The Ayatollah's Plan for Israel and Palestine - Amir Taheri

by Amir Taheri

• The book has received approval from Khamenei's office and is thus the most authoritative document regarding his position on the issue.
• Khamenei makes his position clear from the start: Israel has no right to exist as a state He claims his strategy for the destruction of Israel is not based on anti-Semitism, which he describes as a European phenomenon. His position is based on "well-established Islamic principles."
• According to Khamenei, Israel, which he labels an "enemy" and "foe," is a special case for three reasons. The first is that it is a loyal "ally of the American Great Satan" and a key element in its "evil scheme" to dominate "the heartland of the Ummah."
• Khamenei describes Israel as "a cancerous tumor" whose elimination would mean that "the West's hegemony and threats will be discredited" in the Middle East. In its place, he boasts," the hegemony of Iran will be promoted."
• Khamenei's tears for "the sufferings of Palestinian Muslims" are also unconvincing. To start with, not all Palestinians are Muslims. And, if it were only Muslim sufferers who deserved sympathy, why doesn't he beat his chest about the Burmese Rohingya and the Chechens massacred and enchained by Vladimir Putin, not to mention Muslims daily killed by fellow-Muslims across the globe?
• In the early days of his mission, the Prophet Muhammad toyed with the idea of making Jerusalem the focal point of prayers for Islam. He soon abandoned the idea and adopted his hometown of Mecca. For that reason, some classical Muslim writers refer to Jerusalem as "the discarded one," like a first wife who is replaced by a new favorite. In the 11^th century the Shiite Fatimid Caliph, Al-Hakim even ordered the destruction of Jerusalem.
• Dozens of maps circulate in the Muslim world, showing the extent of Muslim territories lost to the infidel that must be recovered. These include large parts of Russia and Europe, almost a third of China, the whole of India and parts of the Philippines and Thailand.

"The flagbearer of Jihad to liberate Jerusalem."

This is how the blurb of "Palestine," a new book, published by Islamic Revolution Editions last week in Tehran, identifies the author.

The author is "Grand Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Husseini Khamenei," the "Supreme Guide" of the Islamic Republic in Iran, a man whose fatwa has been recognized by U.S. President Barack Obama as having the force of law.

Edited by Saeed Solh-Mirzai, the 416-page book has received approval from Khamenei's office and is thus the most authoritative document regarding his position on the issue.

Khamenei makes his position clear from the start: Israel has no right to exist as a state.

He uses three words. One is "nabudi" which means "annihilation". The other is "imha" which means "fading out," and, finally, there is "zaval" meaning "effacement."

Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei (center), is shown meeting in May 2014 with Iran's military chief of staff and the commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. (Image source: IRNA)

Khamenei claims that his strategy for the destruction of Israel is not based on anti-Semitism, which he describes as a European phenomenon.

His position is based on "well-established Islamic principles", he claims.

One such is that a land that falls under Muslim rule, even briefly, can never again be ceded to non-Muslims. What matters in Islam is control of a land's government, even if the majority of inhabitants are non-Muslims. Khomeinists are not alone in this belief.

Dozens of maps circulate in the Muslim world, showing the extent of Muslim territories lost to the infidel that must be recovered. These include large parts of Russia and Europe, almost a third of China, the whole of India and parts of the Philippines and Thailand.

However, according to Khamenei, Israel, which he labels as "adou" and "doshman," meaning "enemy" and "foe," is a special case for three reasons. The first is that it is a loyal "ally of the American Great Satan" and a key element in its "evil scheme" to dominate "the heartland of the Ummah."

The second reason is that Israel has waged war on Muslims on a number of occasions, thus becoming a "hostile infidel" ("kaffir al-harbi").

Finally, Israel is a special case because it occupies Jerusalem, which Khamenei describes as "Islam's third Holy City." He intimates that one of his "most cherished wishes" is to one day pray in Jerusalem.

Khamenei insist that he is not recommending "classical wars" to wipe Israel off the map. Nor does he want to "massacre the Jews." What he recommends is a long period of low-intensity warfare designed to make life unpleasant if not impossible for a majority of Israeli Jews so that they leave the country.

His calculation is based on the assumption that large numbers of Israelis have dual-nationality and would prefer emigration to the United States or Europe to daily threats of death.

Khamenei makes no reference to Iran's nuclear program. But the subtext is that a nuclear-armed Iran would make Israel think twice before trying to counter Khamenei's strategy by taking military action against the Islamic Republic.

In Khamenei's analysis, once the cost of staying in Israel has become too high for many Jews, Western powers, notably the U.S., which has supported the Jewish state for decades, might decide that the cost of doing so is higher than possible benefits.

Thanks to President Obama, the U.S. has already distanced itself from Israel to a degree unimaginable a decade ago.

Khamenei counts on what he sees as "Israel fatigue." The international community would start looking for what he calls "a practical and logical mechanism" to end the old conflict.

Khamenei's "practical and logical mechanism" excludes the two-state formula in any form.

"The solution is a one-state formula," he declares. That state, to be called Palestine, would be under Muslim rule but would allow non-Muslims, including some Israeli Jews who could prove "genuine roots" in the region, to stay as "protected minorities. [ Editor: read dhimmis]"

Under Khamenei's scheme, Israel plus the West Bank and Gaza would revert to the United Nations' mandate for a brief period during which a referendum would be held to create the new state of Palestine.

All Palestinians and their descendants, wherever they are, would be able to vote, while Jews "who have come from other places" would be excluded.

Khamenei does not mention any figures for possible voters in his dream referendum. But studies by the Foreign Ministry in Tehran suggest that at least eight million Palestinians across the globe would be able to vote, against 2.2 million Jews "acceptable" as future second-class citizens of the new Palestine. Thus, the "Supreme Guide" is certain of the results of his proposed referendum.

