes of the
festival. By declaring that Israel was under invasion at 6:30, Southern
District Commander Superintendent Amir Cohen precipitated the Ofakim
police station commander’s order to disperse the concert-goers. That
decision is credited with saving the lives of 90% of the party’s
attendees. According to Mizrahi, about 200 people were at the party site
when the Palestinian rape, murder and kidnapping gangs arrived a bit
after 9 a.m.
Forty policemen and women died staving off
the invading Palestinian terrorists from the Nova festival. IDF forces
didn’t show up until after the massacre was over and the 39 hostages had
been taken to Gaza. All the same, Mizrahi tried to shift the blame for
the mass slaughter from the IDF onto the police, asking why there were
still 200 people at the party site at 9.
Surprised, the police explained that they
couldn’t enforce the order because they were busy fighting Hamas since
the IDF didn’t arrive.
Mizrahi disclosed to Cohen and his
officers for the first time that on nighttime telephone calls, Bar,
Halevi and their associates discussed the Nova festival but opted to do
nothing. The police officers noted that had they known this at 4 a.m.,
the slaughter would have been prevented.
Plugging the leaks
Hasson’s reports were a grim reminder of
the IDF General Staff and the Shin Bet director’s unforgivable and
arguably criminal dereliction of duty in everything related to the
events of Oct. 7. They were the only ones with knowledge of Hamas’s
preparations to invade. They were the only ones who knew that Hamas was
taking concrete steps to invade in the hours before the invasion. And
they told no one and did nothing.
Since Oct. 7, Halevi and Bar—and their
equally culpable subordinates—have tried to deflect the blame onto
Netanyahu by insisting that the reason they were unprepared was because
of the prime minister’s longstanding policy of containing Hamas. But
this claim is nonsensical given that Netanyahu based his policies on
false information they provided him.
Their efforts to avoid accepting
responsibility for their cataclysmic failures—and to deflect the blame
onto Netanyahu whom they kept in the dark—has brought us to Israel’s
current state, where by the looks of things, Halevi, Bar, their comrades
in the legal system (led by Attorney General Gali Baharav-Miara) and
the justices of the Supreme Court are engaged in an all-out effort to
oust Netanyahu from power as quickly as possible.
Their efforts have been ongoing since the
start of the war. The generals have all but openly accused Netanyahu of
blocking a hostage deal. This comes despite the fact that they have
known all along that Hamas has never been willing to free the hostages,
whom it rightly views as its life-insurance policy. Halevi, Bar and
their subordinates are assumed to be behind nearly all of the leaks to
the media related to Israel’s internal discussions regarding the hostage
talks. Those leaks have repeatedly been used by Hamas to justify their
consistent refusal to make a deal.
The generals are likewise fingered as the
most likely sources of real-time leaks from cabinet meetings, geared
towards scuttling Netanyahu’s plans to advance military operations in
Gaza and Lebanon. They have cooperated under the shadow of the Biden
administration to subvert Netanyahu’s orders.
The leaks from the cabinet meetings are
all felonies. Yet, despite Netanyahu’s repeated requests that criminal
probes be opened to find the leakers, Baharav-Miara has refused.
Her visible determination to enable the
subversion of normal workings of government by refusing to investigate
the leaks is prima facie illegal. All the same, this is her policy.
In shocking contrast to her consistent
protection of anti-government leakers, over the past six weeks,
Baharav-Miara has been at the center of a bold-faced effort to
criminalize any IDF officer, police officer or public servant who
provides Netanyahu and his ministers with information that the IDF and
Shin Bet are determined to hide from them, as they hid Hamas’s pre-Oct. 7
invasion plans from Israel’s elected leaders; or advance ministerial
policies that Bar, Halevi and Baharav-Miara oppose.
