The security
regime that ended the Yom Kippur War on Israel’s northern front was
designed to prevent another war from breaking out, either as a result of
the surplus of combat forces in close proximity to each other, which
made a surprise attack possible, or following tactical friction. It was
therefore agreed to have the armies separated by a UN force that would
be interposed between them and would replace the IDF forces in the
enclaves conquered in Syrian territory, and to establish symmetric areas
of force limitation on both sides of the Area of Separation, in which
the size of the forces stationed would be subject to agreed-on
restrictions. In accordance with the agreement and Security Council
resolution 350, the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)
was established in June 1974 in order to maintain the ceasefire between
Israel and Syria and supervise their compliance with the disengagement
of forces agreement. The force was limited to 1,250 soldiers, and was
deployed in positions in the area of separation and in logistics bases
in Israel (Ziouani) and Syria (al-Faouar). In order to carry out its
mission, UNDOF was assisted by military observers from the United
Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), founded in 1948.
UNDOF vehicles in the Golan Heights, April 27, 2015. Photo: Jalaa Marey / AFP
For decades, UNDOF’s operations were conducted
along Israel’s calmest border. Regular activity included observation of
the Area of Separation and patrols, bi-weekly inspections in the areas
of force limitation on both sides, relay of messages between the
parties, and assistance to the Red Cross in humanitarian tasks, such as
passage of brides and students through the Quneitra border crossing, and
exports of apples from the Druze villages in the Golan Heights to
Syria. Under the agreement, UNDOF’s mandate was extended every six
months, with two reports a year submitted to the UN Secretary General.
These reports were invariably short, routine, and repetitive.
The civil war that broke out in Syria
in early 2011 gradually changed the force’s operational environment. In
the fighting between the regime and the rebels, control over most of the
force’s area of responsibility passed from the Syrian state and its
army to the rebels. The risk to UNDOF forces gradually increased, first
because of their proximity to the fighting. They later became a target
for violence aimed at promoting the military, political, or material
goals of some of the rebel factions.
In July 2012, the inspection patrols
to the areas of force Limitation on the Syrian side stopped, after the
Syrian army failed to assign liaison officers to accompany the UNDOF
personnel due to security reasons. In May 2013, a number of UNDOF
soldiers were kidnapped in the southern Golan Heights by rebels from the
Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade and released shortly afterwards. In
August-September 2014, rebel forces, including the al-Nusra Front,
advanced in a northerly direction, wresting control of most of the area
of separation and the Quneitra border crossing from the regime’s army.
The rebels took 45 UNDOF soldiers from the Fijian contingent hostage,
and besieged two positions manned by dozens of Philippine soldiers. The
surrounded forces escaped to Israeli territory. In the following weeks,
UNDOF abandoned most of its positions in the Area of Separation and its
headquarters in al-Faouar, and withdrew most of its forces to Israel. In
view of the situation, the Quneitra border crossing was closed, and in
order to facilitate the continued operation of the UNDOF positions, the
provision of combat supplies, and medical evacuation, the IDF opened
alternative crossings to and from Israel.
In its first decades, UNDOF had two
infantry battalions, and enjoyed the support and assurance of both
Israel and Syria. In 2002-2012 the force numbered about 1,000 soldiers,
and its annual budget was $40-50 million. When the security situation
deteriorated, several developed countries withdrew their contingents
from UNDOF. Between the spring of 2013 and the summer of 2014, the force
grew to a peak of 1,271 soldiers. After the events of the summer of
2014, however, more forces left UNDOF, and the force now numbers fewer
than 800 soldiers, the lowest number since it was founded. In the summer
of 2014, the force’s annual budget exceeded $60 million, and is now $64
million. The current annual cost of each UNDOF soldier is 140% of what
it was in 2002.
The force size currently is equivalent
to one battalion, with a Nepali company deployed in the four Hermon
positions, a Fiji company in position 80 close to Rafid and Israeli
territory, and a reserve company from Ireland in Camp Ziouani. The force
also mans a number of observation positions along the Israeli border of
the Area of Separation. Since 2013, the frequency and scope of the
periodic reports to the UN Secretary General has doubled, but these deal
mainly with findings in Israel and the area near it. On the maps
attached to the recent reports, the force’s 46 positions and its
observation point still appear unchanged, even though most of them have
been abandoned, seized by the rebels, and looted in recent years. The
reports express the force’s wish, with the support of the Israeli and
Syrian governments, to return to the Area of Separation when the
security situation allows, but it is difficult to predict if and when
the conditions for this will occur.
