Friday, December 26, 2014

Hizbollah Closes a Breach of its Outer Shield: The Threat to Israel - Yoram Schweitzer , Benedetta Berti



by Yoram Schweitzer , Benedetta Berti

In light of the complex evolving predicament facing Hizbollah, the alleged discovery of yet another infiltration would probably be branded by the organization as an operational victory. Indeed, by uncovering high level infiltrators, the group can project power and efficiency and discredit Israel’s intelligence apparatus. Even more significant, assuming media reports are credible, and although other intelligence assets may still be utilized by Israel, the arrested senior operative and his four accomplices may have contributed to the successful thwarting of Hizbollah's planned attacks abroad. If so, their exposure can certainly be seen as harmful to Israel in its campaign against the Shiite terror apparatus. The loss of a high ranking asset may limit Israel’s ability to thwart future terror operations against Israeli targets abroad.
Lebanese and international media reported recently that Hizbollah exposed and tried a high level security operative and four of his subordinates, accusing them of being Israeli agents. The media reports about the alleged Israeli agents are based on a source within Hizbollah rather than an official statement from the organization. The suspects were allegedly members of Hizbollah’s External Operations Unit (also known as Unit 910). The main defendant, Muhammad Shawarba, who formerly served as part of Hassan Nasrallah's personal security cadre, was the unit's deputy commander. 
This latest development joins a series of “spy ring scandals" exposed by the organization’s security services. Hizbollah, long extremely fearful of foreign “spies,” has historically placed an emphasis on counterintelligence. In the early 2000s, as part of Iran's comprehensive support, the group established an ad hoc counter-intelligence unit, while also relying on assistance from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in Lebanon to locate and expose potential infiltrators and prevent leaks of information. One of the lessons derived from the 2006 war with Israel was likewise to invest further in the group’s preventive security and intelligence systems, again with Tehran’s assistance, in order to limit the group’s vulnerability to foreign infiltration within its ranks. Since then, Hizbollah’s counterintelligence efforts have led to an aggressive campaign to identify and apprehend potential spies and double agents in Lebanon in general, and within the organization more specifically. A prominent case involved Hizbollah’s identifying in June and November 2011 a number of members who were also allegedly involved with the CIA. This case had an important impact on Hizbollah, with the group admitting – and for the first time – to have been infiltrated, in turn tarnishing its reputation of invincibility and immunity from internal security breaches.
Though not unprecedented, the recent apprehension of a foreign agent within Hizbollah’s highest ranks further exposes Hizbollah’s vulnerability to external infiltration, despite its well-cultivated image as a cohesive and loyal organization. In addition, on the operational level, this development is of particular significance. Following the alleged assassination by Israel in 2008 of Imad Mughniyeh, Hizbollah's top security official and the head of external operations in Damascus, the group’s Secretary General avowed his commitment to avenge Mughniyeh’s death. This proclamation was followed by a string of largely foiled or failed plots against Israeli assets, personnel, and citizens abroad.
With the alleged spy Shawarba playing such an important role within the group’s military apparatus, his possible collaboration with Israel may have contributed to the foiling of Hizbollah attacks abroad, from Azerbaijan to Turkey, Cyprus, Thailand, and recently Peru (among others), as well as to serious intelligence against the group’s leadership.  In avenging Mughniyeh, Hizbollah’s only “success" has been its attack in July 2012 against Israeli tourists at the Burgas airport in Bulgaria, resulting in six fatalities – five Israeli tourists and one Bulgarian. This attack, which strongly contributed to the European community’s decision to add Hizbollah’s military wing to its list of terror organizations, was reportedly ascribed to Hizbollah based on information allegedly provided by Shawarba.
The recent revelations come at an especially complex time for the Lebanese-Shiite organization: over the past year Hizbollah has been engaged in a multi-front struggle that includes support for Bashar al-Assad in Syria, protection of Hizbollah’s communities and infrastructure, and assistance and coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces in dealing with the so-called “takfiri” threat – referring to the rise in activism of Salafi-jihadist groups in Lebanon, a phenomenon itself exacerbated by Hizbollah’s own involvement in Syria. Over the course of 2014, successful attacks by rival groups against Hizbollah have forced the organization to reexamine its defense and intelligence apparatus, further focusing not only on counterintelligence, but on internal security as well. In addition, Hizbollah’s security landscape and calculations continue to be affected by its post-2006 de facto deterrence vis-à-vis Israel. Preserving the status quo has become increasingly harder since the beginning of the Syrian civil war, with Hizbollah struggling between two competing interests. One is the need to signal strength and resolve as well as to re-establish the rules of the game vis-à-vis Israel, as they have been eroded by the alleged Israeli attacks in Lebanon and Syria targeting weapons convoys on route to Hizbollah operatives in Lebanon. Two, the group still needs to avoid escalation and another all-out war with Israel. In this context, over the past few months the organization has assumed responsibility for several small scale operations in Mount Dov (Shab’a Farms) and the Golan Heights. 
In light of the complex evolving predicament facing Hizbollah, the alleged discovery of yet another infiltration would probably be branded by the organization as an operational victory. Indeed, by uncovering high level infiltrators, the group can project power and efficiency and discredit Israel’s intelligence apparatus. Even more significant, assuming media reports are credible, and although other intelligence assets may still be utilized by Israel, the arrested senior operative and his four accomplices may have contributed to the successful thwarting of Hizbollah's planned attacks abroad. If so, their exposure can certainly be seen as harmful to Israel in its campaign against the Shiite terror apparatus. The loss of a high ranking asset may limit Israel’s ability to thwart future terror operations against Israeli targets abroad.
The continued threat of international terror by the Shiite Lebanese organization   reinforces Israel’s need to convey a firm warning to Hizbollah to refrain from further attempted attacks. In addition, Israel must strengthen its international cooperation in the effort to uncover the group’s activities abroad. Furthermore, given Hizbollah’s historical modus operandi, which includes not claiming responsibility for its external operations, a lack of internal informants could complicate efforts to pin Hizbollah down as an international terror player.
_____________________________________________
Thanks to Yael Basford and Einav Yogev for their assistance with this article.


Yoram Schweitzer , Benedetta Berti

Source: http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=8447

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

The Iranian octopus and Arab states - Dr. Edy Cohen



by Dr. Edy Cohen

Iran's efforts and attempts to destabilize Arab states with subversion and aid for Shiite groups (but not only) have been a great source of tension.