Six weeks ago, Shin Bet officers staged
dramatic bedroom arrests of two military intelligence officers and an
intelligence NCO, dragging them out of their homes in the middle of the
night. They also brutally arrested Eli Feldstein, a military affairs
spokesman in the Prime Minister’s Office. The two officers were later
released, but despite three orders from magistrates and district courts
to release Feldstein and the NCO, acting on appeals from Baharav-Miara’s
prosecutors, the Supreme Court has kept them behind bars. The NCO is
accused of transferring classified information to Feldstein in a manner
that endangers national security. Feldstein is accused of leaking
classified information to Germany’s Bild newspaper in a manner
that endangers national security. The cover story is that the NCO gave
Feldstein a Hamas document showing that the terror group is unwilling to
make a hostage deal under any conditions and is using Netanyahu’s
political opposition to blame the premier for the absence of a deal.
This week, attorney Uri Korb, who
represents the NCO, explained the actual story. Several months ago, a
group of intelligence officers and NCOs were concerned because Haliva,
his replacement Maj. Gen. Yossi Binder, Bar and Halevi were deliberately
blocking information from Netanyahu that the officers and NCOs
considered essential to the premier’s ability to make decisions related
to the war. The NCO transferred this information to Feldstein to be
delivered to Netanyahu. The Bild story was just one of many
documents the IDF and Shin Bet were hiding from the premier. From the
prosecution’s court declarations against Feldstein and the NCO, we
learned last week that the NCO provided Feldstein with information about
a state actor’s collusion with Hamas in perpetrating Oct. 7. The name
of the state entity is blacked out in the document. But the most
reasonable interpretation of the text is that it refers either to the
Palestinian Authority or Egypt.
In both cases, blocking Netanyahu from
receiving the information undermines his ability to understand the
nature of the enemy. It also prevents him from developing a strategy to
effectively combat hostile actors that the IDF, Shin Bet and Biden
administration have been keen to shield from public scrutiny.
Feldstein and the NCO were denied
communication with their attorneys for several weeks. Their families
attest that the men have been treated as terrorists, and are in
psychological and physical distress. Both have also been subjected to
massive pressure to incriminate Netanyahu.
Rupture among law-enforcement agencies
The public persecution of Feldstein and
the NCO serves two ends. First, it seeks to criminalize Netanyahu and
second, it aims to deter other intelligence officers from providing the
prime minister with critical information about the war.
In response to the two men’s plight, the
Knesset is advancing a bill that would provide immunity for
whistle-blowers who share classified information with the prime
minister. In an act of gross insubordination, IDF Spokesman Brig. Gen.
Daniel Hagari harshly criticized the bill in a press conference on
Wednesday night.
The legal system, IDF General Staff and
Shin Bet’s joint abuse of Feldstein and the NCO has exposed Israel’s
three ruling institutions to harsh criticism for their political
subversion. But they don’t care. Far from standing down, last week they
upped the ante precipitously.
Last Monday, the Shin Bet arrested Koby
Yaakobi, head of the Israeli Prison Service, at gunpoint. They similarly
arrested Avishai Muallem, deputy superintendent and the head of the
Serious Crimes Unit in the Samaria and Judea District. Yaakobi is
suspected of informing Muallem that he was under investigation. Muallem
is suspected of refusing to open investigations against Jewish Israelis
in Judea and Samaria that the Shin Bet’s “Jewish Division,” has fingered
as terror suspects. The Shin Bet accuses Muallem of seeking a bribe in
the form of a promotion from Minister of National Security Itamar
Ben-Gvir in exchange for not prosecuting Jewish Israelis.
In recent testimony before the Knesset,
Muallem told lawmakers that most complaints filed by Palestinians and
anarchists in Judea and Samaria against Israeli Jews are frivolous.
Until Muallem took over the unit, its officers served as rubber stamps
for the Shin Bet’s Jewish Division’s accusation against Jews.
The self-evident political nature of the
two senior officers’ arrests and interrogations has caused a rupture of
relations between the police and prison service on the one hand, and the
attorney general and the Shin Bet on the other. As in the case of
Feldstein and the NCO, Yaakobi and Muallem’s arrests serve a twofold
goal.