He does not make clear whether the Kingdom of Jordan, which is located in 80 percent of historic Palestine, would be included in his one-state scheme. However, a majority of Jordanians, who are of Palestinian extraction, would be able to vote in the referendum and, logically, become citizens of the new Palestine.

Khamenei boasts about the success of his plans to make life impossible for Israelis through terror attacks from Lebanon and Gaza. His latest scheme is to recruit "fighters" in the West Bank to set-up Hezbollah-style units.

"We have intervened in anti-Israel matters, and it brought victory in the 33-day war by Hezbollah against Israel in 2006 and in the 22-day war between Hamas and Israel in the Gaza Strip," he boasts.

Khamenei describes Israel as "a cancerous tumor" whose elimination would mean that "the West's hegemony and threats will be discredited" in the Middle East. In its place, he boasts, "the hegemony of Iran will be promoted."

Khamenei's book also deals with the Holocaust, which he regards either as "a propaganda ploy" or a disputed claim. "If there was such a thing," he writes, "we don't know why it happened and how."

Khamenei has been in contact with professional Holocaust deniers since the 1990s. In 2000, he invited Swiss Holocaust-denier Jürgen Graf to Tehran and received him in private audiences. French Holocaust-denier Roger Garaudy, a Stalinist who converted to Islam, was also feted in Tehran as "Europe's' greatest living philosopher."

It was with Khamenei's support that former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad set up a "Holocaust-research center" led by Muhammad-Ali Ramin, an Iranian functionary with links to German neo-Nazis who also organized annual "End of Israel" seminars.

Despite efforts to disguise his hatred of Israel in Islamic terms, the book makes it clear that Khamenei is more influenced by Western-style anti-Semitism than by classical Islam's checkered relations with Jews.

His argument about territories becoming "irrevocably Islamic" does not wash, if only because of its inconsistency. He has nothing to say about vast chunks of former Islamic territory, including some that belonged to Iran for millennia, now under Russian rule.

Nor is he ready to embark on Jihad to drive the Chinese out of Xinjiang, a Muslim khanate until the late 1940s.

Israel, which in terms of territory accounts for one per cent of Saudi Arabia, is a very small fry.

Khamenei's shedding of tears for "the sufferings of Palestinian Muslims" are also unconvincing. To start with, not all Palestinians are Muslims. And, if it were only Muslim sufferers who deserved sympathy, why doesn't the "Supreme Guide" beat his chest about the Burmese Rohingya and the Chechens massacred and enchained by Vladimir Putin, not to mention Muslims daily killed by fellow-Muslims across the globe?

At no point in these 416 pages does Khamenei even mention the need to take into account the views of either Israelis or Palestinians regarding his miracle recipe. What if Palestinians and Israelis wanted a two-state solution?

What if they chose to sort out their problems through negotiation and compromise rather than the "wiping-off-the-map" scheme of he proposes?

Khamenei reveals his ignorance of Islamic traditions when he designates Jerusalem as "our holy city." As a student of Islamic theology, he should know that "holy city" and "holy land" are Christian concepts that have no place in Islam.

In Islam, the adjective "holy" is reserved only for Allah and cannot apply to anything or anyone else. The Koran itself is labeled "al-Majid" (Glorious) and is not a holy book as is the Bible for the Christians.

The "Supreme Guide" should know that Mecca is designated as "al-Mukarramah" (the Generous) and Medina as "al-Munawwarah" (the Enlightened). Even the Shi'ite shrine cities of Iraq are not labeled "muqqaddas" (holy). Najaf is designated as "al-Ashraf" (the Most Noble) and Karbala as "al-Mualla" (the Sublime).

In the early days of his mission, the Prophet Muhammad toyed with the idea of making Jerusalem the focal point of prayers for Islam. He soon abandoned the idea and adopted his hometown of Mecca, where the black cube (kaabah) had been a magnet for pilgrims for centuries before Islam. For that reason, some classical Muslim writers refer to Jerusalem as "the discarded one" (al-yarmiyah) like a first wife who is replaced by a new favorite. In the 11^th century, the Shiite Fatimid Caliph, Al-Hakim, even ordered the destruction of "discarded" Jerusalem.

The Israel-Palestine issue is not a religious one. It is a political conflict about territory, borders, sharing of water resources and security. Those who, like Khamenei, try to inject a dose of religious enmity into this already complex cocktail deserve little sympathy.

Amir Taheri

Source: http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/6263/khamenei-israel-palestine

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Congress Members Frustrated by Secret Iran Nuclear Agreements and Hidden Unclassified Documents - IPT News

by IPT News

Crucial aspects of the Iran nuclear deal remain hidden from the public, and in some instances, from the American government

Crucial aspects of the Iran nuclear deal remain hidden from the public, and in some instances, from the American government, Bloomberg reports.

In a closed-door session with House members Wednesday, Secretary of State John Kerry revealed that two side deals between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) were reached. Kerry [said] he neither read nor possesses the secret agreements.

According to U.S. Rep. Mike Pompeo, R-Kan., a member of the House Intelligence Committee who attended the closed-door session, Congress also is in the dark on these agreements.

"Kerry told me directly that he has not read the secret side deals. He told us the State Department does not have possession of these documents," Pompeo told Bloomberg View columnists Josh Rogin and Eli Lake.

Furthermore, other secret agreements kept from the public were presented to Congress on Monday – part of 18 documents the White House were required to disclose – including secret letters of understanding between the U.S., France, Germany , and the United Kingdom that outline some of the ambiguous aspects of the nuclear deal.

Seventeen of these documents are unclassified, yet they are stored in ultra-secure facilities intended for top-secret information, the Daily Beast reports. These extraordinary precautions indicate that the Obama administration is seeking to keep unclassified documents from reaching the public.

"A lot of both documents and discussion that have been held in a classified setting doesn't have classified characteristics to it... to the extent that many [documents aren't classified,] they should be made totally public, as far as I'm concerned, so that the public can evaluate for themselves," U.S. Sen Bob Menendez, D-N.J., told the Daily Beast.