As Iranian diplomats invest immense efforts into striking a deal with the West over Iran's nuclear program, it seems the nuclear issue is only one of many on the ayatollah regime's plate. In fact, the Iranian nation is facing a plethora of challenges at the moment, coming mainly from the direction of Arab states.

Iran's efforts and attempts to destabilize Arab states with subversion and aid for Shiite groups (but not only) have been a great source of tension. Iran views itself as a regional superpower and has adopted a strategy that has allowed it to amass much power and influence in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. It is with this power that Iran believes it will be able to protect the Shiite minorities in Arab states while simultaneously sticking it to the "Zionist entity." The fall of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein's regime and the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq presented Iran with a rare opportunity to expand its influence to other nations.

The "Iranian octopus" operates both out in the open and covertly in a number of Arab countries. It brands its activities "exporting the [Shiite] revolution" to the Arab world, and is especially active in countries with Shiite populations like Lebanon, Yemen and Iraq. Iranians provide aid in the form of money and weapons to Shiite groups in those countries. They are helping the Houthis take power in Yemen, for example. It is no secret that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard trains Houthi fighters on Eritrean soil for a lot of money, which flows into the coffers of the country's corrupt leaders under the guise of bilateral treaties.

Iran created Hezbollah in Lebanon and provides the group with its most advanced weaponry. It brought the Shiite population from being oppressed to being one of the most organized communities and having the most powerful militia in Lebanon, one which poses a threat to the Lebanese army and to Lebanon's stability. Today Iran is a central player and has immense influence in Lebanon. Over the last eight months, Lebanese parliament members belonging to Hezbollah have been sabotaging efforts to appoint a new Lebanese president. Michel Suleiman, the previous president, completed his term in May. The aim is to stall until a candidate who would be agreeable to the Shiites and to Iran can be found.

Iranian involvement in Iraq includes funding, training and arming of Shiite militias. The political, economic and religious influence Iran has in Iraq has effectively turned it into a sponsor state. The shared border and the rise of Islamic State have increased Iran's involvement in Iraq. Syria and Hamas are Iran's non-Shiite allies. The Iranians are helping the Syrians fight Islamic State and other rebels in efforts to bring Syria's embattled President Bashar Assad, Iran's natural and preferred partner, back into full control. That is why, in the war against Islamic State, Iran admitted for the first time they were bombing Islamic State targets in Iraq and were helping the Syrian regime fight rebels and Islamic State. With regard to the Palestinians, Iran sees a moral obligation to support Hamas in its fight with Israel and provides the terror organization with weapons and funding.

Iranian involvement also stretches to the Persian Gulf. Iran in 1971 captured the islands of Greater and Lesser Tunbs and Abu Musa, which the United Arab Emirates saw as theirs. The takeover underscored the danger Iran poses to its Arab neighbors. Despite Arab League involvement, the dispute has not yet been resolved. 

Iran also operates in neighboring Bahrain and is exerting efforts to increase its influence on the small kingdom. Iran actually claims ownership over Bahrain, no less. The Shiite majority in Bahrain provides legitimacy to the Iranian claim. The kingdom in Bahrain accuses Iran of subversion. Iran has said on more than one occasion that Bahrain is one of the Islamic republic's provinces.

With Iran's military, economic and religious influence posing a national security threat to Arab states, blocking the Iranian nuclear program is those countries' highest priority. A nuclear Iran would pose a much greater threat to Arab nations than it does today.


Dr. Edy Cohen

Source: http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_opinion.php?id=11033

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The Economic Crisis in Russia and Its Political Contexts - Zvi Magen , Sarah Fainberg



by Zvi Magen , Sarah Fainberg


Signs of a severe economic crisis in Russia, threatening the stability and future of Vladimir Putin’s regime, are multiplying. The economic sanctions imposed on Russia are among the main triggers of the crisis, along with the sharp decline in the price of oil, which – according to Russian officials – is the result of deliberate anti-Russian activity initiated by the United States. However, it is too early to eulogize Putin’s rule. He still enjoys widespread public support and projects a sense of being in control of the situation. Nonetheless, the trend is one of crisis whose key feature is uncertainty. It is impossible to predict the scope and duration of the Russian economic decline and its possible negative impact on the nation’s governmental and social stability. This uncertainty means that the potential for exacerbation of the Russian-Western conflict remains. 

Signs of a severe crisis of Russia’s economy are multiplying, which threatens the stability and future of Putin’s regime. The economic sanctions imposed on Russia are among the main triggers of the crisis, along with the sharp decline in the price of oil, which – according to Russian officials – is the result of deliberate anti-Russian activity initiated by the United States.
 