First, the purpose is to intimidate police
officers not to work with Ben-Gvir. Second, Muallem and Yaakobi are
being pressured to incriminate the security minister. Last month,
Baharav-Miara unsuccessfully tried to coerce Netanyahu to fire Ben-Gvir.
Under extra-legal Supreme Court guidelines, if she indicts Ben-Gvir,
then Netanyahu will be required to fire him. Baharav-Miara and her
colleagues are convinced that if he is fired, Ben-Gvir will pull his
party out of the governing coalition and precipitate its overthrow.
This brings us back to Oct. 7.
Bar, Halevi and the political left have
demanded the formation of a commission of inquiry to be controlled by
the Supreme Court. The government seeks the establishment of a public
commission of inquiry whose members will be chosen in equal numbers by
the coalition and the opposition. A judicial commission of inquiry will
be chosen by radical leftist Yitzhak Amit, acting president of the
Supreme Court. He is expected to appoint commission members who will
protect the IDF and Shin Bet from scrutiny and place all the blame for
their failure on Netanyahu.
If Netanyahu’s government falls and the
left is able to form an alternate government in the existing Knesset,
that successor government would pass a law authorizing a commission of
inquiry into the Oct. 7 invasion to be appointed by Amit.
As the days and weeks pass, and U.S.
President-elect Donald Trump’s inauguration draws nearer, Israel’s
ruling class is becoming desperate to oust Netanyahu from power. They
fear that without Biden supporting their efforts and with Trump
determined to rout out their American administrative state counterparts,
they will lose their grip on unchecked power. Muallem, Yaakobi,
Feldstein and the NCO have become victims of their desperation.
Caroline B. Glick is the senior contributing editor of Jewish News Syndicate and host of
the “Caroline Glick Show” on JNS. She is also the diplomatic commentator
for Israel’s Channel 14, as well as a columnist for Newsweek. Glick is
the senior fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs at the Center for Security
Policy in Washington and a lecturer at Israel’s College of
Statesmanship. She appears regularly on U.S., British, Australian and
Indian television networks, including Fox, Newsmax and CBN. She appears,
as well, on the BBC, Sky News Britain and Sky News Australia, and on
India's WION News Network. She speaks regularly on nationally syndicated
and major market radio shows across the English-speaking world. She is
also a frequent guest on major podcasts, including the Dave Rubin Show
and the Victor Davis Hanson Show.
MIDDLE ISRAEL: The civil war’s victors wasted all six years in which they could have rebuilt the land they had destroyed.
RESIDENTS OF Aleppo, Syria, line up to receive bread on Tuesday.(photo credit: REUTERS/Mahmoud Hasano)
With war’s fury gripping his land, seven-year-old Amineh Abu Kerech’s
father fled Damascus to the unknown, taking with him Amineh, her
mother, sister, and childhood.
After one nomadic year in Syria
and three more in Egypt, they proceeded to England, where Amineh – by
then 13 – penned the prizewinning poem, “Lament for Syria.”
“Syrian doves croon above my head,” she wrote, “their call cries in my eyes.”
“I’m
trying to design a country,” she went on, a country “that will go with
my poetry / and not get in the way when I’m thinking / where soldiers
don’t walk over my face / I’m trying to design a country / which will be
worthy of me if I’m ever a poet / and make allowances if I burst into
tears / I’m trying to design a city / of love, peace, concord, and
virtue / free of mess, war, wreckage, and misery.”
Tragically, the Syria for which Amineh longs this week grew even more distant than it already was.
DISPLACED PEOPLE who fled from the Aleppo countryside ride on a vehicle
with belongings, in Tabqa, Syria, this week. (credit: REUTERS/Orhan
Qereman)
Tactically,
the assault is reminiscent of Hamas’s October 7 attack, deploying
riflemen and light vehicles while catching an unsuspecting military by
complete surprise. Strategically, however, the rebels’ chances of
rebooting Syria’s civil war are low. The Syrian arena is too crowded and
contradictory for anyone to fully seize it.