IAEA officials told Pompeo and U.S. Sen. Tom Cotton, R-Ark., that the two side deals involve IAEA inspections of the Parchin military complex and how Iran and the IAEA would address concerns regarding the military dimensions of the Islamic Republic's nuclear program.

The Obama Administration is only required to pass documents in its possession to Congress, therefore the side deals cannot be presented to Congress or the U.S. public.

"Kerry gave no indications they are seeking these documents and there is no indication he is the least bit worried he doesn't have access to this. The Ayatollah [Khamenei] knows what's in the deal but we don't," Pompeo told Bloomberg.

These elements of secrecy regarding unclassified documents hidden from the public and side agreements without U.S. knowledge seem to directly contradict Preside Obama's argument that the Iran nuclear deal is verifiable and transparent.


IPT News

Source: http://www.investigativeproject.org/4929/congress-members-frustrated-by-secret-iran

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Dispatch from Iraq: the Stealth Iranian Takeover Becomes Clear - Jonathan Spyer

by Jonathan Spyer

An Iranian stealth takeover of Iraq is currently under way. Tehran's actions in Iraq lay bare the nature of Iranian regional strategy.

^{Originally published under the title, "On the Ground in Iraq, the Stealth Iranian Takeover Becomes Clear."}

A Shi'a militia billboard in Baghdad

In late June, I traveled to Iraq with the purpose of investigating the role being played by the Iranian-supported Shia militias in that country.

Close observation of the militias, their activities, and their links to Tehran is invaluable in understanding what is likely to happen in the Middle East following the conclusion of the nuclear agreement between the P5 + 1 powers and Tehran.

An Iranian stealth takeover of Iraq is currently under way. Tehran's actions in Iraq lay bare the nature of Iranian regional strategy. They show that Iran has no peers at present in the promotion of a very 21st century way of war, which combines the recruitment and manipulation of sectarian loyalties; the establishment and patient sponsoring of political and paramilitary front groups; and the engagement of these groups in irregular and clandestine warfare, all in tune with an Iran-led agenda.

Power in Baghdad today is effectively held by a gathering of Shia militias.

With the conclusion of the nuclear deal, and thanks to the cash about to flow into Iranian coffers, the stage is now set for an exponential increase in the scale and effect of these activities across the region.
So what is going on in Iraq, and what may be learned from it?

Shia militias are essentially the sole force standing between ISIS and Baghdad.

Power in Baghdad today is effectively held by a gathering of Shia militias known as the Hashed al-Shaabi (Popular Mobilization). This initiative brings together tens of armed groups, including some very small and newly formed ones. 

However, its main components ought to be familiar to Americans who remember the Iraqi Shia insurgency against the U.S. in the middle of the last decade. They are: the Badr Organization, the Asaib Ahl al-Haq, the Kataeb Hizballah, and the Sarayat al-Salam (which is the new name for the Mahdi Army of Muqtada al-Sadr).

All of these are militias of long-standing. All of them are openly pro-Iranian in nature. All of them have their own well-documented links to the Iranian government and to the Revolutionary Guards Corps.

Shia militiamen are becoming a fixture of daily life in the Iraqi capital.

The Hashed al-Shaabi was founded on June 15, 2014, following a fatwa by venerated Iraqi Shia cleric Ali al-Sistani a day earlier. Sistani called for a limited jihad at a time when the forces of ISIS were juggernauting toward Baghdad. The militias came together, under the auspices of Quds Force kingpin Qassem Suleimani and his Iraqi right-hand man Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis.

Because of the parlous performance of the Iraqi Army, the Shia militias have become in effect the sole force standing between ISIS and the Iraqi capital.

Therein lies the source of their strength. Political power grows, as another master strategist of irregular warfare taught, from the barrel of a gun. In the case of Iraq, no instrument exists in the hands of the elected government to oppose the will of the militias. The militias, meanwhile, in their political iteration, are also part of the government.

In the course of my visit, I travelled deep into Anbar Province with fighters of the Kataeb Hizballah, reaching just eight miles from Ramadi City. I also went to Baiji, the key front to the capital's north, accompanying fighters from the Badr Corps.

Asaib Ahl al-Haq fighters operating in Baiji in June

In all areas, I observed close cooperation between the militias, the army, and the federal police. The latter are essentially under the control of the militias. Mohammed Ghabban, of Badr, is the interior minister. The Interior Ministry controls the police. Badr's leader, Hadi al-Ameri, serves as the transport minister.

In theory, the Hashd al-Shaabi committee answers to Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al Abadi. In practice, no one views the committee as playing anything other than a liaison role. The real decision-making structure for the militias' alliance goes through Abu Mahdi al Muhandis and Hadi al-Ameri, to Qassem Suleimani, and directly on to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
No one in Iraq imagines that any of these men are taking orders from Abadi, who has no armed force of his own, whose political party (Dawa) remains dominated by former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his associates, and whose government is dependent on the military protection of the Shia militias and their political support. When I interviewed al-Muhandis in Baiji, he was quite open regarding the source of the militias' strength: "We rely on capacity and capabilities provided by the Islamic Republic of Iran."

Iraqi militia leader Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis (right) with Iranian Quds Force commander Qassem Suleimani

The genius of the Iranian method is that it is not possible to locate a precise point where the Iranian influence ends and the "government" begins. Everything is entwined. This pro-Iranian military and political activity depends at ground level on the successful employment and manipulation of religious fervor. This is what makes the Hashed fighters able to stand against the rival jihadis of ISIS. Says Major General Juma'a Enad, operational commander in Salah al-Din Province: "The Hashed strong point is the spiritual side, the jihad fatwa. Like ISIS."

