by Maj. Gen. (ret.) Gershon Hacohen
The biggest threat to Israel is not a nuclear Iran but rather a plan that pushes establishing a Palestinian state at the expense of dividing Jerusalem and withdrawing to the 1967 borders
During his visit to
Washington in September and in his speech before the U.N. General
Assembly, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu continued to underscore the
Iranian threat and place it at the center of his political efforts.
Meanwhile, U.S. President Donald Trump's desire to promote a
breakthrough in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process created an
underlying link between the White House's support for Israel's demands
on the Iranian-Syrian arena and what is required of Israel in the
Palestinian arena.
As I see it, this link is dangerous to
Israel. The greatest threat to the Jewish state's existence does not
stem from the presence of Shiite militias on the Golan Heights border,
nor does it stem from a nuclear Iran, which is a threat of clear
military-physical dimensions, but rather from a Palestinian state
established in line with the Clinton plan, which seeks the division of
Jerusalem and an Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders.
The Netanyahu government's decision to
refrain from promoting construction in key areas such as the Givat
Hamatos neighborhood in Jerusalem and the seam line running between east
Jerusalem and the Beit Safafa neighborhood, reflects, in practice, the
extent to which despite the change in the nature of the U.S.
administration, the outline of any Israeli-Palestinian agreement
continues to assume dividing Jerusalem would be the basis for any peace
deal.
A critical examination of recent
developments in Syria can teach us how reality changes in unpredictable
ways. Only two years ago, the Israeli defense establishment believed
that the erosion of the Syrian army spelled the inevitable collapse of
Bashar Assad's regime, which in turn would allow Israel to reduce the
IDF's order of battle. Now the defense establishment believes Assad will
most likely survive
the six-and-a-half-year civil war ravaging his country, and the new
threats taking shape on the Israel-Syria border have prompted the
defense establishment to demand a budget increase.
A study of the dynamics of this change
requires a re-evaluation of the basic assumptions on which the Israeli
security concept was shaped with respect to the threat a future
Palestinian state could pose to Israel.
Various defense experts have argued for
years that in the new warfare era, the need for strategic territorial
depth has shifted in favor of a need to protect Israeli population
centers on the coastline from missile warfare. But enough has been said
in the press about the IDF's latest exercise
in the northern sector, which focused on the threat of infiltration by
Hezbollah forces into border-adjacent communities, to cast doubt on this
assumption.
One must also remember that Hamas in the
south and Hezbollah in the north are not the only challenges Israel
faces. The rise of Shiite militias in the Syrian sector requires a
reassessment of the potential threat posed by a Palestinian state. In
the emerging reality, unless Israel retains control of the Jordan
Valley, these militias might sneak under the international monitoring
radar and reach the urban seam lines in Jerusalem, Kfar Saba and
Netanya.
The 2017 concept
The Agranat Commission attributed the
surprise of the 1973 Yom Kippur War to the military's erroneous
operational concept. But it is impossible to develop a perception of
reality and act within it without an operational concept. The lesson is
not to avoid the formulation of a concept, but to be aware of the need
to constantly scrutinize and adjust it.
The experts supporting an Israeli
withdrawal from Judea and Samaria in the framework of the two-state
solution share an almost unshakable concept that is based on three
assumptions: First, the very fact that Israel would withdraw from the
area, with the international community's agreement to recognize the end
of the so-called occupation, would give Israel the legitimacy to defend
itself; second, given a credible threat, the Israeli leadership would
know how and when to order the IDF to go on the offensive across Judea
and Samaria; and third, the IDF's operational and technological
superiority would allow it to win within a matter of days.
Not only is this concept undermined by the
changes in the nature of warfare, its validity must be re-evaluated in a
reality that is liable to force Israel to simultaneously fight in more
than one arena. Moreover, the international arena, too, has undergone
dramatic changes since the 1993 Oslo Accords were signed. Back then,
Israel and the world faced the U.S. as the only true superpower, the
Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact collapsed in Europe, bringing an end to
the threat of the Cold War, and the world seemed on its way toward an
era of stability and prosperity under American hegemony.
The Arab nations were at a disadvantage,
which was intensified after the American victory in Iraq in the 1991
Gulf War. American military superiority was showcased in technological
dimensions as well as in terms of its ability to lead a coalition army
that included Arab, Saudi and Syrian forces. Given the strategic
inferiority in which the leadership of the Palestine Liberation
Organization found itself, the road to the Oslo Accords was paved.
But times have changed. Over the years, the
U.S.'s hegemonic power has weakened, while Russia has regained its role
as a key international player. Small wars have erupted under the guise
of different regional logic; Western Europe found itself threatened by
Russia's fighting in Ukraine; and radical Islamic forces from
Afghanistan, Yemen, Syria and Libya have learned that their military
inferiority harbored a fighting potential that could disrupt the
stability the West craves.
At the same time, something fundamental
changed on the horizon of Israeli-Palestinian expectations. At the
beginning of the Oslo period, there was an expectation of reciprocity in
the reconciliation process. But over the years, as the cycle of
violence and bloodshed continued, the expectation of Palestinian
reconciliation in return for Israeli concessions was replaced in the
Israeli discourse by nothing more than a necessary separation from the
Palestinians, "keeping them on one side and us on the other" with each
side taking care of itself.
As those supporting the separation trend
became more sophisticated in their efforts to explain to the Israeli
public the extent to which this separation is necessary in order to
preserve Israel's Jewish and democratic nature, the more the
Palestinians' bargaining power grew. After all, if withdrawing from
Judea and Samaria and establishing a Palestinian state are Israeli
interests, and Israel is willing to do so to preserve its future, why
should the Palestinians give anything in return? As far as they are
concerned, they are not bound by reciprocity. They get what they want by
virtue of their national right to self-determination.
This premise increases the risk that an
Israeli withdrawal from Judea and Samaria will only fuel the Palestinian
resistance. In this sense, it is worth exploring whether reverting back
to the 1967 borders, with minor adjustments to accommodate the larger
settlement blocs – that comprise no more than 3% of Judea and Samaria –
will provide Israel with the conditions to defend itself.
In addition to the security aspects, a
statement by senior Fatah official Abbas Zaki, explaining why he
supports the two-state solution, is worth exploring further: "The
two-state solution, in my opinion, will bring about Israel's collapse.
Because if they [Israel] leave Jerusalem, what would happen to all their
talk about the Promised Land and the Chosen People? What of all the
sacrifices they made?" he said in an interview with Lebanese television
network ANB in 2009. "They gave Jerusalem a spiritual status. The Jews
see Judea and Samaria as their historic dream, and if the Jews leave
these places, the Zionist idea will begin to implode. Then we will be
able to move forward."
Zaki has keen insight into the significance
of the spiritual-Jewish dimension as a condition for the continued
existence of the State of Israel. The potential for imploding that is
inherent to this threat is far more dangerous than the Iranian threat,
its nuclear dimensions included. National priorities, alongside the
logic of the defense discourse and the trends evident in the region,
mandate both an overt and covert examination and revision of existing
concepts.
Maj. Gen. (ret.) Gershon Hacohen
Source: http://www.israelhayom.com/2017/10/08/the-danger-of-imploding/
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