The
insurgency is led by fundamentalists for whom the secular President
Bashar Assad is an infidel. However, the same Assad’s staunchest allies
are Iran’s equally fundamentalist mullahs.
Syria’s
Sunnis resent Assad’s tribe, the Alawites, but the anti-Sunni
alliance’s Russian patron has a huge Sunni population, nearly 25 million
Russians. The rebels’ patron, Turkey, is expectedly Sunni, but its main
enemy in this theater are the Kurds, who are also Sunnis.
Turkey is fighting the Syrian Kurds because of its own Kurdish
minority, whose nationhood it denies and whose potential secession it
dreads. The US, however, backs the Kurds, which places NATO allies
Ankara and Washington on opposite sides of the Syrian war.
Israel’s
position in all this is even murkier. On the one hand, its Lebanese
nemesis, Hezbollah, fought for Assad. On the other hand, the Sunni
Islamists Hezbollah fought are, from Israel’s standpoint, just as
dangerous.
It’s a big mess, then, but three facts nonetheless loom beyond Syria’s regathered battle fog.
First, Assad
is firmly backed by Russia, which sees in its aerial and naval bases in
western Syria major outposts in its imperial master plan. Second,
Russia’s air power should suffice to stem the renewed rebellion’s
thrust. And third, the 13-year war’s already massive devastation,
dislocation, and despair are now set to further expand.
Syria
has become a battleground for a plethora of imperial predators,
religious fanatics, and distant powers, none of which answers Amineh’s
question: “Can anyone teach me how to make a homeland?”
Syria's future
SYRIA
CAN, and someday will, be rebuilt. But before young Syrians learn “how
to make a homeland,” they must understand who will not remake their
homeland. It won’t be any of the three non-Arab powers that assisted
Syria’s suicide.
It
won’t be Turkey, whose military occupies hundreds of Syrian towns along
a northern strip nearly twice the size of the West Bank. Having
sheltered more than three million Syrian refugees, Turkey now wants them
to return to their homeland, but Assad demands that Turkey first end
its occupation. It’s a recipe for stalemate and yet more decay,
disillusionment, and wrath.
The
Turkish demand is fair, but its refusal to retreat means it doesn’t
care about Syria. It cares about Turkey. Worse, even if it wanted to
help rebuild Syria, Turkey is in no position to help anyone because the
lira, worth $0.26 when Amineh penned her poem, has since plunged to
hardly three cents. The same goes for Russia, where the ruble tanked
over the same period, from 16 American cents to less than one penny, not
to mention Iran’s paper money, which now trades officially at 42,000 –
and unofficially at more than 100,000 – rials to the dollar.
It
is now six years since these three countries concocted the deal that
halted the fighting in Idlib and seemed to end the civil war. Alas, for
the war to end, Syria had to be led from there to a path of massive
reconstruction, the way the US was after its civil war, and the way
Europe was after World War II.
To
end the war, Ankara, Moscow, and Tehran should have launched a Marshall
Plan that would have carpeted Syria with thousands of new houses,
factories, hospitals, and schools. Such thinking, besides being beyond
their means, is beyond their minds. They do war, not peace.
There
was a time when the West would assume such a role, but chances of such
altruism happening during the approaching Trumpian era are as good as
chances that Russia will join NATO.
Only
one nation, it follows, can help Syria recover, the same nation that
Syria’s Persian, Turkish, and Russian intruders have so intensely
bludgeoned and dishonored: the Arabs.
The
princes, emirs, and sheikhs of Riyadh, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, Qatar, and
Oman have not only the money Syria begs for but also the Arab ears that
should hear, and the Arab souls that should feel what Syria’s foreign
invaders will never hear or feel: the lament, as Amineh penned it, for
“Syria, my love,” the land of “merciful soil” and “fragrance of
jasmine,” the tormented motherland whose “screaming cry” she hears “in
the cries of the doves” while reporting from afar that her wing is
broken, like those of her lost country’s doves.