So this is Tehran's formula. The possession of a powerful state body (the IRGC's Quds Force) whose sole raison d'etre is the creation and sponsorship of local political-military organizations to serve the Iranian interest. The existence of a population in a given country available for indoctrination and mobilization. The creation of proxy bodies and the subsequent shepherding of them to both political and military influence, with each element complementing the other. And finally, the reaping of the benefit of all this in terms of power and influence.

This formula has at the present time brought Iran domination of Lebanon and large parts of Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. Current events in Iraq form a perfect study of the application of this method, and the results it can bring. Is Iran likely to change this winning formula as a result of the sudden provision of increased monies resulting from the nuclear deal? This is certainly the hope of the authors of the agreement. It is hard to see on what it is based.

The deal itself proves that Iran can continue to push down this road while paying only a minor price, so why change? Expect further manifestations of the Tehran formula in the Middle East in the period ahead.


Jonathan Spyer, a fellow at the Middle East Forum, is director of the Rubin Center for Research in International Affairs and author of The Transforming Fire: The Rise of the Israel-Islamist Conflict (Continuum, 2011).

Source: http://www.meforum.org/5412/iraq-iranian-takeover

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Iran Warns against US Senate's Access to Tehran-IAEA Agreement - FarsNews

by FarsNews

"The discussions revealed that the secret texts between Iran and the Agency have not even been provided to the US administration."

TEHRAN (FNA)- Iran's Envoy to the International Atomic Energy Agency Reza Najafi objected to the US Senate's demand for being briefed about the contents of the recently signed roadmap of cooperation between Tehran and the IAEA, warning the UN nuclear watchdog to avoid disclosing its secret agreements with Tehran.

 

"The agreements signed between a member country and the IAEA are definitely secret and cannot be presented to any other country at all," Najafi said in an interview with the Iranian students news agency on Saturday.

Referring to the discussions at the US Congress during which the US officials elaborated on the nuclear agreement between Iran and the Group 5+1 (the US, Russia, China, Britain and France plus Germany), he said, "The discussions revealed that the secret texts between Iran and the Agency have not even been provided to the US administration."

"For the very same reason, they cannot be presented to the Senate members either," Najafi added.

Elsewhere in an interview with another Iranian news agency, the envoy said Tehran has already warned the IAEA chief against the repercussions of a disclosure of its agreement with the UN nuclear watchdog agency.

"Iran has clarified it to Amano that the text of its understanding with the IAEA cannot be presented to the Senate," Najafi reiterated.

He further warned that "the Agency knows what it means to disclose a secret document".

The Iranian envoy also cautioned Amano that he is duty bound now to accept possible invitations of other countries' legislatures after he accepted last night to attend a US Senate meeting.

Head of the IAEA Yukiya Amano and Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Ali Akbar Salehi signed a roadmap of cooperation in Vienna on July 14.

The roadmap contains secret arrangements stated in one or two documents entailing on the methods to be used by the two sides in their cooperation.

Senior Iranian nuclear officials have said that all IAEA member stated [sic] have such secret agreements and the UN nuclear watchdog is duty bound to keep them secret to any third party individual or state.

After the roadmap was signed, Salehi announced that the new agreement would fully settle all unresolved issues pertaining to Tehran's nuclear activities in the past.

"All past issues will be resolved completely after Iran and the Agency adopt some measures," Salehi told reporters after signing an agreement called the Iran-IAEA Cooperation 'Roadmap'.

He said that all agreements, including the measures decided for Parchin military site, will be implemented with full respect to Iran's redlines.

Iran had earlier announced that inspection of the country's military sites are one of its redlines.

"I hope that a new chapter in relations and cooperation between Iran and the IAEA will start after the settlement of the past issues," Salehi added.

Salehi made the remarks in Vienna just a short time after diplomats acknowledged a sum-up agreement had been made between world powers and Iran.

In relevant remarks late July, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister and senior negotiator Seyed Abbas Araqchi said that Tehran and the IAEA have compiled a new roadmap to settle the issues related to Parchin military site in Iran.

"The issues related to the past which are wrongly described by the IAEA as Possible Military Dimensions (PMD) have been discussed between Iran and the IAEA and God willing, they will be resolved based on the new roadmap signed by Mr. Amano and Salehi (the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran) and the arrangements made," Araqchi said.

"The road is in the same direction of the past agreements with a new roadmap and some related annexes which are Iran-IAEA documents and that's why they have not been released as no other country would release the documents that it has with the Agency," said Araqchi.

FarsNews

Source: http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13940510000968

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Police Warn of No-Go Zones in Germany - Soeren Kern

by Soeren Kern

• "There are districts where immigrant gangs are taking over entire metro trains for themselves. Native residents and business people are being intimidated and silenced... The reasons for this: the high rate of unemployment, the lack of job prospects for immigrants without qualifications for the German labor market and ethnic tensions among migrants." — Der Spiegel.
• "Every police commissioner and interior minister will deny it. But of course we know where we can go with the police car....[O]ur colleagues can no longer feel safe there in twos, and have to fear becoming the victim of a crime themselves. We know that these areas exist. Even worse: in these areas, crimes no longer result in charges. They are left to themselves. Only in the worst cases do we in the police learn anything about it. The power of the state is completely out of the picture." — Bernhard Witthaut, Chief Police Commissioner of Germany.
• "The gangs traffic in heroin and cocaine, run brothels or are active in the contraband smuggling business. The brutality with which they carry out their activities has made them very powerful, the police are afraid of them. The state is passive with respect to these clans, the politicians ignore the phenomenon... This negligence has, over the years, enabled the emergence of a criminal parallel society. This would not have happened if the authorities had acted early and decisively." — Der Spiegel.
• "When I say that steps must be taken to ensure immigrants comply with rules and regulations, I'm immediately branded as a far right extremist. But order is exactly what is needed." — Volker Mosblech, Duisburg City Councilman.