This crisis is directly linked to developments on the Ukrainian front. The ongoing, low-intensity Ukrainian conflict has turned into a manifest Russian defeat. Ukraine has cut itself off from Russia’s influence and forged closer relations with the West, lowering Russia’s chances of establishing a viable Eurasian Union under its leadership. Adding to Moscow’s predicament, the West, led by the United States, has imposed strong economic sanctions on Russia because of its Ukrainian policy. As a result, Russia currently faces a very challenging economic reality that is forcing it to try to annul some of the steps [that] were taken against it.
From the perspective of the United States, Russia’s difficult situation seems well-suited (at least better than in many years) to US attempts to promote its global strategic objectives. Yet Washington has a list of demands that Russia will find hard to accept. The willingness of the United States to ease the strong pressure exerted on Russia hinges on Moscow’s readiness to concede its assertive policy in eastern Ukraine in particular and in Russia’s post-Soviet neighbors in general, for the conflict over Ukraine is neither an accidental nor a stand-alone issue. The Russia-US conflict (in effect, a Russian-Western conflict) is about gaining comprehensive influence on the post-Soviet space and for this reason it will not end with a compromise over Ukraine alone. Therefore any arrangement palatable to the West will also presumably involve elements connected to other post-Soviet territories in dispute.
In tandem with the Ukraine crisis, recent months have seen increased Russian activity across the Middle East. Russia’s relations with several Sunni states – including Egypt, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, Jordan, and Lebanon – have been upgraded, mitigating the coldness that characterized these relations following the outbreak of the so-called Arab Spring. Russia has signed arms deals, some of them quite large (e.g., with Egypt) with most of these states, while maintaining good relations with its traditional allies: Syria, Iraq, and Iran. Most prominently, after years of strong tension, relations between Russia and Turkey have improved. President Putin visited Ankara in late November, and the two countries signed an agreement on a new gas line from Russia through Turkey to Europe. It seems that as part of its strategy vis-à-vis its complex international situation, Russia has chosen to increase its involvement in the Middle East so as to convert its achievements in the region into leverages of influence on the West, especially on issues pertaining to Eastern Europe. Indeed, within just a two-month time period, Russian activity in the Middle East has scored substantive successes that could form the new basis for a Russian-Western dialogue on Ukraine and other issues.
Furthermore, Russia is seeking to find new ideas that would serve as a basis for a compromise, ultimately resulting in the lifting of Western sanctions. Moscow’s current Middle East activity is insufficient to that end, and therefore Russia must come up with alternatives. It may be that the Syrian conflict will serve as a new focus for this Russian calculation. In practice, Russia remains the main supporter of Bashar al-Assad’s regime and can topple it should it choose to do so. A development of this nature would in fact be congruent with the interests of the US administration, and it may be that this is the background to recent Russian moves in Syria: Putin’s Middle East envoy, Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov, recently met with rebel leaders in Syria, Hizbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, and the Syrian leadership itself; Russia and Iran have been in contact, possibly hinting at the intention to formulate a joint proposal for a Syrian settlement; and Syrian, Iraqi, and Hizbollah representatives met in Tehran, another sign of possible consultations on Syria’s regime. There have also been indications that Russia intends to hold a conference on Syria’s future, including discussions on Assad’s mandate. It may be that an initiative was already formulated by Russia and Iran whereby a new Syrian government, comprising opposition elements, would be declared in the course of an international conference that would also decide Assad’s status (his removal or his incorporation in the new government in a minor capacity). Such a development would mean a new political reality in Syria whose principles would be shaped cooperatively by the West, Russia, and Iran, with the backing of the pragmatic Sunni nations in the Middle East.
This formula will likely neither be accepted by the US administration nor prompt it to lift the sanctions, because the future of Syria is hardly the only issue dividing Washington and Moscow. The December 14, 2014 meeting in Rome between Secretary of State John Kerry and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov dealt with the Middle East crises that are of utmost interest to Russia: the civil war in Syria, the Israeli-Palestinian political process, and the negotiations with Iran over the nuclear issue. In exchange for lifting the sanctions, Russia would presumably have to cooperate with the United States on these three issues, as well as on the Ukrainian crisis. For its part, the US administration is signaling its willingness to advance new understandings with Moscow: President Obama has yet to implement further sanctions on Russia already approved by Congress. But because it is hard to imagine Russia doing an about-face, lowering its profile on the international arena, and adapting its policies on key issues in the Middle East so that it is more aligned with the United States, the sanctions regime on Russian economy is far from over. Therefore, it is almost certain that the severe economic crisis unfolding in Russia has not yet reached its peak.
It is too early to eulogize Vladimir Putin’s rule. He still enjoys widespread public support and projects a sense of being in control of the situation. But the trend is one of crisis whose key feature is uncertainty. It is impossible to predict the scope and duration of the Russian economic decline and its possible negative impact on the nation’s governmental and social stability. This uncertainty – in addition to domestic disagreements over appropriate policies – means that the potential for exacerbation of the Russian-Western conflict remains. It may be that the economic pressure will spur Russia to show flexibility and compromise with the West in order to contain the economic challenge, with its domestic and international repercussions. On the other hand, if Russia persists in maintaining its recent policy on the international arena, not only will the economic crisis and its international impact worsen, but the difficulty in promoting coordinated moves among the great powers and collaboratively address crises in areas of dispute – including in the Middle East – will be further aggravated.

Zvi Magen , Sarah Fainberg

Source: http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=8438

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

US aid to PA should not reward terrorists - Elliott Abrams



by Elliott Abrams


The intent is clear: Congress was aware of the PA's practice of rewarding individuals who ‎had committed acts of terrorism with direct financial support or financial support for their ‎families while they remain in prison. And Congress wants to be sure that aid from the ‎United States isn't paying for this, so for every dollar the PA spends we will reduce aid to the ‎PA by the same amount.


The omnibus appropriations bill recently passed by Congress contains an interesting ‎provision regarding the support for terrorists and their families by the Palestinian Authority:‎

"The Secretary of State shall reduce the amount of assistance made available by this Act ‎under the heading 'Economic Support Fund' for the West Bank and Gaza by an amount the ‎Secretary determines is equivalent to that expended by the Palestinian Authority in ‎payments to individuals and the families of such individuals that are imprisoned for acts of ‎terrorism or who died committing such acts during the previous calendar year.‎"

The intent is clear: Congress was aware of the PA's practice of rewarding individuals who ‎had committed acts of terrorism with direct financial support or financial support for their ‎families while they remain in prison. And Congress wants to be sure that aid from the ‎United States isn't paying for this, so for every dollar the PA spends we will reduce aid to the ‎PA by the same amount.‎

Good idea, long overdue -- but the language quoted above won't achieve that goal. First of ‎all, why only acts committed "during the previous calendar year?" Does that mean that ‎payments to someone who committed an act of terrorism two or five or 10 years ago is ‎exempt? Does that clause about "the previous calendar year" modify "imprisoned for acts of ‎terrorism," or "who died committing such acts," or both? Or does it modify all "payments," ‎which would be the logical meaning: The amount of U.S. aid is to be reduced by the amount ‎of all payments made in the prior year? Sloppy, last minute drafting of this provision is the ‎culprit.‎

The United States reduces the amounts of loan guarantees available to Israel by the ‎amounts Israel spends on settlement construction in the West Bank. There is a procedure ‎in place, whereby Israel tells the United States how much has been spent, State Department ‎or USAID officials verify the amount, and then Israel is informed about the deduction.‎

There's no procedure in place, as far as I can see, to implement this new provision. The new ‎Republican-led Congress should rewrite the above provision to clarify its meaning and ‎establish some procedures. For example, the State Department should keep a running tally ‎of all PA expenditures on behalf of all convicted terrorists and their families, and report it to ‎Congress twice a year. As a condition of receiving any aid, the PA should pledge to keep a ‎tally itself and report it to the United States. Once a year, the State Department should report to Congress ‎the amount it has actually deducted from aid to the PA, and announce this publicly.‎

But meanwhile, American officials dealing with the PA -- in the U.S. Consulate General in ‎Jerusalem -- should tell the PA the intent of Congress is clear. For every dollar they spend ‎rewarding terrorists, their aid will be cut by the same amount -- starting now.‎‎

From "Pressure Points" by Elliott Abrams. 