Middle Israel (originally slugged On the Agenda) today enters its 30th year.
www.MiddleIsrael.net
Amotz Asa-El, a Hartman Institute fellow, is the author of the bestselling
Mitzad Ha’ivelet Ha’yehudi (The Jewish March of Folly, Yediot Sefarim,
2019), a revisionist history of the Jewish people’s political leadership
Iran believes that Iraq is in danger - this means that Iran is worried militias it backs in Iraq could lose influence.
Members of an Iraqi Shi'ite armed group sit in a vehicle
after an attack by a drone strike on an Iran-backed militia
headquarters in Baghdad, Iraq January 4, 2024. (photo credit: REUTERS/AHMED SAAD)
Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ Al Sudani recently said that the escalating conflict in Syria has ties to the rest of the region. He argued that it is connected to the war in Gaza and Lebanon.
Baghdad
appeared concerned that the conflict could spill over to Iraq. Iraq has
grounds to believe this as in 2014 when ISIS was on the rise in Syria, it rapidly spilled over into Iraq and took over a swath of Iraq - leading to a genocide of Yazidis, a minority group, in Iraq.
Iran's
Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi told the Iraqi Al-Sharqiya channel that
the recent developments in Syria “will not be limited to this country,
and said that terrorism and developments in Syria also threaten the
security of Iraq.”
This
is clear messaging from Iraq regarding what is happening in Syria.
Reports indicate that the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces have made
moves to secure areas in Albukamal on the border with Iraq, and in Deir
Ezzor, a city on the Euphrates.
People ride on vehicle with belongings in Hama, after rebels led by HTS
have sought to capitalize on their swift takeover of Aleppo in the
north and Hama in west-central Syria by pressing onwards to Homs, in
Hama, Syria December 6, 2024. (credit: REUTERS/Mahmoud Hasano)
Iraq
has deployed border forces to Al-Qaim and the border area with Syria.
The Iraq-Syrian border is 370 miles long and most of it consists of
desert that is hard to secure and police. The main crossing for
extremists who have flooded into Iraq in the past has been from the
Euphrates River Valley.
Many of the tribes in that valley in Syria generally felt kinship with Iraq and have ties to tribes in Iraq.
Iraq worries about the future
The
meetings in Iraq between Iranian and Iraqi officials clearly show how
Iraq is thinking about the future. Sudani met with Aragchi on Friday.
“The
events in Syria are inseparable from those witnessed in Gaza and
Lebanon, which have threatened the security and stability of the
region,” he said.
Iranian-backed militias in Iraq have involved themselves in the war against Israel and have launched drones at Israel.
Kataib
Hezbollah in Iraq also killed three Americans in Jordan in January
2024. Thus it is Iraq that involved itself in the war in Gaza already.
Iraq is also a conduit for Iranian weapons smuggling to Syria and
Lebanon. Kataib Hezbollah, for instance, has operated in Iraq and Syria
in the past. It is linked to the Iranian IRGC and also Hezbollah in
Lebanon.
Iraq
says it wants to see a unified, stable Syria. Today the Syrian regime is
embattled and losing ground to rebel groups. This has emboldened rebels
in southern Syria as well and the SDF in eastern Syria.
Iran
believes that Iraq is in danger - this means that Iran is worried
militias it backs in Iraq could lose influence. Iran knows that populist
leaders such as Muqtada al-Sadr have said Iraq should not be sending
forces to Syria.
"After
Gaza, they came to Lebanon and then to Syria, and in my opinion this
will not stop in Syria and the whole region is facing threats," the
Iranian foreign minister added. He says the US and America are behind
the attacks in Syria.
According
to Iranian state media, “Araghchi pointed out that before Syria,
threats were limited to the Zionist regime, but now the threat of
Takfiri terrorist groups has also increased, and it is noteworthy that
these armed groups in Syria have been recognized and introduced as
terrorist groups by the United Nations.
Iran's
foreign minister added that but now the countries that claim to fight
terrorism are either silent or supporting the terrorists.”