Spiraling levels of violent crime perpetrated by immigrants from the Middle East and the Balkans are turning parts of Duisburg, a key German industrial city, into "areas of lawlessness" — areas that are becoming de facto "no-go" zones for police, according to a confidential police report that was leaked to the German newsmagazine Der Spiegel.

The report, produced by the police headquarters of North Rhine-Westphalia, the most populous state of Germany (and also the state with the largest Muslim population in Germany), warns that the government is losing control over problem neighborhoods and that the ability of police to maintain public order "cannot be guaranteed over the long term."

Duisburg, which has a total population of around 500,000, is home to an estimated 60,000 mostly Turkish Muslims, making it one of the most Islamized cities in Germany. In recent years, however, thousands of Bulgarians and Romanians (including Sinti and Roma "gypsies") have flocked to Duisburg, creating a volatile ethno-religious cauldron.

According to Der Spiegel:

"There are districts where immigrant gangs are taking over entire metro trains for themselves. Native residents and business people are being intimidated and silenced. People taking trams during the evening and nighttime describe their experiences as 'living nightmares.' Policemen, and especially policewomen, are subject to 'high levels of aggressiveness and disrespect.'
"In the medium term, nothing will change, according to the report. The reasons for this: the high rate of unemployment, the lack of job prospects for immigrants without qualifications for the German labor market and ethnic tensions among migrants. The Duisburg police department now wants to reinforce its presence on the streets and track offenders more consistently.
"Experts have warned for some time that problem neighborhoods could become no-go areas. The president of the German Police Union, Rainer Wendt, told Spiegel Online years ago: 'In Berlin or in the north of Duisburg there are neighborhoods where colleagues hardly dare to stop a car — because they know that they'll be surrounded by 40 or 50 men.' These attacks amount to a 'deliberate challenge to the authority of the state — attacks in which the perpetrators are expressing their contempt for our society.'"

The leak of the document comes amid a spike in attacks on police by mobs of immigrants, not only in Duisburg, but across the country.

In the Duisburg neighborhood of Marxloh, for example, a horde of Lebanese immigrants on June 29 attacked two police officers who were attempting to arrest two men for smoking cannabis on a public sidewalk. Within minutes, the officers were surrounded by more than 100 men who tried to prevent the arrests from taking place. Ten squad cars and dozens of police reinforcements were required to rescue the two officers.

Also in Marxloh, two men who got into a fight on June 24 used their cellphones to call their friends for backup support. Within minutes, more than 300 people had gathered at the scene. At least 100 police officers attempted to separate the two groups, but the mob quickly turned on the police. According to Duisburg police spokesperson Ramon van der Maat, "It happens time and time again, we are called to an incident that at first does not seem so bad. But then we need nine, ten or eleven police cars to restore order."

In Gelsenkirchen, another city in North Rhine-Westphalia, two police officers on July 24 tried to pull over a driver who ran a stoplight. The driver got out of the car and attempted to flee on foot. When police caught up with him, more than 50 people appeared from virtually nowhere to prevent the suspect's arrest. A 15-year-old attacked a policeman from behind and began strangling him, rendering him unconscious. Massive amounts of police reinforcements and pepper spray were needed to bring the situation under control.

In Berlin, some 30 members of rival immigrant gangs got into a fight on June 24 outside a nightclub in the Neukölln district of Berlin. After police arrived, the mob began attacking the officers. More than 60 police officers were needed to restore order.

Also in Berlin, dozens of police officers were deployed to break up a brawl between 50 members of two rival immigrant families at a public playground in Neukölln on June 4. The melee began when two young boys got into a fight, which quickly spiraled out of control after adult family members got involved on behalf of each of the boys.

One day earlier, more than 90 police officers were deployed to break up a fight between 70 members of rival immigrant clans at a public playground in Moabit, an inner city neighborhood in Berlin. The fight began when two women got into an argument over a man, and turned violent after more and more family members got involved. Two police officers were injured.

On June 8, more than 50 police officers were deployed to break up a brawl at a wedding reception for Bosnian immigrants in the Tempelhof district of Berlin. The melee began when two wedding guests got into an argument that led to fisticuffs. Within moments, more than a dozen other people joined in. As soon as the police arrived, however, the rival clans stopped fighting each other and began attacking the officers. One of the wedding guests hit a police officer over the head with a chair; the officer was critically wounded. Other officers were attacked with bottles, while still others were spit upon and verbally abused.

In an interview with the German newsmagazine Focus, the head of the police union in North Rhine-Westphalia, Arnold Plickert, warned of the emergence of no-go zones in the cities of Cologne, Dortmund, Duisburg and Essen. "Several rival rocker groups as well as Lebanese, Turkish, Romanian and Bulgarian clans are fighting for supremacy of the streets," he said. "They make their own rules; here the police have nothing more to say."

In an August 2011 interview with the newspaper Der Westen, Bernhard Witthaut, Chief Police Commissioner of Germany, revealed that immigrants have been imposing "no-go" zones in German cities at an alarming rate.

The interviewer asked Witthaut: "Are there urban areas — for example in the Ruhr — districts and housing blocks that are 'no-go areas,' meaning that they can no longer be secured by the police?" 

Witthaut replied:

"Every police commissioner and interior minister will deny it. But of course we know where we can go with the police car and where, even initially, only with the personnel carrier. The reason is that our colleagues can no longer feel safe there in twos, and have to fear becoming the victim of a crime themselves. We know that these areas exist. Even worse: in these areas, crimes no longer result in charges. They are left to themselves. Only in the worst cases do we in the police learn anything about it. The power of the state is completely out of the picture."

The threat posed by immigrant clans has been growing for many years. In October 2010, Der Spiegel published an article — "Large Arab Families: The State Cowers in Fear of Criminal Clans" — which warned of the emergence in Germany of a "parallel society of criminality" run by "immigrant mafia clans with thousands of members" who are "taking advantage of legal loopholes, social welfare services and international contacts with dominant organized crime groups." The article said the state was helpless to confront the problem because German authorities were "pussyfooting around."