Elliott Abrams is a senior fellow for Middle East Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. 

Source: http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_opinion.php?id=11031

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Kurdistan: More Like Israel, Less Like Iraq - Lawrence A. Franklin



by Lawrence A. Franklin


It is a society that rejects religious zealotry. Most Kurds are Sunni Muslim and one can hear the five-times-a-day Muslim call to prayer, but it is muted and ignored by most.
Like Israel, Kurdistan is more democratic than any of its neighbors. Like Israel, Kurdistan is surrounded by enemies that wish it did not exist. Like Israel, Kurdistan looks West. And like Israel, Kurdistan has maintained an internal equilibrium though all the world betrays it.

Iraqi Kurdistan is full of surprises. Probably, the most unexpected discovery is how normal life is in its capital city, Erbil. Despite a late summer scare by Islamic State [IS] military gains north of Mosul and the threat of suicide bomber attacks, the social discipline of Kurdistan's citizens is admirable. There is a relaxed state of tension. It is "business as usual."

There is also a sense of optimism, pervasive and infectious. Entrepreneurial spirit is alive and well. While there was an exodus of foreign businessmen after the initial territorial gains by the IS, foreign investors are filtering back. The Kurdistan Regional Government [KRG] has already drawn up plans for large-scale projects to improve the infrastructure. Heavy-duty construction vehicles are everywhere. The most visible project is the beltway being built around the city.

An aerial view of Erbil, in Iraqi Kurdistan, featuring the ancient Erbil Citadel in the center. (Image source: Wikimedia Commons/Jan Kurdistani)

Political pluralism has come to the Kurdish north as well. While the Kurdistan Democratic Party [KDP] and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan [PUK] respectively remain the one-two political powerhouses, they now have plenty of company. No one party dominates the parliament. There is plenty of horse-trading on issues, fleeting coalitions, and new political personalities are being heard. Nevertheless, the most influential and respected leaders still come from the Barzani extended family, which run the KDP. The late Mustafa Barzani (1903-1979) is revered as the warrior-godfather of modern Kurdistan.

Kurds, for the most part, are a welcoming lot. The methodical and rapid settlement of tens of thousands of refugees from IS-controlled Iraq required bold leadership by the Barzani-led government and especially from the Catholic hierarchy of Kurdistan. This success also reflects the compassion of a self-confident people. The population of the Dohok region, for example has doubled due to the influx of refugees. There is no observable tension between the newcomers and the population of the host country. Despite the inveterate resentment of the excesses of past Arab regimes, Kurdistan is a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society. It has become even more so with the emigration from other parts of Iraq of Turkmen, Yezidis, and Christian Assyrians and Arabs. It is also a society that rejects religious zealotry. Most Kurds are Sunni Muslim and one can hear the five-times-a-day Muslim call to prayer, but it is muted and ignored by most.

Men, mostly, walk on the streets of Erbil, Dohok, and Zako, especially at night. Kurdistan is not, however, a society that represses women. There are many in parliament, and they are outspoken on the issue of violence to females in Kurdish society. At one conference in mid-November, at least half of the speakers were women prominent in Kurdistan. Women military volunteers are widely admired. The Kurdish media celebrates the Kurdish Peshmerga's female fighters. One woman -- a veteran of the fierce battle to save the Syrian Kurdish town of Kobane (near Turkey's border) from an IS takeover -- who recently visited Erbil, was received as a national hero. Female Yezidis who have escaped after torture by IS operatives are deeply admired too.

Zako, once the center of Kurdistan's Jewish population, still invites back descendants of those who long ago left for Zion. Zako's isolated villages are the wild west of Kurdistan. Its stark beauty against a ring of mountain chains may become a tourist magnet both for its ancient historical attractions and recreational possibilities.

For all of the above reasons, Kurdistan reminds one of Israel. Like Israel, Kurdistan is not dominated by the Arab, nor by Islam. Like Israel, Kurdistan is more democratic than any of its neighbors. Like Israel, Kurdistan is surrounded by enemies that wish it did not exist. Like Israel, Kurdistan looks West. And like Israel, Kurdistan has maintained an internal equilibrium though all the world betrays it.


Dr. Lawrence A. Franklin served on active duty with the U.S. Army and as a Colonel in the Air Force Reserve, where he served as a Military Attaché to Israel.
Source: http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/4975/kurdistan-israel

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12 Months Is Not Enough Time to Stop an Iranian Nuclear Breakout - Emily B. Landau



by Emily B. Landau

The objective of the P5+1 is to keep Iran at about a year from what is known as “breakout”—the ability to quickly assemble one nuclear device. How would that work out in the real world?

The objective of the P5+1 in their negotiations with Iran over a comprehensive deal is to keep Iran at about a year from what is known as “breakout”—the ability to quickly assemble one nuclear device. The logic of the P5+1 stance is that with some modifications to Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and an “ironclad” verification regime, twelve months will be enough time for an Iranian violation to be detected and for the international community to respond before Iran is able to move to a weapons capability.

In a perfect world, they might be right. But in the real world, and based on the experience
of the past eleven years, this best-case scenario assumption is unwarranted. It is much more likely that twelve months will be insufficient time for detection and response. Specifically, it will require whoever is in charge — the IAEA? United States? P5+1? UN Security Council? — to successfully manage three crucial tasks: to detect a violation, and produce clear evidence; to secure agreement that the violation is significant and warrants confronting Iran; and to act on the information in a quick, coordinated and determined manner in order to stop Iran. 

But the quick “detection - decision - action” process envisioned by the P5+1 will not be as smooth, problem-free and timely as they think. In fact, there are likely to be problems of interpretation, and other political constraints at every turn.