Close attention needs to paid to how this plays out and Iraq is watching Syria closely.
If
the Syrian regime loses more ground then groups in Syria such as the
SDF and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham or other rebel groups may come to control
the Iraq-Syria border. There are also US forces in Tanf in Syria near
the Jordanian and Iraqi borders. They have small Syrian rebel groups and
this could also have an affect on the border area. There are also
refugees in the Rukban camp in Syria near the Iraqi and Jordanian
border. There is also the Druze area in Suwayda, which affects this
desert area near the Iraqi border.
This indicates that many processes are in play that could affect the 370 miles of Iraqi border with Syria.
Iraq
has a reason to look at developments in Syria as linked to the rest of
the region. The weakness of Hezbollah has weakened the Syrian regime.
Iraq’s
decision to involve itself in the war in Gaza, via its militias, shows
how it is linked to the conflict. Furthermore, the US forces in Tanf and
eastern Syria play a key role in securing areas that are close to the
Iraqi border. However, Iraq has wanted US forces to leave Iraq, which
can lead to less stability.
The plans follow campaign promises from President-elect Trump and a congressional probe into U.S. Capitol Police and January 6.
Washington Monument with U.S. Capitol behind and Lincoln Memorial to right.
(Richard T. Nowitz/CORBIS/Corbis via Getty Images)
Donald Trump and his political
allies are promising law enforcement reforms and to fight crime in
Washington, D.C., when he takes office again in January.
Already, allies on Capitol Hill are preparing to launch
investigations, new committees, and detail new priorities as the former
president prepares to take the reigns on the executive branch for the
second non-consecutive term.
Some initiatives are taking aim at the nation’s capital, following
promises from Trump on the campaign trail to clean up the city. Congress
is looking to block disfavored city laws or using its power to shape
the city’s budget, while Trump wants to enforce "tough on crime"
policies in the district.
One congressman believes the security of the U.S. Capitol building
itself and the politicization in the police force protecting the complex
at the heart of the city should be the focus of a new select committee.
Rep. Barry Loudermilk, Chairman of the House Administration
Subcommittee on Oversight says reforms are needed to root out undue
political influence on the department’s leadership, exposed by a probe
into the Capitol Police in the aftermath of the January 6 riot.
“I believe we need a select committee that is focused on the security
of the United States Capitol. You know, we've done a lot with our
January 6 investigation, and have done more than anyone ever thought
that we would do to get to the truth,” Loudermilk told the "Just the
News, No Noise" TV show. He added: “But there's one thing that
we've uncovered that no one else can fix, except for the United States
Congress, and that's the issues we have internally.”
“You have the Architect of the Capitol, you have the Capitol Police,
you have both Sergeant at Arms that collectively are responsible for
securing this Capitol. I believe we need a select committee that is
dedicated to looking into all of those to find the how politicized each
of those organizations are, and even the Capitol Police Inspector
General,” Loudermilk said.
Troubling failures
Loudermilk’s probe into the Capitol Police followed from a broader
investigation spearheaded by his subcommittee into the security failures
of January 6 and the conduct of the January 6 Select Committee. That
probe has upended several of the narratives espoused by the former
select committee and uncovered troubling failures, like the Capitol
Police and Democratic leadership’s failure to act on warnings of
violence ahead of the riot.
His investigation also found that the U.S. Capitol Police officer who fatally shot pro-Trump protestor Ashli Babbitt has a lengthy disciplinary record that included incidents with firearms, Just the News reported last week.
The officer, then-Lt. Michael Byrd, was cited for at least two prior
gun-related incidents dating back to 2004 that suggested questionable
judgement. In the first incident, Byrd fired his weapon into the back of
a stolen vehicle fleeing his suburban neighborhood while he was off
duty. This resulted in a referral to a prosecutor, but no charges were
brought. Then in 2019 Byrd left his service weapon unattended in a
public Capitol restroom and was suspended for just over a month.
