by Dror Eydar
Hat tip: Jean-Charles Bensoussan
Professor Moshe Sharon, Israel's greatest Middle East scholar, tells Israel Hayom that the reconciliation deal with Turkey is a success for Israel • "There was a crisis, and now it's over. So it cost us $20 million -- that's small change for us."
Professor Moshe Sharon:
Turkey is the biggest competitor the Islamic State can take on
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Photo credit: Dudi Vaaknin  |
• "In the diplomacy of the bazaar of the
Middle East agreements are upheld not because they are signed, but
rather because conditions exist that force them [to be.] Moreover, in
the conflict between Israel and the Arab states there is a fundamental
problem that does not allow an agreement at all. The problem is that the
Israelis on one side and the Arabs on the other are not talking about
the same goods…"
• "The most important rule says that if
you demonstrate your desire to acquire a certain item, the seller will
immediately raise the price considerably, and the greater an interest
you show, the more he will increase the price. The "item" we're talking
about is peace. Israel is going out of its way to show that it wants to
buy it more than anything. The Arabs, therefore, are creating the
impression that they are actually the ones who hold the keys to the
storeroom where the desired goods are kept, when in truth, those
storerooms are completely empty. To the Arabs' credit, it can be said
that they have already said so countless times. But in this case, the
Jews have also lost their ability to hear…"
• "The Arab proverb says: 'What comes for
free, gives you a lot.' Bazaar wisdom holds that if you are sharp enough
and the other side is naïve or a food, or both together, you can sell
nothing at all and receive a high price for it…"
• "The 'goods' of peace in the Middle East
exist only in one place -- in the storerooms of Israel and in the
archives of the Jewish people. Only Israel can offer those goods in the
Middle East bazaar, and anyone who wants it will have to pay full price
for it…"
• "Go and learn one consistent, important
rule from the bazaar of the Middle East: never conduct negotiations when
you're facing two people or more. Therefore, don't go into negotiations
held as part of conferences; don't approach international bodies; stand
firm that only you and the trader you're dealing with will negotiate.
The goods are in the open because they're yours -- increase the price
several times so you can manage 'discounts.'"- Excerpted from "The Bazaar of the Middle East," by Professor Moshe Sharon
Two events prompted me to speak with Professor Moshe Sharon: Israel's reconciliation agreement with Turkey and the massive terrorist attack in Istanbul on Wednesday. Sharon, the greatest Middle East scholar in Israel today and former head of the Department of Middle Eastern History at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, is an expert on Islamic history and Middle Eastern studies. He served as an advisor to former Prime Minister Menachem Begin on Arab matters and took part in Israel's peace negotiations with Egypt.
The list of Sharon's academic and diplomatic
achievements is a long one. Even at close to 80, he continues to pursue
his studies, which encompass 1,500 years of history. He has authored an
extensive study of Arabic inscriptions in the land of Israel, which
delves into their discovery, their deciphering and their historic,
linguistic and geographic background. The third volume of that study has
just been published.
The inscriptions are an important historical
source, both in terms of the history of Islam and the history of the
land of Israel under Islamic rule. One of the most important
inscriptions Sharon discovered in the past few years is one by Holy
Roman Emperor Frederick II. Frederick, who was the king of Sicily,
described in Arabic all the areas ruled by Europe. The inscription led
Sharon to research the story behind Frederick's ties to Ayyubid Sultan
al-Kamil of Egypt. Because of their special relationship, the Egyptian
sultan gave him nearly all the land conquered by Saladin in 1187 --
including Jerusalem. Pay attention: A Muslim ruler gave Jerusalem back
to the Crusaders.
"That concession can teach us that
well-ordered geopolitics and proper handling of negotiations can lead to
things that now appear impossible," Sharon tells me.
How do you see the attack in Istanbul?
What are the goals of the Islamic State? The
organization sees itself as the exclusive representative of true Sunni
Islam, which should control the entire Islamic world. Therefore, any
Sunni entity that represents the old rule, whether it's Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, the Emirates, Egypt, and of course the most important Sunni
state of all, Turkey, has to be destabilized from within. It has to
create a situation of a lack of confidence to bring down these states,
and then its great goal will be realized: the establishment of Islamic
caliphates.