Let’s begin with presentation of evidence of a violation. Once an agreement with Iran is achieved, after so many years of difficult and time-consuming negotiations, it will no doubt be accompanied by great fanfare and praise to Iran for its cooperation. The negotiators will be ecstatic with their success, and eager to proceed with economic and political cooperation and new ties. The last thing they will want is to find evidence that the agreement is not being adhered to. In fact, the instinct of the P5+1 will be to look the other way if faced with evidence, and they will certainly have no incentive to actively seek it out.

Still, intelligence information and analyses of IAEA reports will find their way to media reports and commentary, and these will quickly become the subject of debate in the public domain — in the media and social media. This will force the relevant parties to pay attention, but some recent cases provide a glimpse of what is likely to happen. 

In the past few weeks alone, questions have been raised (by an independent, Washington - based research institute) about evidence that Iran had fed gas into advanced IR-5 centrifuges, and an article was published about Iran’s illicit procurement of components for its heavy water reactor at Arak, in violation of UN sanctions. These two cases sparked debate over the facts and interpretation of the facts, and whether they violated the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA). In the first case, the United States reported that it confronted Iran with the evidence and told it to stop; for its part, Iran said it would continue to test the centrifuges whenever necessary, and that it is not a violation. The case of Arak elicited debates among experts in the United States over whether this was a violation of the JPOA or “only” of sanctions; regarding the JPOA, some noted the obvious and dangerous procurement loop hole, while others were satisfied that procurement is not a direct violation. 

Another issue that sparked media debate was whether concessions were made by Iran as part of the November 24 decision to extend the nuclear negotiations for another seven months—the United States said concessions were made in certain areas, and Iran denied them. This case was reminiscent of what happened after the Interim Deal was first decided—there was a U.S. version of the deal and an Iranian one, and they were not identical.

These cases demonstrate the “interpretation wars” that will no doubt accompany any news of future violations—among the P5+1 states (and within them), as well as between the P5+1 and Iran. Interpretation of the evidence will be strongly influenced by political considerations—as has been the case for the past eleven years. People will be challenging the veracity and significance of any evidence that is produced, in line with an entire set of political interests. This will be time-consuming, and will come at the expense of the ability to make a quick call that there is clear evidence of a violation.

Then there is the question of significance. Is the violation significant enough to warrant confronting Iran? And if it is deemed significant, what should be done about it? Will action be taken in response to any violation or only in the face of a major violation? The latter would certainly be a mistake, especially as we have learned that Iran operates incrementally—the regime consciously avoids blatant violations that may more easily elicit a harsh international response, preferring to move slowly, bit by bit. That’s how Iran got from several hundred centrifuges to 19,000, including advanced models, and from the first kilograms of low-enriched uranium to an amount today, which if enriched to weapons-grade level, would be enough for six to seven nuclear devices.

Finally, if all of these initial stages are passed successfully, and a decision is made that something must be done, what will that “something” be? More sanctions? Military force? What will be able to stop Iran in a time frame that is likely at that point to be extremely short?

When considering how things are likely to play out—on the basis of how they have played out in the past and the debilitating political constraints—twelve months is in reality no time at all.


Emily B. Landau is Head of the Arms Control Program at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), at Tel Aviv University and the author of “Decade of Diplomacy: Negotiations with Iran and North Korea and the Future of Nuclear Nonproliferation".

Source: http://www.inss.org.il/uploadImages/systemFiles/12  Months Is Not Enough Time to Stop an Iranian Nuclear Breakout - An article by Emily Landau in The National Interest.pdf
 
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Backlash Against de Blasio - Matthew Vaddum



by Matthew Vaddum


Strangely, this far-left radical who, like his ally in the White House never puts politics aside for the benefit of the community, is now asking New Yorkers to do precisely that.


mayor23n-1-webCop-bashing New York mayor Bill de Blasio seems genuinely surprised at the ferocious backlash against him in light of the execution-style weekend killing of two local cops.

After spending the past year in office attacking police, the mayor is now scrambling to put the pin back into the grenade he threw into the local body politic. His crusade against the police goes back at least to his election campaign last year when he caustically criticized then-mayor Michael Bloomberg’s stop-and-frisk policy.

De Blasio is appealing for calm and for a temporary suspension of the ugly anti-police protests his incendiary rhetoric has spawned.

Strangely, this far-left radical who, like his ally in the White House never puts politics aside for the benefit of the community, is now asking New Yorkers to do precisely that.

So far the New York Police Department isn’t in a mood to forgive de Blasio who has teamed up with racial arsonist Al Sharpton to lay waste to what’s left of civil society in the Big Apple. Before the two murders Sharpton had been leading marches where the demonstrators chanted, “What do we want? Dead cops.” Taking cues from the Westboro Baptist Church, Sharpton followers showed up at one cop memorial service chanting and heckling the mourners.

NYPD union leaders have asked de Blasio to skip police funerals and a large gathering of cops turned their backs on the mayor as he showed up Saturday at the Brooklyn hospital where the lifeless bodies of officers Rafael Ramos, 40, and Wenjian Liu, 32, had been taken after they were shot dead by an adherent of the Religion of Peace.

The shooter, Ismaaiyl Abdullah Brinsleywas a Muslim apparently upset at what he believed were the racist killings of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Mo. and Eric Garner in Staten Island. He indicated he was planning to kill “pigs,” and as Robert Spencer notes, Brinsleys Facebook page featured a photo of the Quran open to the eighth chapter, where Allah exhorts the believers to strike terror into the hearts of the enemies of Allah (8:60).

Since de Blasio was sworn in last New Year’s Day, New Yorkers have, in fits and starts, begun to realize that they elected a dangerously erratic Sandinista-loving radical as mayor. Although de Blasio’s reaction to the cop murders strikes many in the punditry as incompetent, they are being charitable. De Blasio’s behavior reflects his pathological,  hateful, profoundly anti-American ideology. He can’t conceal his contempt for those whose job it is to promote law and order.

This is what happens when a small-c communist becomes mayor of the nation’s greatest metropolis.

Former New York mayor Rudy Giuliani, who helped turn New York from a crime-infested urban jungle into the relatively crime-free city his successors inherited, said it was “shameful” for politicians to drive a wedge between police and the communities they serve.

“Police misconduct is a minor part of the problem. Community, serious violent crime is a much bigger part of the problem,” Giuliani said. 