According to Der Spiegel:

"The gangs traffic in heroin and cocaine, run brothels or are active in the contraband smuggling business. The brutality with which they carry out their activities has made them very powerful, the police are afraid of them. The state is passive with respect to these clans, the politicians ignore the phenomenon.
"This negligence has, over the years, enabled the emergence of a criminal parallel society. This would not have happened if the authorities had acted early and decisively: As early as 2004, a Commission of the Federal Criminal Police (BKA) warned that the ethnic groups were out of control and also warned about the so-called Mhallamiye-Kurds [an Arab-speaking ethnic group with roots in southern Anatolia], including the Bremen-based clan known as Family M.
"At the time, special investigators from federal and state governments criticized the lack of any efforts at integration and attacked the German judiciary. It was said that due to misconceived tolerance, the courts exacerbated the problems with their persistent lenience.
"The report warned of 'insular ethnic subcultures that were already firmly established under considerable abuse of the existing weaknesses of the federal government's immigration and asylum law.'
"Today these criminal structures are so entrenched that they 'could only be partially dismantled,' and this only with the support and cooperation of 'all relevant authorities, judicial assistance and the expansion of criminal tactical investigative measures.' In other words: actually never."

The article reveals that some delinquents possess more than a dozen different identities, and that it is common for them to continue collecting social welfare benefits because German privacy laws prevent police from being informed of a suspect's whereabouts.

According to a police investigator interviewed by Der Spiegel, the immigrant clans "view German society as one to be plundered; they see us as born losers." This is unlikely to change anytime soon, he added, because there are nearly 1,000 children in the clans in Bremen alone.

In her book titled "The End of Patience," the late German juvenile court judge Kirsten Heisig warned about the growing danger posed by the so-called ethno-clans:

"A family, father, mother, 10 to 15 children, in some cases up to 19 children, emigrated from Lebanon. Some children were born in the 'homeland,' others in Germany. Before the mothers give birth to their last child, they already have grandchildren. Therefore, a clan increases at breathtaking speed. In official documents, the nationality of the families is given as 'stateless,' 'unknown,' 'Lebanese' or increasingly 'German.' It refers to government social welfare transfers and child benefits.
"An extended family easily generates hundreds of police investigations. If drug trafficking or other illegal transactions intrude on the turf of a rival clan or even of gangs from different ethnic backgrounds, the problem is solved by killing each other, or at least attempting to do so.
"The female family members are focused predominantly on theft while the males commit crimes from all sectors of the Penal Code: drug and property crimes, threats, robbery, extortion, bodily harm, sexual offenses and pimping to murder. The children grow up largely unchecked in these criminal structures."

According to Roman Reusch, a former top public prosecutor in Berlin, young people born into the immigrant clans "are consistently trained to become professional criminals." He said the youths were growing up in an environment in which "the most serious crimes are completely normal." He added: "They have developed a self-service mentality. They are determined to take whatever they want, whenever they want, and as often as they want." This makes them an "ideal reservoir for the foot soldiers of organized crime."

After Reusch attempted to initiate a crackdown on the clans, he was summarily removed from his post. His politically correct successor had a clear message for how he would henceforth deal with the criminals: "I do not like the word 'toughness.'"

Back in Duisburg, the newspaper Rheinische Post offered a glimpse into the reality of German multiculturalism by means of an interview with a streetcar driver. "I wish I would not have to drive the train through this neighborhood [Marxloh]," he said, adding that he often has to apply the brakes because immigrant children are playing on the tracks. "If they are chased away by the police, they are immediately back again as soon as the officers are gone."

As for those riding the trains, there are far more fare evaders than paying passengers, because conductors are afraid they will be assaulted if they ask immigrants to present their tickets.

Duisburg city councilman Volker Mosblech expressed his frustration with the intractability of the situation in Marxloh: "When I say that steps must be taken to ensure immigrants comply with rules and regulations, I'm immediately branded as a far right extremist. But order is exactly what is needed."

Nearly a half-decade ago, Chancellor Angela Merkel admitted that German multiculturalism has "utterly failed." Speaking to a meeting of her center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in Potsdam in October 2010, Merkel said:

"We are a country which at the beginning of the 1960s actually brought [Muslim] guest workers to Germany. Now they live with us and we lied to ourselves for a while, saying that they will not stay and that they will have disappeared again one day. That is not the reality. This multicultural approach — saying that we simply live side by side and are happy about each other — this approach has failed, utterly failed."

At the time, many voters had hoped that Merkel's comments would transform the debate over mass immigration to Germany. Since then, however, immigration, especially from the Muslim world, has continued unabated.

Germany is now home to the largest number of immigrants (8.2 million) of any member state of the European Union. Germany also has the second-largest Muslim population (5 million) in the EU.

German police in riot gear, accompanied by armored vehicles and water cannons, charge into a street battle between Kurds and radical Islamists in Hamburg, Oct. 8, 2014. (Image source: N24 video screenshot)

Germany continues to be the recipient of the largest number of asylum applications in the EU. Germany received more than 200,000 asylum-seekers in 2014, and that number is expected to more than double by the end of 2015.

According to the latest statistics, more than 179,000 people applied for asylum in Germany during the first six months of 2015. Most were from Afghanistan, Albania, Iraq, Kosovo, Serbia and Syria.
 

 

Soeren Kern is a Senior Fellow at the New York-based Gatestone Institute. He is also Senior Fellow for European Politics at the Madrid-based Grupo de Estudios Estratégicos / Strategic Studies Group. Follow him on Facebook and on Twitter.

 

Source: http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/6264/no-go-zones-germany

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Unilateral withdrawal: Recollections and lessons - Yaakov Amidror

by Yaakov Amidror

In an affidavit to the High Court of Justice, I wrote that Ashdod and Kiryat Gat would come within range of rocket fire from Gaza. I could not have imagined that I had underestimated Hamas' capabilities in this regard.