Why Turkey? Or rather, why is a Sunni organization attacking a Sunni country?
[Turkey] might be Sunni, but according to the
ideology of the Islamic State, it's the biggest competitor it can take
on, because Turkey also talks in terms of Islamic rule and Islamic
caliphates.
The way the Islamic State sees it, if we leave
the Shiites aside, there is no regime in the Middle East that is not a
target for destabilization, especially the Muslim Brotherhood. The
Brotherhood has the same goals, but they want to achieve them in
different ways. For the Islamic State, the Muslim Brotherhood -- like
the rest of the Sunni states -- is heretical.
There are "natural" heretics -- the Jews, the
Christians, Europe, America and the rest of the world (Dar al-Harb). And
there are Muslim heretics, who are no better than the original heretics
and thus are "legitimate" attack targets. There is no Sunni state in
the Middle East today that is not an object of attack for the Islamic
State.
The Istanbul attack was planned ahead of time.
The Islamic State is striking Turkey because it cooperates with all the
people who encompass all the heretics -- the Americans. After the
current deal, Islamic State can accuse Turkey of cooperating with the
worst heretics of all, Israel, by granting the Jewish state legitimacy.
Do the Islamic State and Turkey hold different views of Islam?
When it comes to the basic concepts, they are
the same, but when it comes to the political goals of Islam, and in
Islam politics and religion go hand in hand, Islamic State sees the
political goals of Islam as going back to the time of the Salaf, the
glorious past, and founding the Islamic caliphate that was destroyed by
the Turks under Ataturk. [Turkish Prime Minister Recip Tayyip] Erdogan
has taken propriety of "pure" Islam, but for the Islamic State he
represents the old world order, while they represent a new one based
entirely on the wonderful past.
The Sunni-Shiite dispute is 1,350 years old. When did these bloody arguments begin among the Sunnis?
They erupted from time to time. Sometimes as a
messianic movement, like in Sudan at the end of the 19th century.
Sometimes they erupted as they did in the case of the Islamic State,
[which is] a phenomenon that goes back to the very early days of Islam,
to a dispute over who was entitled to rule the Islamic world. It goes
back to the days of the Khawarij [a group that appeared during the
leadership crisis following the death of the Prophet Muhammad] leaving,
when a terrorist movement arose that aspired to lead the Islamic state
based on the principle that says that the most fervent believer should
lead. The principle today is similar -- the Islamic State says that they
know better than everyone else who should lead and what the correct
interpretation of the Quran and Islamic tradition is.
This week, I mentioned your classic article on
the laws negotiating in the Middle East ["The Bazaar of the Middle
East"], which you published after you identified failures in the Oslo
Accords during the negotiation process. This time, in the agreement with
Turkey, did Israel abide by the rules you laid out?
Yes. Obviously, in "the Bazaar," both sides
had to pay a certain price, but a price for something in return. The
Turks didn't actually sell us anything; that's what is important.
Generally, the Arabs want to sell us something -- "peace" -- that they
don't have in stock. They do what a good stallholder does, sell
something they don't have and you pay a lot for it. Under more stringent
negotiating terms, it might have been possible to get slightly better
conditions, but in general we know that it's over and that relations
with Turkey will go back to what they used to be. When it comes to the
Gaza Strip, we got what we wanted.
The deal doesn't mention that we should remove
the [naval] blockade on Gaza. In a certain sense, this is the first
time there is agreement -- as is understood from the Palmer report
ordered by the U.N. -- that acknowledges our right to enact a naval
blockade on Gaza.
The Turks want to send presents to the Gazans?
By all means. There's a port in Ashdod, about 10 km (6 miles) from
them. Send them to us and we'll pass them along, but if we don't check
what goes in [to Gaza], nothing will. What's more, Israel allows
building materials in, most of which aren't being used to rebuild Gaza.