“The people who are saving black lives in the city are [you] the New York City Police Department. I’m not doing it. President Obama’s not doing it. Mayor De Blasio’s not doing it. He’s not out at night walking down housing developments and trying to save children from being killed. Police officers are doing the most, right now, in these very very poor communities and sometimes they’re white communities, but where there are black communities and police officers are doing the most to save the children that are at greatest risk. The politicians with this propaganda separating the community from the police, are doing something that’s shameful and they have to stop doing that. The vast majority of police want to help and the politicians’ rhetoric should reflect the truth, not propaganda.”
But de Blasio isn’t anything like Giuliani or even like Bloomberg, his immediate predecessor, a micromanaging Big Gulp-grabber who now seems like an exemplar of common sense compared to the current mayor.

De Blasio is in many ways President Obama’s “mini me,” except unlike Obama, he has loud critics in the media who for the most part has not been giving him a free ride.

But de Blasio hasn’t generated all of this racial hostility and antipathy toward cops on his own. He’s had a lot of help from President Obama who has been trying to kickstart a wave of civil unrest since even before he took office. The president’s policy of trying to foment violent civil unrest is finally paying dividends.

Attacking the police, as Obama has been doing for years, isn’t exactly a courageous act. The police are easy targets for leftist agitators. Riling up minorities over real and imagined abuses is child’s play. Even Al Sharpton can do it.

On the 2008 campaign trail, the president belittled small town Americans, implying they were racist, a time-honored leftist smear of conservatives. “And it’s not surprising then they get bitter, they cling to guns or religion or antipathy toward people who aren’t like them or anti-immigrant sentiment or anti-trade sentiment as a way to explain their frustrations.

Not too long after his inauguration in 2009 the new president mocked Cambridge, Mass. police by saying they acted stupidly” by arresting Obamas close personal friend, black liberal academic Henry Louis Gates Jr. This led to the seemingly pointless public relations event known as the so-called beer summit between James Crowley (the arresting officer), Gates, and Obama. There was never any evidence that Gates’s arrest had anything to do with his skin color. Arrester and arrestee agreed to disagree yet Obama succeeded in scoring points with his radical base. 

Campaigning in 2010, Obama demonized non-Latinos.

“If Latinos sit out the election instead of saying, ‘We’re gonna punish our enemies, and we’re gonna reward our friends who stand with us on issues that are important to us’ — if they don’t see that kind of upsurge in voting in this election — then I think it’s going to be harder. And that’s why I think it’s so important that people focus on voting on November 2nd.”

The same year he invoked Rosa Parks and segregation in order to ridicule Republicans. We dont mind the Republicans joining us,” Obama told the faithful. They can come for the ride, but they gotta sit in back.

In 2012 Obama suggested if he failed to win reelection minorities would suffer. 

The notion that were all in this together, that we look out for one anotherthats at stake in this election,” he saidDont take my word for it. Watch some of these [Republican] debates that have been going on up in New Hampshire. Later that year he added Republicans “want to take us back to the policies more suited to the 1950s than the 21st century.

In 2012 he needlessly inserted race into the Trayvon Martin saga by saying, “if I had a son, he’d look like Trayvon. Although the shooter who was eventually acquitted, so-called white Hispanic George Zimmerman, wasn’t a police officer, he was an authority figure of sorts as a neighborhood watch volunteer.

Working with Sharpton, the Obama administration sicced the left-wing community organizers of the Justice Department’s Community Relations Service (CRS) on the unsuspecting people of Sanford, Fla. after the death of Martin. Evidence established that Martin attacked Zimmerman, who avoided legal liability because he acted in self-defense.

Even after the acquittal Obama insisted on meddling. He said that Trayvon Martin could have been me 35 years ago,” and gave yet another lecture on race.

Obama vigorously milked the August death of Michael Brown at the hands of white Ferguson, Mo. police officer Darren Wilson. 

Brown, an 18-year-old black male, was killed after he beat Wilson and tried to grab his handgun. Browns defenders characterize him as a gentle giant even though a few minutes earlier he was captured on video committing a strong-arm robbery at a convenience store, roughing up a much smaller clerk in the process. At autopsy Browns height was 6′ 5″ and his weight was 289 lbs. The autopsy results were consistent with witness accounts that Brown reached for Wilsons gun during their fateful altercation.

Obama dishonored his country by giving a speech at the United Nations citing Brown’s killing as something Americans should be ashamed of. After the grand jury refused to indict Wilson, Obama ramped up his rhetoric, claiming that racism is deeply rooted in American society.

A major difference between de Blasio and Obama is that the mayor doesn’t have the president’s silver tongue. Serious calls for de Blasio’s ouster are now coming from civic leaders throughout New York.

But don’t hold your breath waiting for de Blasio to resign. Radical leftists rarely give up power without a fight.


Matthew Vaddum

Source: http://www.frontpagemag.com/2014/matthew-vadum/backlash-against-de-blasio/

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

New Cuba-US Relations Leave Old Security Issues Unreconciled - Luis Fleischman



by Luis Fleischman


President Obama and his aides raised a number of arguments justifying their sudden decision to normalize relations between U.S and Cuba.

They have claimed the status quo and the embargo have not helped topple the Cuban dictatorship. I concede this is true. Secondly, although Cuba made no commitment to decompress or alter in any way its repressive regime, President Obama believes that “more contact will do more to empower the Cuban people”. The assumption is in Obama’s own words that “through a policy of engagement, we can more effectively stand up for our values, and help the Cuban people help themselves as they move into the 21st century.”

The President apparently believes that by expanding commercial sales and exports of goods and services to Cuba and providing more business training and communication between the two countries, the regime will liberalize and adapt our values of free market, democracy and human rights.

This argument is doubtful because except for the U.S, Cuba was open to every other country in the world. China is instructive as an example. China has adopted a policy of economic openness, but this openness has not mitigated the oppressive character of its regime. Whereas there is always the possibility of liberalization — it is by no means guaranteed.

The Cuban regime is as stubborn as the Chinese and the upcoming death of the old generation and founding fathers of the revolution does not guarantee change. It is enough to look at Iran and North Korea to see this.

Third, the Obama Administration also justified its move by claiming that the status quo in U.S-Cuban relations constituted an impediment to our regional policy.

On this point, Brazil, the leader of Latin American regional policy, welcomed the decision. Furthermore, according to Brazil’s chief foreign policy advisor Marco Aurelio Garcia, Brazil had assisted to advance the normalization. Garcia is the chief architect of Brazil’s foreign policy, which aims at developing an independent foreign policy, mostly pro-third world, firmly protective of the principle of national sovereignty and against the interference even on human rights issues.