 

Dismantling a road sign in Gush Katif prior to the disengagement | Photo credit: Miri Tzachi

A short while after the unilateral withdrawal from Gush Katif was announced, a senior minister phoned me and asked that I write an opinion piece justifying the move. After devoting some deep thought in the matter, I told him I would write, but against the decision. When an appeal was submitted to the High Court of Justice, I was asked if I'd be willing to issue an affidavit containing my professional estimation of what would follow once the decision was implemented. I studied the law being proposed and came to the conclusion that in all likelihood, none of the clauses seeking to make assurances would stand the test of reality. The job for our military would be more difficult, our international standing would not improve, we would still have the same responsibilities and terrorism will increase; certainly it would not subside.

With fear and trepidation I wrote that Ashdod and Kiryat Gat would come within range of rocket fire from Gaza, and I could not have imagined that I had underestimated Hamas' capabilities in this regard. I mentioned these two cities specifically because someone, who was close to then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, told me that Sharon himself had said the same thing about the significance of withdrawing from Gaza, following a professional analysis of the matter. No counter-affidavit was issued to the High Court by any professional, but the court denied the appeal.

At the Herzliya Conference held prior to the disengagement, I asked a few questions about the possibilities of terrorism and rocket fire from Gaza after the withdrawal. The American ambassador, incidentally, told me he was surprised at not hearing any answers to my questions. I replied to him that he shouldn't be surprised, those being asked don't have any answers, which is why they aren't giving any.

When Sharon declared a Likud referendum over the withdrawal, I lent my hand to the campaign. I had never been a party member, but this time, I thought, I had to try making a difference. I went from one party office to the next to speak with people. The Likud voted against the prime minister's proposal, but he didn't accept the majority's decision and split the party. The feeling was that Sharon wasn't playing according to the rules of democracy, and the sense of "insubordination" in the air at the time was growing more palpable, mainly for the national religious sector, but certainly not only for them. There were rabbis and public officials who gave their approval -- whether tacit or outright -- and many soldiers were heard saying: This isn't what we enlisted for.

At that moment I recognized two things I needed to do. One -- go out and explain, anywhere I could, why the prime minister was wrong, and that the State of Israel would pay in blood for the mistake he was making. I wasn't taking into consideration the 10,000 missiles that could reach from Hadera to Jerusalem, or the tunnels that would be built underneath our communities, but I did understand that the withdrawal would be perceived as a defeat -- and whenever someone suffers a defeat in the Middle East, it does not matter what his intentions were.

At that time I was going from one army unit to the next, and in each visit I spoke out against the withdrawal. I explained that although a unilateral withdrawal, in my opinion, was a dangerous act of foolishness, refusing the order to carry it out would be an even greater disaster. The army would lose its ability to function, commanders and soldiers would decide on their own what to do or not, and a country lacking a disciplined army can't have a future. If the Right were to be allowed the right to refuse the expulsion order -- then the Left would have to be granted the same right not to protect settlements. If one guy refuses because "it's un-Jewish" -- then the next guy will refuse because "it's not moral," and so on and so forth -- until we lose the army.

At the end of one event, in which I told soldiers from one of the Israel Defense Forces' most elite units why it would be unbecoming to refuse the order, one of the troops came to me and said: "You didn't convince me." I understood that this was the test after that long evening with those soldiers. I asked him who his best friend was in the squad and he pointed at someone. I called that soldier over and asked him: If you receive the order to evacuate, will you do it? Yes, he answered unequivocally. I told the soldier who I had failed to convince: We can both agree that the mission to remove citizens from their homes is like marching, while carrying a stretcher, in mud that reaches up to your mouth. If you are not there with your friend under that stretcher -- the mud will rise above his mouth, but if you are there beside him, the mud will only reach his chin, what do you say? He thought for a second and said, I'll carry out the order. The message got across.

The importance of legitimacy

Two days before the disengagement operation an acquaintance of mine asked to meet with me. He was a member of the IDF General Staff's negotiating team, which would be responsible for tending to the difficult incidents expected to arise during the operation, that regular troops would be unable to resolve. I told him: Your team is unnecessary. There won't be any use of force against the army, certainly no firearms will be used, and the more time you give people to vent their frustrations (warranted in my view), the less chance there will be of any harsh clashes. He seemed skeptical, but in retrospect he admitted I was right.

My lessons are fivefold:

1. For decisions like this, the government must receive the widest possible support from the public. The peoples' sense of having their voices stolen -- after receiving the faulty goods sold to us in Oslo and the failure to fulfill promises made prior to the Likud referendum -- has eroded the government's legitimacy. Under certain conditions, this could lead to societal system failure, which would include the army. Therefore national referendums must be held in these situations; they ensure the most legitimacy. If there is legitimacy, no orders will be disobeyed and resistance will be moderate.

2. Until Israel's final borders are determined, we must take into account that we could find ourselves in similar scenarios. No other organization in the country, other than the army, is large enough to handle such a task. How do we go about it without hurting the army? It's a good question that requires consideration. There is no simple answer.

3. We cannot give decision-makers a free pass just because public opinion shapers like those decisions. Efforts to ingratiate oneself to the media to receive less criticism, could lead to corruption and poor decisions.

4. We expect the decision-makers to explain their decision, and not only after the fact. The fact that in this case there was no organized statement, certainly no document in which the prime minister explained his reasons, makes one wonder and leaves an opening for rumors. 

Today, too, after Sharon's tragic death, no such document of his has been found in writing or on audio, thus my assumption that no such explanation exists.

5. The civilian element, during the evacuation and during the formulation of a worthy alternative for the residents, is critical in any future situation, if we come to it. The current disgrace must never be repeated.