In early 2015, Major General Purna
Chandra Thapa of Nepal replaced Lieutenant General Iqbal Singh Singha of
India, who commanded the UNDOF force for two and a half years. The new
commander established his headquarters in Damascus, where he spends most
of his time, in contrast to previous commanders, who divided their time
between Camp Faouar and Camp Ziouani and frequently visited the
Quneitra border crossing. The new location does not help UNDOF maintain
the excellent working relations at a senior level that it needs on both
sides of the border, even given the presence of the force’s deputy
commander in Israel. It was reported recently that the Nepalese UNDOF
commander has been promoted to Lieutenant General, and was informed of
his imminent return to his country for promotion in the Nepalese army
after only one year as UNDOF commander.
The expected change of commanders in
early February is an opportunity to examine the state of the force and
how it operates, in view of the situation in the area. Clearly, a
significant and widening gap has emerged between the force’s mandate,
structure, and missions and the current reality in which it operates.
The original architecture of UNDOF’s activity, which included the
support of two sovereign countries, was undermined after the regime in
Damascus lost its monopoly over military force and its control of the
territory east of Israel. Preventing war between the Israeli and Syrian
armies is no longer as relevant as it was in the past. Supervising the
force limitations and the Area of Separation lost its value when both
the Syrian regime and the rebels fighting against it are using military
assets in violation of the restrictions under the agreement. Inspection
of the restrictions on forces occurs only on the Israeli side, and the
relevance of its finding is doubtful.
Nevertheless, Israel and Syria support
the continuation of the force’s mission, each for its own reasons. For
Israel, this reflects a commitment to agreements in the framework of a
desirable state order, and draws international attention and relatively
objective reporting (although not entirely free of bias) from a rather
turbulent border area. The IDF’s consistent, professional, and
responsible aid to the UNDOF forces earns it credit among armies and
leaders around the world, beyond what is reflected in the UN reports.
For the regime in Damascus, UNDOF’s continued activity gives the
appearance of order and ostensible sovereign state status in an area
where it has in fact lost control. In addition, this situation provides
the regime with leverage over UN members and agencies that are
structurally dependent on it, as well as undeserved political credit in
UN reports that provide it with flattering lip service.
The bottom line, however, is that
UNDOF’s value to the two sides lies in its status as a reliable channel
of communication between Israel and the Assad regime – a channel that
helps prevent deliberate or incidental cross-border fires from leading
to escalation.
In the situation that has emerged,
Israel should consider efforts to influence UNDOF in the following
directions, which will make it more relevant in the current environment
and help advance Israel’s goals. As a basic assumption, changing the
mandate in the current circumstances is impossible, for various
political reasons. At the same time, the UN’s room for interpretation
makes it possible to adapt the tools, methods, and means utilized by
UNDOF, as follows:
a. It
is essential that UNDOF continue to man the Hermon positions. If these
fall into the hands of Sunni terrorist groups or the radical Shiite
axis, they will pose a grave threat to the nearby IDF positions, and
demand an appropriate response.
b. Israel
must insist that the commander of the force operate from offices in
both Syria (Damascus?) and Israel (Ziouani), and that he be allowed to
move directly between the parties, subject to security conditions. For
this purpose, Israel must demand that the Assad regime refrain from
forcing UNDOF to reach Israel through Lebanon, as is currently the case.
c. In
view of the situation on the ground, UNDOF must be able to contact and
reach understandings with local power groups that control territory, and
to perform stabilizing humanitarian missions through provision of
medical services, food, and aid to civilians. These capabilities,
despite the Assad regime’s opposition, are an essential element in the
renewal of the force’s activity on the Syrian side of the Golan Heights,
and are likely to help improve the situation of the local population,
encourage support for the UN presence, and enhance prospects for UNDOF’s
return to the Area of Separation. UNDOF should also be mandated to
remove mines, which provide terrorist groups with an available source of
standard explosives.
d. In
view of its current number of positions, the size of the force can be
further reduced, as long as reinforcements are available for action or
redeployment as needed.