Likewise, Brazil is protective of the Venezuelan socialist dictatorship. Finally, Brazil is also harshly opposed to the expansion of American influence in the region where the South American giant claims leadership and hegemony.

I see the normalization more like a victory for this regional block and Brazil’s foreign policy because the U.S runs the risk of being effectively neutralized from taking unilateral action when it comes to issues of national security and human rights. The reality is that Cuba did not pledge to improve its ongoing negative record on human rights, which include unfair imprisonment and assassination of political opponents.

While Obama’s signing the Venezuelan sanctions bill one day after the Cuba deal was announced is an encouraging step, it is not clear if Obama will go beyond. The region is likely to rally behind Venezuela as they did with Cuba and the U.S is likely to be forced to go along.

Finally, the Obama Administration pledged to review Cuba’s status place on the list of countries that sponsor terrorism. Cuba continues to send military advisers to Venezuela where they assist in developing Venezuela’s repressive apparatus and totalitarian state.

Venezuela itself harbors members of Hezbollah, Iranian Revolutionary Guards, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Basque guerilla group ETA.

According to a thorough report by Dr. Jaime Suchliki, head of Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami , Cuba directly and through Venezuela continues to provide intelligence to Hamas and Hezbollah. Likewise, Cuba works with Venezuela in promoting Hezbollah and Iranian objectives in South America and against the U.S. Furthermore, Iran-Cuban cooperation on intelligence matters and sabotage has dramatically increased.

Cuba was reported to have facilitated the smuggling of narcotics and terrorists to the U.S. through Mexico and arms and explosives under Iranian diplomatic cover. Likewise, Cuban military officers work together with Venezuelan military, drug cartels and the FARC. It has also been reported that Cuba trains Venezuelan guerillas and Para-military that terrorize the Venezuelan population.

In mid 2013 Cuba tried to smuggle large amounts of sophisticated weapons to North Korea. The Economist reported that under Raul Castro, military and commercial co-operation between the two countries appears to have increased.

These are important issues that affect our security and also the well being of the region. I doubt that any of these issues was addressed.

If these issues are not addressed the normalization could turn only into another bombastic show of shocking news without tangible or positive results.

Originally Published at Newsmax


Luis Fleischman

Source: http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/2014/12/23/new-cuba-us-relations-leave-old-security-issues-unreconciled/

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Alahu Akhbar Derangement Syndrome - Richard Butrick



by Richard Butrick



Health officials at the UN Center for Disease Control are working overtime to control the outbreak of AAD Syndrome but fear that a vaccine will not be available in the near future.


The medical community is alarmed by the recent outbreaks of the AAD Syndrome. Recent virulent outbreaks have occurred in Australia, England, and France.

France has been especially plagued by AAD outbreaks spread by an as yet unidentified virus. Just recently (12/23) a man shouting “Allahu Akbar” started destroying Christmas decorations in the city center of Le Mans. When the police arrived he then tried to take a weapon from one of the police officers. This follows numerous recent virulent outbreaks including a driver shouting “Allahu Akbar” who ploughed his Renault Clio into pedestrians at several different locations in the eastern city of Dijon. The outbreaks in just the last month have killed over a dozen people including school children.

Health officials at the UN Center for Disease Control are working overtime to control the outbreak of AAD Syndrome but fear that a vaccine will not be available in the near future. In the meantime officials note the catalyst for AAD appears to be associated with Christian artifacts and fear that until a vaccine is discovered that Christian communities will have to be quarantined.


Richard Butrick

Source: http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2014/12/alahu_akhbar_derangement_syndrome.html

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Brandeis Students Threaten Journalist for Reporting Anti-Cop Statements - Bradford Thomas



by Bradford Thomas



This is the second time in recent weeks that TruthRevolt has been accused by left-wing activists of defamation for simply quoting them. The abortion activist and actress Lena Dunham went so far as to serve this publication with a cease and desist for reporting statement made in her own book.


brandeisReprinted from TruthRevolt.org.

Pro-Israel student activist and TruthRevolt contributor Daniel Mael has come under fire from campus progressives and fellow students for writing about a Brandeis student representative’s tweet declaring that she had “no sympathy” for the two NYPD officers murdered in Brooklyn Saturday. Since the story went viral, Mael has become the target of personal threats and a campaign to see him suspended or expelled from the school.

In his piece Saturday, Mael quoted multiple Twitter posts by Khadijah Lynch, at the time the Undergraduate Department Representative for Brandeis’ African and Afro-American Studies program, which expressed her lack of “sympathy” for the two police officers murdered earlier that day. “i have no sympathy for the nypd officers who were murdered today,” she wrote Saturday, followed by “lmao, all i just really dont have sympathy for the cops who were shot. i hate this racist f**king country.”

Mael followed the quotes with other inflammatory statements posted by Lynch, including posts asking “what the f**k even IS ‘non-violence’,” decrying “Zionism,” declaring “the fact that black people have not burned this country down is beyond me” and “I am in riot mode.”

TruthRevolt contacted Lynch for clarification about her statement about the NYPD officers; she responded by saying that any publication of her Twitter posts was “slander.” Mael reported that Lynch then returned to Twitter to say that she needed to “get my gun license. Asap.” and that “amerikkka needs an infitada” (a violent uprising).

This is the second time in recent weeks that TruthRevolt has been accused by left-wing activists of defamation for simply quoting them. The abortion activist and actress Lena Dunham went so far as to serve this publication with a cease and desist for reporting statement made in her own book.

When Mael’s article went viral, Brandeis officials distanced the school from Lynch’s comments, calling them “hurtful and disrespectful,” and African and Afro-American Studies Department Chair Chad Williams issued a statement announcing Lynch’s resignation from her position as student representative for the program. Williams also denounced online criticism of Lynch, which he described as “horrifically racist, sexist, Islamophobic and threatening physical violence.”

Now Brandeis students supportive of Lynch are attempting to start a movement to have Mael either suspended or expelled.