Yaakov Amidror

Source: http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_article.php?id=27271

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

An Egyptian lifeline? - Dr. Reuven Berko

by Dr. Reuven Berko

The Egyptians know that for the New Suez Canal to save the country's economy, they must be able to provide safe passage to foreign ships. But with Islamic State already in Sinai, and with powerful enemies in Qatar and Turkey, this will be no easy task.

 

The trial run at the New Suez Canal | Photo credit: EPA

Ever since the Suez Canal was built between 1859 and 1869, for the Egyptian and French governments, the waterway has known its share of ups and downs. For example, in July 1956 the canal was nationalized by then-Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, who three months later was attacked for the decision by Britain, France and Israel in what came to be known as the Sinai Campaign. Nasser reopened the canal in 1957. Ten years later the canal was again shut down, for a period of eight years, until it was reopened in 1975 by Egypt's new president, Anwar Sadat.

In 2014, under current Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi, a project to expand the canal and dig a second waterway was put in motion. At the same time, as part of the Egyptian national project, the Suez Canal Authority issued an amazing series of stamps commemorating the canal's history. This is the nostalgic aspect of the utopian, pan-Arab ideology of the United Arab Republic, which saw Egypt and Syria unite briefly between 1958 and 1961.

In actuality, what unites the two countries is their struggle with Islamist terrorist groups, those wishing to dismantle Syria and carrying out attacks in Egypt (the Muslim Brotherhood). These groups are wreaking havoc on Egypt's internal security while wiping out its tourism industry, which throughout the years has been a fundamental revenue source for the Egyptian economy. 

Beyond fighting Islamic terror and incitement, the Egyptian government is also coping with a rapid natural growth rate (the result of religious bans on contraceptives), poverty and economic bankruptcy, unemployment, the lack of education and a dearth of natural resources. A water crisis is also looming on the horizon, the result of the Ethiopian dam built at the mouth of the Nile River, which has increased the chances of a military conflict in the south of the country.

The new canal, as of now, is seen as a ray of hope. During last week's initial test run, three enormous ships, loaded to the brink with cargo, sailed through the canal, while at the same time, in the opposite lane of the canal, three other ships elegantly passed them by. The head of the Suez Canal Authority, Mohab Mamish, can check that off his list, just days ahead of the official inauguration ceremony on Aug. 6.

This endeavor, taken on by el-Sissi at a cost of $8 billion, was completed within exactly one year. At its center is the Egyptian army's engineering unit. The route was dug 35 kilometers (22 miles) in length and 24 meters (79 feet) deep, so that even the heaviest ships can traverse the canal.

The new canal has been called a "national and global project," due to the dramatic improvement in the number of ships that can pass through the canal simultaneously, without stops or delays, between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean. The Egyptian government now forecasts an unprecedented upswing for the deteriorating economy. The revenue from the new canal is expected to reach $15 billion by 2023 -- three times the amount yielded from the old canal -- due to increasing the number of ships that can cross the canal daily from 49 to 97.

The Egyptians plan to expand the project to include other initiatives: an agricultural and international commerce zone, and a logistical service center. These will all be built on the island that has been created between the two routes, and those needing to travel to the mainland will have the old tunnel under the canal and two bridges at their disposal. 

According to the Egyptian vision, the canal and adjacent commercial and logistical support zone will provide about one third of the Egyptian economy's future revenue.

Islamic State, just a 'stone's throw away'

A main issue for the new canal is security. Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry addressed the matter with foreign journalists. Shoukry stressed that the international community has put faith in Egypt's ability to protect and secure the new maritime traffic, despite the internal security threats and the crisis in which the Middle East is currently mired.

Shoukry and all Egyptians know the canal's future depends on being able to provide safe passage, but Islamist terrorists in Sinai are casting a dark cloud over the optimism. Regardless, in light of the countless attacks against symbols of the regime and the Egyptian security forces, the local press is comparing next week's inauguration of the new canal to the "victory" over the "undefeated Israeli army" on Oct. 6, 1973 (the Yom Kippur War). This sentiment, however, did nothing to prevent a large contingency of naval, air and land forces from safeguarding the trial run last week.

The Egyptians are planning a national celebration. The Coptic pope of Alexandria has been invited to the opening ceremony, as an expression of national gratitude from the government to the country's Christian citizens. The international media expected to cover the event will see thousands of Egyptian citizens gathered along the canal to welcome some 10 ships loaded with tourists. The Qatari press, however, is intentionally and overtly ignoring the affair, in what can only be seen as an affront. Qatar is obsessive about el-Sissi, seeking to show only his faults. Qatar even encourages terrorist groups to attack Egyptian forces.

Qatar and Turkey are unhappy that el-Sissi's regime has continued to survive against the slow collapse of the Muslim Brotherhood. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's Ottoman-Islamist-imperialist dream spans from Turkey to the Gaza Strip, and from Egypt to the Arabian Peninsula. This dream, though, is slipping away, even as he desperately tries toppling el-Sissi.

While Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states are working to form a united Arab army against the threats posed by Shiite Iran in Yemen and the Sunni Islamic State group in Sinai, Turkey and Qatar are spending astronomical sums of money on bolstering, training, manning and arming these Sunni Islamist terrorist groups. Turkey has gone even further. Under the claim that it is fighting against Islamic State, which it funds and dispatches to Syria and Iraq, its forces are now bombing the Kurds, with tacit American support.

In this complex reality, terrorists in Islamic State's enclave in Sinai are just a stone's throw from the Suez Canal. The aid that Hamas and Islamic State receive from Turkey and Qatar, while using weapons smuggled into Sinai from Libya and other African countries -- through Egypt -- is a significant threat to the Egyptian government's hopes that the new canal can help revive the country's economy.

The death blows dealt by Islamist terrorists to Egypt's tourism industry are a gloomy harbinger, and it makes safeguarding the canal for international ships a considerable challenge. Question marks abound for Egypt's security forces, on land, sea and in the air.

Dr. Reuven Berko

Source: http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_article.php?id=27273

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.