Additionally, internal Capitol Police emails show that in the wake of the shooting on January 6, Democratic House leadership pressed the Capitol Police to provide financial assistance
and other support to the officer, Michael Byrd, that far surpassed any
benefits offered to other officers stationed on the Hill that day, Just the News reported last week.
“[T]here has to be reforms, and the only way I believe you're going
to it is if we have a select committee whose commission to look into
these matters,” Loudermilk said.
Rebuilding D.C. into "the crown jewel of the nation"
At the same time, President-elect Trump has promised to bring changes
to law enforcement in the wider city of Washington, D.C., which is
still suffering from elevated violent crimes rates, though it has
declined from high levels last year.
“An important part of my platform for president is to bring back,
restore, and rebuild Washington D.C. into the 'crown jewel' of the
nation,” Trump said last year during his campaign at the same time that the city was experiencing its greatest spike of homicides since 1997.
He has frequently reiterated a promise to “take over our horribly run” capitol city on the campaign trail, according to an Axios analysis of his speeches, press conferences and interviews about policy.
As president, Trump will have many options to directly address issues
he perceives with the city, For example, he could deploy the National
Guard to the city to crack down on crime. The president used this option
during the Summer 2020 riots in the district following the death of
George Floyd in Minneapolis that sparked violent Black Lives Matter
protests across the country.
Trump will also have the opportunity to appoint a new federal
prosecutor for the district who shares his law enforcement priorities.
His congressional allies also have tools that could help Trump shape
the city’s government and law enforcement. The Congress can exercise
control of the district by imposing an oversight board to run the city’s
budget. It did so once before in the 1990s
when the city went bankrupt. Congress can also block or overturn laws
implemented by the city government, as it already did once before with a
bill many critics saw as being too soft on crime.
House Republicans have already say they want to block
the city’s voting law that permits non-citizens to cast ballots in
local elections and prevent the city from following emissions rules set
by California, per Axios.
The Spanish transport minister admitted in May that the the Danish-flagged ship Marianne Danica was denied port entry for "carrying weapons to Israel."
USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72), a Nimitz-class aircraft
carrier in the United States Navy is shown at its home port of Naval Air
Station North Island in San Diego, California, US, May 18, 2023.(photo credit: REUTERS/MIKE BLAKE)
The United States Federal Maritime Commission is investigating three incidents in which Spain
refused port entry to ships reportedly carrying arms to Israel, two of
which were US-flagged, the commission and media reported on Thursday.
“The
commission is concerned that this apparent policy of denying entry to
certain vessels will create conditions unfavorable to shipping in the
foreign trade,” it said Thursday in a notice published in the Federal
Register.
Spain
could be subjected to millions in fines if it has been found to have
interfered with commerce. The maximum fine is $2.3 million per voyage.
Spanish ships may also be barred from entering US ports in response.
The
commission said it had been made aware on November 19 that ships,
including those enrolled in the US-run Maritime Security Program, had
been denied entry. The Washington Times named two of the ships as he
Maersk Denver and Maersk Seletar.
A Maersk spokesman denied that the ships were carrying weapons for Israel in November, according to the Wall Street Journal.
Spanish officials admit to rejected Israel-bound ships
Two of the ships rejected in November were from the Danish shipping giant Maersk and a third was rejected in May.
Tourists look from Casa Batllo at people holding Palestinian and
Lebanon flags during a protest to express support for Palestinians in
Gaza, a day ahead of the anniversary of the October 7th attack, amid the
Israel-Hamas conflict, in Barcelona, Spain October 6, 2024. (credit:
REUTERS/NACHO DOCE)
While Spanish authorities
have yet to comment on the US's investigation, Spanish Transport
Minister Oscar Puente admitted in May that the the Danish-flagged ship
Marianne Danica was denied port entry for "carrying weapons to Israel,"
according to the Associated Press.
“We
are not going to contribute to any more arms reaching the Middle East,”
he said. “The Middle East needs peace. That is why that this first
denial of authorization will start a policy for any boat carrying arms
to Israel that wants to dock at a Spanish port.”