The Daily Caller reports that a member of the 2014-15 student conduct board sent an email Monday to the Brandeis president, senior administrators, professors, and students calling on them to “stand up for the principle of social justice” and hold Mael “accountable.” Entitled “VERY IMPORTANT: Holding Daniel Mael accountable, and other threats to student safety!” the email charges Mael with “expos[ing] Khadijah to the largely white supremacist following of the website” and claims that he has “potentially” violated student conduct policies. (Full text of email below.)

Due to the threatening nature of much of the pushback, Brandeis law enforcement officials have met with Mael to discuss his safety on campus. WFB reported Tuesday that Brandeis officials told them that they were “in touch” with campus law enforcement who was working to address threats against those on campus but could provide no further details due to student privacy and security policies.

As of the time of publication, the administration at Brandeis has made no public statement in support of Mr. Mael’s first amendment rights or, as with the statement from Department Chair Chad Williams, denouncing the racist and sometimes violent statements being made by actual Brandeis students against him.

Text of email from Brandeis student conduct board member:
Subject: VERY IMPORTANT: Holding Daniel Mael accountable, and other threats to student safety!
Hello to all,
This email is similar, but not identical, to one that had been sent out previously today. The first was to call attention to the issue, whereas this one is a request from many members of the Brandeis community that the student responsible for the incident be held accountable for his actions. We apologize for any redundancy.
As you may have been made aware, the safety of one member of the Brandeis community, Khadijah Lynch, has been compromised by the actions of another Brandeis student, Daniel Mael. Those of us within the Brandeis community who value the safety and integrity of all members of our community are requesting that action is taken to hold this student accountable for his actions, which have directly put Khadijah in danger and continue to do so.
Mael, a regular contributor on a website called “TruthRevolt”, a popular conservative-oriented political website designed, according to its mission statement, to “unmask leftists in the media for who they are, destroy their credibility with the American public, and devastate their funding bases,” wrote an article targeting Khadijah for a series of tweets she made on her own personal Twitter over the last month. In doing so, he posted a photo of her as well as information about her as a student as well as giving people access to her Twitter username. The article can be seen here:
http://www.truthrevolt.org/news/student-leader-no-sympathy-executed-nypd-officers
Whether one agrees or not with the very blunt comments Khadijah made on her Twitter account, the audience of these postings was originally those who frequented her Twitter. We do not propose to offer any opinion on the posts themselves, but it is important to note the sequence of events and intended audiences. After having posted the aforementioned article, Mael has exposed Khadijah to the largely white supremacist following of the website on which he posts, which has led to harassment, death threats, rape threats, and excessive hate speech directed to her personal Twitter (now private), Facebook (now deactivated), and Linkedin. People who frequent TruthRevolt have also gained access to Khadijah’s personal email address and her Brandeis mailbox number, and have threatened to contact her persistently. We have taken screenshots of some of these threatening comments and have attached them to this email, although more will likely be posted after this has been sent.
As can be seen in the article itself, Khadijah specifically requested that her personal comments be removed from the website and the article in question taken down, but her wishes were ignored and Mael continued to post updates to the article until Khadijah made her Twitter private.
In doing so, he has potentially violated multiple parts of Section 2.10, particularly 2.10.f of Rights and Responsibilities, and we have screenshot and uploaded as an attachment the relevant portion. It is essential that this be taken into consideration. Other sections potentially violated are 3.2a (stalking), and attention may also be warranted about Section 17, 20, and 21.4. 
A Facebook page has also been made on which hate speech, directed toward Khadijah herself as well as a plethora of racist comments, have been made, and there has been word that professional hackers may have now stated plans to target specific members of the Brandeis community. The safety of the Brandeis community has been placed in jeopardy also by another student named Ben Vizlakh, who posted an article to this Facebook page telling its members that this email was going to be sent out, mentioning one student by name (a screenshot of his post has been attached here). Vizakh has potentialy violated 2.13 (retaliation) with regard to spreading the word of this email to people who pose a threat to the safety of Brandeis students. Here is the relevant Facebook link:
https://www.facebook.com/groups/340022509539521/?pnref=story
Upon Khadijah’s resignation as a UDR, Mael also posted the following, which did little more than to spur more negative comments about her (including another rape threat) as well as Brandeis University and its faculty:
http://www.truthrevolt.org/news/student-leader-resigns-after-stating-she-has-no-sympathy-murdered-cops
Additionally, if you go to Google and type “Khadijah Lynch Brandeis” this story has been reposted all over the Internet, with similar hateful comments and threats directed toward her. Not only does the posting of this article put Khadijah in danger, but also the Brandeis community at large, given the volume of hateful messages being posted about the school on social media by strangers.
The most pressing concern ought to be the safety of our students, and as such we request that action is taken to ensure Khadijah’s safety. A large part of this involves holding the student responsible who callously disregarded her safety. With the speed at which information is spread digitally these days and the fact that her personal information has been compromised and is in the hands of strangers, it is essential that action is taken. As students and community members who know Khadijah personally, we neither condone nor condemn the statements she had made, but we must understand the intent with which her posts and personal information were made accessible by a fellow Brandeis student to the general public, especially on a website frequented by white supremacists that seek to threaten and intimidate anyone with views that differ from their own. It is unfathomable to many within the Brandeis community that such an action could have been carried out with anything but malicious intent, as contributors to websites are perfectly aware of the following their websites receive. As a journalist, he must be aware of the impact that publishing such articles could have on other people’s safety, and it is important that he be held accountable for his actions.
Included in this email are students within the Brandeis community who stand in solidarity with Khadijah in this difficult time and who wish to see action taken to hold the student in question responsible and to protect her safety. As Chad Williams, Chair of the African and Afro-American Studies Department mentioned in his statement on this situation, “While it may be easy and convenient at this emotionally charged moment to condemn Ms. Lynch, we must also strive to understand why she would make these comments. This means openly and honestly recognizing the very real pain and frustration that many young people of color struggle with in trying to navigate their place in a society that all too often delegitimizes their existence.” While Khadijah has taken responsibility for her comments and has withdrawn from her position as a UDR, it is the responsibility of our community to condemn the threatening and hateful comments she has received and stand up for the principle of social justice on which Brandeis was founded.
Thank you so much for your time and we hope that you have a Happy Holiday!
Best wishes,
The Brandeis Community 

Bradford Thomas

Source: http://www.frontpagemag.com/2014/bradford-thomas/brandeis-students-threaten-journalist-for-reporting-anti-cop-statements/

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.