Gaza is in ruins, but these materials are used to build tunnels [attack
tunnels into Israel]. The Turks can ask [us] to transfer humanitarian
aid. By all means, let them send what they want. It's a savings for us.
What disturbs many Israelis is the $20 million
payment [to be disbursed among the families of the Turks who were
killed in the Mavi Marmara raid]. While the contract stipulates that the
payment is ex gratia, in good will, beyond the letter of the law. There
is no admission of anything, and they can't sue us, etc. Nevertheless,
the feeling is one of giving in and compensating the attackers. How do
you see the Israeli payment to the Turks?
Israel paid them "surra," a bundle of money
the Ottomans would give to tribal leaders not to attack the convoys
returning from Mecca, laden with goods. That's what we did now: 'You
won't sue us for anything and we'll give you surra, we'll pay you to
spare our blood, and that's the end of it. It's ex gratia -- out of good
will; the Ottomans understood it well. You have a chance to harm me, so
I'll pay you not to. I don't know how much you can hurt me, but you
can. You know what? Take $20 million and stop all this. Let's not fight
anymore.
Does this give Erdogan a way of climbing out
of the predicament he got himself into and presenting the deal he
secured to the Turkish people?
Yes. He'll say, "The Jews paid me." He can
even present it as a jizya that the dhimmi (the protected class) pays to
the Muslim. Fine. We'll say: We're paying you just like you would pay
the Bedouin tribal leaders not to attack your convoys returning from
Mecca.
Does this payment affect our status with them?
It will be forgotten, and within two or three
weeks matters will go back to normal. Tourists will fly off, trade will
develop. Everything will be over and forgotten. The standoff is over.
It's not like there are suddenly diplomatic relations again, there
always were. There was a crisis, and it's over. Everyone got off his
high horse. It cost $20 million. That's small change for us.
We made a great achievement in that nothing
will enter Gaza. The Turks can set up a power station and other things
there, so that the destruction in the next war will hurt. The more
outside entities build in Gaza and promote expensive ventures, there
will be more pressure on the Hamasniks not to upset us because we might
destroy it in a day. Just like they built a big airport and it was razed
in a single day.
On a personal level, the demand of the
families of [soldiers Oron Shaul and Hadar Goldin, whose remains are
being held by Hamas and Israeli civilian Avera Mengistu, who has been in
Hamas captivity since he crossed the border fence in September 2014] is
certainly understandable. But can the Turks exert influence over Hamas
on the matter of the soldiers' bodies?
No. One has nothing to do with the other. What
do the Turks have to do with the bodies -- did they fight a war with
us? Hamas also won't give them a thing, because they want to use the
bodies for their own gain. [The Turks] don't have that kind of ability
to pressure [Hamas]. Maybe Egypt does. The Turks aren't in charge in
Gaza. They make a lot of noise and want to look like the leaders of the
Middle East. Will they give to Hamas? After a ship or two of Turkish aid
to Gaza, that will stop, too.
In principle, is it right to tie diplomatic agreements to the return of bodies?
Any pressure on the government that might,
heaven forbid, lead to the release of murderers in exchange for bodies
is very dangerous. First and foremost, it's our own internal matter, not
the Turks' and not anyone else's. We ourselves should understand that
pressure on the government, like there was in the case of [captive IDF
soldier Gilad Schalit] is a disgrace, and even turned Schalit into a
hero. The soldiers' bodies have nothing to do with the Marmara or this
agreement. The Turks can't do a thing. Were we supposed to scrap an
important agreement because of something impossible?
You are a student of Bernard Lewis. About five
years ago, I published a conversation with him in which he spoke about
the ancient historical tensions between the Persians and the Turks.
Where does Turkey fit in today in the Middle East puzzle?
First, the Sunni-Shiite struggle always exists
in the background, the tension between Turkey, which wants to establish
itself as the speaker for Sunni goals, and Iran, which expresses the
goals of the Shiites. This tension is currently playing out in two war
zones: Iraq and Syria.
Despite being a minority, do the Shiites want to turn all Islam into Shiite Islam?
They want to turn the entire world Shiite.
