by Meir Gershuni
The attack in the resort town in Tunisia last weekend proved once again that the soft underbelly of many countries is its tourist sites and hotels. Meir Gershuni on the need to draw the necessary conclusions with regard to the security settings of tourist resorts around the world. Opinion
39
people, most of them European tourists, were killed in the June 26,
2015 terror attack on a beachside hotel in Sousse, a resort town in
northern Tunisia. The terrorist, a 26 year-old local Islamist, was
inspired in his act by ISIS. The organization also claimed
responsibility for the attack and published a picture of the terrorist,
with two Kalashnikovs at his sides.
Pictures of the attack that were published on international
media – a publication that serves the terrorists' objectives even more
than the attack itself – show the terrorist as he walks freely on the
beach along with his assault rifle, while dozens of local residents
stand and stare as he walks by. What we have not seen in the pictures is
a sign of security and police forces, whose complete absence made the
terrorist's task much easier. He was not required to possess any special
fighting ability as he systematically picked his victims, preferably
British tourists, judging from testimonies of survivors who fled the
scene.
The absence of security forces around foreign tourists is a
surprise to those familiar with the traditional concept of the Tunisian
security forces, which in the past made sure to closely monitor foreign
visitors. Not necessarily to protect them, but rather as an attempt to
prevent activities that are not "convenient" as far as the authorities
are concerned, as establishing connections and "liberal" initiatives by
foreign visitors and locals. The lack of security presence itself,
during this time of Ramadan, also points of an inadequate assessment –
to the point of completely ignoring the sensitivity of this time and the
likelihood that fanatic Islamists will take advantage of it to take
violent action. The Tunisian security forces lacked a basic assessment
of the situation, in light of which there is a need to reinforce the
security presence in sensitive places, with an emphasis given to
concentrations of foreign tourists, in the country considered the number
one exporter of terrorists affiliated with ISIS (so far over 3,000).
In the last half decade, we have witnessed a noticeable
upsurge of severe attacks against hotels and resorts, which – due to
improper preparations and absence of security forces – fit the category
of "soft targets" for carrying out terrorist attacks and other forms of
crime.
Resorts, and luxury hotels in particular, are attractive
targets, mainly due to the fact that they usually host a high
concentration of foreign tourists and businessmen. They are also a
significant economic component of the tourism industries, and have
material weight in influencing the GDP of the country. A series of past
attacks has taught the terrorist organizations the greatness and high
impact of the media coverage of such attacks on hotels and tourist
sites.
Despite the known facts, the fact that most hotels and
resorts in the world are not secured in direct proportion to the
terrorist threats, is evident and recognized. This is in part also a
result of the common indecision caused by the attempt to preserve the
quality of service given to the guests, and reducing, or even
abolishing, the possibility of using security measures that will affect
the hotel's image and perception as a fortress, not to say a luxurious
prison.
Combining the above facts – a hotel being an attractive
target in light of its activities and guests, being of economic
importance to the state, the lack of adequate security, and the large
international media coverage in tragic events – all make hotels and
resorts the most attractive destinations for terrorist attacks.
According to reports in international media, the attack in
Tunisia seems to be of a lone terrorist, unlike most terrorist attacks
against hotels in the past. The Mumbai terrorist attack in November
2008, for example, was executed after the planning and organization were
made well in advance. A team of 11 terrorists participated in the
attack – they raided and attacked (in several squads) a number of sites
in the city including the Taj Mahal hotel (31 killed) and the Oberoi
Trident (32 killed), and of course Mumbai's Chabad House (6 killed) and
other sites. The total number of victims was 173 people. It is
noteworthy that despite the fact the attack in Mumbai was planned and
organized, and that global intelligence agencies had prior information
about the intentions of the attack, the various defects – including the
lack of cooperation between intelligence agencies – prevented the
possibility of connecting the pieces of the puzzle and create the
intelligence picture needed to thwart the attacks in advance.
During the last fifteen years, dozens of terror attacks
against hotels and prominent resorts worldwide were carried out. Suffice
to mention the terrorist attacks in Bali, Indonesia in 2002 and later
in 2005 (in which more than 200 people were killed, many of them foreign
tourists), the attacks in luxury hotels in Baghdad, Sharm El Sheikh,
Mumbai, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tunisia, Taba and so forth. Hundreds of
people were killed and thousands more injured in these attacks – a huge
success in terms of terrorist organizations. From our acquaintance with
"the role model" motive, it is likely that this success will serve as a
catalyst for additional terrorist attacks on hotels and resorts that
will remain vulnerable.
It seems that despite the painful experience of past
attacks, the lessons have not been derived or implemented in all places.
These lessons are required for the consolidation of preparedness and
proper security response to terrorist threats against all tourist
destinations, and hotels in particular. It is safe to assess that a
minimal presence of well-trained, efficient security force could have
prevented, or at least reduce the dimensions of the vicious massacre of
tourists in Tunisia.
Meir Gershuni served as a head of division in ISA (Israel
Security Agency). He is the owner of a consulting firm that specializes
in the design and execution of security layouts for critical
infrastructures.
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.
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