They have a long-standing emotional historical grudge against the
Sunnis. It doesn't matter to them that they're a minority. In the end,
they want to get even, even if Hussein [ibn Ali, the grandson of
Muhammad] was murdered 1,350 years ago -- as far as they're concerned,
it happened yesterday morning.
This is a point I've addressed in my research:
that in ultra-conservative societies, time is less linear and more a
frozen loop, mythological. In other words, historic events didn't take
place in the far distant past, but are constantly present.
Very true. While the Shiite world says that it
has a long grudge against the Sunnis, the Sunni world says that its
answer to the Shiites and the world as a whole is to go back to the days
of Muhammad, back to the caliphate. The Shiites talk about the Mahdi --
the living, hidden messiah. The Sunnis say that the world of Islam,
which has sustained serious blows and almost reached the point of
collapse, can be revived. Not by democratization or modernity -- the
opposite: by returning to the time of Abu Bakhr [the first caliph after
Muhammad], the time of Muhammad. If we revive the pure, clean Islam of
the days of the Prophet, we'll found the caliphate.
Why, after six years, did the Turks conclude that they had to compromise?
Turkey wants to be accepted in Europe. Not
just economically, but also to open the gates of Europe to the millions
of Muslim migrants who will pass through it. It can't be in a situation
of dispute with Israel. The Turks' feeling is that Israel is developing a
ring of countries around it. The important one is Russia. The Russians
are old enemies of the Turks. Recently, Israel is developing a
relationship with Russia, which is of great concern to the Turks.
I heard that Israel was secretly behind the
Turkish apology to the Russians [for downing the Russian fighter jet].
Since when are they enemies?
Since the days of Peter the Great (1672-1725.)
The Russians very much want to reach what they call "the warm waters"
-- the Mediterranean Sea, in other words. The only access they have to
the Mediterranean, which is also why they're busy in the Ukraine now, is
via the Black Sea, the Dardanelles strait and the Bosporus. So the
Turks have one eye on Russia, and the other on Europe and NATO. NATO is
their insurance policy against the Russians. Israel is part of that
quartet. Aside from the economic and other reason, the Turks want to
play a part in the Middle East itself. The roles they can play are to
get deeply involved in the wars in Syria and Iraq, or to play some part
in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. So the Turks say, let's dig in and
we'll be a moderating influence in Gaza, we'll get closer with Egypt. At
the same time, they acknowledge Israel's power.
Why [Hamas-controlled] Gaza, and not Ramallah and [Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud] Abbas?
As far as they're concerned, Abbas is
irrelevant. They don't like him. Gaza is good for them for a simple
reason: It echoes in the world. The Marmara [incident] was part of that
-- Turkey wanted to look like the one that was lifting the Gaza
blockade. It didn't lift the blockade, but looks like it's in charge in
the region. Israel doesn't care, so long as we keep an eye on what the
Turks are doing, and they know that.
Don't forget that Erdogan wants to be a Muslim
leader, to inherit the Turkish sultanate and caliphate. If it was up to
him, he would declare himself caliph tomorrow. Because he sees himself
as someone who is reversing the revolution of Kemalism [sweeping
societal changes designed to differentiate the modern state of Turkey
from its Ottoman predecessor, led by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk].
Do you really see that a great change has taken place in Turkey over the past decade?
The revolution of Kemalism succeeded in the
big cities, but in the villages, which is most of Turkey, Kemalism had
only the most limited success. So long as the villages used primitive
agricultural methods, there were a lot of working hands there. But when
modern agricultural tools appeared, the villages didn't need a lot of
hands. So people left for the cities and in Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir,
Antalya, and other places, established neighborhoods that were
essentially pure Muslim villages. The school system did cut them off
from Arabic writing, but not from Islam. So Erdogan is depending not
only on the villages, but also the Muslim areas in the cities -- that's
his power. As long as the villages stayed villages and the cities stayed
cities, the cities were the most important stronghold for the army and
the revolution. But starting from the 1960s, the villages invaded the
cities, and the picture changed. That's the rule.
Dror Eydar
Source: http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_article.php?id=34697&hp=1
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